劳动合同解除制度的制度价值

劳动合同解除制度指的是劳资双方的权利义务关系归于消灭,对劳动者来说非常重要,劳动合同一旦解除,意味着就是丢掉工作。因此,劳动合同解除制度是劳动合同法律制度中的重要内容之一。如何设计符合我国劳动力市场实际要求的、有利于维护劳动关系和谐发展的劳动合同解除制度,是我国当前实施中的《劳动合同法》要完善的热点问题之一。本文主要是从劳动合同解除制度的功能、价值、意义等方面来阐述劳动合同解除制度的制度价值。     

浅析订立劳动合同的技巧

劳动合同关系到合同双方当事人的切身利益,它也是劳动争议处理的主要依据之一,因此,不管是用人单位还是劳动者都应当掌握一定的劳动合同知识.文章主要从实际操作的角度,介绍一些劳动合同签订的技巧.     

什么是无固定期限劳动合同

无固定期限劳动合同是指不约定终止日期,同时不得将法定解除劳动合同的条件约定为终止条件的劳动合同。无固定期限劳动合同是劳动合同的一种类型。实际工作中,由于现行的劳动法律、法规和规章对无固定期限劳动合同规定较少,使得一些用人单位和职工对无固定期限劳动合同产生了模糊认识,甚至发生争议。笔者就此谈点粗浅的看法。无固定期限劳动合同的终止条件目前对无固定期限劳动合同的终止条件主要有两种认识。一是认为职工法定退休年龄是无固定期限劳动合同的终止条件;一是认为无固定期限劳动合同中双方约定的终止条件是无固定期限劳动合同的终止条件。笔者认为,这两种看法结合起来,则是对无固定期限劳动合同     

论无固定期限劳动合同的解除

无固定期限劳动合同，是指用人单位与劳动者约定无确定终止时间的劳动合同。本文主要是依据《劳动合同法》及相关法律、法规的规定，就无固定期限劳动合同的解除作全面论述。     

来言去语

解除劳动合同与终止劳动合同意义不同编辑同志:我们在处理劳动争议案件时,经常会碰到劳动者与用人单位关于劳动合同“解除”与“终止”的纷争。请问这两者有何区别?李学松李学松同志:解除劳动合同与终止劳动合同的主要区别如下:一、法律概念不同(一)劳动合同的解除是指劳动合同订立后,尚未全部履行以前,由于某种原因导致劳动合同一方或双方当事人提前解除劳动关系的法律行为。(二)劳动合同的终止是指劳动合同的双方当事人按照合同所规定的权利和义务已经完全履行,劳动合同关系自然失效,且任何一方当事人均未提出继续保持劳动关系的法律行为。二、形成的法律依据不同     

劳动合同终止的理解与适用

本案主要反映的是劳动合同终止的问题。与提前消灭劳动关系的解除行为不同，劳动合同的终止是指当事人双方按照劳动合同规定的条款，实现和履行了相应的义务，劳动合同即因法定或约定的条件出现而丧失效力的现象。     

当前劳动合同签订履行中存在的问题及对策

前不久,就当前企业职工劳动合同的签订履行以及工资分配中的有关问题,笔者在所在市进行了全面调查,主要存在以下问题:一是劳动合同签订率高,执行率低。效益好的企业,能够实现职工的合法权益,工资福利,各种保险费的缴纳,职工较为满意,无须劳动合同的制约;效益差的企业,劳动合同规定的内容根本无法实现,劳动合同成为纯粹的形式,重签订轻履行成为普遍的现象;改制企业不履行前身同职工签订的劳动合同。二是劳动合同签订率高,鉴证率低。被调查的企业70%同职工签订了劳动合同,但到当地劳动保障部门鉴证的仅占签订劳动合同企业的15%。脱离了劳动保…     

“炒鱿鱼”怎样“炒”才合法

现实生活中,经常听到有人在谈论中提到某某被老板“炒鱿鱼”了,或者是有人说:我们公司老板太不够意思,我把老板给“炒”了。职场里人们常讲的“炒鱿鱼”,即解除劳动合同,是指劳动合同订立以后,在还没有全部履行之前,由于某种因素导致劳动合同一方或者双方当事人提前解除劳动关系的行为。劳动合同只有在生效以后,才存在解除的问题,无效合同不发生合同解除。劳动合同一旦生效即具有法律约束力,当事人不能随意解除劳动合同。根据法律规定,劳动合同解除主要有协商解除和法定解除两种。劳动合同解除后劳动关系即自行终止,也就是说,一旦解除了劳动…     

劳动合同推行中问题不少

劳动合同是用人单位与劳动者建立劳动关系的法律依据,用以明确双方的权利义务。可是,在实际工作中我们发现,不依法签订劳动合同的现象非常普遍,主要集中在乡镇企业、私营企业、外商及港澳台商投资企业等经济成份中。主要表现在以下几个方面: (一)不依法订立劳动合同。一是一些用人单位利用     

简述企业续订职工劳动合同的标准与操作分析

企业在和职工的劳动期满之后,企业需要决定对职工进行继续聘用还是不再聘用,在续订职工劳动合同的时候需要按照一定的标准来进行,这对企业和职工自身来说都是一种保障。续订劳动合同在劳动关系的调整中是一个十分复杂的问题,其对于企业人力资源的设置等都有十分重要的影响。本文主要分析企业续订职工劳动合同的标准与操作,为促进企业顺利进行续订劳动合同关系提供建议。     

Short-term or long-term labor contracts

This paper analyzes the duration of labor contracts and focuses on the strategic effect arising from the different lengths that labor contracts have.     

