过度自信与企业融资偏好:基于高管性别的纠偏

以中国沪深两市2010-2015年A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验管理者过度自信和女性高管对上市公司融资偏好的影响。结果表明：当中国上市公司进行融资时,遵循的融资偏好依次为股权融资、债权融资、内部融资;而当公司内部的管理者过度自信时,容易选择更冒险的融资方式;在加入高管性别作为调节后,发现女性高管能够理性调整融资方式,具体表现为整体降低过度自信管理者的激进程度,使得过度自信产生的融资偏好趋近理性。     

Top executive dismissal,ownership and corporate performance

This paper evaluates the empirical relationship between top executive turnover and firm performance. Based on a sample of the 460 largest UK listed companies during the period 1990–1998, we establish an inverse and robust statistical relation between the probability of a management change and a firm's performance: top executives are fired for poor performance. This can result from internal monitoring of management by the board or block share holders. Second, the data indicate that only very poor levels of performance affect significantly the turnover likelihood: corporate performance must fall dramatically to force a senior executive job separation. Third, the likelihood of managerial turnover for poor performance has not changed over time: today's senior managers face the same disciplining effects as those senior managers in earlier years. Finally, there seems to be no evidence that managerial stock ownership, measured as the proportion of ordinary shares owned by top managers, enables them to become entrenched.     

Does the effect of the annual year taboo exist? Empirical evidence from senior managers’ zodiac year and corporate inefficient investment

Based on the unique folk belief of the zodiac year, this study explores the effect of senior managers' zodiac year on corporate inefficient investment (CII) using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2019. The study findings are as follows: (1) senior managers are more conservative and cautious in their zodiac year. Increasing risk aversion prevents blind investment and inhibits CII. (2) The restraining effect of the zodiac year on CII is more apparent in nonstate-owned enterprises, regions with low marketization levels, Central China, and Northeast China. This effect is attributed to the degree of superstitious belief of senior managers and becomes more pronounced with increasing age. The zodiac years of the Year of the Ox, Year of the Dragon, and Year of the Pig affect the Annual Year Taboo the most; meanwhile, the zodiac years of the CEO and the chairman exert a more significant effect than that of the vice-chairman. In addition, the restraining effect is only reflected in the zodiac year and draws a significantly negative market reaction. (3) The level of cash holdings is a potential channel for senior managers to improve corporate investment efficiency in managers’ zodiac year. By providing unique evidence from the Eastern cultural context, this study enriches the research literature on emerging market culture and business management.     

How to have an honest conversation about your business strategy

Too many organizations descend into underperformance because they can't confront the painful gap between their strategy and the reality of their capabilities, their behaviors, and their markets. That's because senior managers don't know how to engage in truthful conversations about the problems that threaten the business--and because lower-level managers are afraid to speak up. These factors lie behind many failures to implement strategy. Indeed, the dynamics in almost any organization are such that it's extremely difficult for senior people to hear the unfiltered truth from managers lower down. Beer and Eisenstat present the methodology they've developed for getting the truth about an organization's problems (and the truth is always embedded within the organization) onto the table in a way that allows senior management to do something useful with it. By assembling a task force of the most effective managers to collect data about strategic and organizational problems, the senior team sends a clear message that it is serious about uncovering the truth. Task force members present their findings to the senior team in the form of a discussion. This conversation needs to move back and forth between advocacy and inquiry; it has to be about the issues that matter most; it has to be collective and public; it has to allow employees to be honest without risking their jobs; and it has to be structured. This direct feedback from a handful of their best people moves senior teams to make changes they otherwise might not have. Senior teams that have engaged in this process have made dramatic changes in how their businesses are organized and managed--and in their bottom-line results. Success that begins with honest conversations begets future conversations that further improve performance.     

The dominant senior manager and the reasonably careful, skilful, and cautious auditor

This paper examines a paradox in corporate audit history that threatens the credibility of the current audit as a means of protecting stakeholders from corrupt senior managers. Using a historical analysis of legal cases of fraudulent reporting and subsequent public accountancy responses, the study reveals the paradox of a corporate auditor denying or limiting responsibility to detect material accounting misstatement (MAM) facilitated by dominant senior managers (DSM), while relying on the honesty of senior managers. The primary finding of the legal case analysis is the persistent presence of a DSM or team of DSM in the context of various contributing features, and the creation by Victorian lawyers of a model of excuses for the corporate auditor. The primary finding from the responses of public accountants is, within the context of the model of excuses and the assumption of managerial honesty, continuous denial, or limitation of auditor responsibility for detecting MAM facilitated by DSM. The consequence of this history is that DSM intent on MAM currently face corporate auditors generally untrained to assess the audit risk of managerial domination facilitating MAM. The paper's single recommendation is that corporate auditors be educated and trained to assess the audit risk associated with DSM facilitating MAM. The paper's contribution to corporate auditing is its use of historical analysis to bring together previously known but relatively disparate matters into a coherent whole that signals a fatal flaw in existing practice.     

