Interest rate co-movements, global factors and the long end of the term spread

The decoupling of US short and long interest rates has been a distinctive feature of the 2000s. We employ recent advances in panel econometrics to document this disconnect for industrial countries and link it to a global latent factor in long term rates. We investigate whether international forces, such as global inflation, global output, or the global savings glut may be behind this global latent factor. The savings glut is the most likely contender, suggesting that reserve accumulation and a search for yield from emerging markets has lowered long rates internationally, driving a wedge between domestic short and long rates.     

Monetary policy surprises and international bond markets

We examine the impact and spillover effects of monetary policy surprises on international bond returns. Within the framework of Campbell and Ammer (1993), we decompose international bond returns into news regarding future returns, real interest rates and future inflation for Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. We examine how excess bond returns in these three countries are affected by surprise changes in monetary policy in each country. Our measure of the unanticipated element of monetary policy is based on futures markets rather than the more traditional vector autoregression. Our results indicate that excess bond returns primarily react to domestic as compared to foreign monetary policy surprises. We also find there is a strong divergence between the effects of domestic monetary policy on excess bond returns in Germany relative to the U.K. A surprise monetary tightening in Germany (U.K.) leads to a rise (fall) in the excess holding period return. We trace this effect to news about lower (higher) inflation expectations and could be potentially rationalized by differences in the credibility of the monetary policy authority in each country.     

Expectations,Surprises and Treasury Bill Rates: 1960–82

Changes in six-month bill rates over semiannual periods in the 1960s and 1970s are successfully related to expected changes and to surprises. The latter include unanticipated changes in expected inflation, in the growth of industrial production and base money, and in inflation uncertainty. Estimation of the basic equation through the middle of 1983 does not suggest any change in structure. Moreover the equation “explains” 60 percent of the extraordinarily high level of real rates since late 1980, largely owing to an excess of unexpected net increases in anticipated inflation over actual increases. Our estimates provide some support for the expectations theory; there appears to be information content in six–month forward rates. While this content is swamped by the impact of surprises in equations explaining rate changes in terms of forward rates alone, the content is clear when proxies for the surprises are included in the equations.     

Excess long real rate volatility

Variance and comovement bounds tests are performed on riskless real interest rates for the USA, Canada, UK, Germany, and Japan. Each country’s long real rate exhibits excess volatility relative to its fundamental long real rate derived under the rational expectations theory of real term structure. Internationally, each country’s long real rate relative to the USA exhibits excess comovement relative to their corresponding fundamental long real rates. The excess volatility clouds the arbitrage-induced link between long and short real rates. This noise hinders the monetary transmission mechanism and the ability of central bankers to influence long real rates by managing short real rates.     

The Federal Reserve,the Emerging Markets,and Capital Controls: A High‐Frequency Empirical Investigation

In this paper, I use weekly data from seven emerging nations—four in Latin America and three in Asia—to investigate the extent to which changes in Fed policy interest rates have been transmitted into domestic short‐term interest rates during the 2000s. The results suggest that there is indeed an interest rates “pass‐through” from the Fed to emerging markets. However, the extent of transmission of interest rate shocks is different—in terms of impact, steady state effect, and dynamics—in Latin America and Asia. The results also indicate that capital controls are not an effective tool for isolating emerging countries from global interest rate disturbances. Changes in the slope of the U.S. yield curve, including changes generated by a “twist” policy, affect domestic interest rates in emerging countries. I also provide a detailed case study for Chile.     

Interest Rates as Options

Since people can hold currency at a zero nominal interest rate, the nominal short rate cannot be negative. The real interest rate can be and has been negative, since low risk real investment opportunities like filling in the Mississippi delta do not guarantee positive returns. The inflation rate can be and has been negative, most recently (in the United States) during the Great Depression. The nominal short rate is the “shadow real interest rate” (as defined by the investment opportunity set) plus the inflation rate, or zero, whichever is greater. Thus the nominal short rate is an option. Longer term interest rates are always positive, since the future short rate may be positive even when the current short rate is zero. We can easily build this option element into our interest rate trees for backward induction or Monte Carlo simulation: just create a distribution that allows negative nominal rates, and then replace each negative rate with zero.     

