Social comparisons in wage delegation: experimental evidence

We make two main contributions in this article. We examine whether social comparisons affects workers’ performance when a firm can choose workers’ wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect workers’ performance. Our second contribution is methodological. We find that our treatment effects are present with both stated effort and a real-effort task, which suggests that both approaches may yield similar results in labor experiments.     

信任研究:理论演进

近年来,信任研究方兴未艾,已经成为许多社会科学学科研究的课题,经济学也已经将其纳入了研究范围,并且得到了广泛关注.本文试图以经济学的信任研究为核心,同时与其他学科的研究作比较分析,梳理信任研究的理论及其演化路径,并在此基础上进行简单评述,以资借鉴.     

Trust,risk and time preferences: evidence from survey data

The paper shows that time preferences and risk preferences are key covariates of self-reported trust. They both predict negatively a measure of generalized trust; however, risk aversion is positively correlated with an index of particularized trusting behaviour (which refers to the circle of known people).     

Remittances and incumbency: Theory and evidence

By raising household income, remittances lower the marginal utility of targeted electoral transfers, thus weakening the efficacy of vote buying. Yet, remittances make individuals wealthier and believe the national economy is performing well, which is positively attributed to the incumbent. Building on these insights, I show that the confluence of these divergent channels generate a surprising result that at increasingly higher levels of dissatisfaction with the incumbent, a remittance recipient is more likely to vote for the incumbent than a non‐remittance recipient. These predictions and their underlying mechanisms are substantiated across 18 Latin American countries.     

Globalization and taxation: Theory and evidence

We construct a theoretical model to capture the compensation and efficiency effects of globalization in a set up where the redistributive tax rate is chosen by the median voter. The model predicts that the two alternative modes of globalization- trade liberalization and financial openness- could potentially have different effects on taxation. We then provide some empirical evidence on the relationship between taxation and the alternative modes of globalization using a large cross-country panel data set. On average, globalization is associated with lower taxation but there is some evidence that in countries with high capital-labor ratio, globalization is associated with increased taxation. We make a distinction between de jure and de facto measures of globalization and find a strong negative relationship between taxation and de jure measures of globalization. The results for de facto measures of globalization are mixed.     

Credit market discipline: Theory and evidence

Popular in the academic literature and financial press, the credit market discipline hypothesis holds that credit markets, through risk premia increasing in debt level, constrain governments from borrowing and thus, impose fiscal discipline on sovereign borrowers. While several papers document rising risk premia, none have investigated the consumption response. This paper fills this gap by using data on U.S. states' risk premia from 1973–98. An optimizing model is formulated, whereby states intertemporally smooth consumption in the face of interest rates which increase with debt. Deviations from optimality are considered by allowing for governments which consume out of contemporaneous resources. In both cases, credit market discipline is rejected. Rejection is robust to sample splits based on ideology and the stringency of balanced budget requirments.     

Budget processes: Theory and experimental evidence

This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We compare the outcomes of bottom-up and top-down budget processes. It is often presumed that a top-down budget process leads to a smaller overall budget than a bottom-up budget process. Ferejohn and Krehbiel [Ferejohn, J., Krehbiel, K., 1987. The budget process and the size of the budget, Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 31, 296–320] showed theoretically that this need not be the case. We test experimentally the theoretical predictions of their work. The evidence from these experiments lends strong support to their theory, both at the aggregate and the individual subject level.     

Reinterpreting social pacts: Theory and evidence

We investigate the empirical determinants of social pacts over the 1970–2004 period. We adopt a political economy approach, showing that governments are more likely to sign a pact when the cost of a conflict with trade unions is relatively larger. Such a cost depends on macroeconomic variables and on measures of social conflict and union strength. These findings are remarkably stable across sub-periods, in apparent contrast with previous contributions that emphasised differences between first- and second-generation pacts. Our interpretation is that pacts were different across periods because the policy issues changed, but the incentives to seek union consensus did not.     

Competitive burnout: Theory and experimental evidence

We examine equilibrium selection in a two-stage sequential elimination contest in which contestants compete for a single prize. This game has a continuum of equilibria, only one of which satisfies the Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) refinement. That equilibrium involves “burning out” by using all of one's resources in the first stage. It is Pareto-dominated by many other equilibria. We find that CPNE predicts well when four people compete, but not when eight people compete for two second-stage spots. Using a cognitive hierarchy (CH) framework, we show that when the number of players and the mean number of thinking steps are large, the CH prediction involves burning out. This provides a partial explanation of our results. We also develop a formal argument as to why CPNE logic is more compelling with more players. We conclude that more competition leads to higher bids, and that burning out is indeed a competitive phenomenon.     

Credible delegation

We show that the vertical delegation of decision-making authority to agent firms can act as a credible strategic commitment even when contracts are unobservable (or renegotiable) if and only if multilateral delegation is combined with decentralized ownership of the agent firms. In this case, the possibility of renegotiation of other agents’ contracts constrains the set of contracts acceptable to each agent. Delegation may induce more or less aggressive behavior, depending on the nature of within-structure competition among the agent firms. Thus, delegation may be a valuable, credible strategic commitment mechanism when strategies are either substitutes or complements.     

