Does it help firms to secretly pay for stock promoters?

We examine deals between listed firms and promoters who have been secretly hired to increase their stock prices. This behavior by the secret promoter is illegal (and leads to prosecution) but the actions of the hiring firm are legal. We use data from these prosecutions to analyze the behavior and motivations of the hiring firms. We find that secret promotion leads to an initial increase in the price and trading volume of the firms on the date that the secret promotion started. Subsequently, however, we find that this increase in price is reversed when regulators (e.g. SEC or NASD) take action against these promoters for not disclosing their relationships with the hiring firms. We find that the main motives behind these relationships are to maximize the private benefits of the firm’s managers and owners through pumping the share prices and subsequently dumping their shareholdings.     

How does managed care do it?

Integrating the health services and insurance industries, as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) do, could lower expenditure by reducing either the quantity of services or unit price or both. We compare the treatment of heart disease in HMOs and traditional insurance plans using two datasets from Massachusetts. The nature of these health problems should minimize selection. HMOs have 30% to 40% lower expenditures than traditional plans. Both actual treatments and health outcomes differ little; virtually all the difference in spending comes from lower unit prices. Managed care may yield substantial increases in measured productivity relative to traditional insurance.     

When does relationship lending start to pay?

This paper empirically characterizes relationship lending using data from more than 20,000 loans of a Spanish bank to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The study analyzes the pricing determinants of loans to firms based on the entire previous bank–firm relationship, allowing for the identification of nonlinear pricing patterns in the bank–firm relationship. We show that firms only start capitalizing the gains of relationship lending when the relationship extends beyond two years. This reduction in the loan rate spread charged is driven by the opaque firms, for which the acquisition of “soft” information is especially relevant. Finally, we find that relationship lending significantly mitigates the increased costs of refinancing loans along two dimensions: relationship duration and having additional contracts—other than loans—with the bank.     

Why does workers' compensation pay more for health care?

An analysis shows that health care providers charged substantially larger amounts for treatment of workers' compensation cases than for the treatment of similar patients insured by Blue Cross.     

What does it mean to be green?

Today a company is not considered environmentalist unless it moves beyond mere compliance with government regulations to behavior its competitors, and even customers, do not expect. How should it set its agenda? Author Art Kleiner proposes that, to be green, a company must ask three questions: What products should we bring to market? How much disclosure of pollution information should we support? And how can we reduce waste at its source? These questions can't be answered, Kleiner says, unless managers insist on sustainable growth. In this sense, a big investment in environmentalism is like a big one in R&D--both presuppose patient capital and managerial maturity. What are green products? Kleiner cautions against giving in to misinformed public opinion--as McDonald's did in giving up its styrene "clamshells," which were more recyclable than the composite papers it switched to. Rather, companies should rely on literature that analyzes the product life cycle. As for public disclosure, the benefits may be unexpected. Federal legislation requiring companies to report the emission of potentially hazardous waste to a central data bank has not made environmentalists attack them. Rather, it has forced companies to learn what chemicals they inadvertently produce and how much--knowledge that helps them improve production processes. Sharing it helps ecological researchers study the combined effects of plant emissions. As for pollution prevention, Kleiner notes the analogy to quality and observes that it is better to design harmful waste products out of the system than catch them at the end of the line.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

Does it pay to pray? Religious nonprofits and funding

This study examines whether religious identity has an impact on two types of funding, donations and government grants, received by nonprofit organizations. We argue that religious nonprofits attract more donations because (1) donors feel an affinity or special tie to religious organizations and/or (2) donors regard religious organization as having good stewardship. Using 54,917 organization-year observations we find that 18% of the largest U.S. nonprofit organizations have some religious identity and that these organizations receive more donations than their non-religious counterparts. We further find that the association is more pronounced for nonprofits in more religious geographic areas, those with unrestricted donations, and organizations with better stewardship. Conversely, we find that government grants are negatively associated with religious identity, a result consistent with the separation between church and state established under U.S. law and tradition. This negative relationship, however, is mitigated for nonprofits with better stewardship. Our results should be of interest to donors and policymakers who seek to understand the impact of religion on nonprofit funding as well as the role of donor affiliation and stewardship in the fundraising process.     

Mandatory dividend rules: Do they make it harder for firms to invest?

