社会资本在农村集体经济改革中的演变与构建

狭义上的社会资本指网络关系、社会规范以及信任程度,中国农村集体经济在这些方面具有不同于西方国家的特点。论文分析了在中国改革开放这一制度变迁的过程中社会资本发生变化的机理及其对农村集体经济的影响。根据理论研究提出应重构农村集体经济社会资本,这对于建设和谐社会、实现经济转型和提高农民收入等具有重意义。政策含义是：培育农村经济中介和社会中介组织,建立发挥合作经济的作用,明确供销社和信用社合作性质,同时,基层政府和社区的互动应该有边界。     

Management of common property resources: Limits to voluntary collective action

This paper finds that the voluntary collective action may be an alternative to market and government in the management of common property resources. In developing countries, the people's capabilities to harness the preserved commons and the fairness in the appropriation of benefits from them are the limits on the voluntary collective action. It shows that collective action is possible if an outside agency plays the role of a catalyst in mitigating these limits. It also shows that there can be mutually beneficial sharing arrangements between government and village communities for the management of local forest resources. The standard result that common and state property resources turn into open access resources as population grows also holds good for the natural resources jointly managed by government and people.     

略论自然资源产权界定的多维视角

经济学理论表明,产权制度对资源配置效率与公平至关重要。由产权理论和资源经济学理论可知,有效率的资源产权应该权能完整,按是否具有可排他性、可竞用性和公益需要,分别将资源产权界定为个人、社区集体和国家所有,并与社会传统、道德和伦理观念相一致。资源产权是公民生存与发展的保证,应保障每个人拥有相对平等的资源产权或资源开发受益权。对非国有资源产权权能加以限制,及征收生态环境税和资源收益税,能够有效实现资源开发利用社会目标;非公有资源产权可通过股份合作形成资源的社会所有制。     

从“管水协会”案例看民间协会的集体行动机制

局部区域性共享资源的治理应当以社区自治为主,政府间接支持为辅的方式。由于共享资源的性质决定了社区自治是集体行动的性质,因此需要围绕协会的组织与领导实现共享资源治理中的成本投入与分摊以及收益的分享。以协会的组织和契约性规则为正式制度,结合以互惠合作为核心的群体规范等非正式制度共同构成"管水协会"这类民间协会的集体行动机制,实现共享资源的社区自治。     

The role for policy in common pool groundwater use

We consider a model of intertemporal common pool groundwater use with substitutable irrigation technology and declining yields from groundwater stocks where pumping cost/stock externalities arise from the usual common property problem. We contrast competitive and optimal allocations and examine the role of substitutable irrigation capital vis-a-vis the effectuation of efficient methods as well as levels of resource use. A case study involving groundwater use in New Mexico illustrates the procedures and considers the efficacy of some simple policy options regarding the amelioration of inefficiencies.     

关于集体经济的若干看法

“劳动力产权”的涵不应是“劳动力拥有资本产权”,而应是“摆脱了附属地位的劳动者对自己劳动力的拥有”。改革使劳动者拥有自己的劳动力,但这不是集体企业产权改革的内容,不能用“劳动力产权”论指导集体企业的产权改革。“劳动力资本”将不能兼存的两个事物扯在一起,可能根本破坏市场秩序。集体企业改革采用股份合作制形式,解决了传统集体企业产权虚置的问题,但也在企业的公有性质中加入了私有因素。这决定了改革后的集体企业可以参加市场竞争,但在内部又具有互助共济性质。集体经济难以成为市场经济下的基本经济形态,但可发挥帮助和扶持社会弱势群体,执行政府社会福利政策的长处与优点。不应认为集体经济所占比重越高越好。     

SOCIAL CAPITAL,GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE OF ETHIOPIAN COFFEE COOPERATIVES

ABSTRACT: The performance of agrarian cooperatives strongly depends on the interaction between internal cohesion and external exchange. Empirical assessments of social capital and trust within cooperatives suggest that market involvement could enhance collective action. This relationship may not hold, however, under circumstances of heterogeneous membership and strong state control. We use field data from a comparative sample of 500 coffee farmers belonging to five cooperatives of Sidama Cooperative Union, Ethiopia to outline how differences in economic performance are related to the structure of social networks. We identify clear trade‐offs between bonding and bridging social capital that favour remotely located cooperatives.     

