Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs

We construct an endogenous growth model in which bank runs occur with positive probability in equilibrium. In this setting, a bank run has a permanent effect on the levels of the capital stock and of output. In addition, the possibility of a run changes the portfolio choices of depositors and of banks, and thereby affects the long-run growth rate. These facts imply that both the occurrence of a run and the mere possibility of runs in a given period have a large impact on all future periods. A bank run in our model is triggered by sunspots, and we consider two different equilibrium selection rules. In the first, a run occurs with a fixed, exogenous probability, while in the second the probability of a run is influenced by banks’ portfolio choices. We show that when the choices of an individual bank affect the probability of a run on that bank, the economy both grows faster and experiences fewer runs.     

Private money and bank runs

Abstract This paper studies bank runs in a model with private money. We show that allowing claims on demand deposits to circulate as a medium of exchange can help prevent bank runs. In our model, there exists a unique banking equilibrium where no one demands early withdrawals of real goods and agents in need of liquidity use private money to finance consumption. With private money, the unique equilibrium not only eliminates bank runs but also improves banking efficiency. The implications of our model are consistent with the evidence from the banking history of the United States.     

Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs

We study the Diamond-Dybvig [Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity, J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401-419] model as developed in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] and Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs, J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in record-keeping. We examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank-run equilibria. For a special case, we discover that the agency problem may or may not simplify the qualitative structure of bank liabilities. We also find that the uniqueness result in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] is robust to our form of agency, but that the non-uniqueness result in Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs, J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123] is not.     

MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF LENDER OF LAST RESORT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF PAYMENTS*

We construct a model to clarify the mechanism by which the lender of last resort (LLR) can prevent bank runs. In our model, a bank has both the function of facilitating payments in which inside money is settled using outside money and the function of financial intermediation using a deposit contract. The deposit contract might lead to a bank run, and might even contribute to an efficient allocation. Therefore, to consider the liquidity supply by the LLR, we introduce the deposit contract as a factor of instability in the banking model. We show that the LLR can assist in the recovery of both the efficiency and stability of the financial system.     

Optimal Reserves and Short‐Term Interest Rates in a Model of Bank Runs

A global game framework of bank runs is used to analyse a bank's choice of its reserve level and short‐term interest rate. Higher level of reserves and a lower short‐term interest rate would decrease the probability of bank runs. When the bank's reserve policy is transparent, it will hold excess reserves to discourage withdrawals by patient depositors. This inefficiency of excess reserves increases with the proportion of impatient depositors. When the bank has private information about its reserve level, it will follow a more risky strategy of choosing lower reserves and higher early return than what maximizes depositor welfare and increases the probability of bank runs.     

Bank Fragility and International Capital Mobility

The paper presents a model of a small open economy with a fragile banking sector and imperfect international capital mobility. In this model, increased international integration of the market for bank deposits makes bank runs more likely, resulting in a welfare loss for the business sector. Bank depositors may gain or lose depending on the parameters. When depositors gain, whether the gains exceed the losses to the business sector depends on the size of the holdings of foreign assets relative to the deadweight costs of bank runs. Thus, limited international financial integration may not be desirable.     

A bank runs model with a continuum of types

We consider a bank runs model à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) [3] with a continuum of agent types, indexed by the degree of patience. Much of our understanding based on the two-type model must be modified. The endogenous determination of a cutoff type is central to the analysis. In the case where the bank can credibly commit to a contract, the optimal contract results in socially excessive early withdrawals in every equilibrium of the post-deposit subgame. Thus, even at the best equilibrium the socially efficient outcome is not achieved, and agents? behavior exhibits features of a bank run. In the case where commitment is not possible, there are strictly more early withdrawals and strictly lower welfare than the full-commitment equilibrium.     

