Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

Nonlinear behavior of the socio-economic dynamics for lake eutrophication control

To succeed in combating lake eutrophication, cooperation of local inhabitants, small factories, and farmers in reducing phosphorus discharge is very important. But the willingness of each player to cooperate would depend on the cooperation of other players and on the level of environmental concern of the society in general. Here we study the integrated dynamics of people's choice of behavior and the magnitude of eutrophication. Assumptions are: there are a number of players who choose between alternative options: a cooperative and environment-oriented option is more costly than the other. The decision of each player is affected by “social pressure” as well as by economical cost of the options. The lake pollution increases with the total phosphorus released, and a high pollution level in the lake would enhance the social pressure. The model includes a positive and a negative feedback loops which create diverse dynamical behavior. The model often shows bistability — having an equilibrium with a high level of cooperation among people and clean water, and the other equilibrium with low cooperation and polluted water, which are simultaneously stable. The model also shows fluctuation between a high and a low levels of cooperation in alternating years, cycle with a longer periodicity, or chaotic fluctuation. Conservatism of people stabilizes the system and sometimes helps maintaining cooperation. The system may show unexpected parameter dependence — the improved phosphorus removing efficiency might make water more polluted if it causes the decline in the environmental concern and cooperation among people.     

Evolutionary game dynamics and distributed recency-weighted learning

This paper presents a relationship between evolutionary game dynamics and distributed recency-weighted Monte Carlo learning. After reviewing some existing theories of replicator dynamics and agent-based Monte Carlo learning, we provide proofs of the formulation-level equivalence between these two models. The relationship will be revealed not only from a theoretical viewpoint, but also by computational simulations of the models. As a consequence, macro dynamic patterns generated by distributed micro-decisions can be explained by parameters defined at an individual level. In particular, given the equivalent formulations, we investigate how the rate of agents’ recency weighting in learning affects the emergent evolutionary game dynamic patterns. An increase in this rate negatively affects the inertia, making the evolutionary stability condition more strict, and positively affecting the evolutionary speed toward equilibrium.JEL Classification: C63, C73Supervisions and advice given by Arthur J. Caplan have greatly contributed to this paper. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments redirecting my presentation to a more appropriate one.     

矿区生态经济系统中的利益冲突分析

矿区作为生态经济系统的一个有机载体,存在不同的经济组织和利益群体.这些利益群体之问的利益整体水平和获取利益的能力有较大的差异,由此引发了不同利益群体之间的利益冲突.本文以经济博奕论理论为基础,运用F-H分析法构造了非量化的矿区博弈分析模型,详细分析了矿区生态经济系统中利益冲突的可能结局,并得出了维护矿区生态经济利益的关键在于矿区所在地的政府和环保执法部门执法力度的结论.     

Coexistence of Strategies and Culturally-Specific Common Knowledge: An Evolutionary Analysis

We analyze social dynamics in a continuous population where randomly matched individuals have to choose between two pure strategies only ('cooperate' (C) and 'not cooperate' (NC)). Individual payoffs associated with the possible outcomes of each interaction may differ across groups, depending on the specific social and cultural context to which each agent belongs. In particular, it is assumed that three sub-populations are initially present, 'framing' the game according to the prisoner's dilemma (PD), assurance game (AG) and other regarding (OR) payoff configurations, respectively. In other words, we assume that common knowledge about the payoffs of the game is 'culturally-specific'. In this context, we examine both the adoption process of strategies C and NC within each sub-population and the diffusion process of 'types' (PD, AG and OR) within the overall community. On the basis of an evolutionary game-theoretic approach, the paper focuses on the problem of coexistence of PD, AG and OR groups as well as of 'nice' (C) and 'mean' (NC) strategies. We show that coexistence between C and NC is possible in the heterogeneous community under examination, even if it is ruled out in homogeneous communities where only one of the three types is present. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The brief history of game theory and the dissemination in China

After the year of 1944, Von Neumann and Morgenstem published the book ＂Theory of Games and Economic Behavior＂, the game theory had gradually become an emerging discipline. At present, game theory has already penetrated to every industry and widespread application in economy, politics and military and so on. The paper introduces the history and the developed situation of game theory about the foreign and domestic state.     