村民投资村级公共物品的实践与理性思考

村民投资村级公共物品的前提是具有共同的利益,但共同利益的实现依赖于集体行动困境的有效破解.即克服搭便车问题。良好的村庄社会资本为投资行为提供了社会环境和基础,尤其是村庄精英及以其为中心形成的网络为村民投资的形成有积极的组织和动员作用;内部激励机制是村民投资的社会基础,能有效克服集体行动中的搭便车行为。     

Valuing nature: From environmental impacts to natural capital

Economic valuation of natural and environmental assets is now a well established practice. Economic analysis provides several methods for discovering the impact on social welfare associated with changes in the ability of these assets to provide different goods and services. In general terms, these valuation exercises have been performed in the framework of Environmental Impact Assessment or, more generally, Cost Benefit Analysis. There is, however, an increasing demand nowadays to go beyond this framework and to value natural capital (natural resource stocks, land and ecosystems) as such. There are two main reasons for this new demand. On the one hand, sustainability requires that proper account should be taken of capital depreciation and, therefore, there is a need to value natural capital changes. This valuation process, nevertheless, only makes sense when some kind of substitution between natural and other forms of capital is allowed. On the other hand, there is also an increasing tendency to demand that the stock of natural capital present in a given territory be valued, either to discover one of the main components of social wealth or to help adequately plan changes in land use. Yet, whereas conventional valuation methods are probably adequate to fulfill the first task, this is less true in the case of the second, while even more difficulties arise in connection with the third one. Even if at first sight the process appears conceptually identical, these tasks are of a different order of magnitude, as the experience of both the World Bank and the Statistics Division of the United Nations in this respect clearly shows.     

Collective management of residential housing in Russia: The importance of being social

Homeowners associations (HOAs) implement collective management in residential housing. We assess the performance of such associations in Russia by using the stochastic frontier technique. Cultural traits enabling tenants to make proper use of the HOA decision-making procedures are essential for resolving the collective action problem and ensure accountability of governing bodies and outside contractors. Such “technical civic competence” has a stronger impact on HOA performance than more conventional forms of social capital which rise in their significance when HOA governance breaks down and informal grassroots alternatives are mobilized instead. Massive and indiscriminate “supply-led” introduction of collective management in residential housing without matching cultural and institutional prerequisites could be counterproductive. Flexibility, freedom of choice, and market development are required to avert the failures of HOAs commonly observed in Russia.     

Governance,resources and growth

Using a large sample of 50 oil exporting countries, we extend the prior literature by examining the role of quality of governance (QOG) on economic growth under the condition of heterogeneity and cross-sectional independence in errors. We document that QOG is by far the most consistent driver of economic growth both in the long- and short-run. Our result is robust to an alternative and an inverse measure of QOG. We also investigate a number of mediating factors contributing the QOG and economic growth linkage. We show that the long-run positive effect of QOG on economic growth is stronger in countries with higher information communication technology (ICT) diffusion; and such effect works only in countries with higher social capital, economic globalization, and financial development (FD). We also show that the ‘resource curse’ or ‘resource blessing’ debate in growth literature is sensitive to methodological choices.     

Environmental variability and collective action: Experimental insights from an irrigation game

Studies of collective action in commons dilemmas in social–ecological systems typically focus on scenarios in which actors all share symmetric (or similar) positions in relation to the common-pool resource. Many common social–ecological systems do not meet these criteria, most notably, irrigation systems. Participants in irrigation systems must solve two related collective action problems: 1) the provisioning of physical infrastructure necessary to utilize the resource (water), and 2) the asymmetric common-pool resource dilemma where the relative positions of “head-enders” and “tail-enders” generate asymmetric access to the resource itself (water). In times of scarcity, head-enders have an incentive to not share water with tail-enders. Likewise, tail-enders have an incentive to not provide labor to maintain the system if they do not receive water. These interdependent incentives may induce a cooperative outcome under favorable conditions. However, how robust is this system of interdependent incentives in the presence of environmental variability that generates uncertainty about water availability either through variation in the water supply itself or through shocks to infrastructure? This paper reports on results from laboratory experiments designed to address this question.     

