论矿业企业税收法律制度的完善

针对我国现行矿业企业税收法律制度存在的问题与不足,提出了完善我国矿业企业税收法律制度的立法对策.     

矿业统计与矿业管理探析

矿业统计是矿业管理的重要组成部分,为矿业的经营决策提供可靠依据,在矿业的经济运行中发挥着信息、咨询和监督三大职能。当前全国矿山系统正由过去放型发展模式转变为环境友好型和精细化管理的发展模式,围绕矿山发展的新趋势,矿业的统计工作应如何开展才能更好地为矿业管理服务,充分显示统计工作的魅力,已是摆在矿业统计工作者面前的新课题。     

苏里南矿业管理体制与税费制度

苏里南矿业管理体制具有南美国家共同的特点,对其境内的矿产资源的勘查、开发实行矿业权登记制度。并对包括钻石、黄金、铝土矿等矿产资源可申请预查权、勘查权和开采权等矿业权,这是其有别于大多数国家的重要特点。苏里南矿业税费总体上比较简单,主要表现为面积税、补偿税和矿业权使用费上。     

中国矿业税费法律制度的重构——以矿产所有权出让为视角

从实证分析的角度而言,在采矿权出让中,国家出让的是矿产的所有权而非用益物权。采矿权价款作为矿产的用益物权的对价,占矿产品的实际销售收入的比例太低。按矿产品的实际销售收入征收矿产资源补偿费和税收,国有矿产资源资产和税收大量流失。我国应实行矿产所有权出让,向受让人收取矿产所有权出让金、矿区国有土地使用费、矿山环境恢复费。根据矿产所有权出让金的数学模型,确定它的合理金额。按照同矿产的可采储量等量的矿产品的销售收入,征收环境税、增殖税,取消矿产资源补偿费和资源税。     

腐败与反腐败理论的制度经济学分析

在对腐败行为进行制度经济学分析的基础上 ,可以归纳出几个重要的推论 :第一 ,由于人的理性有限 ,机会主义行为倾向不可避免 ,任何人都有滑向腐败的可能 ;第二 ,当一个国家或地区腐败惩罚机制不够完善时 ,一部分腐败行为得不到及时的惩罚或者有逃脱惩罚的可能 ,短期之内腐败收益远大于腐败成本 ,使得政府当局反腐败政策在一定程度上失效 ;第三 ,由于反腐机制的不完善 ,反腐败政策因此陷入两难困境 :如果惩治过于严厉 ,腐败者会孤注一掷 ,加剧腐败 ;但如果惩治不够严厉 ,就达不到敲山震虎的目的 ,会诱使未腐败者腐败。     

国外矿业税费制度及其对我国的启示

各国矿业税费制度是由矿产资源的勘查及其开采活动的特殊性所决定,并随着矿业的发展而逐步完善。我国当前的矿业税费制度还存在许多亟需完善之处。我们可借鉴其他国家矿业税费制度中的一些成熟、有效做法,以促进我国矿业的持续、稳定、健康发展。     

主要矿业国家税费制度比较及趋势研究

由于我国矿业税费负担过重、税费制度不合理,严重阻碍着我国矿业的可持续发展和矿业的国际竞争力,改革矿业法及涉及矿业企业的税费制度的呼声越来越高。对比分析了国外矿业大国的税费现状和税收体制,以及近年来其矿业税费制度改革的趋势,以期为我国矿业税费改革提供借鉴。     

论让与担保制度的历史发展与制度功能

让与担保制度是一种须移转标的物上权利归属的非典型的物的担保制度.虽然德国、瑞士和日本等国及我国台湾地区的立法并无让与担保物权的直接规定,但其学说及实践却广泛采用了这种担保形式.近年来,让与担保在我国实践中大量涌现,对于这种能促进社会流转与交易安全、合理、可行的担保物权类型,法律应尽快加以确认和规范,以便完善我国的市场经济法制.本文就让与担保制度的历史发展与制度功能进行评述.     

腐败与反腐败的理论逻辑

在经济飞速发展和改革逐步深入的今天,腐败问题已成为危害经济社会生活的毒瘤,而反腐败工作也日益提上了议事日程。本文描述了腐败对政治、经济与社会的危害,并在系统地分析了腐败成因的基础上,详细地论述了预防与治理并举的反腐败逻辑。     

委内瑞拉矿业法与矿业管理体制

委内瑞拉具有丰富的矿产资源,尤其以其丰富的石油资源享誉世界。本文对其1999年矿业法出台背景作了分析,概括了其主体内容,还分析了委内瑞拉石油政策演化的国际环境,认为国家对石油资源的控制逐步加强,与其国家石油公司成立合资公司几乎成为了当今与委内瑞拉石油合作的唯一方式。随着石油税收的加重,委内瑞拉逐渐实现了石油资源利益的最大化。本文还对委内瑞拉矿业权制度及相关税收制度等内容进行了初步的探讨。     

Distortions in oil contract allocation and environmental damage in the presence of corruption

This article investigates how distortions in oil contract allocation can alter a government official’s decisions and shows that corruption enlarges the parameter space over which multinational oil companies win the contract against the smaller companies. It is found that corruption superficially creates an equilibrium outcome that looks efficient even when it is not, and diminishes the official’s concern for environmental damage by weighing damage to the public less and oil revenues more. Sensitivity analyses show that for all levels of environmental damage and corruptibility, multinational oil companies always win the contract. An important policy implication is that corruption distorts optimal decisions and causes oil contract allocation decisions to be based primarily on monetary benefit than social welfare.     

