Enforcement in informal saving groups

Informal groups cannot rely on external enforcement to insure that members abide by their obligations. It is generally assumed that these problems are solved by ‘social sanctions’ and reputational effects. The present paper focuses on roscas, one of the most commonly found informal financial institutions in the developing world. We first show that, in the absence of an external (social) sanctioning mechanism, roscas are never sustainable, even if the defecting member is excluded from all future roscas. We then argue that the organizational structure of the rosca itself can be designed so as to address enforcement issues. The implications of our analysis are consistent with first-hand evidence from rosca groups in a Kenyan slum.     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

POLITICAL INEQUALITY,CENTRALIZED SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS,AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC GOODS

Centralized sanctioning institutions cultivate cooperation by eradicating the gains from free‐riding. Studies show that electing a community member to operate a centralized sanctioning institution further increases support for the public good. These studies have overlooked an all‐too‐common attribute of non‐laboratory elections: political inequality. In this paper, we replicate those studies and, then, introduce novel experimental treatments that examine how political inequality influences the cooperation‐enhancing effect of a democratic election to centralized sanctioning institutions. In our novel treatment conditions, participants receive either a random allotment of votes that they can use to elect a centralized sanctioning authority or an allocation of votes proportional to their earnings in a previously‐executed public goods game. We find that political inequalities created via the random allocation of votes do not hinder cooperation, whereas political inequalities created via past game play undermine elected authorities and diminish contributions to the public good from individuals advantaged by political inequality.     

Board monitoring,firm risk,and external regulation

We examine the relationship between board monitoring and firm characteristics using a broad sample of firms over the 8 year period from 1996 to 2003. We find that board independence and monitoring is negatively related to firm risk in the absence of external regulation. In addition, we find that external regulatory and political pressures affect the level of board monitoring, especially after the increased focus on board composition by the stock exchanges beginning in 1999 and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act. We find that the sensitivity of the negative relationship between board monitoring and firm risk decreases in the post 1999 period suggesting that firms have increased board monitoring in response to external regulations. We also find that these external regulations have had an asymmetrical impact on high-risk firm. In our empirical analysis we also control for other factors that affect board monitoring and find that firms in which the CEO has longer tenure and greater equity ownership have less board monitoring activity and that there is a negative relationship between the level of board monitoring and the level of shareholder rights.      

Context matters to explain field experiments: Results from Colombian and Thai fishing villages

During the last decade, field experiments regarding the study of common pool resource governance have been performed that replicated earlier findings of laboratory experiments. One of the questions is how the decisions made by participants in rural communities are influenced by their experience. This paper presents the results of field experiments in Colombia and Thailand on fishery resources. Context information is derived from the communities via in-depth interviews, surveys and role playing exercises. The use of different methodological tools allowed to link decisions in field experiments with contextual variables for two fishery villages. Explanation of core variables in social dilemmas is given, the degree of cooperation levels, preferred rules, rule compliance and enforcement. Main findings include: i) fishermen made decisions in the field experiments that reflected their own experience and context, ii) agreements for rule crafting are possible only under specific conditions that guarantees livelihoods and sustainability, iii) the broader context determines cooperation levels at a local level, iv) inequalities in the sanctioning of rule breakers decrease the possibilities of reaching cooperation agreements, and v) high levels of trust among local fishermen is not a sufficient condition for resource sustainability, when trust in external rule makers and enforcers is low.     

Truth,Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games*

We have conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and institutional choice on truth‐telling and trust in sender–receiver games. We find that in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction predominantly after having trusted lies. Individuals who sanction are responsible for truth‐telling beyond standard equilibrium predictions, and they are more likely to choose the sanctioning institution. Sanctioning and non‐sanctioning institutions coexist if their choice is endogenous, and the former shows a higher level of truth‐telling but lower material payoffs. Our experimental findings are consistent with logit agent quantal response equilibrium with two distinct groups of individuals: one consisting of subjects who experience non‐monetary lying costs as senders and non‐monetary costs when being lied to as receivers, and the other consisting of payoff maximizers.     