Interbank Lending, Liquidity and Banking Crises

In this paper, we show that abandoning the Diamond and Dybvig hypothesis of a unique bank representing the entire banking system gives rise to the possibility of endogenizing the interbank exchanges. In a system characterized by uncertainty regarding the moment of withdrawal of deposits, access to interbank liquidity decreases the bank risk of failure and bank runs. The possibility, moreover, to invest excess liquidity in the interbank market at a positive interest rate increases expected bank profits.
(J.E.L.: E52, G21).     

Bank runs as coordination failures: An experimental study

We use experimental methods to investigate what factors contribute to breakdowns in coordination among a bank’s depositors. Subjects in our experiment decide whether to leave their money deposited in a bank or withdraw it early; a bank run occurs when there are too many early withdrawals. We explore the effects of adding uncertainty about fundamental withdrawal demand and of changing the number of opportunities subjects have to withdraw. Our results show that (i) bank runs are rare when fundamental withdrawal demand is known but occur frequently when it is stochastic, and (ii) subjects are more likely to withdraw when given multiple opportunities to do so than when presented with a single decision. For the multiple-opportunity case, we evaluate individual withdrawal decisions according to a set of simple cutoff rules. We find that the cutoff rule corresponding to the payoff-dominant equilibrium of the game, which involves Bayesian updating of probabilities, explains subject behavior better than other rules.     

Herding and bank runs

Traditional models of bank runs do not allow for herding effects, because in these models withdrawal decisions are assumed to be made simultaneously. I extend the banking model to allow a depositor to choose his withdrawal time. When he withdraws depends on his consumption type (patient or impatient), his private, noisy signal about the quality of the bank's portfolio, and the withdrawal histories of the other depositors. Some of these runs are efficient in that the bank is liquidated before the portfolio worsens. Others are not efficient; these are cases in which the herd is misled.     

基于金融体系视角的银行危机的传导机制分析

世界各国的金融体系可简单的分为市场主导型金融体系和银行主导型金融体系，银行在金融体系中为全社会提供流动性、管理支付清算，银行的稳定对一国金融体系的稳定至关重要。传统的银行危机传导理论并不能有效解释近期银行危机传染事件。运用三期模型比较了不同金融体系下银行挤兑在区域间的传导条件，对发展中国家、转轨国家频繁爆发的银行危机的原因给出体系层面解释。     

Does the BRRD affect the retail banking business model in the Euro area?

This paper discusses how the introduction of the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in European Union legislation may change the retail banking business model, which is the most prevalent model in Southern European countries. The main point is the treatment of deposits in the BRRD. Uninsured deposits may be written down or converted into equity in case of resolution of a bank. This contrasts with the treatment of other short-term liabilities, in particular repurchase agreements. Short maturity repos are excluded from the bail-in, regardless of their size. Also, liabilities related to securities lending and derivatives are given privileged treatment. It is argued that this will be an advantage for wholesale and investment banks, which use these types of short-term funding largely to finance asset purchases. Moreover, it will severely hit retail banking business models of various types by undermining the trust of depositors in the bank, causing bank runs whenever rumours circulate about financial distress situations, thus increasing its cost of funding and lowering the value of its shares. Therefore, to avoid runs on repos, runs on banks are resurging.     

Run theorems for low returns and large banks

In this paper, we revisit the issue of bank fragility in the Diamond and Dybvig (J Polit Econ 91:401–419, 1983) model with sequential service and finite traders. We provide a precise condition under which banks are susceptible to a run when the return on investment is low, and we show that sufficiently large banks are always susceptible to a run. One interpretation of the condition is that exposure to runs occurs when desire for consumption smoothing or predictability of preference profiles are relatively high.     