A test for regulatory lag and the role played by periodic contract renewals in mitigating such lag in local cable franchise relationships

Summary and Conclusions This study reports two primary findings. First, the typical cable franchise relationship appears to be characterized by substantial regulatory lag. While long-term franchise contracts may involve a significant amount of day-to-day interpretation and modification, the interpretation and modification are not sufficient to ensure that the contractual terms of trade are consistently at market. In terms of pricing, channel capacity, community programming channels, and franchise fees, the terms of trade confronted by cities prior to franchise renewal are significantly less favorable than the terms of trade found in post-renewal contracts.Second, periodic franchise renewals appear to be a relatively effective means of mitigating regulatory lag and adjusting the contractual terms of trade to market. The terms of trade obtained by cities conferring renewal contracts are roughly, although not entirely, equivalent to the terms obtained by similarly situated cities concurrently issuing initial franchise awards.The conclusions to be drawn from these findings are twofold. First, the existence of regulatory lag in cable franchise relationships may be desirable. From a dynamic efficiency perspective, that is, regulatory lag may provide the regulated firm with an appropriate incentive to undertake risks, reduce costs, and/or improve productivity (Vogelsang 1988). In addition, because most of the capital assets associated with a cable system have economic lives of 10 to 15 years (Webb 1983), it may be inefficient to continually attempt to adjust the terms of trade in a franchise relationship to market (Schmalensee 1979).Second, while continuous regulatory oversight may have undesirable economic consequences, periodic contract renewals show promise as an effective means to ensure that regulatory authorities continue to promote the interests of a public utility's consumers. If designed perhaps to correspond to the points in time at which the public utility needs to rebuild or upgrade its plant, contract renewals may serve to push regulators to periodically examine whether the terms of trade offered by the public utility are at market. Without such encouragment, public utility commissioners may be content to sit back and do nothing (Joskow 1974, 298–299) so long as none of the actors in the regulatory process are complaining.     

On the persistence of corruption

This paper tries to answer the question why the phenomenon of corruption seems to be inherently existent in any society. The dynamic model presented shows how rational agents may generate multiple equilibria of corruption within the same kind of socio-economic system. We assume that the individual disutility caused by the loss of reputation from a corrupt transaction depends on the acceptance of corrupt behavior by the representative individual. Depending on the values of some key parameters like the marginal utility of corrupt behavior and the initial acceptance of corruption a completely corrupt equilibrium where all people completely accept corruption or a completely honest equilibrium where corruption is not accepted at all may be the limit state of the optimal path. Also inner equilibria in-between exist; however, they are always unstable.     

腐败的预警预控体系分析

分析了在我国建立腐败预警预控体系的紧迫性和必要性,界定了腐败预警预控体系的定义和内涵,建立了腐败预警预控体系的结构,并详细阐释了腐败预警预控体系的运用流程,为我国腐败的预警预控工作提供参考和借鉴。     

On corruption,bribes and the exchange of favors

This paper investigates how the availability of alternative forms of bribe payments, on top of money, may facilitate corruption. There are two bribe payment technologies and a Corruptor and a Receiver must agree on the value and on the technology of the bribe. The paper infers which form of payment can be used by analyzing probabilities of punishment, bargaining powers of agents, and relative efficiency of the two different technologies. By assumption, monetary payments have distinct efficiency than do non-monetary favors. If the Receiver has a sufficiently high utility for payments using a particular technology, then only bribes paid via this technology are feasible. There is also a range of intermediate cases where monetary bribery is used if and only if the relative bargaining power of the Receiver is sufficiently large compared to that of the Corruptor.     

城市轨道交通项目合同体系研究

城市轨道交通项目的特点决定了其合同体系是十分复杂和不确定的,它对整个项目管理的运作有很大的影响,业主必须给予足够的重视。通过分析城市轨道交通项目合同体系策划的依据,指出城市轨道交通项目合同体系协调的内容,在此基础上,给出了城市轨道交通项目的合同体系示意图。     

Intelligence and corruption

This study finds that countries with high-IQ populations enjoy less corruption. I propose that this is because intelligent people have longer time horizons.     

Bicameralism and corruption

This paper studies the impact of bicameralism on the level of corruption of elected officials. The relationship between parliamentary organization and corruption is analyzed in a two-period game between legislators, citizens and a lobby group, which delivers several predictions that we empirically investigate using a panel of 35 democracies during the period 1996-2004. Assuming that legislators choose a multidimensional policy on which citizens and a lobby group have opposing interests, we show that bicameralism improves the accountability of legislators to the electorate when the same party controls the two chambers and party polarization is high, while the opposite holds if the two chambers are controlled by different parties. These predictions find strong support in our empirical analysis.     

Competition in bureaucracy and corruption

This paper studies the consequences of introducing competition between bureaucrats. Firms are supposed to invest into eliminating negative externalities of production, while bureaucrats administer the process by issuing licences. Some bureaucrats are corrupt, that is, they issue a licence to any firm in exchange for a bribe. The competition regime is found to create more ex ante incentives for firms to invest, while the monopoly regime is better at implementing ex post allocation, that is, distributing the licences given the firms' investment decisions. Additional results on the effect of punishments and bureaucrats' rotation are provided.     

Political contributions and corruption in the United States

The empirical evidence presented in this study indicates that political contributions and corruption are complements, rather than substitutes. Based on panel data for seven election cycles, regression results show that in the United States, political contributions and federal corruption convictions are positively correlated. Accordingly, we propose an alternative explanation for the relationship between political contributions and corruption: two components of a comprehensive strategy for rent-seeking. As long-term investments, political contributions influence legislators to change the rules of the game; as short-term investments, corruption influences public officials to sidestep the existing rules, in order to maximize the rent collected.