Federal transfers, environmental policy and economic growth

We study the effects of commonly used cross-country transfer programs on uncoordinated national environmental policies, economic growth and natural resources in a federal economy. Natural resources are a federation-wide public good. In each member country, production degrades the environment, but clean-up policy can improve it. Clean-up policy is financed by taxes on polluting firms’ output and cross-country redistributive transfers. We solve for a symmetric Nash equilibrium among national governments. Transfer policies that lead to higher pollution taxes make existence harder, and are harmful not only to growth but also to the environment. The best way to improve environmental quality is to implement a taxation system that stimulates growth and broadens tax bases to finance national clean-up policies.     

我国绿色税收政策效果分析及改革设想

我国在经济快速发展过程中出现了许多社会问题,其中环境污染是最严峻的问题之一。税收政策在促进环境改善方面具有十分明显的作用,通过制定税收政策引导企业经营方式的改变,从而实现环境改善已是各国的通行作法。与欧美国家相比我国税制的绿化程度很低,且不成体系。与生态环境有关的税收政策,散见于资源税、消费税、企业所得税等税种中,许多仍以费的形式存在,有较大的空间。应在借鉴国外绿色税收政策成功作法和经验的基础上,增加现行税种的环境保护功能,实行专门的环保税种,实行费改税等。     

关于完善我国环保型税收政策的探讨

环保型税收在环境保护方面具有不可替代的作用。随着我国经济发展环境问题日益凸现,运用税收手段解决环境问题已成为各国通行的做法。鉴于我国目前以流转税为主,经济发展水平不高,所以不能完全照搬西方的做法,但西方发达国家生态税有许多值得我们借鉴的成功经验。我国税制中与生态环境有关的政策,散见于资源税、消费税、企业所得税等几个税种中,有些仍以费的形式存在,有较大的空间。建议应增加现行税种的环境保护内涵,实行专门的环保税种,实行费改税等。     

Environmental taxes with heterogeneous consumers: an application to energy consumption in France

This paper constructs a model with four groups of households who have preferences over labor supply, consumption of polluting (energy related) and non-polluting (non-energy) goods, and emissions. It quantifies the model for the French economy and computes its optimal tax equilibria under nine second-best tax regimes. We find that the redistributive role of environmental taxes requires the polluting goods to be taxed at a rate much below their marginal social damage. These goods may even require an outright subsidy if the society values equality ‘a lot’. Secondly, if environmental taxes that have an exclusively externality-correcting role, they benefit all types—although the gains are rather modest. The gains and losses become more substantial when environmental taxes have a redistributive role as well. Third, setting the environmental tax at its Pigouvian level, rather than its optimal externality-correcting-cum-redistributive level, benefits the high-income group at the expense of the low-income groups. Fourth, nonlinear taxation of polluting goods, and nonlinear commodity taxation in general, is a powerful redistributive mechanism. Fifth, introducing environmental taxes in the current French tax system, with its suboptimal income taxes, results in substantial welfare gains for the highest income group and a sizable loss for the least well-off persons.     

Choosing the right instrument

This paper analyses the optimal choice of second-best optimal environmental policies. Using a partial equilibrium model, the paper first reconfirms the well-known result that the existence of a double dividend (in its weak definition) favours environmental policy instruments which maximise tax revenues for a given improvement in environmental quality. Additional revenues can be used to reduce the distortion of existing taxes such as taxes on labour and capital income. Without uncertainty, environmental taxes and auctioned permits are equally appropriate. In the presence of uncertainty, however, the optimal choice of taxes or tradable permits depends on the relative magnitudes of the marginal environmental damage and the marginal benefit from consuming a polluting good. In the second part, the paper, therefore, analyses how the revenue capacity affects the optimal choice of environmental policy instruments in the presence of uncertainty. The paper shows that the first-best choice rule between price and quantity regulation (Weitzman, 1974) remains valid in a second-best world with distortionary taxation.     

Asymmetric Tax Policy Responses in Large Economies With Cross-Border Pollution

We build a model of cross-border pollution between two large open economies, one importing the polluting good and the other exporting it, and derive their non-cooperative trade and environmental tax policies. We show among other things, that (1) in response to a bilateral reduction in trade taxes by both countries, the former country’s optimal policy is to lower its Nash emissions tax while the latter’s is to raise it, and (2) in response to an increase in emissions tax rates by both countries, the former country’s optimal reaction is to raise its Nash import tariff, while the latter’s is to reduce its Nash export tax. That is, in the present context, freer trade leads the exporting country to adopt stricter while the importing country laxer environmental tax policies.     

