Land conversion pace under uncertainty and irreversibility: too fast or too slow?

In this paper stochastic dynamic programming is used to investigate land conversion decisions taken by a multitude of landholders under uncertainty about the value of environmental services and irreversible development. We study land conversion under competition on the market for agricultural products when voluntary and mandatory measures are combined by the Government to induce habitat conservation. We show that land conversion can be delayed by paying landholders for the provision of environmental services and by limiting the individual extent of developable land. It is found, instead, that the presence of ceilings on aggregate conversion may lead to runs which rapidly exhaust the targeted amount of land. We study the impact of uncertainty on the optimal conversion policy and discuss conversion dynamics under different policy scenarios on the basis of the relative long-run expected rate of deforestation. Interestingly, we show that uncertainty, even if it induces conversion postponement in the short-run, increases the average rate of deforestation and reduces expected time for total conversion in the long run. Finally, we illustrate our findings through some numerical simulations.     

Wetland restoration,collective action and the role of water management institutions

Over the past 50 years, large areas of agricultural land have been drained and put into intensive agricultural production. Increasing attention is now being paid to the issue of restoring wetland areas and promoting environmental benefits. Collective action is important for wetland restoration, both because of the physical interactions among landholders and because of the cost saving and enhanced environmental benefit that can be achieved at a larger scale. Policy needs to be geared towards facilitating co-operation among farmers if environmental schemes are to be effective in enabling wetland restoration. Internal Drainage Boards have been primarily involved with securing of land drainage for local landholders. They now have a formal responsibility to further nature conservation but could take a more proactive role in promoting wetland restoration. They have good information on local water management options and are well placed to co-ordinate actions for restoration. Agri-environment policy could be redirected in order to promote collective action for wetland restoration.     

The Entry‐Deterring Effects of Inflexible Regulation

This paper investigates the signalling role of tax policy in promoting, or hindering, the ability of a monopolist to practise entry deterrence. We show that environmental policy can facilitate the incumbent firm's concealment of information from potential entrants, thus deterring entry, and yet entail welfare improvements. Furthermore, we demonstrate that entry deterrence is more likely to arise when environmental regulation cannot be rapidly revised across time if market conditions change (inflexible regimes) than when regulatory agencies can adjust environmental policy over time.     

The effects of environmental taxes and quotas on the optimal timing of emission reductions under Choquet–Brownian uncertainty

The effects of two environmental policy options for the reduction of pollution emissions, i.e. taxes and non-tradable quotas, are analyzed. In contrast to the prior literature this work endogenously takes into account the level of emissions before and after the adoption of the new environmental policy. The level of emissions is determined by solving the firm's profit maximization problem under taxes and fixed quotas. We find that the optimal adoption threshold under taxes is always larger than the adoption threshold under fixed quota, even in a setting characterized by ecological uncertainty and ambiguity – in the form of Choquet–Brownian motions – on future costs and benefits over adopting environmental policies.     

Additionality When REDD Contracts Must be Self-Enforcing

This paper examines self-enforcing contracts as a financial mechanism for reducing carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation when the opportunity cost of the land (i.e., landholder type) is private information and is imperfectly correlated over time (i.e., partially persistent types). Because self-enforcement limits the feasible incentives, the conservation levels are constrained by the surplus created. Regardless of the degree of persistence of such opportunity costs across contracting periods, a first-best self-enforcing contract can deliver “additional” carbon sequestration beyond the business as usual scenario only if the value of forest conservation is sufficiently high. Otherwise, self-enforcing contracts can induce some, suboptimal level of carbon sequestration. The degree of persistence of opportunity costs across periods does not affect the amount of total payments provided in the optimal menu of contracts, but greater persistence of opportunity cost types leads to contracts that feature more of the total payment as a bonus in contracts for landholders with a high opportunity cost for their land and more of the total payment as an upfront fixed payment for landholders with a low opportunity cost.     

