Irreversible abatement investment under cost uncertainties: tradable emission permits and emissions charges

A major concern with tradable emission permits is that stochastic permit prices may reduce a firm’s incentive to invest in abatement capital or technologies relative to other policies such as a fixed emissions charge. However, under efficient permit trading, the permit price uncertainty is caused by abatement cost uncertainties which affect investment under both permit and charge policies. We develop a rational expectations general equilibrium model of permit trading and irreversible abatement investment to show how cost uncertainties affect investment under permits. We compare the resulting investment incentive with that under charges. After controlling for the assumption that random shocks affect the abatement cost linearly, we find that firms’ investment incentive decreases in cost uncertainties, but more so under emissions charges than under permits. Therefore, tradable permits in fact may help maintain firms’ investment incentive under uncertainty.     

Graded eco-labels: A demand-oriented approach to reduce pollution

Supplied oriented environmental policies are generally used in order to limit production related pollution. This fact is based on the hypothesis that consumers are not willing to sacrifice personal utility for a wider social gain. We suggest that widespread environmental concerns of consumers can be exploited to push producers along cleaner technological patterns. Our core assumption is that consumers would be ready to purchase cleaner products if the products' characteristics are not ‘too dissimilar’ to those of more polluting alternatives. However, due to a lack of information about non-observable product characteristics, this assumption on its own is not sufficient for ‘environmental friendly’ producers to become competitive. We show - by means of a simulation model - that only if consumers are provided with appropriate information on the greenness of products through adequate eco-labels (graded eco-labels), then producers will be pressed to implement innovations aimed at reducing the environmental impact of their products. Under two test settings - one without any certification and another with binary eco-labels - the model shows markets characterised by highly polluting technological patterns. Only in the presence of graded eco-labels, competition drives the market toward cleaner technological patterns.     

Learning or lock-in: Optimal technology policies to support mitigation

We investigate conditions that amplify market failures in energy innovations, and suggest optimal policy instruments to address them. Using an intertemporal general equilibrium model we show that ‘small’ market imperfections may trigger a several decades lasting dominance of an incumbent energy technology over a dynamically more efficient competitor, given that the technologies are very good substitutes. Such a ‘lock-in’ into an inferior technology causes significantly higher welfare losses than market failure alone, notably under ambitious mitigation targets. More than other innovative industries, energy markets are prone to these lock-ins because electricity from different technologies is an almost perfect substitute. To guide government intervention, we compare welfare-maximizing technology policies including subsidies, quotas, and taxes with regard to their efficiency, effectivity, and robustness. Technology quotas and feed-in-tariffs turn out to be only insignificantly less efficient than first-best subsidies and seem to be more robust against small perturbations.     

Would my driving pattern change if my neighbor were to buy an emission-free car?

Aiming to reduce the number of brown (polluting) cars on the road, several countries currently promote the purchase and use of green (emission-free) cars through financial and non-financial incentives. We study how such incentives affect consumers who continue to drive brown cars. Using a simple model, we analyze the effects of policy instruments such as subsidizing green cars, taxing brown cars, and allowing green cars to drive in bus lanes. Car owners are influenced by price incentives as well as by external effects from traffic (such as congestion) both in regular lanes and in bus lanes. An extension of the model also considers how changes in local driving habits affect brown-car driving. We find that subsidizing green cars and allowing them to drive in bus lanes might increase brown-car driving. We also report the results of a recent survey containing questions specifically designed to tap the significance of the model’s core mechanisms. The results are partially consistent with propositions derived from the model. While most brown-car respondents report their driving was unchanged after the implementation of the policies to promote green cars, some – particularly in major cities – report that these policies caused them to reduce or increase their driving. We conclude that some mechanisms in our model are more important than others and that certain mechanisms appear to influence different brown-car drivers in different ways. Overall, it seems that Norwegian policies to promote the transition from brown to green cars have somewhat reduced brown-car driving.     