Why Finance Ministers Favor Carbon Taxes,Even If They Do Not Take Climate Change into Account

Fiscal considerations may shift governmental priorities away from environmental concerns: finance ministers face strong demand for public expenditures such as infrastructure investments but they are constrained by international tax competition. We develop a multi-region model of tax competition and resource extraction to assess the fiscal incentive of imposing a tax on carbon rather than on capital. We explicitly model international capital and resource markets, as well as intertemporal capital accumulation and resource extraction. While fossil resources give rise to scarcity rents, capital does not. With carbon taxes, the rents can be captured and invested in infrastructure, which leads to higher welfare than under capital taxation. This result holds even without modeling environmental damages. It is robust under a variation of the behavioral assumptions of resource importers to coordinate their actions, and a resource exporter’s ability to counteract carbon policies. Further, no green paradox occurs—instead, the carbon tax constitutes a viable green policy, since it postpones extraction and reduces cumulative emissions.     

Uncertainty over future environmental taxes

Besides static efficiency properties, environmental policies should be evaluated in terms of their longer-run impacts on investment and technological change to reduce pollution and degradation of natural resources. Using a stochastic dynamic programming approach, this paper analyzes how uncertainty about a future environmental tax on a polluting input alters investment in resource conservation and how such investment affects future demand for the polluting input. The impact on investment depends crucially on price elasticities of demand and on the manner in which investment shifts and rotates the demand schedule for the polluting input in the future. The expectation of a higher tax does not necessarily create stronger incentives for investment in resource conservation. More uncertainty about future policies does encourage investment if it makes a firm more responsive to future price changes and discourages investment if it makes a firm less responsive to price changes.     

Dynamic analysis of bribery firms’ environmental tax evasion in an emissions trading market

Using an R&D-based growth model with dual regulation, we analyse how environmental policies influence pollution, corruption, a growth rate, and welfare. Considering that polluting firms bribe bureaucrats to evade paying environmental tax, we find that a stricter environmental tax leads to a decrease in growth rate via a decrease in the permit rent as well as an increase in pollution and corruption per firm and results in worsening households’ welfare and in improving the bureaucrats’ welfare. Thus, tax evasion with corruption improves households’ welfare and worsens the bureaucrats’ welfare. Our findings imply that tax evasion under dual regulation improves social welfare.     

THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES An empirical study of water and solid waste levies in Flanders*

ABSTRACT ** ** Résumé en fin d'article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resúmen al fin del artículo.
: Environmental problems are considered by the majority of economic agents as important factors in making public policy. As a result, economic and market-integrated instruments are increasingly being used as alternatives to traditional environmental policy instruments. This article aims to determine the actual effect of environmental taxes on pollution levels. In particular, a case study of Flemish environmental taxes on water and solid waste pollution is reported. A quantitative model for testing the actual effectiveness of environmental taxes is developed, based on similar studies that analysed Dutch environmental policy. The conclusions of this analysis are extended with a qualitative analysis of information provided by in-depth interviews. Data-driven empirical research of the Flemish situation does not confirm the expected direct relationship between an increase in taxation and a decrease in pollution. In general, industrial firms do not consider the present taxation system a legitimate one for changing their polluting activities. As a result, the greening’of management is limited and environmental taxes are considered by the majority of firms as a mere business taxation rather than a system to create a switch from polluting to non-polluting behaviour.     

Externalities in a spatial context: The case of air pollution

In this paper air pollution externalities are analyzed in an explicit spatial setting that recognizes the spatial interdependence of polluters and their victims. Optimal environmental policies are shown to consist not only of Pigouvian taxes but of two other policies. First, regulations controlling the allocation of land between polluters and victims are needed. Secondly, if pollution taxes are imposed by local governments, in general it will be necessary for the federal government to take some of the tax proceeds and redistribute them amongst localities. For example, some of the proceeds in heavily taxed and polluted communities may have to be redistributed to lightly taxed and polluted communities.     

促进区域经济协调发展的税收对策

我国区域经济差距过大的税收政策存在税率相同而实际税负不一,税种设计、税收政策不合理,应利用税收政策刺激企业投资,实行差别税率,调整主要税种和完善税收优惠政策。     

Tax Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets with Environmentally Conscious Consumers

This paper analyses the effects of tax competition on environmental product quality, pollution and welfare in a two-country, vertically differentiated, international duopoly, in which consumers are environmentally conscious. The firm in each country chooses first the environmental quality of its product (which reflects the emissions generated in the production process) and then the price. In equilibrium one country will be more polluted than the other because firms choose different levels of environmental quality of their products. We find that a country’s optimal commodity tax is higher if the domestic firm is the more polluting supplier. Furthermore, non-cooperative commodity tax rates are inefficiently high in equilibrium. This is because, in this framework with environmentally aware consumers, commodity taxes affect the choice of firms regarding their emissions. Therefore, a domestic tax reduction not only raises the profits of the foreign firm but also lowers its emission levels, resulting in higher welfare for the other country. We also analyse the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative commodity and emission taxes with border tax adjustments. With these two policy instruments available, commodity taxes are higher.     

