Tax-spending policies and economic growth: Theoretical predictions and evidence from the OECD

We present an endogenous growth model to study the growth effects of the composition of government expenditure and the associated tax burden. When we use data from a set of 23 OECD countries during 1970–2000, our econometric results support the predictions of the theory. The share of productive government expenditure is associated with higher growth, and this result is more robust when we use effective average tax rates and statutory tax rates as measures of the tax burden. With respect to the tax burden, different tax rates have different growth effects.     

Economic freedom–growth nexus in European Union countries

This study examines the economic freedom and economic growth nexus in a panel of 28 European Union countries. We investigate the relationship between growth and different components of economic freedom, measured in five major areas of the Economic Freedom of the World index. The aim of the article is to assess which aspects of economic freedom – and to what extent – contribute to economic growth in the EU. Our empirical analyses suggest that the results are sensitive to the method of estimation. Using the Generalized Method of Moments estimator which allows addressing endogeneity, we found a positive relationship between economic growth and four of the five aspects of economic freedom: security of property rights, quality of monetary policy, freedom to trade and regulatory policies.     

Government size, composition, volatility and economic growth

This paper analyses the effects in terms of size and volatility of government revenue and spending on growth in OECD and EU countries. The results of the paper suggest that both variables are detrimental to growth. In particular, looking more closely at the effect of each component of government revenue and spending, the results point out that i) indirect taxes (size and volatility); ii) social contributions (size and volatility); iii) government consumption (size and volatility); iv) subsidies (size); and v) government investment (volatility) have a sizeable, negative and statistically significant effect on growth.     

Federal transfers, environmental policy and economic growth

We study the effects of commonly used cross-country transfer programs on uncoordinated national environmental policies, economic growth and natural resources in a federal economy. Natural resources are a federation-wide public good. In each member country, production degrades the environment, but clean-up policy can improve it. Clean-up policy is financed by taxes on polluting firms’ output and cross-country redistributive transfers. We solve for a symmetric Nash equilibrium among national governments. Transfer policies that lead to higher pollution taxes make existence harder, and are harmful not only to growth but also to the environment. The best way to improve environmental quality is to implement a taxation system that stimulates growth and broadens tax bases to finance national clean-up policies.     

Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers

This paper incorporates rent seeking from state coffers into a general equilibrium model of economic growth and endogenous policy. Self-interested individuals try to extract, for personal benefit, part of tax revenues that could be used to finance public investment. We solve for a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in individual agents' behavior. The determinants of rent seeking in general equilibrium are identified and we consider the efficient size of public sector given the rent-seeking activity. Cross-country data from 108 rich and developing countries provide support for our predictions.     

Introduction: Is the European Union Capable of Integrating Diverse Models of Capitalism?

ABSTRACT

The causes and consequences of the Euro crisis have led comparative political economy scholars to question whether European integration can accommodate diverse models of capitalism. This special issue addresses two important questions about the compatibility of diverse growth models within the European Union (EU): Are some growth regimes better suited to European integration than others? and does the EU favour a particular constellation of domestic institutions? Contributions within this special issue provide a qualified yes to these questions, concluding that the EU favours export-led growth models whilst it penalises and discourages domestic consumption-oriented growth paths, particularly those that are financed by debt accumulation. While recent comparative capitalism literature highlights that European monetary integration has favoured export-led growth regimes, contributions in this special issue outline that the EU’s prioritisation of export-led growth over domestic demand-led growth is present in other facets of integration, including EU accession, financial integration, the free movement of people, fiscal governance and the Europe 2020 growth strategy. Findings here provide important insights for both the European integration and comparative capitalism literature, highlighting that the unique economic ties being forged within the European project may be problematic for those countries outside northwestern Europe and for workers in low-wage domestic sectors.     

The Influence of Socioeconomic Factors on Economic Growth

The main goal of this paper is to analyse the relationship between social capital and economic growth taking into account the role of fiscal policy from theoretical and empirical points of view. To achieve this goal, “Human Capital and Public Capital Effects on Economic Growth” is focused on the effects of two traditional factors: human capital and public capital effects on economic growth. “Social Capital Effects on Economic Growth” considers qualitative variables introducing some socioeconomic effects on economic growth process analysis. In this case, social capital the main variable will be considered. “Empirical Analysis,” an empirical analysis is developed considering the case of European countries prior to the EU enlargement. Finally, in Conclusions,” the main conclusions will be resumed.      

中国的财政分权与经济增长——基于省级面板数据的实证

在Barro、Davoodi和Zou模型的基础上,本文构造了一个财政分权与经济增长关系的模型,并利用1980-2004年省级面板数据,采用随机效应回归方法,分阶段实证研究了我国财政分权对经济增长的影响.实证研究发现,财政分权总体上促进了我国的经济增长,而且我国财政分权的经济增长效应存在显著的跨区差异,东部地区的财政分权经济增长优势高于中西部地区.作者认为,财政分权体制下地方政府财政行为的差异与公共支出构成的差异是造成我国财政分权经济增长效应跨区差异的重要原因.     

EMU fiscal indicators: a misleading compass?

