Does fiscal redistribution discourage local public investment?

This paper studies the determinants of regional (oblast‐level) public investment in transitional Russia, focusing on the effects of federal fiscal redistribution. A model of local government expenditure in the presence of regional asymmetries shows that revenue redistribution from wealthy to poor regions discourages local public investment. Random‐ and fixed‐effects estimation of regional panel data for 1994–97 supports the existence of a disincentive effect from fiscal redistribution on regional public investment, which varies according to a region's federal status and wealth: non‐republics have a lower propensity to invest out of transfers than out of own income, as do regions with above‐median per capita income. Republics reduce public investment more than current spending in response to higher federal taxation. Russia's ‘asymmetrical federalism’ thus creates different fiscal incentives for different types of regions.     

Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization

This paper develops a model to explain how sub-national political regimes affect the variation in retention rates in a country in which a region and a central government bilaterally bargain over the distribution of tax revenue given a particular tax rate (and thus fiscal decentralization is asymmetric). This study examines cases in which both sub-national and national governments have the same political regime (democracies and non-democracies) and situations in which the central and regional political regimes differ. This article shows that in the latter case, regions receive a smaller share of tax revenue for a broad set of parameters of the model (as opposed to the case of a pure non-democracy); in the case of identical political regimes, the comparative fiscal decentralization is determined by the productivity-enhancing effect of regional public goods.     

The effects of economic and political integration on fiscal decentralization: evidence from OECD countries

Abstract .  This paper examines the impact of economic and political integration on the vertical government structure. It argues that, by increasing the market size and the benefits of decentralized provision of public goods, integration triggered the recent process of decentralization in OECD countries. A panel analysis relates the degree of fiscal decentralization to economic and European integration, controlling for interregional heterogeneity, economies of scale, and institutions. The results mostly support a decentralizing effect of economic integration in general and of European integration in particular for heterogeneous EU countries, whereas participation of subnational governments in national decision-making is associated with more centralization.     

Impacts of fiscal decentralization on local development in Vietnam: A disaggregated analysis

After the Doi Moi reforms, Vietnam pursued fiscal decentralization to strengthen the autonomy and governance capacity of local governments. While several empirical studies analysed the impact of fiscal decentralization on the economic growth of Vietnamese provinces, very few studies examined its impact on their social development. This study represents an initial effort to fill this gap. The empirical analysis applied the panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) estimation and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to an updated panel data of 63 Vietnamese provinces, spanning the period from 2011 to 2019. The results indicate a positive impact of fiscal decentralization on both economic and social development as well as efficiency of resource utilization for development targets. However, realizing the full potential of fiscal decentralization requires the fulfilment of certain conditions.     

Fiscal decentralization,fiscal rules and fiscal discipline

Fiscal decentralization (FD) and fiscal rules (FR) are institutional mechanisms that are implemented by varying degrees in increasing number of countries. This paper investigates empirically the effect of FR on the effectiveness of FD in achieving fiscal discipline. Panel evidence strongly supports that balanced budget and expenditure rules help FD to achieve this goal, while debt rule has a direct disciplinary effect.     

A political foundation of public investment and welfare spending

This paper develops a political economy model to examine the implications of political selection under an authoritarian regime. We formalize the fiscal policy choice of local governments, focusing on two political selection mechanisms and their implications for public investment and welfare spending. A growth-oriented promotion system induces local officials to increase public investment, which may increase output but crowd out welfare transfers. This mimics the recent investment-driven growth in China and relatively low effort to tackle high inequality. Under a broader incentive structure, we show that it is possible for an authoritarian regime to attain the social welfare of a democracy.     

Tax competition, rent-seeking and fiscal decentralization

The present paper provides a basis for evaluating fiscal decentralization of expenditure and tax responsibilities, by encompassing the literature on tax competition and rent seeking. Both tax and rent seeking competitions are conceived of as being wasteful and self-defeating. We find that rent-seeking activities account for political distortions which may be mitigated in the process of fiscal decentralization, while tax competition results in economic distortions associated with decentralization. Welfare evaluation should be based on the balance of the political gain and the economic cost.     