To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning

In this paper, we characterize optimal regulatory policies composed of a pollution standard, a probability of inspection and a fine for non-compliance, in a context where both monitoring and sanctioning are socially costly, and the penalty may include gravity and non-gravity components at the regulator’s discretion. Under given penalties, the optimal policy entails compliance with the standard as long as a quite intuitive condition is met. Non-compliant policies may include standards even below the pollution levels that minimize the sum of abatement costs and external damages. Interestingly, the appropriate structure of the penalty under non-compliance is highly progressive, while the best possible shape of the fine under compliance is linear. If the regulator is entitled to choose the structure of the fine, linear penalties are socially preferred and the optimal policy induces compliance.      

The Cost-Effective Choice of Policy Instruments to Cap Aggregate Emissions with Costly Enforcement

We study the cost-effectiveness of inducing compliance in a program that caps aggregate emissions of a given pollutant from a set of heterogeneous firms based on emissions standards and the relative cost-effectiveness of such a program with respect to an optimally designed program based on tradable discharge permits. Our analysis considers abatement, monitoring and sanctioning costs, as well as perfect and imperfect information on the part of the regulator with regard to the polluters’ abatement costs. Under perfect information we find that (a) the total-cost-effective design of a program based on standards is one in which the standards are firm specific and perfectly enforced, and (b) the total cost of an optimally designed program based on standards is lower than the total cost of an optimally designed transferable emission permits system, except under special conditions. This is true when it is optimum to induce perfect compliance and when it is not. Under imperfect information, nevertheless, it is only by implementing a system of tradable permits and perfectly enforcing it with a constant marginal penalty tied to the price of the permits, that the regulator can surmount the informational problem and at the same time minimize the total cost of the program with certainty.     

The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia

We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban–rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. An important reason is that there is punishment of contributors in all four subject pools. Thus, punishment can also undermine the scope for self-governance in the sense of high levels of voluntary cooperation that are sustained by sanctioning free riders only.     

“绿色信贷”执行效率与地方政府行为

中国在转变经济增长方式的背景下开展的"绿色信贷"业务加大了对环保项目的扶持和对环境污染项目或企业的打击。但在粗放型增长模式下的经济核算体系与地方官员政绩考核体系的矛盾导致地方保护主义和地方政府在环境保护方面缺位;低效信息传导和环境监管致使"绿色信贷"执行不力。分析地方政府与商业银行的博弈,在不同发展观及制度安排下效用函数改变后政府行为及其影响下的"绿色信贷"开展的外部条件,从可持续发展角度提出转变政府职能是提高环保执行效率的途径。     

外部风险对中国地方政府规模的影响

本文利用我国28个省市区1978—2006年的数据,分析了我国外部风险对地方政府规模的影响。研究发现,在当前我国更为开放的市场经济中,外部风险导致了地方政府规模的扩大,且外部风险与社会保障和社会福利支出显著正相关。为了抵御外部风险,必须把一部分经济资源配置到政府部门,以增加社会保障和社会福利等方面的支出。     

中小企业信贷市场的监控研究——基于信息和产品差异化模型

中小企业信用缺损成为中小企业陷入融资困境并制约其发展的重要原因,但中小企业信贷市场风险高,对中小企业信贷市场的监控便成为研究的重要课题.银行监控中小企业信贷市场的有效途径之一是对借主的事前监控.构建监控模型和产品差异化模型在于银行利用资源在发放贷款之前监测企业,通过银行获取信息或者在市场力(产品差异化)投资模型的分析表明两种选择产生不同的预测,即银行加大分支机构和人力资本的投入,有利于提高信息获取的范围以及信息获取的准确性,但对市场力增长不显著;银行对借主资金交易的管理有利于提高借贷风险控制能力.     

Pollution standards, technology investment and fines for non-compliance

In this paper, we analyze whether it is socially desirable that fines for exceeding pollution standards depend not only on the degree of non-compliance but also on technology investment efforts by the polluting firms. For that purpose, we consider a partial equilibrium framework where a representative firm chooses the investment effort and the pollution level in response to an environmental policy composed of a pollution standard, an inspection probability and a fine for non-compliance. We find that the fine should strictly decrease with the investment effort when (i) there are administrative costs of sanctioning; (ii) the optimal policy induces non-compliance; and (iii) either the fine is sufficiently convex in the degree of non-compliance or the investment effort decreases marginal abatement costs significantly.     