A model of technological breakthrough in the renewable energy sector

Models with induced technological change in the energy sector often predict a gradual expansion of renewable energies, and a substantial share of fossil fuels remaining in the energy mix through the end of our century. However, there are historical examples where new products or technologies expanded rapidly and achieved a high output in a relatively short period of time. This paper explores the possibility of a ‘technological breakthrough’ in the renewable energy sector, using a partial equilibrium model of energy generation with endogenous R&D. Our results indicate, that due to increasing returns-to-scale, a multiplicity of equilibria can arise. In the model, two stable states can coexist, one characterized by a lower and one by higher supply of renewable energy. The transition from the low-output to the high-output equilibrium is characterized by a discontinuous rise in R&D activity and capacity investments in the renewable energy sector. The transition can be triggered by a rise in world energy demand, by a drop in the supply of fossil fuels, or by policy intervention. Under market conditions, the transition occurs later than in the social optimum. Hence, we identify a market failure related to path-dependence and technological lock-in, that can justify a strong policy intervention initially. Paradoxically, well-intended energy-saving policies can actually lead to higher emissions, as they reduce the incentives to invest in renewable energies by having a cushioning effect on the energy price. Hence, these policies should be supplemented by other instruments that restore the incentives to invest in renewable energies. Finally, we discuss the influence of monopoly power in the market for innovations. We show that market power can alleviate the problem of technological lock-in, but creates a new market failure that reduces static efficiency.     

Incentives for Technological Development: BAT Is BAD

This paper examines the effect of environmental regulation on a firms incentives to invest in developing cheaper (clean-up) technologies in a model where consumers are willing to pay for environmentally clean technologies. It focuses on two types of policies: a BAT based policy and a commitment policy. In the former policy, the standard is based on the best available technology (BAT) where the regulator re-optimizes environmental regulation in response to new technologies. However, under a commitment policy, the regulator announces a regulation and sticks to it irrespective of the firms adopted technology. The paper finds that cleaner technologies are not adopted if the regulator announces a BAT based policy. A commitment policy not only leads to positive investment in research and development but is also welfare improving.JEL classifications: O31, O38, Q55     

Modelling the faddish, fashionable and efficient diffusion of agricultural technologies: A case study of the diffusion of wool testing technology in Australia

This study investigates the nature of innovation diffusion in an agricultural context. The dominant agricultural diffusion models assume that an economically rational choice is made to adopt or reject agricultural technologies. However, recent studies of agricultural innovation highlight the ‘irrational’ and potentially ‘inefficient’ nature of the diffusion in this context. To investigate how and why agricultural technologies are adopted or rejected, we examine the diffusion of wool testing technologies in the Australian wool industry using the Bass diffusion model and Abrahamson's diffusion and rejection typology. The results show that diffusion of agricultural innovation is not simply an efficient choice made to close observable performance gaps. The findings suggest that the adoption of inefficient innovations and the rejection of efficient innovations can be driven by an adopter's social context, powerful external influences and imitation within an adopter group and that these drivers change over time, suggesting an evolutionary social process underlies the diffusion of agricultural technologies.     

Do Extrinsic Incentives Undermine Social Norms? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Energy Conservation

Policymakers use both extrinsic and intrinsic incentives to induce consumers to change behavior. This paper investigates whether the use of extrinsic financial incentives is complementary to intrinsic incentives, or whether financial incentives undermine the effect of intrinsic incentives. We conduct a randomized controlled trial that uses information interventions to residential electricity customers to test this question. We find that adding economic incentives to normative messages not only does not strengthen the effect of the latter but may reduce it. These results are consistent with recent theoretical work that suggests a tension between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives.     

Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution

We consider a model of occupational choice in large economies where individuals differ in their wealth endowment. Individuals can remain self-employed or engage in productive matches with another individual, i.e., form firms. Matches are subject to a moral hazard problem with limited liability. The division of the gains from such matches is determined by competitive forces. When the incentive problem is asymmetric, matches are typically wealth-heterogeneous, with richer individuals choosing the occupation for which incentives are more important. The utilities attained within a match depend on the wealth distribution and changes in the latter give rise to ‘trickle down’ effects.     

Optimal fiscal policy in a world liquidity trap

We construct a model of the international transmission of ‘liquidity trap’ shocks, and examine the case for international coordination of fiscal policy to respond to the liquidity trap. Integrated financial markets tend to propagate liquidity traps. In a global environment, fiscal policy may be effective in raising GDP when the economy is stuck in a liquidity trap, but it does so in a ‘beggar thy neighbor’ fashion; when one economy is in a liquidity trap, the cross country spillover effect of fiscal policy is negative. We examine the welfare optimizing policy response to a liquidity trap when countries coordinate on fiscal policy. Fiscal policy may be an effective tool in responding to a liquidity trap, although it is never optimal to use fiscal expansion sufficiently to fully eliminate a downturn. Moreover, there is little case for coordinated global fiscal expansion. For the most part, the country worst hit by a liquidity trap shock should use its own policies to respond, without much help from foreign policies.     

