Psychological and implied contracts in organizations

Two forms of unwritten contracts derive from relations between organizations and their members. Psychological contracts are individual beliefs in a reciprocal obligation between the individual and the organization. Implied contracts are mutual obligations characterizing interactions existing at the level of the relationship (e.g., dyadic, interunit). Employee/employer relations and changing conditions of employment give rise to issues not addressed in conventional transaction-oriented models of motivation and individual responses. The development, maintenance, and violation of psychological and implied contracts are described along with their organizational implications.Promise is most given when least is said. (George Chapman,Hero and Leander, 1598)     

Psychological contracts and reciprocity: a study in a Finnish context

Existing research has demonstrated how the norm of reciprocity operates as a general principle in exchange relationships. However, limited explicit theoretical and empirical attention has been paid to its role in the functioning of the psychological contract. Using a sample of Finnish public sector employees, this study investigated the impact of perceived employer fulfilment of psychological contract on employee perceptions of the form of reciprocity underlying the exchange relationship. The potential mediating role of the reciprocity perceptions between perceived contract fulfilment and its outcomes (affective commitment, continuance commitment and intention to leave) was also examined. The results show that perceived employer fulfilment is positively associated with employee perceptions of the generalized form of reciprocity, and negatively with perceptions of the balanced form of reciprocity. Further, perceptions of generalized reciprocity were found to mediate the relationship between perceived contract fulfilment and affective commitment and intentions to leave the organization. Results and implications are discussed.     

Trust and formal contracts in interorganizational relationships — substitutes and complements

We hypothesize that trust is a moderator of the direct relationship between control and coordination concerns and contractual complexity. Our results suggest that high trust weakens the positive relationship between control concerns and contractual complexity and reinforces the positive relationship between coordination concerns and contractual complexity. By highlighting the dual role of contracts (i.e. a controlling and coordinating function) and the moderating role of trust in this regard, our paper provides a new focus to the current discussion on the relationship between trust and contracts (i.e. substitutes or complements) that may help reconcile some divergent perspectives in the literature. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An anatomy of zero‐hour contracts in the UK

We present the first attempt to locate zero‐hour contract (ZHC) jobs—jobs that lack a guaranteed minimum number of hours—within theoretical frameworks of the employment relationship and occupational class and empirically explore their characteristics using successive UK Labour Force Survey. In line with these theories, we find this contentious form of employment to be strongly differentiated by the nature of occupational tasks and to overlap with nonstandard employment features (e.g. part‐time and temporary). They are also highly concentrated in a small number of occupations and sectors, with over half of ZHC jobs found in just 10 occupations. We further show that ZHCs are associated with indicators of inferior job quality such as low pay and underemployment. Although we find no evidence that ZHCs are a particularly pervasive feature of the UK labour market, further growth cannot be ruled out in certain occupations.     

Prevention incentives in long‐term insurance contracts

Long‐term insurance contracts are widespread, particularly in public health and the labor market. Such contracts typically involve monthly or annual premia which are related to the insured's risk profile. A given profile may change, based on observed outcomes which depend on the insured's prevention efforts. The aim of this paper is to analyze the latter relationship. In a two‐period optimal insurance contract in which the insured's risk profile is partly governed by her effort on prevention, we find that both the insured's risk aversion and prudence play a crucial role. If absolute prudence is greater than twice absolute risk aversion, moral hazard justifies setting a higher premium in the first period but also greater premium discrimination in the second period. This result provides insights on the trade‐offs between long‐term insurance and the incentives arising from risk classification, as well as between inter‐ and intragenerational insurance.     

“组织间公民行为”及其发生机制:关系契约与心理契约的共同作用

本文对“组织公民行为”的内涵进行了剖析,将“公民行为”概念从个体层面扩展到了组织层面,提出用“组织间公民行为”来表达组织在长期交换中的一些特定行为,并梳理出了它的5个代表性维度.本文同时结合关系契约和心理契约理论,构建出了一个组织间公民行为的发生机制;其中,将心理契约引入该机制中,更是提出了一个新的分析视角,完善了现有的组织间关系研究范式.本文进而以3个具体例子对该机制进行了阐述,为组织进行关系管理提出了建议,为未来的研究指明了方向.     

Discounting inflation — a note

The aim of this paper is to clarify the confused issue of the effect of inflation on the discounting procedure for investment appraisal. The standard approach is considered, together with the impact of inflation, and the problem of how to adjust the standard approach to take account of inflation. The point is made that it is usually easiest to estimate expected returns in current prices, in which case the discount rate should reflect the real opportunity cost of capital, to avoid mixing real returns and nominal interest in a manner which leads to the rejection of worthwhile projects. An example is given of how the real rate of interest can be computed from the nominal rate of interest and the rate of inflation, and the difference this makes to discounting a sample project. The paper then illustrates how real rates of interest have frequently been negative over the past decade and how this implies that projects may be acceptable even if the sum of future undiscounted returns is less than the initial outlay. The conclusion drawn is that investors should maximize economic profit defined as the surplus over opportunity cost, which reduces the deterrent of nominally high interest rates, for the maximization of surplus over opportunity cost has the corollary of minimization of opportunity loss.     