Fighting inflation in Mexico: Theory and evidence

Mexico adopted the inflation targeting strategy in 2002, and this came together with declining inflation. According to the economic authorities, this also brought about lower pass-through of exchange rate changes into inflation. The objective of this article is to test the main hypotheses of Mexico’s prize-stabilization strategy. As a preliminary step, we show evidence whereby the interest rate has not the impact on demand assumed in the conventional view. We then estimate econometric models, which show first of all that inflation depends essentially on the evolution of labor and input costs. Then we demonstrate that higher employment and higher wages associated with higher output do not necessarily entail higher labor costs because productivity also increases when output rises. In the final section, we set forth our main conclusions, which cast doubts on some crucial aspects of the inflation targeting strategy, and propose a different interpretation about why inflation declined in this country.     

Trust and trustworthiness after a land restitution program: lab-in-the-field evidence from Colombia

Constitutional Political Economy - We assess the impact on trust and trustworthiness of a governmental program to compensate victims of forced displacement. All our subjects were eligible to apply...     

Heterogeneous preferences and in-kind redistribution: Theory and evidence

This paper examines the impact of social heterogeneity on in-kind redistribution. We contribute to the previous literature in two ways: we consider (i) the provision of several public goods and (ii) agents different not only in income, but also in their preferences over the various goods provided by the public sector. In this setting, both the distribution and size of goods provision depend on the heterogeneity of preferences. Our main result is that preference heterogeneity tends to decrease in-kind redistribution, while income inequality tends to increase it. An empirical investigation based on United States Census Bureau data confirms these theoretical findings.     

Quota removal and firm-level offshoring: Theory and evidence

Recent literature indicates that offshoring can effectively increase firm productivity and improve product quality. Therefore, global value chains have increased in importance. In this paper, we investigate the impact of export growth on firm-level offshoring. Removal of the quota on textile and clothing products in importing countries boosts China's exports of quota-restricted products. This removal offers a quasi-natural experiment. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that export growth induced by the quota removal increases the extensive and intensive margins of firm-level offshoring. The impact is more pronounced on domestic firms and firms that are engaged in ordinary trade. Our findings suggest additional gains from trade liberalization: trade liberalization not only boosts exports, but also enhances firm productivity and product quality through encouraging firm-level offshoring.     

Child survival and contraception choice: Theory and evidence

This paper asks whether increases in child survival bring down fertility and incentivize couples to switch from traditional to modern methods of contraception. Our parsimonious model predicts the answer in each case is, yes. We test these connections using household-level Demographic and Health Surveys from recent fertility transitions using arguably exogenous variation in child survival at the regional level. We find a 1% increase in ambient child survival leads to a fertility drop of 1.2%. The same raises the chance of switching to modern birth control (and sticking to it) by 0.4%. Our finding supports the notion that prevailing rates of child survival influence the effectiveness of family planning programs that promote modern contraceptive use.     

Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence

Punishment of shirkers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems and sustaining coordination in work teams. Explanations of the motivation to punish generally rely either on small group size or on a Folk theorem that requires coordinated punishment and, hence, highly accurate information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production in which the punishment of shirkers depends on strong reciprocity: the willingness of some team members to contribute altruistically to a joint project and also to bear costs in order to discipline fellow members who do not contribute. This alternative does not require small group size, complex coordinated punishing activities, or implausible informational assumptions. An experimental public goods game provides evidence for the behavioral relevance of strong reciprocity and how it differs from unconditional altruism.     

Message-contingent delegation

The paper studies the role of delegation and authority in a principal-agent relation in which a non-contractible action has to be taken. The agent has private information relevant for the principal, but has policy preferences different from the principal. Consequently, an information revelation problem arises. I consider a partially incomplete contracting environment with contractibility of messages and decision rights and with transferable utility. I contribute to the literature by allowing for message-contingent delegation and by deriving the optimal partially incomplete contract. It is shown that message-contingent delegation creates incentives for information revelation and may outperform unconditional authority and unconditional delegation.     

Veto-based delegation

In a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers, I establish the veto-power principle: the principal can implement an optimal outcome through veto-based delegation with a properly chosen default decision. This result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment powers required by the principal: to design the default outcome and to ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent's decisions.     

信用、社会资本与企业孵化行为研究——基于行为理论的分析

本文基于行为理论,构建了企业孵化行为模型,并推导出企业孵化网络进化的稳态方程.在企业孵化网络中被孵企业拥有社会资本,且影响社会资本的关键因素是可信度,在具有较高社会资本的企业孵化网络中,被孵企业所作出的承诺,即使不能使他们获得最大的经济利益也是值得信任的.契约的不确定性导致契约设计并不能解决孵化网络运行机制中的所有问题,声誉、信用与契约对企业孵化网络运行的影响同等重要.声誉是形成契约的基础,但仅靠声誉是脆弱的,只有在相互信任的基础上,依靠契约及共同遵守的行为规范才能保证企业孵化网络的正常运转.