地方官员激励、制度环境与要素市场扭曲*——基于中国省级面板数据的实证研究

探寻地方官员干预要素市场的动因是治理中国要素市场扭曲的前提,而地方官员对要素市场的干预可能主要源于财政、晋升和寻租等方面的激励。本文基于对现有文献的梳理和归纳,理论上分析了地方官员激励影响要素市场扭曲的机理,并利用中国省级层面面板数据对理论假说加以检验。研究发现：地方官员的财政激励、晋升激励和寻租激励对地区要素市场都产生了显著的扭曲效应,而“入世”后的这种扭曲效应下降了。在不同制度环境中,地方官员激励对要素市场扭曲的影响存在着差异。金融和法律环境的改善以及产权明晰程度的提高,能够在一定程度上规避地方官员激励对要素市场产生的扭曲效应。本文既拓展了官员激励和要素市场扭曲等研究领域,又启发了中国要素市场扭曲的治理方向。     

Local public goods, inter-regional transfers and private information

Suppose that the centre wishes to make transfers between member states of a federation to reduce inequality. However, it lacks precise information concerning the cost differences that are responsible for the initial income inequality. We examine the implications of asymmetric information for the design of the transfer scheme. We show that if member states’ inherent cost levels as local public good providers take discrete values, the first best, or ‘complete information’, transfer scheme may or may not violate incentive compatibility. If inherent cost is a continuous random variable, such a scheme certainly violates incentive compatibility. We also explore the possibility of binding participation constraints. In our model, a binding incentive compatibility constraint leads to a reduction in effort devoted to cost reduction, and a binding participation constraint will also lead to a violation of Samuelson's optimality condition for public good provision.     

A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral Climate Action

In this paper we argue that when a subgroup of countries cooperate on emission reduction, the optimal response of non-signatory countries reflects the interaction between three potentially opposing factors, the incentive to free-ride on the environmental benefits of cooperation, the incentive to expand energy consumption, and the incentive to adopt the cleaner technologies introduced by the coalition. Using an Integrated Assessment Model with a game-theoretic structure we find that the equilibrium abatement of the coalition composed by OECD countries would be moderate, in line with the Pledges subscribed in Copenhagen, but increasing. The mitigation strategy would consist of investments in energy R&D and deployment of cleaner technologies with high learning potentials. International knowledge and technology externalities would facilitate the diffusion of cleaner technologies in non-signatory countries, offsetting the free-riding incentive and reducing their emissions. If the OECD group curbs emissions beyond the optimal equilibrium level, reaching reduction rates between 40 and 45 % below 2005 levels in 2050, the benefits of technology externalities would no longer compensate the effect of lower fossil fuel prices. Our results suggest that a moderate unilateral climate policy could induce a virtuous behaviour in non-signatory countries and that policies promoting the international transfer of technologies and knowledge could represent an effective complement to mitigation targets.     

Fiber in the backbone! The impact of broadband adoption on firm growth in network markets

This article examined the relationship between the adoption of technology, via the deployment of broadband, on revenue growth, which is an important measure of financial performance, of the deploying firms using panel data for all of the major local exchange carriers in the US telecommunications industry from 1988 to 2001. The sector is an important network market context where the implications of deployment have substantial salience. The results show a positive relationship between broadband deployment and carriers’ revenue growth. This result implies that encouraging the adoption and deployment of broadband technologies in addition to the benefits of the consumers and firms at the receiving end of the new technology create the potential for better financial performance for the deploying firms. These results also imply that steps that can be taken to provide incentives that will hasten the further deployment of broadband will result in gains in financial performance within the sector.     