Land Tenure Insecurity and Formalizing Land Rights in Madagascar: A Gender Perspective on the Certification Program

This contribution examines Madagascar's land tenure reform – aimed at reducing land tenure insecurity – from a gender perspective. In particular, it investigates the certification program issuing formal land title deeds (land certificates) to landholders. Drawing on a household survey with gender-disaggregated asset data conducted in the rural municipality Soavinandriana, the analysis suggests that the certification program has strengthened both men's and women's formal claims to individually held land. However, the lack of gender equality principles and, in particular, of mechanisms to ensure that couples’ jointly held land is jointly secured, seems to have reinforced primary ownership of land by male household heads, at the expense of women's land rights. Furthermore, the land tenure reform does not address some of the most important threats to tenure security such as colonial titles and commercial pressure on land, and large parts of the country are still not covered by the certification program.     

Comparative costs and conservation of wild species in situ, e.g. orangutans

The extent to which conservation is feasible is constrained by budgets and the financial sacrifice stakeholders are willing to bear. Therefore a possible objective for conserving a species is to minimise the cost of achieving that stated aim. For example, if a minimum viable population (MVP) of a species is to be conserved, the size and type of habitats reserved for this could be selected to minimise cost. This requires consideration of the comparative (relative) opportunity costs of reserving different land types for conservation. A general model is developed to demonstrate this and is applied to the case of the orangutan. In the ecological literature, recommendations for reserving different types of land for conservation have been based on comparisons of either the absolute economic returns they generate if converted to commercial use or on differences in the density of a species they support. These approaches are shown to be deficient because they ignore relative trade-offs between species population and economic conversion gains at alternative sites. The proposed model is illustrated for orangutan conservation.     

Biodiversity value and the optimal location of forest conservation sites in Southern Finland

Safeguarding biodiversity has been one of the most important issues in environmental and forest policies since the 1990s. In Southern Finland, decisions concerning further actions for the preservation of forest biodiversity will be made in the coming years. To support policy making, we present a multi-regional model that is applicable in determining the economically optimal regional allocation of conservation sites. Three habitat quality models are evaluated to calculate habitat quality indices used as a surrogate for a biodiversity value in a forest sector model. The scenarios presented provide information about the economic impacts of conservation choices on the forest sector. The overall economic impacts of conservation depend on its scale and regional allocation. Conserving land with high biodiversity value can have less adverse impact on the forest sector than conservation of typical commercial forest sites. When optimizing conservation set-asides, we found that set-asides targeted to certain regions possessing higher/lower than average relative share of ecologically valuable land, caused lower/higher adverse economic impacts on the forest sector. Because it is expensive to search land suitable for conservation, these regions could be respectively favoured/avoided when asking forest owners to offer their land for the new conservation program in Southern Finland, which will be based on voluntariness.     

Conserving biodiversity with tradable permits under changing conservation costs and habitat restoration time lags

Tradable permits are a common environmental policy instrument that has recently been applied also to the conservation of biodiversity. Biodiversity conservation differs in many respects to the classical applications of tradable permits like emissions control. One particularity is that, even if the permit system maintains a constant total amount of species habitat, habitat turnover (the destruction of a habitat and restoration elsewhere) affects the ecosystem. Another particularity is that the restoration of habitats often takes much time, leading to time lags between the initiation of restoration activities and the time when restored habitat is available for trading. We use an agent-based model of a tradable permit market to study the influence of heterogeneous and dynamic conservation costs and habitat restoration time lags on key variables of the market, such as the costs incurred to the market participants and the amount of habitat turnover. Our results show that there may be trade-offs between these key variables. We also find that restoration time lags can lead to fluctuations in permit prices that reduce the efficiency of the permit market. We conclude that temporal lags deserve a careful analysis when implementing tradable permit systems for the preservation of natural habitats and biodiversity.     