Resource discovery and the politics of fiscal decentralization

If the central government is a revenue maximizing Leviathan then resource discovery and democratization should have discernible impacts on the degree of fiscal decentralization. We systematically explore these effects by exploiting exogenous variation in giant oil and mineral discoveries and permanent democratization. Using a global dataset of 77 countries over the period 1970–2012 we find that resource discovery has very little effect on revenue decentralization but induces expenditure centralization. Oil discovery appears to be the main driver of centralization and not minerals. Resource discovery leads to centralization in locations which have not experienced permanent democratization. Tax and intergovernmental transfers respond most to resource discovery shocks and democratization whereas own source revenue, property tax, educational expenditure, and health expenditure do not seem to be affected. Higher resource rent leads to more centralization and the effect is moderated by democratization.     

The political economy of fiscal procyclicality

It is well-recognized that fiscal spending in developing countries tends to display significant procyclicality (increased spending during expansions and vice versa), in contravention of rational stabilization policy. Theoretical explanations have relied on either financial access or political-economic factors to justify this phenomenon. In this paper, we model the fiscal-output relationship as a dcc-garch process, and inquire whether debt or political economy constraints play a comparatively more important role in conditioning this correlation. Our evidence favors a positive effect from political economy, with weaker and more mixed results pertaining to financial access. Somewhat surprisingly, we also find that politics-induced procyclicality appears to be driven by advanced economies, and fiscal rules exacerbate procyclical tendencies.     

Fiscal decentralization and fiscal consolidations in emerging market economies

Results using event study analysis based on a data panel of expenditure and revenue developments in emerging market economies during 1972–2001 indicate that subnational governments supported fiscal consolidation efforts by cutting their capital expenditure and increasing their revenues.     

Optimal fiscal decentralization: Redistribution and welfare implications

The literature has been inconclusive regarding the welfare effects of fiscal decentralization (FD), defined here as the extent to which local governments collect and spend local tax revenues. We present an original model to investigate formally the distributional and welfare implications of FD. In contrast to the standard approach that compares the implications of full FD with that of centralization, we consider that the central government chooses the level of FD to maximize welfare in a heterogeneous country. Noncooperatively, local governments choose their tax collection effort to maximize local utility. We show that an increase in the tax rate leads optimal FD to increase so as to compensate for the welfare loss from decreasing optimal local tax effort. Hence, welfare and income distribution improve in FD at its intermediate, rather than extreme, levels. We coin this result as the decentralization-Laffer curve. As regional spillovers increase, FD is less desirable as it deteriorates welfare and income distribution. This finding provides a novel support for the decentralization theorem and contributes to the fiscal policy debate.     

In government we trust: The role of fiscal decentralization

This paper looks whether fiscal decentralization is associated with trust of citizens in government related institutions. We expect a positive relationship based on the argument of governments' improved responsiveness to preferences of citizens that is perceived to result from more decentralized fiscal systems. Survey data from up to 42 countries over the period 1994–2007 confirm this positive relationship. It is robust to controlling for unobserved country heterogeneity and a wide array of other explanatory variables that are associated with trust in government related institutions. Moreover, we do not find that the positive association with fiscal decentralization extends to other, non-government related institutions.     

Explaining fiscal decentralization and the role of ethnic Diversity

This paper considers the causes of fiscal decentralization with a specific focus on the role of ethnic diversity. To do so, I employ an instrument for ethnic diversity based on the origin of anatomically modern human life. Using two measures of decentralization that capture decision making autonomy and accounting for the depth of divisions between ethno-linguistic groups using the structure of language trees, I find that ethnic diversity has a positive effect on the degree of decentralization. It is the amount of fractionalization towards the leaves of the trees, where groups are more numerous and less distinct, that drive decentralization.     