The relations among accounting conservatism,institutional investors and earnings manipulation

Most scholars have indicated corporations using accounting conservatism to reduce earnings manipulation, although certain scholars believe that firms have more incentive to increase earnings manipulation. Institutional investors play an important external monitoring role, and affect firm's earnings manipulation. Previous studies adopted accruals as an earnings manipulation proxy to detect the relationship among accounting conservatism, institutional investor shareholdings, and earnings manipulation. We further investigate the relationship among accounting conservatism, institutional investor shareholdings, and earnings manipulation by using Benford's law. Our results indicate that firms with more conservative financial reporting have less probability of engaging in earnings-manipulative activities. We also find the negative association between earnings management and institutional investor shareholdings. However, if corporate financial statements tend toward conservatism, institutional investor shareholdings could increase managers' incentive to manage earnings. Our findings have important implications for investors to make investment decisions.     

The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract

A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat of punishment can curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enterprises. Since punishment is often costly, however, this raises an issue of second-order free-riding: indeed, the sanctioning system itself is a common good which can be exploited. Most investigations, so far, considered peer punishment: players could impose fines on those who exploited them, at a cost to themselves. Only a minority considered so-called pool punishment. In this scenario, players contribute to a punishment pool before engaging in the joint enterprise, and without knowing who the free-riders will be. Theoretical investigations (Sigmund et al., Nature 466:861–863, 2010) have shown that peer punishment is more efficient, but pool punishment more stable. Social learning, i.e., the preferential imitation of successful strategies, should lead to pool punishment if sanctions are also imposed on second-order free-riders, but to peer punishment if they are not. Here we describe an economic experiment (the Mutual Aid game) which tests this prediction. We find that pool punishment only emerges if second-order free riders are punished, but that peer punishment is more stable than expected. Basically, our experiment shows that social learning can lead to a spontaneously emerging social contract, based on a sanctioning institution to overcome the free rider problem.     

Leverage,managerial monitoring and firm valuation: A simultaneous equation approach

The paper examines how leverage and managerial ownership relate to firm valuation. It is argued that both leverage (which serves as an external monitoring function) and managerial ownership (which serves as an internal monitoring function) affect firm value, while internal monitoring by managers and external monitoring through debt were viewed as substitutes or complements. After controlling for the effect of exogenous variables, the results reveal the existence of a substitution monitoring effect between debt and the managerial group. Additionally, firm valuation is found to exert a significant influence on managerial ownership and vice versa. Robustness tests indicate a weak but growing role of bank debt as a disciplinary mechanism.     

Analyst following and pay-performance sensitivity: evidence from China

We examine whether analyst following is associated with pay-performance sensitivity in China. Based on our analyses of 17,020 Chinese firm-years from 2007 to 2015, we find that pay-performance sensitivity is higher when companies are followed by financial analysts. We also find that the analyst following/pay-performance sensitivity relationship is stronger for non-state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than for SOEs. Overall, our results indicate that companies followed by financial analysts exhibit more pay-performance-sensitivity, which is consistent the notion that financial analysts can serve an external monitoring role.     

Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street‐Level Bureaucracies*

Many street‐level bureaucrats have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of a street‐level bureaucracy, and we study the implications of its personnel policy on the self‐selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay‐for‐performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but it necessitates an increase in compensation, which can result in sorting from the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also explain why street‐level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients.     

Daily Business and External Condition Indices for the Australian Economy

We estimate an unobservable domestic business conditions index for Australia using a variety of observable macroeconomic and financial variables, relating it to an unobservable external index involving external variables relevant to Australia. Our small open economy, dynamic factor model uses stock and flow variables arriving at mixed frequencies. We find important links between the domestic and external indices, consistent with the small open economy assumption.     

Knowledge spillovers,absorptive capacity and total factor productivity in China’s manufacturing firms

Applying the stochastic frontier framework, this study explores the diffusion and absorption of technological knowledge in China’s manufacturing firms, based on a panel of more than 10,000 local and foreign-invested firms over the period 1998–2001. Our empirical approach allows us to distinguish between technological progress (TP) and technical efficiency (TE) in analysing whether R&D, exports and the presence of foreign direct investment simultaneously enhance TP through knowledge spillovers in a single framework and whether different types of domestic absorptive capacity moderate external knowledge spillovers in relation to TE. The results show that there are positive inter-industry productivity spillovers from R&D and foreign presence, whereas evidence of intra-industry productivity spillovers from FDI to Chinese firms is less robust. We find evidence that absorptive capacity is one of the key determinants to quantitatively explain intra-industry differences in productivity of local Chinese firms. The findings have important policy implications.