The importance of the design of market-based instruments for CO2 mitigation: An AGE analysis for Spain

In the past few decades, economists have defended the use of market-based instruments (MBI) in environmental and climate policy. There have been many papers which have compared the costs of attaining environmental objectives with MBIs and with command and control instruments. However very few have compared different MBIs in examining these costs. This paper seeks to analyse various MBIs for CO₂ mitigation from the viewpoint of cost-effectiveness, using an AGE (applied general equilibrium) model for the case of Spain. A distinction is drawn between (1) quantity instruments, which represent different extents of a market for emission permits; and (2) price instruments, which represent different types of tax. Each instrument can affect different segments of the emission sources and therefore can have very different effects on the economy as a whole. We show how MBI can help to minimise mitigation costs, but also how taxes and tradable emission permits that are limited or constrained by many exemptions and distortions can raise costs considerably.     

Environmental amenities and optimal agricultural land use: The case of Israel

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of changing land allocation among crops as a mechanism for increasing net-social benefits, where production profits and amenity values are augmented. A positive mathematical programming model is calibrated and applied to 43 regions in the northern part of Israel, using a crop-discriminating amenity-value function. Changes in land allocation increase net-social benefits by 2.4% nationwide and by up to 15% on the regional level, where in some regions the net-social-benefits-increase/profit-loss ratio exceeds 20. Therefore, the results indicate that a policy encouraging amenity-enhancement of agricultural land use is warranted, provided that it is implemented on a regional scale, rather than as a comprehensive nationwide-enforced program.     

Strategic environmental policy and the accumulation of knowledge

In dealing with a transnational pollutant-emitting duopoly welfare-maximising policy makers face two negative externalities: imperfect competition and unpriced emissions. Strategic environmental policy models show that these externalities involve a trade-off between reducing pollution and allowing for rent-seeking of the respective firm. This dilemma usually results in a suboptimal internalisation of the negative externality emerging from emissions. Indeed, the conventional model setup includes an R&D stage that enables the firms to mitigate regulation costs. But the typical one period configuration ignores that R&D expenditures create knowledge capital which is, due to its inherent cumulativeness, also effective in following periods. Our model analyses the established trade-off in a two period setting and therefore allows for an investigation of intertemporal knowledge accumulation. We find that the intertemporal effects provide an incentive for a policy maker to set a higher tax rate compared to a one-period setup which lessens the magnitude of the suboptimal internalisation of emissions. Under certain conditions even a tax rate above the Pigouvian level is possible in period 1.     

Environmental adders in the real world

This paper evaluates the use of environmental ‘adders’ as a regulatory instrument. It evaluates their likely performance in meeting the policy objective of social costing given the changes in the electric utility industry's structure and in environmental policy since the efforts to estimate these costs were initiated. The prognosis is largely negative — suggesting that environmental adders are inconsistent with the increased competition already underway in the utility industry, as well as with the trend toward greater use of true market-based approaches to environmental policy that are not subject to detailed economic regulation.     

Environmental Taxation and Induced Structural Change in an Open Economy: The Role of Market Structure

Abstract. Studies of structural change induced by environmental taxation usually proceed in a perfect-competition framework and typically find structural change to be quite moderate under realistic emission reduction scenarios. By observing that some of the industries affected are likely to operate under imperfect rather than perfect competition, additional mechanisms emerge which may amplify structural change beyond the extent identified as yet. Especially, changes in economies of scale may arise which weaken or strengthen the competitive position of industries over and above the initial cost effect. Using a computable general equilibrium model for Germany to examine the effects of a unilaterally introduced carbon tax, we find that induced structural change is more pronounced under imperfect competition than under perfect competition. At the macroeconomic level, we find that aggregate losses in economies of scale are larger than aggregate gains, implying that the total costs of environmental regulation are higher under imperfect competition than under perfect competition.     