Innovation,diffusion, and trade: Theory and measurement

What are the sources of economic growth? This paper presents a multicountry growth model of innovation and the adoption of foreign technologies through trade. The costs of both domestic innovation and adopting foreign innovations are estimated using data on innovation, output and trade. A decomposition of the sources of growth shows that technology adoption accounts for about 65% of “embodied” growth in developing countries. Developed countries grow mainly through domestic innovation, which explains 75% of their “embodied” growth. Counterfactuals show how growth rates and levels of income would change if countries faced the same barriers to adoption and research productivity.     

Dynamic linkages among real interest rates in international capital markets

Short-run and long-run dynamic linkages among weekly real interest rates for G-10 countries are examined using a variety of time-series tests. These tests give special attention to the time-series properties of nominal interest rates, ex-ante expected rates of inflation and real interest rates. Term structure information is used to recover a theoretically consistent measure of ex-ante expected inflation. In-sample and out-of-sample Granger causality tests are also examined to evaluate lead/lag relationships among real interest rates. The results provide strong support for well-integrated markets, particularly in the long run. The results imply leadership roles for the US in international asset markets.     

The comovement of US and German bond markets

We use a vector-autoregression, with parameter estimates corrected for small-sample bias, to decompose US and German unexpected bond returns into three ‘news’ components: news about future inflation, news about future real interest rates, and news about future excess bond returns (term premia). We then cross-country correlate these news components to see which component is responsible for the high degree of comovement of US and German bond markets. For the period 1975-2003 we find that inflation news is the main driving force behind this comovement. When news is coming to the US market that future US inflation will increase, there is a tendency that German inflation will also increase. This is regarded bad news for the bond market in both countries whereby bond prices are bid down leading to immediate negative return innovations and changing expectations of future excess bond returns. Thus, comovement in expected future inflation is the main reason for bond market comovement.     

Inflation illusion and the dividend yield: evidence from the UK

We report evidence that the UK dividend yield and expected inflation are positively correlated from 1962 to 1997, but negatively correlated subsequently. Using a commonly used VAR (vector auto-regression)-based procedure we find strong evidence that the positive correlation is caused both by inflation illusion and the effect of inflation on required rates of return. We also find some evidence that it is caused by inflation rationally reducing expected real dividend growth. We find that Chen and Zhao's (2009. “Return Decomposition.” Review of Financial Studies 22 (12): 5213–5249) criticism of the VAR-based procedure has little empirical relevance but that the procedure can be highly sensitive to the choice of data period.     

Can trade costs explain why exchange rate volatility does not feed into consumer prices?

If countries specialize in imperfectly substitutable goods, trade costs increase the share of expenditure devoted to domestic output, reducing the exposure of consumer price inflation to exchange rate changes. I present a multi-country flexible-price model where expenditure shares are inversely related to trade costs through a gravity equation. In this setting, consumer price inflation can be approximated as an expenditure-share-weighted average of the contributions to inflation from all countries. I use data from 24 OECD countries, 1970-2003, to estimate a structural gravity model. I combine the fitted expenditure shares from the estimation with actual data on exchange rates to construct predictions of inflation. The behavior of these predictions indicates that trade costs can explain both qualitatively and quantitatively the failure of exchange rate volatility to feed into inflation.     