Implicit incentives and reputational herding by hedge fund managers

Several theories of reputation suggest that managers' incentives affect their propensity to engage in herding behavior. This paper investigates these theories by tracking hedge fund managers' herding behavior over their careers. I first examine managerial incentives for herding, and show that more senior managers that deviate from the herd have a significantly higher probability of failure and do not experience higher fund inflows than their less-senior counterparts. These implicit incentives should encourage managers to herd more as their careers progress. I find strong support for this hypothesis: using a number of proxies for herding, I show that more experienced managers herd more than less-experienced managers. Finally, I examine performance differences between more and less-experienced managers, and find that while more experienced managers underperform less-experienced managers, this underperformance does not appear to be caused by differences in herding. Overall, these results are in direct contrast with studies of mutual fund managers, reflecting important difference in implicit incentives between the two industries.     

Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies

This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. Further, we find that greater tournament incentives lead to higher R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage, but lower capital expenditures intensity. Our results support the hypothesis that option-like features of intra-organizational CEO promotion tournaments provide incentives to senior executives to increase firm risk by following riskier policies. Finally, the compensation levels and structures of executives of financial institutions have received a great deal of scrutiny after the financial crisis. In a separate examination of financial firms, we again find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives.     

In praise of middle managers

Middle managers have often been cast as dinosaurs. Has-beens. Mediocre managers and intermediaries who defend the status quo instead of supporting others' attempts to change organizations for the better. An INSEAD professor has examined this interesting breed of manager--in particular, middle managers' roles during periods of radical organizational change. His findings will surprise many. Middle managers, it turns out, make valuable contributions to the realization of radical change at companies--contributions that go largely unrecognized by most senior executives. Quy Nguyen Huy says these contributions occur in four major areas. First, middle managers often have good entrepreneurial ideas that they are able and willing to realize--if only they can get a hearing. Second, they're far better than most senior executives at leveraging the informal networks at companies that make substantive, lasting change. Because they've worked their way up the corporate ladder, middle managers' networks run deep. Third, they stay attuned to employees' emotional needs during organizational change, thereby maintaining the transformation's momentum. And finally, they manage the tension between continuity and change--they keep the organization from falling into extreme inertia or extreme chaos. The author examines each of these strengths, citing real-world examples culled from his research. Of course, not every middle manager in an organization is a paragon of entrepreneurial vigor and energy, Huy acknowledges. But cavalierly dismissing the roles that middle managers play--and carelessly reducing their ranks--will drastically diminish senior managers' chances of realizing radical change at their companies. Indeed, middle managers may be the most effective allies of corner office executives when it's time to make major changes in businesses.     

‘Chronic unease’ for safety in senior managers: an interview study of its components,behaviours and consequences

The high reliability literature describes a sense of chronic unease as supporting managers’ ability to deal with (safety) risks. This concept has been proposed to contain five components, namely the traits of propensity to worry, pessimism, and the cognitive abilities of requisite imagination, flexible thinking and vigilance. We study their applicability to senior managers’ experience of chronic unease and explore related behaviours and consequences. Semi-structured interviews (n = 27) were conducted with senior managers from the energy sector. Content analysis identified flexible thinking most frequently, followed by pessimism, propensity to worry, vigilance and requisite imagination. Experience additionally emerged as a theme. Sections that had been coded as flexible thinking were frequently also coded as a behaviour, suggesting it to be a partially observable response to chronic unease. Other behaviours that emerged as related to chronic unease were demonstrating safety commitment, transformational and transactional leadership styles, and seeking information. Chronic unease was described as having positive effects on safety, positive and negative effects on team interaction and negative effects on business and the managers’ personal outcomes. The findings indicate that the five components provide a basis for the measurement of chronic unease and suggest central behaviours and responses that should be considered in its future investigation.     

