Coasean bargaining with symmetric delay costs

Delay costs play a role in Coasean bargaining over environmental conflicts when an injunction restricts actions until a settlement is reached. Results from the lab suggest that efficiency remained relatively robust to discrete and increasing marginal delay costs, but declined significantly with nonincreasing marginal delay costs. Bargainers appear to deal with probability and consequences separately rather than in combination as maintained by expected utility theory, and as such, neglect ends over means. How the distribution of wealth is best organized depends on perspective: constrained self-interest best organizes behavior if expected utility is maintained; pure self-interest dominates if we acknowledge the probability–consequence heuristic.     

Property as an economic concept: reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960), most economic analyses of property rights disregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide to rightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers in terms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstate the role of “private ordering” and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, the essential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and, second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable of making truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactions on the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting both elements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of both property and corporate contracting.     

The Coasean analysis of lighthouse financing: myths and realities

In ‘The Lighthouse in Economics’ (Coase, R. H. Journalof Law and Economics, vol. 17, no. 2, 357–76, 1974), Coasereached the conclusion that in England there existed a relativelyefficient privately financed lighthouse system, which wouldrefute economists' traditional statements concerning the productionof public goods. The purpose of this paper is to challenge hisconclusion. We first show that, from a methodological and theoreticalperspective, ‘The Lighthouse’ is consistent with‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (Coase, R. H. Journalof Law and Economics, vol. 3, 1–44, 1960). Then, applyingCoase's own method (historical case studies), we attempt tore-examine the respective roles and efficiencies of privateinitiative and government.     

On the dual nature of weak property rights

In the natural-resource literature, conventional wisdom holds that weak property rights will cause a resource to be over-exploited. This is because weak property rights are typically perceived as a problem of input exclusion – or theft of un-extracted resources. We present evidence to the effect that weak property rights often take the form of contestable outputs – or output theft – and that this has an impact on resource use. We propose a model of resource use under generally weak property rights – or weak state presence – when resource users face the dual problem of input exclusion and output appropriation. We show that introducing the possibility that outputs be contested acts as an output tax, with the added twist that resource users effectively determine the tax level. This tax has a depressive effect on input use. Whether the resource is under- or over-exploited depends on the relative severity of output appropriation and input exclusion problems. Increasing enforcement measures against theft may lead to severe resource overuse. Efficiency considerations require to account not only for direct resource input use, but also for thieves’ efforts and gains as well as the costs of enforcement against theft and trespass.     

On the dual nature of weak property rights

In the natural-resource literature, conventional wisdom holds that weak property rights will cause a resource to be over-exploited. This is because weak property rights are typically perceived as a problem of input exclusion – or theft of un-extracted resources. We present evidence to the effect that weak property rights often take the form of contestable outputs – or output theft – and that this has an impact on resource use. We propose a model of resource use under generally weak property rights – or weak state presence – when resource users face the dual problem of input exclusion and output appropriation. We show that introducing the possibility that outputs be contested acts as an output tax, with the added twist that resource users effectively determine the tax level. This tax has a depressive effect on input use. Whether the resource is under- or over-exploited depends on the relative severity of output appropriation and input exclusion problems. Increasing enforcement measures against theft may lead to severe resource overuse. Efficiency considerations require to account not only for direct resource input use, but also for thieves’ efforts and gains as well as the costs of enforcement against theft and trespass.     

Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security

This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining.     

制度变迁中土地产权的性质与合约选择:一个有关合作经济的案例分析

This paper discusses an evolutionary process of rural collective property rights or agricultural cooperation economy in detail. We convince that both the evolution of the household contract system and the rural cooperation economy in the market elaborate the key position of property rights’ multi-attribute in the formation of contract structure and organization shape. If there were strong externality between several elements of household, the collective property rights should be chosen. __________ Translated from Guanli Shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2008, (6): 61–67, 94     

The nature of discounting

From monetary policies to the climate change problem, from the burden of private credit card debts to the evaluation of public projects, discount rate is the central issue, yet there is little clear understanding about the nature of discounting. In this paper, applying a newly developed production theory, we discuss how discount rate is related to other factors in social systems, such as risk, duration of production, fixed cost in production and market size. The relations among different factors in a social system put constraints on the ranges of discount rate that are viable in particular environments. Our findings have strong policy implications. In a world of increasing cost of extracting natural resources, the continuation of low discount rate policy will generate wide gyration of social systems that we have witnessed in recent years.     

The nature of tournaments

This paper characterizes the optimal way for a principal to structure a rank-order tournament in a moral hazard setting (as in Lazear and Rosen in J Polit Econ 89:841?C864, 1981). We find that it is often optimal to give rewards to top performers that are smaller in magnitude than corresponding punishments to poor performers. The paper identifies four reasons why the principal might prefer to give larger rewards than punishments: (1) R is small relative to P (where R is risk aversion and P is absolute prudence); (2) the distribution of shocks to output is asymmetric and the asymmetry takes a particular form; (3) the principal faces a limited liability constraint; and (4) there is agent heterogeneity of a particular form.     

Regulation through Collaboration: Final Authority and Information Symmetry in Environmental Coasean Bargaining

Many people see collaborative decision-making as the next wave in environmental regulation. This paper examines how two elements within collaborative processes—final authority over stakeholder negotiations and information symmetry through mandated information sharing of relative payoffs—affect the efficiency and the distribution of wealth. Using a Coasean bargaining experiment, we find final authority for stakeholders is critical for efficient negotiations. Efficiency drops by two-thirds given a 10% risk to the final authority given symmetric information. Efficiency declines further once asymmetric information is considered. Final authority appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for efficient agreements.     