What are the costs and benefits of mandatory dividend rules? On the one hand, they make it harder for controlling shareholders to divert corporate assets. On the other hand, they reduce the internal funds available for firms to invest, possibly leading to the loss of valuable projects. To assess this trade-off, we look at investment and dividend decisions in a sample of public firms in Brazil. We show that a significant fraction of these firms use loopholes of Brazil's mandatory dividend rules to avoid paying dividends. And yet, the dividend rules are effective. They help explain why the average dividend yield in Brazil is higher than in the U.S., without making it harder for firms to invest.     

Too big to fail in banking: What does it mean?

Interest in too big to fail (TBTF) resolutions of insolvent large complex financial firms has intensified in recent years. TBTF resolutions protect some in-the-money counterparties of a targeted insolvent firm from losses that they would suffer if the usual bankruptcy resolution regimes used in resolving other firms in the industry were applied. Although special TBTF resolution regimes may reduce the collateral spill-over costs of the failure, the combined direct and indirect costs from such “bailouts” may be large and often financed in part or in total by taxpayers. Thus, TBTF has become a major public policy issue that has not been resolved in part because of disagreements about definitions and thereby the estimates of the benefits and costs. This paper explores these differences and develops a framework for standardizing the definitions and evaluating the desirability of TBTF resolutions more accurately.     

Does it pay to be ethical? Evidence from the FTSE4Good

The empirical mean–variance evidence comparing the performance of Socially Responsible Investments (SRI) and conventional investments suggests that there is no significant difference between the two. This paper re-examines the problem in the context of Marginal Conditional Stochastic Dominance (MCSD), which can accommodate any return distribution or concave utility function. Our results provide strong evidence that there is a financial price to be paid for socially responsible investing. Indices composed of socially responsible firms are MCSD dominated by trademarked indices composed of conventional firms as well as by indices carefully matched by size and industry with the firms in the SRI indices. Zero cost portfolios created by shorting the SRI index and using the proceeds to invest in the conventional index generate higher average returns, lower variance and higher skewness than either of the two indices standing alone. They also MCSD dominate the SRI and conventional indices standing alone.     

Does it really pay off for investors to consider information from social media?

This paper raises the question whether investors can learn something from social media sentiment that they do not already know from (existing) financial information disclosed by companies and financial analysts. Therefore, the relationship between financial information and Refinitiv’s MarketPsych social media sentiment index is explored. The paper introduces adjusted social media sentiment, which corrects social media sentiment for the impact of financial information such as earnings surprises, analyst forecast revisions, new dividends, and 8-K filings. It turns out that adjusted social media sentiment is related to subsequent short-term stock returns. This is particularly true for stocks with negative (adjusted) sentiment. Moreover, looking at long-term holding returns the paper does not find compelling evidence for reversals suggesting that (adjusted) social media sentiment reflects information about the prospects of the firm.     

Does it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking

We exploit a unique sample to analyze how homophily (affinity for similar others) and social ties affect career outcomes in banking. We test if these factors increase the probability that the appointee to an executive board is an outsider without previous employment at the bank compared to being an insider. Homophily based on age and gender increase the chances of the outsider appointments. Similar educational backgrounds, in contrast, reduce the chance that the appointee is an outsider. Greater social ties also increase the probability of an outside appointment. Results from a duration model show that larger age differences shorten tenure significantly, whereas gender similarities barely affect tenure. Differences in educational backgrounds affect tenure differently across the banking sectors. Maintaining more contacts to the executive board reduces tenure. We also find weak evidence that social ties are associated with reduced profitability, consistent with cronyism in banking.     

Board composition after mergers,does it matter to target shareholders?

This paper examines whether post-merger board composition affects the premiums paid to target shareholders. Using a sample of 207 stock-for-stock mergers from 1996 to 2004, we show that target merger premiums vary inversely with target director representation on the post-merger board. We also provide some evidence that both inside and outside target directors may trade shareholder wealth for board seats in the combined firms. However, we do not find board ownership moderates the relation between target merger premiums and post-merger board composition. Consistent with previous studies of management incentives in mergers, our empirical evidence supports the non-perfect agency theory. That is, target directors may sacrifice target shareholder interests to obtain a seat on the post-merger board.     

Trustee reputation in securitization: When does it matter?

We consider the role of trustees–who are nominated to protect the interests of investors–in securitization pricing and whether investors rely on them to mitigate risks. In particular, we examine the effect of trustee reputation on initial yield spreads of European mortgage‐backed security (MBS) issuances between 1999 and the first half of 2007. We find that engaging reputable trustees led to lower spreads during the credit boom period prior to the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Our findings suggest that trustees’ reputation was considered by investors to be more important when risk assessment became more challenging.     