The effectiveness of any device for fiscal discipline crucially depends on the indicators it refers to. This paper assesses the indicators adopted for fiscal rules in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with respect to their relevance for EMU’s objective of fiscal soundness and to the adequacy of the underlying statistical framework in providing conditions for enforcement. The paper argues that EMU’s deficit and debt indicators present several shortcomings with respect to both sustainability analysis and monitoring requirements. The debt indicator allows the achievement of targets via operations that do not improve fiscal sustainability and tends to underestimate overall outstanding liabilities. The deficit indicator cannot be monitored in a timely manner, allows too much room for discretion, and is subject to significant revisions. While acknowledging that any single indicator can be distorted when used as a policy target, the paper argues that the weaknesses of EMU’s indicators would be much reduced if consistency cross-checks played a larger role than they currently do.The authors wish to thank Claudia Braz, Carlo Cottarelli, Jorge Cunha, Mark De Broek, Albert␣Jaeger, Mohan Kumar, Joao Nogueira, Ethan Wiseman and the anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the EMU when cyclical conditions are uncertain

This paper examines economic policy interactions in the Economic and Monetary Union when the assessment of cyclical conditions in real time is surrounded by uncertainty. On the basis of a simple stylised model it shows that with a Nash-type of interaction different views about the output gap on the side of the policy players—the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Central Bank—can give rise to excessive activism with policy players pushing economic variables into opposite directions. It argues that the costs of such policy conflicts can be reduced by agreeing on a common assessment of the cycle, by constraining policy variables, and/or by increasing the weight of fiscally conservative institutions. An alternative option to sidestep policy conflicts ensuing from diverging views of the cycle is to take policy decisions sequentially, as is the case in a Stackelberg-type of interaction. The paper shows that for a given misperception of the cycle, the impact on the policy instruments and on output and inflation are generally smaller in the Stackelberg equilibrium as compared to a Nash outcome. Alternative allocations of roles—that is leader versus follower—are discussed and assessed.

A common pool theory of supranational deficit ceilings

The budget deficit bias is modeled as the result of a domestic common pool problem and of an international externality. Deficits can be used to finance both unproductive and productive public spending. An optimally set supranational deficit ceiling is examined and welfare is compared to the unconstrained outcome and to the case of nationally set deficit ceilings. The supranational deficit ceiling is found to be welfare improving relative to similar national arrangements, but does not fully eliminate the deficit bias unless combined with a domestic fiscal institution allowing for precommitment to productive public spending.     

How elections affect fiscal policy and growth: revisiting the mechanism

This paper reconsiders the popular result that the lower is the probability of reelection, the greater is the incentive of incumbent politicians to choose short-sighted, inefficient policies. The set-up is a general equilibrium model of economic growth, in which fiscal policy is endogenously chosen under electoral uncertainty. Political parties can value possible economic benefits differently depending on whether they are in or out of power, and—by contrast with the literature—the relevant preference coefficient is a choice variable rather than an exogenous taste parameter. The main result is that, when political parties choose both economic policy instruments and preference coefficients, the fundamental reason for short-sighted policy is the extra rents from being in power per se.     

转移支付均等化条件分析——基于转移支付与地方经济增长的关系

文章运用近16年的转移支付数据验证了龚六堂2000年的观点,即中央政府对地方政府的转移支付率与地方经济增长率之间是"倒U型"的关系。并在此基础上进一步推导出地方经济增长和中央政府对地方政府的转移支付之间也存在着这样"倒U"关系。用这种关系解释两个问题:第一,转移支付对地方经济增长有部分正的刺激作用,无论是富裕地区还是贫穷地区,中央政府都应该对其地方政府给予转移支付,同时转移支付也不是越多越好,也应该有个量的限制,当地方政府的收益足够大时,转移支付对经济增长的刺激就不再那么明显,反而会抑制地方经济增长;第二,从新的角度分析转移支付均等化实现的条件,即富裕地区较贫穷地区较早的进入"倒U"曲线的边际收益递减阶段时,才可能实现均等化。     

Spatial heterogeneity and interregional spillovers in the European Union: Do cohesion policies encourage convergence across regions?

Using a spatial econometric perspective, the speed of convergence for a sample of 163 regions of the European Union (EU) over the period 1981–1996 is estimated. For this purpose, we use a specification strategy which allows an explicit modeling of both spatial heterogeneity and spatial autocorrelation found in the analyzed sample. The estimated final model combines groupwise heterocedasticity, the identification of two spatial regimes and spatial dependence. Our results show how an appropriate consideration of the role of spatial effects can shed new insights into the European convergence process. We find that regions in the EU cohesion-fund countries (Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain) are converging separately from the rest of regions of the EU. Our estimations indicate that over the analyzed period, there was a faster conditional convergence in relative income levels of the regions belonging to Cohesion countries (5.3%) than in the rest of the regions of the EU (3.3%). Therefore, our results contrast with other evidence that points to the fact that the convergence process in Europe has weakened or even has stopped at the beginning of the 1980s. Moreover, our work shows clear evidence of separate spatial convergence clubs among EU regions.