The competitive implications of multimarket bank branching

Retail banking markets have traditionally been viewed as locally limited. However, recent studies have found evidence that large multimarket banking organizations tend to offer uniform interest rates for retail deposit accounts throughout the area that they serve, at least within a given state. This uniform pricing phenomenon raises questions about the continued relevance of the concept of local banking markets for both research and antitrust purposes.We address this issue by employing a model designed to explain the pricing behavior of single-market banks that face competition from multimarket banks. Empirical results are found to be consistent with the many implications of the model. We find that even with multimarket banks present in the market, local market concentration influences the pricing behavior of single-market banks; however, this relationship weakens as the market share of multimarket banks grows. We also find that, on average, multimarket banks offer lower deposit interest rates than do single-market banks operating in the same market, and, in most cases, greater multimarket bank presence is associated with lower deposit interest rates offered by single-market banks.     

Retail deposit fees and multimarket banking

This paper reports a systematic examination of the determinants of deposit-related retail banking fees using a set of survey data that is unusual for its size, specificity, and sampling properties. The analysis focuses explicitly on six different fees associated with checking accounts and automated teller machine (ATM) usage. A preliminary analysis documents that, on average, multimarket banks charge substantially higher fees than do typically smaller, single-market banks. A more detailed econometric analysis yields results consistent with predictions of recent models. In particular, it finds that the greater the presence of multimarket banks in the local market, the higher are the retail deposit fees of single-market banks (except in highly concentrated markets) and the weaker is the positive relationship between those fees and market concentration.     

Electricity markets and oligopolistic behaviors: The impact of a multimarket structure

The article analyses the development of retail competition in electricity markets, compares market structures and performance in Great Britain and Norway, and concludes that there is no satisfactory outcome in a multimarket setting like Great Britain. We study differences in retail profits between Norway and Great Britain, both considered as benchmarks for competitive markets. We highlight the price parallelism of British suppliers whatever the trend of wholesale prices. These behaviors contrast with the small and stable retail mark-ups in each group of suppliers in Norway. The main explanation comes from the combination of vertical integration and multimarket setting, which allows parallel pricing behaviors in the British retail market. We also evaluate the impact of other factors that influence the dynamic of retail competition: national fuel mixes and institutional design of retail and wholesale markets. However, we demonstrate that a multimarket setting, which is a major feature of most retail markets, remains the main determinant of oligopolistic profit. Remedies must be implemented to correct these market imperfections.     

Does the Presence of Big Banks Influence Competition in Local Markets?

This paper examines whether the biggest organizations in the banking industry influence competition differently than their smaller rivals. Big bank financial strength, multimarket links, diversified operations, status as too big to fail, economies of scale and scope, and in some cases, weak incentives to be aggressive may result in big banks affecting competition in a given local market differently than would be suggested by market shares and other structural measures. Understanding the influence of big banks on competition has important implications for antitrust policy toward bank mergers. Empirical results reveal that, in rural markets where big banks operate, competition may be reduced, thereby enabling all banks in those markets to earn greater returns. The presence of a big bank is associated with an approximately 0.09 percentage point effect on a bank's return on assets, which represents about a 7.7% performance advantage for firms that face big banks over firms that do not. The relationship between big banks and profitability holds only when banks are classified as big if they are both very large and regionally prominent. The presence of banks that possess only one of these characteristics does not appear to substantially influence competition. Finally, no clear and consistent patterns of variation are found in the relationship between the profitability of small banks and the presence of big banks. The number of big banks, the market shares of big banks, and the level of concentration in markets with big banks do not strongly influence the relationship.     

Interbank competition and information production: Evidence from the interest rate difference

In this paper, using firm-level cross-sectional data in the US, we report that interest rates on loans extended by inside banks are significantly lower than those on loans extended by outside banks for younger firms in concentrated loan markets, while such loan rate differences are not clearly observed in competitive loan markets. The analytical model presented in this paper predicts that an inside bank is more likely to quote rates lower than those of outside banks to capture a customer in order to gain time to establish exclusive access to the customer’s private information, counting on the consequent future rent from informational advantages over rival banks, if the inside bank intends to acquire private information about the borrower’s creditworthiness. In light of this prediction, we conclude that the above empirical finding is consistent with the hypothesis that increased competition discourages banks from collecting borrower-specific private information.     

Deposit competition and loan markets

Less-intense competition for deposits, by mitigating banks’ incentive to take excessive risks, is traditionally believed to lead to lower non-performing loan (NPL) ratios and more-stable banks. This paper revisits this proposition in a model with borrower moral hazard in which banks’ NPL ratios depend endogenously on their loan pricing. In relatively uncompetitive loan markets, less-fierce competition for deposits (i.e., lower deposit rates) leads to lower loan rates and, thus, safer loans. In more-competitive markets, the opposite can occur: As banks’ deposit-repayment burdens decline, they become less eager to risk-shift; this softens competition for risky loans, leading to higher loan rates and, ultimately, riskier loans. Overall, the model predicts a hump-shaped relationship between banks’ pricing power in deposit markets and their NPL ratios.     

