Optimal Delegation

We analyse the design of decision rules by a principal who faces an informed but biased agent and who is unable to commit to contingent transfers. The contracting problem reduces to a delegation problem in which the principal commits to a set of decisions from which the agent chooses his preferred one. We characterize the optimal delegation set and perform comparative statics on the principal's willingness to delegate and the agent's discretion. We also provide conditions for interval delegation to be optimal and show that they are satisfied when the agent's preferences are sufficiently aligned. Finally, we apply our results to the regulation of a privately informed monopolist and to the design of legislatives rules.     

Gauging potential sovereign risk contagion in Europe

This study adopts the CoVaR methodology to analyse the tail risk relationships among European sovereigns, which provide arguably important information for policymakers to identify countries that should come under close scrutiny during the current debt crisis.     

Delegation and Threat in Bargaining

Two principals (“nations”) appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. Here authority means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own. The low-authority equilibrium Pareto dominates (with regard to the principals) the case of the principals deciding on the provisions simultaneously (autarchy). The high-authority equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the low-authority equilibrium and it may even be dominated by autarchy.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, and C72.     

Financial stress and sovereign debt composition

Using a panel of 13 advanced economies for the period 1980–2012, we find that periods of impaired financial intermediation mainly accrue to maturity mismatches in sovereign debt. Thus, a higher (lower) share of short-term (medium and long-term) debt leads to an increase in the financial stress index. From a policy perspective, our work suggests that debt management policies translated into longer average maturities of sovereign debt not only reduce the expected debt servicing cost, but also mitigate strains in the financial sector.     

The elusive costs of sovereign defaults

The evidence supporting the presence of output losses associated with sovereign defaults is based on annual observations and suffers from measurement and identification problems. This paper examines the impact of default on growth using quarterly data and finds that output contractions precede defaults and that output starts growing after the quarter in which the default took place. This indicates that default episodes mark the beginning of the economic recovery and that the negative effects of a default on output are likely to be driven by the anticipation of default, independently of whether or not the country ultimately decides to validate it.     

Exchange rate policy under sovereign default risk

We examine monetary policy options for a small open economy where sovereign default might occur due to intertemporal insolvency. Under interest rate policy and floating exchange rates the equilibrium is indetermined. Under a fixed exchange rate the equilibrium is uniquely determined and independent of sovereign default.     

Oil crises and sovereign debt's private financingedward

Relative to bond financing, there is a significant and temporary increase in the use of loan financing by less developed countries as oil crises occurred. We argue that bank loan syndication reschedules debt more efficiently and better serves balance of payments financing than bondholders. This explanation is consistent with the line of argument that banks are unique. In addition, the low-income countries' loan financing increased more than that of the middle-income countries during the oil-crises, which is compatible with the notion that the contracting cost is cheaper with loan financing than with bond financing.     

Evolution of wealth inequality in China

Household wealth is a key indicator that reflects national economic competiveness and individual income levels. The distribution of wealth is central for evaluating social justice in a country. This article uses a data set composed of the 2002 China Household Income Project and the 2010 Chinese Family Panel Survey to analyze the level of wealth and wealth inequality in China during 2002 and 2010. The analysis decomposes the evolution of wealth inequality during that period in terms of the structure and composition of wealth. The findings show that there was a large increase in the quantity of wealth and wealth inequality between 2002 and 2010. The level of wealth in 2010 was four times that of 2002, and housing assets were the greatest component of overall wealth in 2010. Wealth inequality also rose dramatically after 2002, with the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth increasing from 0.538 in 2002 to 0.739 in 2010. The rapidly escalating price of housing has been the main contributor to increasing wealth inequality in recent years.     

试论会计委派制

由于我国会计管理体制和监督制约机制还不够规范健全,造成会计信息失真问题普遍存在,它扰乱了会计工作的正常秩序,阻碍了经济发展,因此,会计委派制应运而生,它是对现行会计监督机制和会计人员管理体制的一项重大改革,也是建立社会主义市场经济和加强国家宏观经济调控的迫切需要。会计委派制有利有弊,只有提高对会计委派制的认识并加以完善,才能使会计委派制这一新生事物对经济发展发挥更大的作用。     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

The trajectory of wealth in retirement

In this paper, we develop a measure of household resources that converts total financial and non-financial assets, plus annuity-like assets (mainly, Social Security and defined-benefit pensions) into an expected annual amount of wealth per person in retirement. We use this measure, which we call “annualized comprehensive wealth,” to investigate spend-down behavior among a panel of older households in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from 1998 to 2006. Our analysis indicates that for most retired households, comprehensive wealth balances decline much more slowly than their remaining life expectancies, so that the predominate trend is for real annualized wealth to rise significantly with age over the course of retirement. Comparing the estimated age profiles for annualized wealth with profiles simulated from several different life-cycle models, we find that a model that takes into account uncertain longevity, random medical expenses, and intended bequests lines up best with the broad patterns of rising annualized wealth in the HRS.     