Free trade and the burden of domestic policy

Abstract. Consider a small economy facing accession to a exogenously defined trade agreement. Before accession, the government controls trade and pollution policy. After accession, it retains control over pollution policy, but must allow free trade in all goods. This is a choice many governments face while joining trade agreements today. They decide whether greater market access to other members is more valuable than control over trade policy. I ask two questions. All else being equal what happens to environmental policy after accession? Second, what affects the choice of accession and how does this choice impact aggregate welfare? I show that a loss in control over trade policy alters the political incentives determining environmental policy. Before accession, producers can transfer a portion of their burden of environmental regulation to consumers through price increases. After accession the same regulation is borne entirely by producers. Owing to the change in burden, there exist plausible conditions under which the adoption of free trade can lead to more stringent environmental regulation, a reduction in the preferential treatment of special interest groups, and an increase in aggregate welfare.     

Environmental regulation and trade openness in the presence of private mitigation

Acknowledging the differential ability of individuals to privately mitigate the consequences of domestic pollution for their health is essential for an understanding of their demands for regulation of the environment and of trade in dirty goods, and for analysis of the implications of these demands for equilibrium policy choices. In a small open economy with exogenous policy, we first explain how private mitigation at a cost results in an unequal distribution of the health consequences of pollution in a manner consistent with epidemiologic studies, and consequently how the benefits and costs of trade in dirty goods interact with choices concerning private mitigation to further polarize the interests of citizens concerning environmental stringency. The economy is then embedded in a broader political economy setting, and simulated to investigate the role of private mitigation in shaping political equilibria. We show that when citizens can choose between mitigating the health consequences of domestic pollution privately and reducing pollution through public policy, the same polarization of interests underlies equilibrium policy choices in both democratic and autocratic regimes.     

Value of land as a pollutant sink for international waters

The purpose of this paper is to analyse and compare the values of a marginal change in the area of land as a pollutant sink under different decision-making contexts and objectives: international coordination versus national policies for pollutant reduction, and maximization of net benefits versus minimization of costs for pollutant reductions. The analytical results show that a coordinated policy between countries generates a higher value of a marginal change in the supply of land as a pollutant sink than an uncoordinated policy. It is also shown that the value is lower (higher) under the decision objective of maximizing net benefits when the efficient pollutant load is higher (lower) than the load target under the cost effectiveness approach. An application to the Baltic Sea drainage basin land as a nitrogen sink for the management of eutrophication reveals that the differences between values under different policy contexts and objectives can be quite large in magnitude.     

Strategic Environmental Policy, Clean Technologies and the Learning Curve

In the political discussion, it is often emphasized that the environmental service industry (which produces a clean factor of production) benefits from an early and strong environmental policy. This is especially likely if the costs of production are decreasing over time due to learning curve effects. Surprisingly, the environmental service industry has not been integrated into the theory of strategic environmental policy yet. Our main question is whether a national leadership in environmental policy can pay off if profits of the environmental service industry are taken into account. We consider a two-period model with one firm in each country competing on a third market. Emissions can be substituted by the clean factor when deciding upon the production technology. The unit costs of producing the clean factor in the second period are decreasing in the quantity produced in the initial period. We derive the optimal environmental policy for both periods from a national point of view and show that the presence of the environmental service industry can indeed lead to a national leadership in pollution control.     

THE POLITICS OF PRECOMMITMENT WITH ELECTORAL UNCERTAINTY AND TRANSACTION COSTS

Despite the lack of legal channels through which binding commitments can be made by the government, economic and political factors enable it to affect future outcomes. In practice, large transaction costs are associated with any significant change of policy, and therefore the current government can adopt policies so that certain outcomes are more likely to be realized by its successor. In this paper it is argued that transaction costs combined with electoral uncertainty are likely to drive the current government to adopt a policy which is extreme relative to the preferences of the existing political parties. This policy is adopted in order to ensure that due to transaction costs, the future government will not depart radically from the most preferred policy of the current government. If the current policy is likely to affect the election outcome, then, in addition to the above considerations, the electorate attitudes would have to be taken into account by the government. Hence, the current government confronts two factors in choosing its policies: the behavior of the future government and the behavior of the electorate. The interplay between the two factors determines the choice of the current policy.