Does it really pay to be green? Determinants and consequences of proactive environmental strategies

This study examines what factors affect firms’ decisions to adopt a proactive environmental strategy and whether pursuing proactive environmental strategies leads to improved financial performance. Using longitudinal data from 1990 to 2003 for the four most polluting industries in the US (Pulp & Paper, Chemical, Oil & Gas, and Metals & Mining), this research empirically models the causal relations between firms’ environmental performance and their financial resources and management capability. Our results show that positive (negative) changes in firms’ financial resources in the prior periods are followed by significant improvements (declines) in firm’s relative environmental performance in the subsequent periods. In addition, we also find that significant improvements (declines) in environmental performance in the prior periods can lead to improvements (declines) in financial performance in the subsequent periods after controlling for the impact of Granger causality. Finally, 3SLS analysis suggests that the positive association between environmental performance and financial performance is robust. Overall, our results are consistent with predictions of the resource-based view of the firm and indicate that although becoming “green” is associated with improvement in firm performance, such a strategy cannot be easily mimicked by all firms.     

Does it pay to be different? Relative CSR and its impact on firm value

Conventional aggregation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) raw scores and its interpreted impact on firm value have provided mixed evidence in the literature. We show that the value impact of CSR activities relies heavily on the industry-specific relative position of the firm. Only firms that distinguish themselves over their peers are associated with increased firm value. This finding is robust and holds for both responsible and irresponsible behaviors. Information concerns and portfolio construction can allude to a possible CSR clientele, suggesting the existence of an optimal CSR level. Our peer-effect results are robust to unobserved heterogeneity along the lines of Gormley and Matsa (2013).     

Are zombie firms more incentivized to financialize?

This paper investigates whether zombie firms demonstrate a tendency to invest in the financial sector, a practice we term financialization strategy. Unlike those in the United States, Japan, and Europe, we find that zombie firms in China are not necessarily small and that they rely heavily on government subsidies in addition to bank loans for survival. In addition, we document that zombie firms in China experience limited investment opportunities in their core businesses. This combination of readily available funding and limited investment opportunities jointly motivate the financialization of firms with zombie status. We further find that financialization is preferred by non-state-owned firms and by those located in regions with less developed markets. Finally, we suggest that a contagion effect can occur in terms of financialization in provinces that have a high percentage of zombie firms. This research sheds light on the effects of a triangular relationship among firms, government agencies, and financial institutions on both the operations of individual firms and overall market efficiency.     

HIPAA's privacy rule: what is it, and how does it affect you?

This article discusses the implications for stakeholders of the privacy rule under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, on which the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services first released guidance on July 6, 2001. Although guidance will continue to evolve, the authors urge organizations to initiate the implementation of policies to ensure compliance by the actual effective date of 2003. (Small health plans have until 2004 to comply.)     

Heterogeneous multiple bank financing: does it reduce inefficient credit-renegotiation incidences?

Small and medium-sized firms often obtain capital via a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length bank lending. We show that such heterogeneous multiple bank financing leads to a lower probability of inefficient credit foreclosure than both monopoly relationship lending and homogeneous multiple bank financing. Yet, in order to reduce hold-up and coordination-failure risk, the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt must not become too large. For firms with intermediate expected profits, the probability of inefficient credit-renegotiation is shown to decrease along with the relationship bank’s information precision. For firms with extremely high or extremely low expected returns, however, it increases.

Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship: Evidence from China's listed firms

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay–performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.     

A collateral tax sanction: When does it mimic a welfare-improving tag?

The suspension of a driver’s license or the revocation of a passport or a professional license are used by the tax authorities as sanctions for failure to comply with tax obligations and are referred to as collateral tax sanctions. In this paper, I propose a new rationale for why it may be beneficial to use collateral tax sanctions for the purpose of tax enforcement. By affecting consumption and providing enforcement targeted to a group, collateral tax sanctions may allow the government to impose punishment correlated with an individual’s earning potential. Such punishment also makes the effective tax rates correlated with an individuals’ earning potential and therefore leads to a more effective redistribution of income. I show that the use of collateral tax sanctions could increase the CES social welfare function when the skill distribution of the targeted group first-order stochastically dominates the skill distribution of the other group and the social welfare function is sufficiently concave.