The Fiscal and Monetary Linkage between Stock Returns and Inflation

Contrary to economic theory and common sense, stock returns are negatively related to both expected and unexpected inflation. We argue that this puzzling empirical phenomenon does not indicate causality. Instead, stock returns are negatively related to contemporaneous changes in expected inflation because they signal a chain of events which results in a higher rate of monetary expansion. Exogenous shocks in real output, signalled by the stock market, induce changes in tax revenue, in the deficit, in Treasury borrowing and in Federal Reserve “monetization” of the increased debt. Rational bond and stock market investors realize this will happen. They adjust prices (and interest rates) accordingly and without delay. Although expected inflation seems to have a negative effect on subsequent stock returns, this could be an empirical illusion, since a spurious causality is induced by a combination of: (a) a reversed adaptive inflation expectations model and (b) a reversed money growth/stock returns model. If the real interest rate is not a constant, using nominal interest proxies for expected inflation is dangerous, since small changes in real rates can cause large and opposite percentage changes in stock prices.     

贸易摩擦、宏观经济波动与经济开放程度的选择

本文构建一个包含关税冲击以及外汇风险溢价的两国开放经济DSGE模型,创新地揭示了关税冲击造成实际汇率波动的“直接效应”与“间接效应”,刻画了关税变动、贸易条件与实际汇率之间的动态关系与作用机制。我们深入分析了不同经济开放程度下贸易摩擦造成的宏观经济波动以及经济福利损失。模拟结果表明,在一定贸易开放程度下,外国加收关税一方面会导致本国贸易条件恶化,引发出口及产出下降;另一方面会导致本国汇率贬值,引发出口及产出增长。关税冲击发生后短期中汇率贬值效应占优,本国产出会出现小幅上升,随后贸易条件恶化效应逐步显现,产出持续下降。福利分析结果表明,本国适度提升贸易开放度,虽然经济福利损失会小幅上升,但福利损失增加幅度小于外国,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对优势;如果本国过度提高贸易开放度,则会导致本国福利损失大幅增加,并且大于外国福利损失增幅,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对劣势。因此,应适度逐步有序地提升贸易开放度。此外,本国适度推进资本账户开放的政策能够改善贸易条件,促进本国经济增长。     

Monetary Policy Stress in EMU: What Role for Fundamentals and Missed Forecasts?

This article reexamines the problem of monetary policy stress in the EMU. In addition to estimating the amount of stress in particular countries, we investigate its sources by breaking it down into its “fundamental” parts, covering how it is a result of country-specific macroeconomic divergences and the EMU-wide “non-fundamental” component, with special attention given to the role of missed forecasts. Our results confirm that peripheral countries were exposed to risks emerging from low interest rates while the “core” countries did not suffer from much monetary policy stress. Interestingly, the bulk of it was non-fundamental, i.e., not caused by inflation and output gap differentials between countries. We show that missed forecasts did make an important contribution to this part of the stress and were mainly responsible for pushing the interest rate below its rule-consistent level.     

Macroeconomic Fluctuations in Developing Countries: Some Stylized Facts

This article documents the main stylized features of macroeconomicfluctuations for 12 developing countries. It presents cross-correlationsbetween domestic industrial output and a large group of macroeconomicvariables, including fiscal variables, wages, inflation, money,credit, trade, and exchange rates. Also analyzed are the effectsof economic conditions in industrial countries on output fluctuationsin the sample developing countries. The results point to manysimilarities between macroeconomic fluctuations in developingand industrial countries (procyclical real wages, countercyclicalvariation in government expenditures) and some important differences(countercyclical variation in the velocity of monetary aggregates).Their robustness is examined using different detrending procedures.     

贸易摩擦、宏观经济波动与经济开放程度的选择

本文构建一个包含关税冲击以及外汇风险溢价的两国开放经济DSGE模型,创新地揭示了关税冲击造成实际汇率波动的“直接效应”与“间接效应”,刻画了关税变动、贸易条件与实际汇率之间的动态关系与作用机制。我们深入分析了不同经济开放程度下贸易摩擦造成的宏观经济波动以及经济福利损失。模拟结果表明,在一定贸易开放程度下,外国加收关税一方面会导致本国贸易条件恶化,引发出口及产出下降;另一方面会导致本国汇率贬值,引发出口及产出增长。关税冲击发生后短期中汇率贬值效应占优,本国产出会出现小幅上升,随后贸易条件恶化效应逐步显现,产出持续下降。福利分析结果表明,本国适度提升贸易开放度,虽然经济福利损失会小幅上升,但福利损失增加幅度小于外国,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对优势;如果本国过度提高贸易开放度,则会导致本国福利损失大幅增加,并且大于外国福利损失增幅,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对劣势。因此,应适度逐步有序地提升贸易开放度。此外,本国适度推进资本账户开放的政策能够改善贸易条件,促进本国经济增长。     