Land rents,optimal taxation and local fiscal independence in an economy with local public goods

A general equilibrium model of an economy with cities, farms and free migration of population is constructed. The cities produce internationally traded goods via production functions subject to economies of scale. They also produce housing and a local public good. Two areas are defined to be disjoint if households performing an economic activity in one area are not operating in the other. An area is exclusive if it is disjoint to its complement. The economic surplus of an area is then defined to be the value of the area's net export of goods and resources. Local efficiency of an area is defined to be a state in which its economic surplus attains its maximum value. This state is proved to be a necessary condition for Pareto optimality of the economy. It is then proved that beside Piguvian corrective taxes the only taxes necessary and sufficient to finance local government activities efficiently, are taxes on land rents. Furthermore, if jurisdiction of a local government is over an exclusive area no intervention of central government is necessary, and local authorities can be fully autonomous. If the economy can be divided into pairwise disjointed exclusive areas, those areas are optimal jurisdictions in the sense that efficiency in the economy can be achieved with local authorities only.     

The political economy of fiscal deficits and government production

This paper studies how disagreement over which goods government should provide affects resource allocation in the public sector. An incumbent combines pre-determined capital with labor to produce different goods in the current period, and accumulates physical and financial capital for future production. Capital-labor complementarity determines how anticipated political turnover shapes governments' choice between saving in physical capital or financial assets. Turnover tends to render the stock of physical capital for public production too low and inefficiently combined with labor. The main cost of political turnover is production inefficiency in the public sector, not a suboptimal savings level.     

Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism,Chinese style

Aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies. Using a panel data set from China, we investigate the relationship between provincial government's fiscal incentives and provincial market development. We report three empirical findings. First, we find that during the period of “fiscal contracting system” the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small, suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible. Second, we find a much higher correlation, about four times, between the provincial government's budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s, demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform. Third, we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives, measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue, are associated with faster development of the non-state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy. This holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization. Finally, we compare federalism, Chinese style, to federalism, Russian style.     

The impact of national fiscal rules on the stabilisation function of fiscal policy

We study the relationship between discretionary fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability in 21 OECD countries over the 1985–2012 period. The novelties of our contribution lie in the use of annual panel data, whereas most of the existing evidence is cross-sectional, and more importantly in the thorough investigation of how fiscal rules affect the policy-macroeconomic stability relationship. We find that the aggressive use of discretionary fiscal policy, particularly of government consumption items, leads to higher volatility of output and, to a lesser extent, inflation. However, when strict fiscal rules are introduced, discretionary policy becomes output-stabilising rather than destabilising. This result can be more easily achieved by rules on balanced budgets, rather than on expenditures, revenues, or debt. On the other hand, fiscal rules are unable to affect the inflation-destabilising nature of discretionary policy, if any, probably because of the higher importance of central banks in that respect.     

The impact of decentralization and inter-territorial interactions on Spanish health expenditure

This paper examines the determinants of regional public health expenditure in a decentralised health system. Unlike previous studies we take into account possible policy and political interactions among authorities, as well as unobserved heterogeneity. Our emprirical contribution lies in running a spatial panel specification using a dataset of all Spanish region states on aggregated and disaggregated health expenditures (pharmaceuticals, inpatient and primary care). Results are consistent with some degree of interdependence between neighboring regions in spending decisions. Empirical evidence of long term efficiency effects of health care decentralisation, suggests that a specific spatial-institutional design might improve the health system efficiency as well as regional cohesion. Political and scale effects are consistent with theoretical predictions.     

财政分权与经济增长关系的文献综述

近年来,伴随着我国财政分权实践的不断推进,财政分权理论研究得到众多学者的重视。有关财政分权的理论文献可谓是汗牛充栋,其中不乏对财政分权后果的研究,财政分权与经济增长关系的理论研究和经验研究更是研究的热点之一。但是,相关研究并没有得出一致的结论,财政分权的利弊之争持续不断。因此,有必要对财政分权与经济增长关系的相关文献进行总结和评述,进而获取有益的启发。