基于生态视角的旅游业与生态环境博弈研究

旅游行业的快速发展给经济社会带来了积极效应,但是也给生态环境造成了巨大压力。以旅游发展和环境保护的博弈关系研究为出发点,以政府和旅游企业作为博弈主体,通过引入政府的生态环境治理奖惩制度,并且结合模型求解和仿真实验进行博弈分析。研究结论为:一是旅游企业转型成本和收益之比决定其绿色转型的决策意愿;二是政府的环保监管决策主要基于监督成本与污染处罚收益之比;三是政府和旅游企业之间的博弈是长期的,双方最终的选择策略与其最初策略密切相关。基于上述结论,文章建议作为发展和环保博弈的推动者,政府部门要着眼制定长远政策,加快建设健全奖罚结合的机制,帮助和引导旅游企业绿色转型。     

社会困境中的社会建设——以成都市为例

基于博弈论和社会心理学的基础,首先说明了社会建设能够调和个人利益和整体利益,眼前利益和长远利益之间的矛盾,随后介绍社会困境的含义,旨在说明社会建设本质上就是为了解决社会困境,接着将社会困境分为多人困境和两人困境,并分别介绍了相应的解决办法,最后详细介绍了成都市社会建设举措能调解社会困境的价值,处理好效率与公平的关系。     

言息科技革命与反垄断法的冲突——微软公司VS．美国司法部案例分析

科技进步所诱发的信息革命给我们经济、法律、文化、伦理等社会关系造成了巨大的冲击。其中,建立于传统经济运行模式基础上的监管规制(尤其是反垄断法)在信息时代中显得难以应付,这集中表现于美国司法部与微软公司的世纪之诉中。因此,通过分析微软公司的案例,指出了反垄断立法背后的理论基础并不能囊括信息时代企业的竞争行为,因此有必要研究与信息经济时代特征相适应的反垄断立法。     

中央与地方政府在地质灾害防治投资中的决策行为研究

目前,我国地质灾害防治资金绝大部分是由中央政府承担,调动地方政府投资积极性,强化地方政府的投资责任,是中央政府面临的一个重要问题。文章运用博弈理论,建立博弈模型,对我国中央与地方在地质灾害防治投资中确定投资份额的决策行为进行了分析,最后提出地方政府应成为防灾减灾的主导者。     

乡村旅游地产品差异化经营不足的深层原因透析——基于产权经济理论和农民行动理论的双重视角

根据乡村旅游地产品差异化经营不足的现实,首先从供给、需求以及政府规制角度对乡村旅游产品差异化经营不足的一般性原因进行分析。在此基础上,结合我国乡村旅游地的社会经济实际,从产权经济理论和农民行动理论的双重视角出发对乡村旅游地产品差异化经营不足的原因展开分析。研究指出:我国土地资源产权制度的缺失及乡村旅游资源的公共池塘资源特征使得乡村旅游经营者很难在产品差异化经营的道路上取得根本性突破。乡村旅游地的熟人社会关系使创新者难于对产品差异化经营成果实施有效保护,产品差异化经营面对的高交易成本使农民在权衡利弊后最终选择模仿或抄袭创新者。     

供应链战略联盟的信息共享研究——以零售业供应链为例

随着时代的发展和市场竞争的加剧,供应链中的某些企业不再单独作为供应链中的一个个体而存在,而是逐渐形成了供应链中的战略联盟,他们之间同时存在着竞争与合作。而随着供应链管理的研究深入,供应链企业间的信息共享变得越来越重要。虽然现代信息技术的发展为企业间的信息共享构建了必要的基础平台,但是依然存在着信息技术以外的原因影响企业间的信息共享。本文在总结前人工作的基础上,运用博弈论,以零售业供应链为例,分析了供应链战略联盟的企业间竞争与合作并存情况下的信息共享,并给出了实现信息共享的对策。     