Tournament-based incentives and mergers and acquisitions

This research examines the relation between tournament-based incentives, which are proxied by the difference between a firm's CEO pay and the median pay of the senior managers, and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that tournament-based incentives are positively related to firm acquisitiveness and acquiring firms' stock and operating performance. Further analysis indicates that positive acquisition performance increases the likelihood of the CEO being promoted from inside the acquiring firm. Our evidence is consistent with the view that tournament-based incentives motivate acquiring firms' managers to make greater efforts and take more risk that result in superior acquisition performance.     

Future skills and current realities: How the psychological (Jungian) type of European business leaders relates to the needs of the future

How ready for the future are our business leaders? This paper addresses this question by drawing on two pieces of research. An international skills audit was carried out to ascertain if the skills needed by future business leaders would be different from the skills needed today; the results from 340 respondents are presented. These are compared with data on the Jungian type of over 8000 senior managers and executives taken from nine different European countries. Type was measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator^® (MBTI^®) instrument. The findings are used to identify challenges for the future. For example, although the audit suggested that skills such as the ability to empower others are likely to become increasingly important, people with the most common type preference amongst European senior managers (ESTJ) may, especially when under stress, have a particular tendency to want to make all the decisions themselves, without any input from others. The ways in which organisational psychologists and HR practitioners can employ psychological type to help leaders meet these challenges are briefly discussed.     

Globalization discourses and performance measurement systems in a multinational firm

This paper examines the role of management control systems, in particular performance measurement systems (PMSs) such as the Balanced Scorecard and key performance indicators, in a multinational context. We begin by exploring how globalization discourses are engaged with, consumed, appropriated, re-produced, disseminated and promoted in a major multinational company. We link the adaptation and dissemination of global discourses of senior managers with Said’s (1975/1997) concepts of authority and molestation. We then examine how PMS are translated and customized within local manufacturing plants and sales units in the UK and China, the significance of benchmarking and the extent to which PMS render managerial discourses of globalization practical. We comment on the importance of discourse in understanding control systems in general and the way in which external discourses impact the internal practices of the organization. We also explore some of the sources that give rise to molestation (deviation of practice from global aspirations of senior managers). We conclude by stressing the potential for the globalizing effects of PMS through the interaction of the discourses of HQ and subunits, even in the absence of explicit statements about globalization.     

Resource Accounting and Executive Agencies

Executive agencies have had several years' experience of the introduction and development of accruals based accounting systems. Senior agency managers therefore provide an authoritative source of information on the problems that could follow from introducing it more widely across government. A survey of senior managers revealed that, despite major improvements in accounting information systems, agencies still face difficulties in implementing accruals accounting. Government departments also seem unlikely to accept easily the switch from cash accounting to accruals accounting without extensive training. The effort and resources required for this should not be underestimated.     

Surplus or Deficit – Who Cares? Cross-subsidy in Colleges of Higher Education

The traditional ethos of higher education encourages the provision of a broad range of academic subjects aimed at producing overall benefits to society and the economy, rather than focusing on the provision of subjects that can achieve financial viability. Under such an ethos the existence of cross-subsidy goes largely unquestioned. However, pressures on higher education funding, combined with an increasing emphasis on accountability, performance measurement and value for money mean that attitudes to cross-subsidy may be changing. This study, which concentrates on one specific sector of higher education, i.e. colleges of higher education, consists of a pilot study at one institution and a sector-wide survey and examines the extent to which the cross-subsidy of academic departments is tolerated by senior managers. Although a number of reasons for tolerating cross-subsidy were supported by the respondents, an analysis of the results reveal much lower levels of support from the finance directors of colleges of higher education than from other senior managers.     

Corporate Capital Structure,Agency Costs,and Ownership Control: The Case of All-Equity Firms

This paper provides evidence that all-equity firms exhibit greater levels of managerial stockholdings, more extensive family relationships among top management, and higher liquidity positions than a matched sample of levered firms. Further, top managers of all-equity firms with family involvement in corporate operations have greater control of corporate voting rights than managers of all-equity firms without family involvement. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that managerial control of voting rights and family relationships among senior managers are important factors in the decision to eliminate leverage.     

