Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit.     

Unobserved punishment supports cooperation

Costly punishment can facilitate cooperation in public-goods games, as human subjects will incur costs to punish non-cooperators even in settings where it is unlikely that they will face the same opponents again. Understanding when and why it occurs is important both for the design of economic institutions and for modeling the evolution of cooperation. Our experiment shows that subjects will engage in costly punishment even when it will not be observed until the end of the session, which supports the view that agents enjoy punishment. Moreover, players continue to cooperate when punishment is unobserved, perhaps because they (correctly) anticipate that shirkers will be punished: Fear of punishment can be as effective at promoting contributions as punishment itself.     

Strong,bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas

We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker’s risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest—and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.     

Feedback,punishment and cooperation in public good experiments

A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give subjects feedback is critical for the efficacy of punishment. Providing subjects with information about the earnings of their peers leads to significantly less cooperation and lower efficiency compared to a treatment in which subjects receive information about the contributions of their peers. This is despite the fact that the feedback format does not affect incentives. The data suggest that this happens because the feedback format acts as a coordination device which influences the contribution standards that groups establish.     

Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers

We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available.     

New insights into conditional cooperation and punishment from a strategy method experiment

This paper introduces new experimental designs to examine how conditional cooperation and punishment behaviours respond to the full range of variation in the contributions of others. It is shown that contributions become significantly more selfish-biased as others contribute more unequally, while punishment increases both with decreasing contributions by the target player and increasing contributions by a third player. Low contributors who punish antisocially do not direct their punishment specifically toward high contributors, while their beliefs indicate that they expect to themselves be punished.     

The evolution of cooperation through imitation

We study evolutionarily stable outcomes for a class of games that admit cooperation and conflict as possible Nash equilibria. We make use of two ideas: existing strategies are more likely to be imitated than new strategies are to be introduced; players are able to identify opponents' behavior prior to interaction. The long-run evolutionary limit is efficient for the case of perfect recognition of opponents' behavior. For the case of imperfect recognition, efficiency is not achieved and long-run outcomes are more efficient the more accurate is the information. Strategies that emerge in the long run are those where players reward opponents who are likely to play the same way, and punish opponents who are likely to play differently.     

Promoting social capital for the elderly

The new gold standard has evolved from aging in place to aging in community. Having social capital by being an active member of a community has a positive effect and can decrease vulnerability to health risk. Federal and state monies have been utilized to support community activities for the elderly including the first meal programs and moving to community-based assisted living programs. While staying in the community is the ideal, a community can be created by progressive leadership in a traditional retirement community including a skilled nursing home. Retirement communities based on the six dimensions of wellness can create a nurturing environment. Nurse leaders can meet the challenge of creating strong environments for the elderly.     

运用激励理论 推进管理创新

本文从管理创新的角度出发 ,论述了在管理中激励的内涵、作用 ,以及进行激励管理应具备的条件、方式和途径 ,以提高生产和工作效率 ,加速发展社会生产力。     

以产业结构调整促经济增长

经济结构调整是推动经济增长的根本动力 ,无论是发达国家还是发展中国家的经济发展实践都充分证明了这一点。 90年代以来 ,在经济全球化的推动下 ,以信息化、知识化为主要内容的新一轮产业结构调整对世界经济格局及我国经济均产生巨大影响。面对我国经济矛盾的突出和国际形势的变换 ,十五大明确提出要对国民经济结构进行战略性调整。本文认为我国应以发展为主题 ,产业结构调整为关键 ,通过体制创新和科技创新来建立合理的经济结构 ,从而促进经济的健康发展     

Converting social conflict: Focal points and the evolution of cooperation

We examine the ability of focal points to transform situations of potential conflict into situations of cooperation. In performing this function, focal points convert “worst-case scenarios” into “better-case scenarios,” which are easier for political economic systems to handle. Focal points thus contribute to the ability of political economies to perform well in the face of less than ideal conditions, enhancing systemic robustness. JEL Code P0     

乡村振兴助推绿色城镇化发展研究

目前,从乡村振兴视域研究绿色城镇化还有待破题。乡村振兴,为绿色城镇化的谋划与推进,提供了更为广阔的视野和长远的考量。当前,绿色城镇化推进出现了忽视整体认知和实践贯彻的全面耦合性;忽视了城市与乡村的一体性;忽视了绿色城镇化的动力持续性等问题。这些问题的破解,需要在深刻认知乡村振兴与绿色城镇化的逻辑关联下,进一步变革城乡居民发展理念,根植绿色发展认知;推进农村产业改革,提供绿色生态产品;提升农业生产效率,提供绿色城镇化人力资源;充分发挥农业农村基础功能,为绿色城镇化推进提供价值支撑;推进城乡协调发展规划,引领城乡生态规划实践;推进城乡产业转型升级,为绿色城镇化提供产业支撑。     

独立审计社会信用奖惩机制效应实证分析

以商务部公布的会计信息质量检查公告及证监会处罚公告检查结果作为研究背景,选取2003—2012年会计师事务所的客户量及综合收入为研究数据,从激励和惩罚两个机制对数据进行实证研究,并从信息论、监督论和保险论3个方面描述了独立审计的功能。通过市场整体对被处罚会计师事务所的反应情况得出结论,认为在我国资本市场中,独立审计社会信用惩罚机制发挥着有效与失效并存的作用。     

以专业思想教育推动学风建设的思考

高校学风建设,是高校教育工作的重要内容。培养良好的学风是推进素质教育的客观要求。以专业思想教育为着力点,将专业思想教育和学风建设有机结合,把专业思想教育融入大学生学习阶段的全过程,充分发挥学生在学风建设中的主体地位,构建特色学风。     

Self-control in peer groups

Social influences on self-control underlie both self-help groups and many peer interactions among youths. To understand these phenomena, we analyze how observing each other's behavior affects individuals’ ability to deal with their own impulses. These endogenous informational spillovers lead to either a unique “good news” equilibrium that ameliorates behavior, a unique “bad news equilibrium” that worsens it, or to the coexistence of both. A welfare analysis shows that people will find social interactions valuable only when they have enough confidence in their own and others’ ability to resist temptation. The ideal partner, however, is someone with a slightly worse self-control problem than one's own: this makes his successes more encouraging, and his failures less discouraging.