混业经营：中国商业银行发展的必由之路

分业经营在经济发展水平较低的时期对金融的发展具有一定的促进作用。在而，对现代金融来说它却带来了一系列的问题，银行风险的恶化、竞争力的下降等，更严重的是，随着我国加入世贸组织，我国商业银行将面临更大的冲击，坚持分业经营无异于作茧自缚，摆在我们面前的路只有一条-混业经营，这是大势所趋。     

Deposit insurance and regulation in a Diamond-Dybvig banking model with a risky technology

Summary Three deposit insurance schemes are studied in a version of the Diamond-Dybvig banking model with a risky technology. The schemes include a full deposit guarantee and two alternatives which people have suggested as ways to limit the moral hazard problem of deposit insurance: deductible and coinsurance. Regulation to suppress the moral hazard problem under each scheme takes the form of solvency and incentive compatibility constraints. When the regulation is relaxed slightly, as it might be under regulatory error, the insurer's payout is lower under the alternatives than under the full guarantee. However, the coinsurance and deductible schemes are less effective at preventing bank runs than the full guarantee. Moreover, in some environments, even the full guarantee itself does not provide enough reassurance to rule out bank runs.I am indebted to Neil Wallace, John Kareken, Ed Green, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Andy McLennan, Mike Stutzer, Jan Werner and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.     

BANK RUNS: DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS*

Diamond and Dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs. We extend the Diamond–Dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors. We find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first‐best outcome: depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects. However, an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first‐best allocation.     

Beliefs, Bailouts and Spread of Bank Panics

This article highlights the spread of bank panics across countries, as the public reassesses governments' propensity to bailouts. Policymakers decide whether to save collapsing banking systems by weighing social costs of crises against the costs associated with raising taxes to finance rescue packages. Policymakers know those social costs of bank liquidation whereas the public does not. In this setup, financial crises may result from the public's self‐fulfilling prophecies about equilibrium outcomes, as lenders' expectations impinge on the taxation cost of bailouts. It follows that a banking crisis in a country leads creditors to reexamine policymakers' willingness to bailouts in other countries, which eventually makes their banks more vulnerable to self‐confirming depositors' runs.     

Preventing bank panics: The role of the regulator's preferences

How do the preferences of a banking authority affect its decision making in periods of distress and thus financial stability? We study this question in a version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with a monopolistic bank and a time-consistent policy response by a banking authority. We show that limited commitment on the part of the banking authority may induce fragility but the banking authority's incentives are also an important determining factor in the degree of financial stability. In particular, under a simple suspension scheme, delegating a banking authority who places sufficient weight on a banker's welfare acts as a commitment device and prevents runs, in analogy with how a Rogoff (1985) “conservative” central banker helps reduce inflation bias. In contrast, once interventions take the form of payment rescheduling, the scope for the bank's susceptibility to a panic increases should the banking authority put more weight on monopoly rents. Identifying such an aspect of vulnerability suggests that appointing a banking authority whose objective function deviates from that of depositors may have unintended consequences.     

Consumer perception of deposit insurance: little awareness,limited effectiveness?

The empirical findings on bank runs and market discipline are at odds with the theoretical predictions from the literature, at least in emerging markets. Using unique survey data from the Netherlands, we explore two possible explanations: deposit holders may have limited knowledge of deposit insurance (DI)-schemes or they may not fully trust these schemes to be executed faithfully. We find that knowledge on the eligibility for DI is limited, particularly when it concerns minor banks. Nevertheless, households with more deposits have better knowledge of the DI-scheme and show higher levels of trust. In addition, deposit holders generally expect an associated payback time that well exceeds the time it has taken to pay back depositors in the past. Moreover, consumers believe repayment is more likely and faster for large, systemic banks. These results confirm that both households’ awareness of the coverage and trust in the operations of the DI-scheme are suboptimal.     

A Bank Panic Model with a Bond Market

We have constructed a model of bank failure with monetary assets (bonds), adopting the overlapping-generations model. In it, monetary assets play a role in dispersing the credit crunch from a single bank run into a nationwide bank panic. As established by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a single bank run is explained by a model without any monetary assets. In our model, however, the bond market is introduced to describe the process in which a bank run spreads. As a result, our model describes a general phenomenon—credit market failure—rather than a single bank run.
JEL classification numbers: G21, E40.