The sequencing of union contract negotiations

In this paper we explore the determination of the sequencing of wage bargains in an institutional structure consisting of a single firm employing two unions, under two alternative assumptions about the nature of feasible contracts. If contingent contracts are prohibitively costly, we find that the unions prefer to lead in the negotiations process if the labor inputs are substitutes and follow if they are complements, while the firm is indifferent. If contingent contracts are permitted, both unions prefer to lead, while the firm prefers to negotiate first with the weaker union.     

企业劳动契约的激励模型分析——一种发生在道德风险之前的逆向选择问题

本文分析了企业劳动契约的制定过程以及企业和员工之间的委托代理关系,企业在制定劳动契约时会面临发生在道德风险之前的逆向选择问题。在将其与企业的人力资源管理实践相结合构造出相关模型,以及对这一委托代理模型的激励约束进行分析之后,得出这样的结论:企业作为委托人在制定劳动契约时应该综合考虑代理人(员工)的外在机会效用水平,内生成本函数,效用偏好函数和努力水平等激励影响因素。     

When Does the Stepping‐Stone Work? Fixed‐Term Contracts Versus Temporary Agency Work in Changing Economic Conditions

This paper emphasizes differences among short‐term contracts in terms of career prospects. Using French data over the 2002–2010 period, we rely on a dynamic model with fixed effects to disentangle state dependence from unobserved heterogeneity. Although fixed‐term contracts may provide a ‘stepping‐stone’ to permanent positions, temporary agency work is hardly better than unemployment in this regard. The Great Recession of 2008 has changed the dynamics on the labor market and amplified the difference between fixed‐term contracts and temporary agency work. For both types of temporary workers, providing overtime work does not significantly increase the transition to permanent employment. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What effect does uncertainty have on the length of labor contracts?

The literature on duration of explicit labor contracts has suggested that increased uncertainty should be associated with shorter labor contracts. More recently, it has been argued that the effect of uncertainty on contract duration depends on the type of uncertainty involved. Specifically, if the uncertainty pertains to aggregate real shocks, then contract durations should increase as workers seek to insure themselves against the repercussions of such shocks. Using a sample of 1876 labor contracts signed during the period 1977–1988, this paper provides an empirical test of the foregoing hypothesis (known as the efficient risk sharing hypothesis). The paper presents results from estimation of a generalized-probit, simultaneous equation model, in which the dependent variables are contract length, indexation of the contract through a cost-of-living allowance, and the rate of wage change specified in the contract. The empirical findings confirm the efficient risk sharing hypothesis.     

Wages,implicit contracts,and the business cycle: Evidence from a European panel

We study the joint behavior of hours and wages over the business cycle in a unique panel of 13 European countries, and document significant history dependence in wages. Workers who experience favorable market conditions during their tenure on the job have higher wages, and work fewer labor hours. Unobserved differences in productivity, such as varying job quality, or match-specific productivity are not likely to explain this variation. The results instead point to the importance of contractual arrangements in wage determination. In economies with decentralized bargaining practices, such arrangements resemble self-enforcing insurance contracts with one-sided commitment (by the employer). On the other hand, in countries with strong unions and centralized wage bargaining, wage behavior is better approximated by full-commitment insurance contracts. The co-movement of hours and wages further confirms a contractual framework with variable worker hours. Despite the strong prevalence of contracts in Europe, however, the elasticity of labor supply is considerably smaller compared to the U.S. labor market.     

STAKEHOLDER-AGENCY THEORY

Taking agency theory and stakeholder theory as points of departure, this article proposes a paradigm that helps explain the following: (1) certain aspects of a firm's strategic behaviour; (2) the structure of management-stakeholder contracts; (3) the form taken by the institutional structures that monitor and enforce contracts between managers and other stakeholders; and (4) the evolutionary process that shapes both management-stakeholder contracts and the institutional structures that police those contracts.     

论劳动合同试用期的法律属性

由于劳动法律出于倾斜保护劳动者合法权益之考量,在法律规范上加入了大量国家干预的内容,使得劳动法律兼具有私法与公法之双重性质,因而对劳动合同试用期之法律属性的分析,不能仅仅局限于劳动法理论本身,更应以民法理论为基础。在劳动法范畴,试用期为劳动合同之特别契约;而在民法范畴,试用期为劳动合同所附之解除条件。     

Endogenous timing of managerial delegation contracts in a unionized duopoly

In a multiple‐stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and unionized labor market, this paper analyzes whether firms' owners decide managerial incentive contracts sequentially or simultaneously. When firms compete in quantities, firms' owners can choose incentive contracts simultaneously or sequentially, depending on the unions' relative bargaining power and the degree of product differentiation. Instead, when firms compete in prices, firms' owners set incentive contracts sequentially with substitute goods and simultaneously with complement goods.     

Motivate and select: Relational contracts with persistent types

We develop a model of relational contracts with moral hazard and asymmetric persistent information about an employee's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics and the distribution of employees' talent. Bonus contracts are more likely to be adopted in complex jobs and when high talent is not too common or too rare. Firms with “normal” jobs are more likely to adopt termination contracts. In labor market equilibrium, different contracts may be adopted by ex ante identical firms. Hence, we offer an explanation for the coexistence of different employment systems within the same industry.