Review of Guillaume Plantin and Jean‐Charles Rochet,When Insurers Go Bust: An Economic Analysis of the Role and Design of Prudential Regulation

When Insurers Go Bust applies agency theory and the theories of adverse selection and moral hazard as the motivation for prudential regulation of insurance. The resulting scheme has strong flavors of verifiability, simplicity, consistency, and transparency. In consequence, ruin theory does not have an operational role. Theory is applied in familiar ways that are at best convenient shorthand for correct ideas and at worst acceptably suggestive. As in other sources, there is inappropriate emphasis on the general theory of excessive risk‐taking, which tends to deflect attention from the specific nature of insurance firms, but the theoretical excess is adequately counterbalanced by thoughtful case studies. This book is useful for the insurance scholar and feasible as a segment of an advanced undergraduate course.     

An Incomplete Contracting Model of Dual Distribution in Franchising

Dual distribution in franchising is addressed from an incomplete contracting perspective. We explicitly model cooperative (dual distribution) franchising as an organizational form, next to wholly-owned, wholly-franchised, and dual distribution franchise systems. Key conclusions of the model are: (1) dual distribution as an efficient governance mechanism does not depend on heterogeneous downstream outlets, and (2) whether dual distribution or some other organizational form is efficient depends on the size of the benefits to dual distribution relative to the parties’ costs of investing.     

国际贸易市场信息不对称及关系网问题探析

市场信息严重不对称,将限制市场功能的发挥,降低市场交易效率,甚至会导致整个市场的失灵。国际贸易中也存在信息不对称和逆向选择问题,关系网理论是在交易成本说、资源稀缺及相互依赖说、体制理论说和社会资本说基础上产生的,运用这一理论可以提高企业运行效率,减少外部环境的不确定性,克服国际贸易交易中的市场失灵问题,进而对国际贸易发展具有一定促进作用。     

垄断厂商质量供给不足的经济学分析——基于消费方市场透明度理论

运用市场透明度理论,从信息不对称条件下垄断厂商的质量选择入手,分析消费方信息劣势与质量供给不足之间的经济学关系,阐述所带来的道德风险问题和逆向选择问题。加大对产品信息的弥补作用,发挥行业组织作用,建立市场信誉机制是解决质量供给不足问题的关键。     

An Illustrative Application of Multi-Unit Franchise Expansion in a Local Retail Market

Abstract

Retail expansion in a local market offers many challenges, and given the sensitivity of survival to location mistakes, it is imperative to develop site models that incorporate realistic impediments to that expansion. Small independent businesses or local area franchisees facing limits on all forms of capital rarely can open additional units without delays. In this paper, we test the benefit of using Kaufmann, Donthu and Brooks' (2000) multi-unit site selection model that incorporates the reality of delays in the opening of new stores as well as the recognition that local retail chains can face competition from many hard to identify sources. We use data from the actual introduction of a small set of stores in a major United States metropolitan market to estimate the potential for improvement over a pure sequential expansion strategy. When compared to the sequential strategy actually used by the retailer, we estimate that performance could have been improved by 15.5% if a model that anticipated the delays in opening the stores and competition from secondary sources would have been used.     

Modeling the Effect of Losing a Key Individual on Internal and External Relationships

This paper investigates the impact of losing a key individual in an inter-organizational relationship. It seeks to understand why this will cause some relationships to end while others will endure. A model illustrating the complexity of variables that influence relationship development, maintenance and ending is developed. It is suggested that the balance between the interpersonal and organizational elements of these variables will determine whether or not a relationship endures.     

政府规制中的多重委托代理与道德风险

政府规制合同实际上是一个多重委托代理合同,这种多重性表现在两个方面,从纵向看,存在着公众、议会、规制机构、被规制企业之间的多重委托代理链条;从横向看,存在着两个或两个以上的规制机构共享对某一企业或行业的规制权的情形.在这两种情形中,由于信息不对称,都存在着代理人的道德风险,因而在制定规制政策时必须考虑这一问题.     

Refunds and collusion in service industries

This paper investigates industry-wide agreements on joint refund policies, and how they influence price competition. We compute the profit of fully-colluding, competing, and semicolluding service providers who offer refunds to those consumers who do not show up at the time of service. Our main findings are that both a monopoly serving all consumer types, and semicollusive service providers offer full refunds. In contrast, competing service providers offer only partial refunds. Finally, refund policies are investigated under moral hazard behavior.     

Contracting, signaling, and moral hazard: a model of entrepreneurs, ‘angels,’ and venture capitalists

Investment by wealthy individuals, known as ‘angels,’ in startup firms is quite significant and has taken off in the last few years. Angels invest in the company at an earlier stage than venture capitalists (VCs) do. This paper examines the relationship between an entrepreneur, an angel, and a VC from the seed investment made by the angel to the exit stage. The study characterizes the equilibrium contracts among the players and provides insights into the related institutional arrangements. Next, the study examines the signaling aspects of the game. The paper also analyzes the moral hazard problems of the entrepreneur and the VC. It shows that the outcome in a startup firm is not efficient because of the free-rider phenomenon.     

Institutions and moral hazard in open economies

I investigate the interaction between international trade and national institutional development in an environment characterized by heterogeneous individuals choosing their education levels to maximize their utilities; and institutions alleviating moral hazard by allowing managers to better observe and verify the productive efforts of workers. Liberalized trade allows institutions to serve as independent sources of comparative advantage. In this setting, I examine the effect of trade liberalization on the distribution of income in institutionally developed and underdeveloped nations. Trade affects income via a direct effect on prices and an indirect effect on the incentives to invest in education.     

How the Features of Business Relationships Influence Their Endings

This paper discusses the connection between the nature of an existing business relationship and its ending, based on existing research on the reasons and the process of business relationship ending. This study first discusses the features of business relationships that most likely influence their ending process. Based on these features the paper presents propositions on how a particular type of relationship would end.     

Client-Agency Relationships

Abstract

The increasing occurrence of client turnover and agency switching among client/agency relationships is of concern to advertising agencies throughout the world. It is proposed that small firms could provide a substantial alternative client base for agencies in order to dampen the impact of uncertainty. This study investigates the perceptions held by owner/managers of small firms toward agencies within New Zealand. We identified two groups of respondents–those who perceived agency contribution to store performance as high and those who perceived it to be low.Significant differences were found between the two group' response ratings on advertising agency services, agency attributes and selection criteria. We conclude by discussing the managerial implications of this study and provide directions for future research in this area     

基于交易代理的信誉缺失根源与对策探析

交易关系是现代经济活动的基本关系,任何组织内部都是基于委托代理链条的交易关系的复合。信誉缺失问题正是伴随交易行为发生的。信誉与短期机会收益之间具有替代关系,当短期机会收益增加或长期收益不确定性增加时交易参与人就有失信的动机。通过对合同进行分解分布实施,或改变合同的激励结构可以在一定程度上抑制失信动机。     

Where Do Financial Constraints Originate from? An Empirical Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Capital Markets

Despite the voluminous and growing literature on financial constraints, the origins of the constraints are hardly ever empirically analyzed. This paper offers such an analysis. We study, in particular, the empirical prevalence of adverse selection and moral hazard in capital markets using a unique survey data on Finnish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The survey data suggest that adverse selection is empirically more prevalent than moral hazard in the capital markets that the SMEs face. We also find that of the variables indicating the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard, the former has more explanatory power in regressions modeling the availability of external finance to the SMEs than the latter. Finally, we document that our proxies for adverse selection and moral hazard are inversely related to the age of firms, just like Peter Diamond’s (1989) model predicts.