The nature of heterodox economics

Heterodoxy serves as an umbrella term to cover the coming togetherof separate projects or traditions. In answering the question,‘what distinguishes heterodoxy from the orthodoxy?’,the author argues that matters of ontology are central. In answeringthe question, ‘how are the various traditions that makeup the modern heterodoxy to be distinguished from each other?’,the author defends criteria other than varying commitments tospecific substantive theories, policy measures or techniques(or basic units) of analysis.     

The nature of regional unemployment in Italy

Taking as a starting point the evidence of growing disparities for most of the 1984–2007 period, this article investigates the nature of regional unemployment in Italy. In particular, we assess whether the Italian regional unemployment rates contain a unit root and are, thus, subject to pure hysteresis, considering as alternative hypotheses both a linear and a non-linear stationary process. For that purpose, we employ three recently developed panel unit-root tests, taking account of structural breaks, cross-section dependence and non-linearities. Contrary to previous studies in the literature, our results reject the pure hysteresis hypothesis and support the characterisation of regional unemployment in Italy as a stationary but non-linear process, subject to multiple equilibria, in line with the ‘structuralist hypothesis’ advanced by Phelps (1994).     

The nature and units of social selection

On the basis of the technical definition of selection developed by George Price (1995), we describe two forms of selection that commonly occur at the social level, subset selection and generative selection. Both forms of selection are abstract and general, and therefore also incomplete; both leave aside the question of explaining the selection criterion and why entities possess stable traits. However, an important difference between the two kinds of selection is that generative selection can accommodate an explanation of how new variation is created, while subset selection cannot. An evolutionary process involving repeated cycles of generative selection can, in principle, continue indefinitely because imperfect replication generates new variation along the way, whereas subset selection reduces variation and eventually grinds to a halt. Even if the two kinds of selection are very different, they share a number of features. First, neither subset selection nor generative selection implies improvement: neither kind of selection necessarily leads to efficiency or implies systematic outcomes. Second, both subset selection and generative selection can lead to extremely rapid effects in a social population. Third, in the social domain, both generative selection and subset selection involve choice and preference in some way: neither form of selection necessarily excludes intentionality. In concluding the article, we single out a challenge for future research in identifying the role of various units of culture in selection processes and the multiple levels at which social selection processes take place.     

The incidence of heterogeneous residential property taxes

In an economy with multiple tax jurisdictions, the distribution of the burden of heterogeneous residential property taxes is shown to depend on the elasticity of demand for housing, the elasticity of substitution between land and capital in housing production, the elasticity of supply of land to individual tax jurisdictions, and the degree of population mobility between tax jurisdictions. It is demonstrated that the excise effects of the residential property tax may not cancel across jurisdictions and the average rate of tax may overstate or understate the burden on residential capital.     

The incidence of a classified property tax

Under a classified property tax, different classes of property are taxed at different rates. The incidence of such a tax is analyzed in a two-sector, two-factor model.     

The strategic nature of advertising in segmented markets

We develop a simple model in which firm-specific advertising has cooperative and predatory effects. Our model is set in a static market where firms are naturally segmented into two distinct submarkets: several large firms located in the core, with small firms operating as a fringe. We test the net effect of opposing market size (cooperative) and market share (predatory) effects of both fringe and core firm advertising on the advertising decisions of large firms in several US consumer industries. Empirically, fringe firm advertising leads to an increase in advertising efforts by large firms, implying strategic complementarity. On the other hand, increased advertising by core firms in an industry decreases advertising expenditures of other core firms, indicating they are strategic substitutes. Our findings imply that equilibrium levels of advertising can be greater with asymmetric, rather than symmetric, strategic interactions.     

The changing nature of inflation persistence in Switzerland

This note analyzes the persistence of inflation in Switzerland. In particular, we assess the impact of the new monetary framework adopted by the SNB in 2000 on inflation persistence. A set of rolling-window estimates shows that inflation persistence has fallen significantly since the end of the 1990s.     

The evolving nature of the college wage premium

Focusing on the signaling aspect of education, we show that the college wage premium can be U-shaped in the share of the population with a college degree. This prediction is consistent with empirical evidence from a range of countries. Moreover, the equilibrium in our model is unique, which means that we are able to generate empirically-testable predictions linking income inequality and the premium enjoyed by the college educated. Consequently, our model provides a framework for future empirical studies.     

The nature of unemployment in segmented labor markets

In a segmented labor market, if the total supply of labor is variable, some of the resulting equilibrium unemployment is involuntary, in the sense that it consists of workers with reservation wages below the lowest offered wage.     

The changing nature of the OECD shadow economy

Traditionally, the presence of the shadow economy (SE) has been associated, mainly and positively, with taxation. Recently, some authors have suggested that the SE may be also linked to the institutional setting (efficiency of the bureaucracy, regulations, corruption, etc.) so that just two stable equilibria are possible. In the “good” one, there is a small hidden sector, large fiscal revenues and honest/appreciated institutions. The other, “bad”, equilibrium is the opposite. Unlike the traditional approach, therefore, the recent literature argues that the tax burden and SE can be negatively correlated. Examining the links between these variables in relatively uncorrupt systems, this paper reconciles the two views. Theoretically, it claims that many different good equilibria can emerge whereby SE and its determinants are linked in complex and different ways. For instance, taxation and SE can go hand-in-hand, even taking into account the institutional framework. Empirical evidence for OECD countries supports both the model and the changing nature of the SE.