THE BEHAVIOR OF U.S. SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES SINCE OCTOBER 1979

Short-term interest rates in the United States have been “too high” since October 1979 in the sense that both unconditional and conditional forecasts, based on an estimated vector autoregression model summarizing the prior experience, underpredict short-term interest rates during this period. Although a nonstructural model cannot directly answer the question of why this has been so, comparisons of alternative conditional forecasts point to the post-October 1979 relationship between the growth of real income and the growth of real money balances as closely connected to the level and pattern of short-term interest rates. This finding is consistent with the authors' earlier conclusion, based on analysis of a small structural macroeconometric model, that the high average level of interest rates has been due to a combination of slow growth of (nominal) money supply and continuing price inflation, which together have kept real balances small in relation to prevailing levels of economic activity.     

On the rationality and efficiency of inflation forecasts: Evidence from advanced and emerging market economies

This paper provides a full characterization of inflation rate forecasts using the mean values from Consensus Economics for a sample of 78 advanced and emerging economies between 1989 and 2014. It also assesses the performance of inflation rate forecasts around business cycles’ turning points. As expected, that inflation forecasts start to mirror the actual data as the forecast horizon draws to a close, particularly in advanced economies. The mean forecast error is positive and larger than one point when we pool all countries, but this masks inter-group differences. Moreover, we find evidence for biasedness, inefficiency or information rigidities, with a clear tendency for “forecast smoothing”. Accounting for cross-country informational linkages is important: forecasters fail to adjust their inflation forecasts quick enough in response to domestic news and news from abroad. Finally, during recession episodes forecasts generally appear to be inefficient. The same holds true for recoveries.     

Some dynamic theory of macroeconomic policy effects on income and prices under the government budget restraint

Consider a macroeconomic model with constant capacity, an inflation adjustment process depending on excess demand, a government budget restraint, and plausible assumptions. Steady-state equilibrium paths have constant (possibly zero) inflation rates. Stability is assured if the endogenous policy variable is money, government purchase, or the tax rate; if it is government debt instability is assured (contrary to Blinder-Solow). Exogenous increases in money or government purchases raise prices in the short and long run. An open market purchase raises prices in the short run, but if money is endogenous it reduces money and prices in the long run.     

The Terminal Value and Inflation Controversy

This journal recently published what was effectively a debate between Gunther Friedl and Bernhard Schwetzler (hereafter “F&S”), on the one hand, and Michael Bradley and Gregg Jarrell (“B&J”). B&J initiated the first round of the debate by criticizing the constant growth valuation model, commonly known as the “Constant Growth Model” or “Gordon Growth Model.” The Gordon Growth Model was introduced by Myron Gordon and Eli Shapiro (“G&S”) in a 1956 paper and has long been widely used by corporate and investment practitioners. F&S responded to B&J with a defense of the original G&S formulation. In revisiting this debate, the authors find that the models B&J and F&S advocate are at bottom two different versions of the same G&S constant growth model, but with quite different assumptions about the effect of inflation on the amount of capital reinvestment required to sustain businesses over time. The authors resolve the dispute by showing that both models, when using a consistent set of assumptions about inflation and capital reinvestment, produce identical growth rates and estimates of value. At the same time, however, the authors recognize that the two models (the G&S/F&S model, on the one hand, and the B&J model on the other) are likely to be appropriate for very different kinds of companies, and each for only small subsets of companies.