Fashion and wealth accumulation

Summary. This paper examines the influence of fashion on wealth accumulation in an economy with two groups of agents. Fashion is modelled as an externality generated by a particular dependence of individual agents' time preference on the two groups' per-capita consumption habits. It is shown that fashion causes excessive wealth fluctuations in the sense that stronger and more persistent fashion is more likely to generate limit cycles in wealth. Opposite to intuitive arguments , however, the externality in fashion does not necessarily generate instability in wealth. In a special case, equilibrium consumption and wealth are stable but the optimal ones that internalize the externality are locally unstable. Whether equilibrium consumption is excessive relative to optimal consumption depends on the distribution as well as the aggregate level of wealth. Received: December 15, 1995; revised version: July 21, 1998     

European bank stress test and sovereign exposures

We use an event study methodology to revisit the bank stress test conducted by the European Banking Authority in 2011. Instead of only considering the final results disclosure, we consider six key official announcements during the stress test. Our results indicate that abnormal returns reversed over the course of the stress test and that the emerging sovereign crisis contributed to the stock market perception of bank health.     

多任务下的协调和授权

在逆向选择框架中，我们考察多任务下两种激励的协调和对应授权问题。具体来说，我们主要关注三个问题：一是多任务时两种激励如何作用，以及决定的因素是什么；二是在多任务的框架中．授权发生基本机制是什么，激励的相互作用对于授权的影响是什么；三是在多任务的条件下利益关系和组织的权利结构是否存在对应的关系．利益冲突的增加是否有利于授权。     

Delegation of Decision-Rights for Wetlands

Different nutrient abatement activities jointly determine water quality. Policies are determined by governments at central and local level, implying that decisions can be affected by strategic considerations. In this article, decentralization of wetland policies is analyzed with regard to the environmental and economic consequences. A two-stage game is used to investigate strategic abatement decisions regarding nitrogen fertilizer reductions, waste water treatment plant phosphorus reductions and wetlands, assuming that wetland decision can be decentralized. It is shown that under particular circumstances, strategic consideration may imply that a central government undertakes more abatement than socially optimal, but in most cases the opposite is likely to occur. Decentralization of wetland decisions is advantageous to the central government but only benefits the local government if its wetland technology is considerably more efficient that the central government’s. This paper explains why local governments often hesitate to take on additional responsibilities for environmental management, and identifies conditions under which local governments make smaller losses or even gain from delegation. The results also contribute to understanding how strategically optimal matching grants are chosen when governments only take into account their own direct costs of abatement and the central government needs to satisfy the local government’s participation constraint.     

Delegation and Information Sharing in Cournot Duopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper it is assumed that ownership and management are separated. Contrary to the classical result of information sharing in a Cournot duopoly with private cost information, the paper shows that information sharing is no longer always a dominant strategy and expected consumer surplus is no longer always decreased. The paper determines the circumstances under which information is exchanged and analyzes its welfare consequences.      

Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies

This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. The delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives: in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance. We show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits, the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium. The paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives. We also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear-quadratic payoffs.     

Strategic Delegation of Multiple Tasks

This paper studies both the owner–manager relationship and the union–firm relationship in a model of unionised duopoly to analyse whether a firm's owner delegates the task of wage bargaining to a manager along with the task of output determination. We also analyse the profit and welfare effects of multiple‐task delegation. It has been shown in the literature that, when there is only one delegation task – output determination – delegation of output decisions to managers leads to lower profits for owners than non‐delegation as pure profit‐maximisation. However, when there are two delegation tasks as in our model – output determination and wage bargaining – we show that owners are better off delegating both tasks than delegating only the output decision or not delegating at all. This result provides a rationale and managerial insight for strategically delegating multiple tasks to managers. Moreover, we show that union utility, consumer surplus and social welfare are all higher when owners do not delegate the task of wage bargaining than when they do. This result suggests that governments implement union contracts that require owners, rather than managers, to negotiate wages with unions in order to benefit unions and consumers and to improve social welfare as well.     

Outward foreign direct investment and sovereign risks in developing host country

Outward foreign direct investment can affect developing, technology-receiving host countries mainly through tax revenue, technology spillover and the competition effect. With the consideration of these three effects of the outward foreign direct investment on host country, we develop a dynamic game model of interaction between foreign investors and host country from a dynamic perspective, to reveal the dynamic evolution mechanism of the sovereign risk faced by outward foreign direct investment. The result shows that: host governments usually give a specific tax holiday for outward foreign direct investors, and during the period of tax holiday investment decision of investors would be influenced by technology spillover effect, specifically, the greater the technology spillover the slower the growth of investment stock. Once the system reaches a stable state, the host country will impose a tax on multinational corporations. If the equilibrium tax rate of industries or regions which makes it easy to obtain technology spillover is high, then the equilibrium capital stock would be low.