女性高管是否影响公司盈余质量——基于我国上市公司的大样本分析

选用我国上市公司的大样本数据,实证检验公司高层中女性比例的高低对上市公司的盈余质量的影响。结果显示,与国外同类研究的结论不一致,在我国上市公司中,盈余反应系数、稳健性、平滑度以及持续性等各个方面的盈余质量均未因女性高管的作用而存在显著差异。     

Communication of risk assessment information to risk managers

This article describes the results of a two-phase study of risk communication between risk assessors and risk managers (including policy makers). The first phase consisted of telephone interviews with 30 air quality risk managers from all levels (18 from local, state, and regional offices, and 12 from national offices). The second phase involved a focus group with 11 senior EPA risk managers representing a broad range of EPA national offices and programmes. The two-hour focus group elicited responses from the risk managers to specific examples of videotaped risk information created by agency risk assessors. The risk managers indicated their interests in hearing both qualitative and quantitative information about risk and emphasized the importance of discussing other information about the decision context. Similar responses to the videotaped risk information were elicited from a class of students at the Harvard School of Public Health. This exploratory work suggests that to better inform risk managers, risk assessors must also appreciate and present the broader context of the decision, and they must convey how uncertainties and weaknesses in the assessment may influence stakeholder perceptions of risk and the effectiveness of different risk management options. Further research on how to communicate risk information to risk managers is recommended.     

Why change programs don't produce change

Faced with changing markets and tougher competition, more and more companies realize that to compete effectively they must transform how they function. But while senior managers understand the necessity of change, they often misunderstand what it takes to bring it about. They assume that corporate renewal is the product of company-wide change programs and that in order to transform employee behavior, they must alter a company's formal structure and systems. Both these assumptions are wrong, say these authors. Using examples drawn from their four-year study of organizational change at six large corporations, they argue that change programs are, in fact, the greatest obstacle to successful revitalization and that formal structures and systems are the last thing a company should change, not the first. The most successful change efforts begin at the periphery of a corporation, in a single plant or division. Such efforts are led by general managers, not the CEO or corporate staff people. And these general managers concentrate not on changing formal structures and systems but on creating ad hoc organizational arrangements to solve concrete business problems. This focuses energy for change on the work itself, not on abstractions such as "participation" or "culture." Once general managers understand the importance of this grass-roots approach to change, they don't have to wait for senior management to start a process of corporate renewal. The authors describe a six-step change process they call the "critical path."     

THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTING IN ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: PROMOTING PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PRIVATISED UK WATER INDUSTRY

Privatisation has been one of the most important and controversial policy initiatives to emerge in the U.K. over the last decade. Yet despite its prominence, little so far is known about its impact on those centrally involved in its implementations: senior management. This paper will investigate the ways in which senior management within one of the major privatised industries, the Water Industry, have sought to give effect to the strategic change involved in the transformation of a public sector Water Authority into a private sector Water plc. Although the monopoly character of the supply of Water services has remained intact, managers in the new Water plcs have had to respond to new expectations and assessments of corporate performance from shareholders, investors and financial analysts; from customers; and from a new economic regulatory regime operated by the Director General of the Office of Water Services. The Director General, in addition to operating price controls, is committed to developing “yardstick” competition which will provide the opportunity to make comparative judgements about performance levels achieved by each of the new Water plcs. In pursuit of improvements in efficiency and profitability, senior managers have engineered a variety of restructurings of corporate organisation to give more focus to achieving new business objectives, and to move away from a public sector bureaucratic management style with its traditional tall-pyramid structure to flatter and less hierarchical management structures. Although many of the changes have been justified in terms of empowerment and providing more autonomy for local managers, the paper argues that the experience of change for these managers has largely consisted of being subjected to much greater accountability for their performance through greater emphasis on the achievement of financial targets, more systematic monitoring of performance, the introduction of individual performance appraisal, and performance-related pay. Central to this intensification of the scrutiny of performance have been changes in accounting information systems and how they are used. In examining how these changes have functioned in their organisational context, the paper seeks to contribute to an understanding of the role of accounting in processes of organisational change     

Management and Accounting Developments in Executive Agencies

The executive agency programme has moved ahead rapidly since its introduction in 1988 and by 1996 over 70% of all civil servants were working under executive agency conditions. This has resulted in a major change in the structure of the civil service and in the management of the activities of central government. The question that then emerges concerns the benefits, if any, that these changes have brought about. This paper reports the results of a survey of a sample of senior managers in executive agencies. The survey attempted to ascertain the extent to which agencification was felt to have led to increases in autonomy and freedom to manage and also to obtain the views of managers on a range of issues including changes in operational effectiveness and quality of service delivery. These, after all, are some of the key measures of the success or otherwise of the agencification programme. The survey also examined changes in specific management accounting practices and a broad overview of the findings is provided in the paper. In general, it seems that the senior managers of executive agencies do feel that agencification has achieved many of the benefits hoped for and that is has brought about changes and improvements in management and management accounting practices.