Trust and reciprocity in inter-individual versus inter-group interactions: The effects of social influence, group dynamics, and perspective biases

Using an experimental trust game, I examine whether the perspectives and behavior of group representatives and consensus groups differ from those of the same individuals in an analogous inter-individual situation. A primary goal of this research is to extend past work on trust and reciprocity by examining the impact of the social contexts within which social interactions are characteristically embedded. Specifically, this research concerns whether norms and dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in the contexts of inter-individual and inter-group interactions. First, I examine whether dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in various inter-group interactions where inter-group decisions are operationalized as 1) autonomous group representatives, i.e., individuals who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making a decision on behalf of a three-person group engaging with a group representative of another such group; and 2) consensus groups, i.e., group members making a consensus trust or reciprocity decision for their groups via a collective process with another such group. Results of these studies show that 1) people trust less and reciprocate less when responsible for a group or organizational decision as autonomous group representatives; 2) consensus groups do not differ from individuals in their level of trust but show dramatically less reciprocity. The group consensus mechanism in fact produced by far the lowest reciprocity level, significantly lower than that exhibited by either individuals or autonomous group representatives. Thus, inter-group trust and reciprocity dynamics are not readily inferable from their inter-individual counterparts. Moreover, an important implication is emerging here: the extent and direction of the discrepancy between individual and group choices in regard to trust and reciprocity levels and possibly other social preferences in general may depend importantly on the precise details of the group decision-making mechanism, for example whether decisions are made consensually, by majority vote, or by a group leader or representative. In addition to examining the level of trust and reciprocity that occur in these various situations, I also studied, using both behavioral and questionnaire data, the roles of self-interest, social influence, and group dynamics in trust and reciprocity perceptions and behavior. The results showed that there exist discrepancies between behavioral forecasts and the actual behavior, and that trusting behavior is driven strongly by expectation of level of reciprocation, while reciprocating behavior is driven strongly by the difference between trust expectation and actual trust received.     

新农村发展绿色建筑激励约束机制设计

在介绍绿色建筑概念的基础上,分析了现阶段新农村发展绿色建筑的必要性,研究了新农村发展绿色建筑的激励约束机制问题,然后根据激励约束机制设计理论的基本观点,对新农村发展绿色建筑的激励约束机制进行了定性分析,提出政府应建立严密的行政监管体系,制订适合的激励约束政策和法律法规,采取多样化的激励手段,进行多角度的激励约束等建议。     

房地产调控中政府行为博弈分析——中央政府和地方政府

自1998年我国房地产市场改革以来,房地产业迅速发展,现已成为国民经济的支柱产业,与此同时,商品房价格一路飙升,各地房价不断创下新高。面对房价飞涨,中央政府出台了一系列房地产调控政策,但房价依然居高不下,主要原因之一在于调控政策的实施受到来自各方的阻力,以地方政府最为突出。本文基于博弈视角探讨了中央政府与地方政府在房地产调控中的行为特征,在分析双方博弈动机的基础上,构建了博弈模型,进而研究了双方博弈的内在机制,得出中央政府的最优策略为严格监督地方政府对调控政策的执行,杜绝地方政府的抵制行为,而地方政府获利的行为则是抵制中央政府的各种调控政策,并且为了取得成功常常采取变相抵制措施。最后,本文分别针对中央政府和地方政府提出了政策建议,以期中央政府与地方政府能够达成合作博弈,更好地促进我国房地产行业的发展。     

流动社会的流动治理:国家和社会关系的视角——基于川中S市的实证研究

中国社会变迁导致的"双重流动"和"分离运动"对传统社会管理模式形成了挑战,为此,来自地方的社会管理创新通过"统筹"、"嵌入"、"服务"、"组织"和"跟踪"等措施对此进行了应对。文章认为,从国家和社会关系的角度来看,社会管理创新是通过国家的回归来实现的,它意味着国家和社会关系的重新调整,是政府的再造和社会的重组。     

