Growth and human capital: good data,good results

We present a new data set for years of schooling across countries for the 1960–2000 period. The series are constructed from the OECD database on educational attainment and from surveys published by UNESCO. Two features that improve the quality of our data with respect to other series, particularly for series in first-differences, are the use of surveys based on uniform classification systems of education over time, and an intensified use of information by age groups. As a result of the improvement in quality, these new series can be used as a direct substitute for Barro and Lee’s (2001; Oxford Economic Papers, 3, 541–563) data in empirical research. In standard cross-country growth regressions we find that our series yield significant coefficients for schooling. In panel data estimates our series are also significant even when the regressions account for the accumulation of physical capital. Moreover, the estimated macro return is consistent with those reported in labour studies. These results differ from the typical findings of the earlier literature and are a consequence of the reduction in measurement error in the series.      

On good government

Besley’s treatment of principled agents is a major contribution to public choice and political economy. By focusing on politics as an agency problem, he has shown the way to a new generation of research on the interface of politics and economics.

Exchanging good ideas

This paper develops a framework to describe how the existence of technological spillovers leads to a distribution of technology clusters. Marshallian spillovers in this paper are assumed to be due to interaction of labor. The dynamics of cluster size, composition, and technology accumulation are characterized.     

Democratic public good provision

This paper analyzes an overlapping generation model of redistribution and public good provision under repeated voting. Expenditures are financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across skill groups and across generations. We focus on politico-economic Markov equilibria and contrast these with the Ramsey allocation under commitment. The model features indeterminate equilibria, with a key role of forward-looking strategic voting. Due to the lack of commitment to future policies, the tax burden may be on the wrong side of the dynamic Laffer curve. Moreover, restrictions on government policies can in some cases be welfare improving.     

Weak links, good shots and other public good games: Building on BBV

We suggest an alternative way of analyzing the canonical Bergstrom-Blume-Varian model of non-cooperative voluntary contributions to a public good that avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased. We exploit this approach to analyze models in which the aggregate level of public good is determined as a more general social composition function of individual gifts — specifically, as a CES form — rather than as an unweighted sum. We also analyze Hirshleifer's weakest-link and best-shot models. In each case, we characterize the set of equilibria, in some cases establishing existence of a unique equilibrium as well as briefly pointing out some interesting comparative static properties. We also study the weakest-link and best-shot limits of the CES composition function and show how the former can be used for equilibrium selection and the latter to establish that equilibria of some better-shot games are identical to those of the much simpler best-shot game.     

Insurance as a Giffen good

When natural attrition from membership makes dividend-maximization a reasonable goal, are labor managers perverse? For homogeneous technologies, we demonstrate that improving product market conditions always lead the competitive dividend maximizer to substitute capital for labor if optimal scale is determinate.     

Is smoking a fiscal good?

Even though smokers incur higher health expenditures than nonsmokers of the same age, smokers have significantly higher mortality rates, so the expected lifetime health expenditure for a smoker is actually lower than for a nonsmoker. Because of this fact, some politicians and policy-makers have argued that society might actually be better off promoting smoking rather than discouraging it. We consider this argument in a general-equilibrium model where health expenditures are paid for by a single-payer health-care system financed by taxes. Because the percentage increase in the tax base is larger than the percentage increase in health-care expenditures, the elimination of smoking actually decreases the budget-balancing health-care tax rate.     

Private good clubs and the core

The incentive for potential club members to form private good clubs is an average cost function that is decreasing over at least part of its range. Benefits to club members are measured by consumer's surplus, and a game theoretic characteristic function is used to describe total club benefits. Then, in the game framework, the optimum club size is examined and related to the existence of the core, which in turn is shown to be crucially dependent on the demand and cost curves.     

Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good

Summary. We consider the problem of reallocating the total initial endowments of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. With the uniform reallocation rule we propose a solution which satisfies many appealing properties, describing the effect of population and endowment variations on the outcome. The central properties which are studied in this context are population monotonicity, bilateral consistency, (endowment) monotonicity and (endowment) strategy-proofness. Furthermore, the uniform reallocation rule is Pareto optimal and satisfies several equity conditions, e.g., equal-treatment and envy-freeness. We study the trade-off between properties concerning variation and properties concerning equity. Furthermore, we provide several characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule based on these properties. Received: August 29, 1995; revised version June 26, 1996     

Nash implementation with a private good

Summary. I construct a general model of social planning problems, including mixed production economies and regulatory problems with negative externalities as special cases, and I give simple mechanisms for Nash implementation under three increasingly general sets of assumptions. I first construct a continuous mechanism to implement the (constrained) Lindahl allocations of an economy, and I then extend this to arbitrary social choice rules based on prices. I end with a mechani sm to implement any monotonic social choice rule, assuming only the existence of a private (not necessarily transferable) good. In that general case, each agent simply reports an upper contour set, an outcome, and I need two agents to make binary numerical announcements. I do not require the usual no-veto-power condition. Received: February 19, 1998; revised version: January 30, 2002     

Favor trading in public good provision

Favor trading is common. We do something nice for someone and they do something nice in return. Several motives might underlie such behavior, including altruism, strategic motives, and direct or indirect positive reciprocity. It is not yet well-understood how these fit together to affect behavior, how they interact in various institutional structures, and how they play out over time. We use a laboratory experiment to study the elements and dynamics of favor trading in a particular setting: the private provision of a public good. In our experiment, giving subjects the ability to practice targeted reciprocity by making a simple, low-cost change in information provision increases contributions to the public good by 14 %. Subjects reward group members who have previously been generous to them and withhold rewards from ungenerous group members. Strategic concerns cannot explain all of this behavior, and it must be at least partly due to direct reciprocity. When someone cannot directly benefit from favor trading, he gives much less to the public good. People thus excluded from the “circle of reciprocity” provide a clean and strict test of indirect reciprocity. Contrary to previous studies in the literature, we do not observe indirect reciprocity.     

Good governance and good aid allocation

We model the aid allocation process as a rent-seeking contest between two countries and investigate the effects of differing allocation rules on recipients' behavior in a simple framework. We investigate the aid allocation mechanism design that attempts to increase the governance quality of potential recipient countries: the potential recipients spend costly resources improving governance, while the donor country allocates the fund based on their governance quality. The paper compares two mechanisms: one uses a simple winner-takes-all tournament to award the entire available purse to the country with the best governance; while under the other aid is distributed among countries in proportion to their governance qualities. The paper shows the second mechanism outperforms the first only if competing countries are sufficiently asymmetric. Moreover, the recipient who is most effective in governance – and stands to benefit the most from development assistance – has interests opposite to those of the donor. In addition, the paper shows that if the donor country allocates the fund based on both governance and the levels of poverty, it may result in a poverty trap: the leaders of potential recipient countries deliberately allocate funds away from the poorest so as not to better their position in order to receive more aid.