The incidence of a tax on pure rent in a small open economy

This paper analyzes the effects of a land rent tax on capital formation and foreign investment in a life-cycle small open economy with endogenous labor-leisure choices. The consequences of land taxation critically depend on how the tax proceeds are used by the government. A land tax depresses capital formation, crowds out foreign investment and increases national wealth and consumption when the land tax revenues are distributed as lump-sum payments. If the proceeds from land taxation are used to finance unproductive government expenditure, the land tax will be neutral in its effects on the capital stock, nonhuman wealth and labor. When the tax revenues are used to reduce labor taxes, the land rent tax spurs nonhuman wealth accumulation and ambiguously affects the capital stock and labor.     

Excess Burden of Taxation and Environmental Policy Mix with a Consumer‐Friendly Firm

This study examines the environmental policy mix of tradable emission permits and emission taxes in a duopoly model with a consumer‐friendly firm. We analyse the interplay of the two policies and the welfare consequences in the presence of excess burden of taxation. We show that an emission tax can be redundant when both the excess burden of taxation and the degree of consumer friendliness are insignificant. However, when the excess burden of taxation is significant, tradable permits policy with tax treatment should be applied to enhance welfare in the presence of a consumer‐friendly firm. Finally, under the tax revenue‐neutral case where the excess burden of taxation does not matter, the environmental policy mix is also efficient if the degree of consumer friendliness is sufficiently high.     

Optimum Growth and Carbon Policies with Lags in the Climate System

We study the optimal carbon tax in an economy in which climate change, stemming from polluting non-renewable resource, affects the economy’s growth potential. Our main contribution is to introduce and explore the natural time lag of the climate system between emissions and damages to capital accumulation in an endogenous growth setting. This allows us to investigate how optimal climate policy, and its interplay with climate dynamics, affect long-run growth and the transition of the economy towards it. Without pollution decay, a higher speed of emissions diffusion steepens the growth profile of the economy. With pollution decay, this leads to lower short-run but higher long-run economic growth during transition. Poor understanding of the emissions diffusion process leads to suboptimal carbon taxes, resource extraction and growth.     

Border tax adjustments and tariff‐tax reforms with consumption pollution

We develop a model of a small open economy, where pollution per unit of consumption between domestically produced and imported quantities of the same good differs. We show that the first‐best policy combination calls for consumption taxes on all polluting goods, and border tax adjustment (BTA) measures, that is, tariffs or import subsidies. We identify conditions under which well‐known tariff‐tax reform policies for developing economies, such as a consumer‐price‐neutral piecemeal reform of trade and a consumption tax, and a consumer‐price‐neutral reform of all trade and consumption taxes improve welfare. We also evaluate whether reforms of trade taxes alone are superior to consumer‐price‐neutral reforms of trade and consumption taxes.     

Stock externalities and the diffusion of less polluting capital: an option approach

In this paper, the diffusion of less polluting capital in response to a stock externality is investigated. An economy is considered with identical polluted agents and a continuum of polluters who have the ability to invest in less polluting capital units. The option approach of investment decisions is used to justify environmental policies based on pollution thresholds and emission standards. The dynamics of optimal diffusion is first examined. The design of a suitable emission tax is then considered and some cases of tax inefficiency are detailed in the context of a game between symmetric polluters. The model is finally applied to greenhouse gas accumulation.     

A research of green taxation policy for promoting energy saving and emission reduction

It＇s been proved by theory and practice that taxation policy is one of the important means of realizing energy saving and emission reduction. The green taxation system in the Western countries has got better effects in energy saving and environmental protection. In the recent years, China has in succession released some taxation policies promoting energy saving and emission reduction, but still has a huge gap to meet the real needs of energy saving and emission reduction. By analyzing China＇s status quo of the polices of energy saving and emission reduction and drawing upon experiences of the developed countries about green taxation, this paper presents how to perfect ideas of China＇s energy saving and emission reduction taxation policies： adjusting taxes relevant to green taxation in the current taxation system, such as resource tax, consumer tax, and so on; collecting new environmental tax; perfecting the preferential taxation policies for the energy saving and environmental protection industries.     

Environmental policies in a differentiated oligopoly revisited

Constructing a model of polluting oligopoly with product differentiation, we consider how product differentiation, together with the presence and absence of free entry, affects optimal pollution tax/subsidy policies. The sign of the short- and long-run optimal pollution taxes are highly sensitive to the parameter measuring product differentiation as well as the presence of free entry. How they are affected by a change in product differentiation, which is not addressed in the existing literature, is also made clear.