General Equilibrium Tragedy of the Commons

Many poor economies depend on open access resources for their livelihoods. Households in resource-based economies allocate their time and other factors between resource extraction and other activities. As a result, factors may shift from one sector to another as marginal returns change. This has two important implications. First, it implies potentially strong linkages between resource and non-resource sectors. Second, it means that unmanaged resources cause inefficient allocations of inputs across all sectors, and the effects of resource management spill into other sectors. We construct a local general equilibrium model that accounts for inputs that over-allocate to an open access resource and create a general equilibrium tragedy of the commons. This model describes resource rent dissipation more adequately in economies with mobile factors than a model with slowly dissipating rents. Perfectly mobile factors dissipate rent in every period, but endogenous wages cause labor and capital allocations to change with the resource stock. We use the model to illustrate medium-run impacts of a limit on capital in an artisanal fishery in Honduras. Simulation results reveal that fishery management has economy-wide impacts on prices and wages. Managers in developing countries thus should consider these linkages when implementing policies to conserve fish stocks.     

Methods of pricing common property use and some implications for optimal child-bearing and the social discount rate

Each individual consumes a numeraire capital-consumption good, harvests “fish” from a common property resource, and makes child-bearing and capital bequest decisions in her one-period life. The model is developed in a way that traces the physical impacts of harvest choices across generations. Consistent with previous results in models with pollution, it is shown that the efficient resolution of the stock externality can be accomplished by a combination of Pigouvian harvest and a child-bearing tax. Results are extended to show that the creation of asset-like individual transferable quotas (ITQs) induces efficient harvest and child-bearing decisions without a child-bearing tax. Clarifying previous results, it is shown that the social discount rate is equal to the common net-of-Pigouvian-tax rate of return on capital in both industries.     

Wealth inequality and collective action

We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups.     

Social capital and social learning after Hurricane Sandy

The post-disaster context is one characterized by profound uncertainty. Those affected by the storm, or earthquake, or flood, must determine what strategies to pursue in response to the disaster and must find ways to coordinate their recovery efforts with others in their community. Ex ante it is not clear what strategies will be most effective. If communities are to recover after a disaster, community members must engender and engage in a process of social learning involving experimentation, communication, and imitation. This paper explores the post-disaster social learning process. Specifically, we focus on the importance of social capital in facilitating social learning after a disaster, including facilitating community members’ ability to communicate their desire to return, to assess damage, to overcome barriers to rebuilding through collective yet voluntary action, and to learn from and imitate others’ successes. Focusing on how this process took place after Hurricane Sandy in Rockaway, New York, especially within the Orthodox Jewish community, we examine how community groups (a) adapted existing organization structures and (b) created new procedures and imitated the successful actions of others in order to spur recovery.     

心理资本与战略人力资源管理

本文分析了心理资本的内涵,比较了其与人力资本、社会资本的差异,并探讨了战略人力资源管理和心理资本的联系,提出了以创新性战略人力资源管理实践培育和开发心理资本的途径。     

Capital Gains and Income Arising from Nonrenewable Resources

Should capital gains be included in income arising from nonrenewable resources? In the present paper, I show that capital gains from a nonrenewable resource can be divided into two terms: real price change effects and real interest rate change effects. By application of sectoral income theory developed by Asheim and Wei (Environ Res Econ 42:65–87, 2009), only the former term is part of real income of the resource and the latter term should not be included. This result is significant in the sense that all change in real resource wealth can be included as part of real income only if future real interest rates are assumed to be constant. Hotelling rule always implies that capital gains from nonrenewable resources coincide with real interests on resource wealth; net investment generated from the resource cancels out current cash flow from the resource; and real income comes from price change effects.