Combining choice modelling and multi-criteria analysis for technology diffusion: An application to the uptake of electric vehicles

Efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the residential sector by adopting technologies such as solar photovoltaics and electric vehicles (EVs) have major implications for the capacity of electricity distribution networks, particularly at local areas with high uptake. Consumer decisions to purchase these technologies are also influenced by several complex criteria such as costs/benefits, performance, appeal/status, risk, psychographics, and demographics. This complexity motivated the development of an innovative diffusion model, incorporating features of multi-criteria analysis and choice modelling, to estimate the adoption of these technology options spatially across the landscape of heterogeneous consumers. We test the model to forecast market share of EVs through to 2030, using the vehicle stock across all 1.5 million households in Victoria, Australia. Seven financial and non-financial criteria were included and calibrated via focus groups and a large‐scale survey. Annual change of criteria values and their elasticity to adoption were incorporated. Geographical differences in uptake of EVs were primarily due to driving distance, employment status and household income, with urban areas having about three times the proportional uptake. By testing the model for a range of incentives, we demonstrate its capability to inform and evaluate policy options.     

Financial markets, specialization, and learning by doing

This paper considers three questions: (1) what is the role of financial markets in development, (2) why do some economies have such poorly developed financial markets, and (3) can government policy be used to promote financial market development? With respect to the first question, we formalize the widely-held notion that financial markets promote entrepreneurship, specialization, and learning-by-doing. However, if economic incentives for specialization are absent, financial markets may fail to form. This occurs when real interest rates are too low. We also discuss policies that can be used to promote financial market development. When these policies are successful, they will be growth promoting. Finally, we examine policies intended to manipulate returns on savings, which are often important components of “financial liberalizations”. We describe conditions under which such policies will be conducive to growth.     

Optimal Incentives with State‐Dependent Preferences

In both experimental and natural settings, incentives sometimes underperform, generating smaller effects on the targeted behaviors than would be predicted for entirely self‐regarding agents. A parsimonious explanation is that incentives that appeal to self‐regarding economic motives may crowd out noneconomic motives such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation, ethical values, and other social preferences, leading to disappointing and sometimes even counterproductive incentive effects. We present evidence from behavioral experiments that crowding may take two forms: categorical (the effect on preferences depends only on the presence or absence of the incentive) or marginal (the effect depends on the extent of the incentive). We extend an earlier contribution (Bowles and Hwang, 2008 ) to include categorical crowding, thus providing a more general framework for the study of optimal incentives and as a result, an expanded range of situations for which the sophisticated planner will (surprisingly) make greater use of incentives when incentives crowd out social preferences than when motivational crowding is absent.     

Modelling future uptake of solar photo-voltaics and water heaters under different government incentives

To accelerate the adoption of technologies to reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the residential sector, government policy makers offer a range of fiscal instruments and incentives. Despite the high costs of these schemes, methods are lagging to systematically evaluate their likely effectiveness amongst a geographical landscape of heterogeneous consumers. To address this need, a model was developed for spatial adoption of technologies such as water heaters and solar photo-voltaic panels (PVs), across housing stock, given government policy incentives. By combining features of choice modelling, Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) and diffusion models, it provides a capability to analyse future adoption patterns of the competing technology options under a range of features for purchase timing and choice. The model was implemented across 2.7 million residential dwellings in the State of New South Wales (NSW) of Australia to estimate future stock of PV and water heater options at geographical units of 250 households. Validation against actual numbers of PV installations at each postcode showed the model was effective at identifying high versus low adoption locations. Application to a wide range of policy scenarios, ranging from feed-in tariffs to upfront rebates, showed substantial differences in their effectiveness to accelerate uptake, and the government expenditure required.     

Bidding for brains: Intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers

We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the ‘poaching’ of their ‘brains’ by larger, wealthier markets.     

Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions

Credit agents in microfinance institutions (MFIs) must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the MFI's objectives. We show that while giving incentives has no cost in for-profit MFIs, it is costly in pro-poor MFIs: When repayment and wealth are positively correlated, a pro-poor MFI cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment. It then becomes necessary to audit the share of very poor borrowers selected by an agent in order to provide the latter with adequate incentives. When audit costs are large, pro-poor MFIs may have to forego selection on wealth — and use other targeting devices such as working in impoverished geographical locations. Driven by donor concerns with ‘mission drift’ away from the poor, audits on the wealth status of clients have been introduced at the level of MFIs. We show that introducing pro-poor incentives requires extending such audits to the level of credit agents.