高校科研团队冲突、行为整合与绩效的关系

高校创新型科研团队冲突划分为关系冲突、任务冲突和过程冲突三个维度;高校创新型科研团队行为整合也包括联合决策、开放沟通和团队合作三个维度。目前对高校科研团队的研究集中于团队冲突对团队绩效的直接影响,忽视了对团队冲突与团队绩效之间的中介变量进行深入探讨。本文在理论分析的基础上提出了高校创新型科研团队行为整合对团队冲突与团队绩效关系的中介作用假设,采用问卷调查的方式收集数据,运用统计方法对假设进行了实证检验。一方面在一定程度上丰富了团队冲突直接作用于团队绩效的研究;另一方面也对建设高校科研团队提供了一些有参考价值的意见。研究结果显示：联合决策、开放沟通和团队合作在关系冲突与团队绩效之间具有完全的中介作用、在任务冲突与团队绩效之间具有部分的中介作用,在过程冲突与团队绩效之间不具有中介作用。     

The dynamics of university-industry-government relationships in Nanoscience: investigating the Triple-Helix differences between Iran and Switzerland

This study aims to find the differences between national and international relationships in Iran and Switzerland’s Nanoscience research between 2008–2015. The results show significant differences some of which are attributed to the general dichotomy of developed-developing countries like stronger University-Industry-Government relations in Switzerland; but others are not, especially those pertaining to bilateral relations. In summary, the Government-Industry relations in Switzerland are generally closer in this field because the emerging characteristics of Nanoscience call for more state intervention, even in the context of developed countries. Greater Government-University relations in Iran can be explained by referring to the structure of national innovation system of this country. However, the no significant differences between University-Industry relations result needs further research so that it may in turn lead to improvements of the triple-helix calculations. Lastly, some theoretical implications and further research directions are suggested at the end.     

Determinants of control structure choice between entrepreneurs and investors in venture capital-backed startups

This study examines two kinds of control structures in venture capital-backed startups. Based on incomplete contracting theory, we analyze the influence of various factors on these control structures in venture capital models, from the perspectives of investors, entrepreneurs, and startups. In particular, we show how factors such as bargaining power, monitoring costs, private benefits, and risk aversion impact the allocation of control rights. Using the survey data on a heterogeneous group of venture capital-backed startups in China, we empirically examine the impacts of various factors on the control structures of these enterprises. Based on the full sample of enterprises, we find that the stronger the venture capitalist’s bargaining power and the higher the monitoring costs, the more likely investors and entrepreneurs are to prefer joint control. Further, the greater the entrepreneur’s financing need and private benefits, the more likely investors and entrepreneurs are to choose joint control. High-tech startups are more likely to choose a joint control model than those in traditional industries. This is especially true for high-tech startups at an early stage of development. In addition, for high-tech startups, the probability of choosing joint control shows a negative relationship with investors’ strategic benefits and a positive relationship with investors’ risk aversion. Regarding startups in traditional industries, investors’ strategic benefits and risk aversion have an insignificant impact on their control structures.     

Institutional Endowments and the Lithuanian Holding as Innovative Network: A Problem of Institutional Compatibility in the Baltic Sea Area

Post-socialist Lithuania had an undeveloped banking, a weak network commitment, and a resilient nomenklatura. An evolutionary Crossroads game shows that this made the nomenklatura bank convention stronger than the capitalist bank convention. In the nomenklatura bank convention, rent-seeking behavior decreases network commitment and thereby the effect of network complexity, thus making learning-by-financing weaker. This created a problem of institutional compatibility of bank-industry networks in the Baltic Sea Area during Lithuania's first voucher stage of privatization that might be overcome by foreign direct investment initiated in her second hard currency stage.