Testimony for the defense—a case for computers

An indictment has been lodged against computers, claiming that computer system implementation tends to usurp attention away from the more pressing problems of urban planning. Furthermore, it has been charged that computers should not be permitted a role in high level bureaucratic and legislative decision making. The troubled times which our cities are experiencing bear bitter witness to the fact that past independent, intuitive judgement has not satisfactorily met the challenge of urban societal planning. Computer technology, coupled with technical advances in urban sciences, provides a powerful tool for use in creative public management. It is administrative inefficient use of resources to relegate the computer to handle only routine clerical tasks.

This paper takes the form of testimony on behalf of the defense, computer technology, against the charges presented by authors Robbins and Harvey [1].     

The Europeanisation—or the Erosion—of Industrial Relations?

This article considers the impact of European integration on industrial relations. An industrial relations regime can be understood as a tension between employment structured by market dynamics and broader social regulation, between the principles of contract and status. Economic Europeanisation threatens this relationship. Its survival may depend on new forms of supranational regulation, but not necessarily as the ‘social dimension’ of Europeanisation is customarily conceived.     

Are non‐binding contracts really not worth the paper?

We experimentally investigate behavior in sequential one‐shot transactions which are governed by non‐binding contracts. In a second, incomplete information treatment, contracts are binding for some players. While according to traditional game‐theoretical analysis no trade is expected in the first treatment, full trade should result in the latter. However, we find that trade is even higher in the non‐binding contract treatment. On the one hand, non‐binding contracts—although they are cheap talk—do guide behavior, especially at the beginning of a business relationship, while reciprocal reactions prevail later on. On the other hand, in the treatment with binding contracts cooperative behavior appears to be crowded out. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Business formation — a network approach

This article suggests that the key to entrepreneurial success is to be found in the ability to develop and maintain a personal network. In elaborating this proposition I regard the environment of the business venture as “enacted”. The inexperienced new entrepreneur needs support to create a personal network and to manage the enacted environment. The concept of the “organizing context”, defined as a clustered sociocentric network, is introduced to provide a tool with which the entrepreneur can deal more efficiently with the different subprocesses that create his or her reality. The approach supplies a framework within which various forms of entrepreneurship — indigenous, corporate, etc. — can be compared and analysed beyond their institutional differences. The interaction between various forms of entrepreneurship and organizing contexts is empirically illustrated from case studies.     

Endogenous timing of managerial delegation contracts in a unionized duopoly

In a multiple‐stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and unionized labor market, this paper analyzes whether firms' owners decide managerial incentive contracts sequentially or simultaneously. When firms compete in quantities, firms' owners can choose incentive contracts simultaneously or sequentially, depending on the unions' relative bargaining power and the degree of product differentiation. Instead, when firms compete in prices, firms' owners set incentive contracts sequentially with substitute goods and simultaneously with complement goods.     

Adimpact—a multi-media advertising effectiveness-measurement method

Recall and recognition are the methods which are usually used to establish if a person has been exposed to advertising or not. Recall tends to greatly underestimate exposure. Recognition, though coming much closer to actual exposure, has severe practical limitations, especially for radio commercials and in terms of the number of advertisements that can be tested at a time. Adimpact is a method offering an alternative way of establishing probable exposure to advertising, which is independent of the respondents' ability to recall or recognize the advertisements they have seen or heard.     

Teaching Leadership Through a Cultural–Psychological Lens

Leadership education is in a unique position at the college level. The study of leadership is both multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary, and is often found in different academic departments at different institutions. The educational aspect of leadership is often overlooked, leaving many college teachers with an opportunity to further develop their pedagogy and practice. In the current paper, a cultural–psychological approach to leadership education, grounded in a review of prominent educational psychologist and educator Jerome Bruner's (2008) book The Culture of Education, is presented. The educational framework along with implications as to how this approach adds value to curricular design and classroom instruction in the undergraduate leadership studies classroom are provided.     

Text and metatext in the resource‐based view

This paper distinguishes between text and metatext in the resource‐based view (RBV) – that is, the actual words and logic fundamental to the RBV (the text) and the traditions, interpretations and applications of the theory (the metatext). It argues that Kaufman's ( 2015 ) criticism of the RBV as applied to strategic human resource management actually focuses on RBV metatext and not text. Indeed, unlike some RBV metatext, RBV text actually has a great deal to say about research and practice in strategic human resource management.