Bank Mergers,REIT Loan Pricing and Takeover Likelihood

The impact of bank mergers on Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) loan pricing and takeover likelihood is assessed. REITs that lose their primary banking relationship due to bank mergers pay higher interest rates on future borrowings. Bank consolidation reduces bank competition for REIT loans which affects loan pricing. Moreover, based on randomly matched samples of REITs, the results imply that firms losing their agent banks due to bank mergers and those with limited access to bank debt are more likely to be acquired while REITs associated with acquiring banks are more likely to acquire other firms. Additional analysis of the 92 merged REITs reveals that 33% of the target REITs’ banks are merged with their REIT acquirers’ banks prior to the REIT mergers while 67% of the target REITs share at least one major bank with their acquirer.     

Deposit market competition,wholesale funding,and bank risk

Empirical research on the effect of bank competition on bank risk has so far produced very inconclusive results. In this paper we revisit this long-standing debate and propose a new empirical approach that is concentrated on the relationship between deposit market competition and bank risk. This approach closely follows the traditional theoretical views of the competition and risk relationship and is focused on testing the classical moral hazard problem of the bank: deposit market competition raises the optimal risk choice of the bank by raising the costs of bank liabilities. Since banks can substitute between retail and wholesale funding, we relate deposit market competition to wholesale market conditions and examine their joint effect on the risk of bank assets. The analysis is based on a unique, comprehensive dataset, which combines retail deposit rate data with data on bank characteristics and data on local deposit market features for a sample of 589 US banks. Our results support the notion of a risk-enhancing effect of deposit market competition.     

The Cross‐Market Spillover of Economic Shocks through Multimarket Banks

This study investigates the mortgage lending of banks operating in multiple U.S. metropolitan areas during the housing market collapse of 2007–09. We show that multimarket banks reduced local portfolio lending in response to high overall mortgage delinquencies in their other markets, consistent with the view that local economic shocks can be transmitted to other regions through banks’ internal capital markets. This spillover was greatest when the bank lacked a branch presence and when the market was highly peripheral to the bank in terms of its total mortgage lending. These effects were not fully offset by securitization or other portfolio lenders.     

Bank Mergers and Diversification: Implications for Competition Policy

This paper analyses competition and mergers among risk averse banks. We show that the correlation between the shocks to the demand for loans and the shocks to the supply of deposits induces a strategic interdependence between the two sides of the market. We characterise the role of diversification as a motive for bank mergers and analyse the consequences of mergers on loan and deposit rates. When the value of diversification is sufficiently strong, bank mergers generate an increase in the welfare of borrowers and depositors. If depositors have more correlated shocks than borrowers, bank mergers are relatively worse for depositors than for borrowers.     

Do foreign banks increase competition? Evidence from emerging Asian and Latin American banking markets

In this paper we examine the impact of foreign bank penetration on the competitive structure of domestic banking sectors in host emerging economies. We focus our analysis on Asia and Latin America during the period 1997-2008. Using bank-level panel data to identify foreign banks and to estimate measures of banking competition, we are able to provide robust empirical evidence that an increase in foreign bank penetration enhances competition in these host countries’ banking sectors. We find that this positive foreign bank penetration and banking competition link is associated with a spillover effect from foreign banks to their domestic counterparts. This spillover effect becomes stronger when more efficient and less risky foreign banks enter into less concentrated host country markets. We also find that the spillover effect is greater when foreign banks enter in the form of ‘de novo penetration’ than through mergers or acquisitions of domestic banks (‘M&A penetration’).     

Securitization,competition and monitoring

We analyze the impact of loan securitization on competition in the loan market. Using a dynamic loan market competition model where borrowers face both exogenous and endogenous costs to switch between banks, we uncover a competition softening effect of securitization that allows banks to extract rents in the primary loan market. By reducing monitoring incentives, securitization mitigates winner’s curse effects in future stages of competition thereby decreasing ex ante competition for initial market share. Due to this competition softening effect, securitization can adversely affect loan market efficiency while leading to higher equilibrium profits for banks. This effect is driven by primary loan market competition, not by the exploitation of informational asymmetries in the secondary market for loans. We also argue that banks can use securitization as a strategic response to an increase in competition, as a tool to signal a reduction in monitoring intensity for the sole purpose of softening ex ante competition. Our result suggests that securitization reforms focusing exclusively on informational asymmetries in markets for securitized products may overlook competitive conditions in the primary market.     

A Model of the Commercial Loan Rate

This paper explores the theoretical and empirical determinants of the commercial loan rate charged by commercial banks based on a model of financial intermediary behavior which assumes monopolistic competition in asset and liability markets. The model incorporates the constraint that banks must maintain at least a minimum quantity of bonds in asset portfolios. Equations are estimated on a time series basis to explain the behavior of commercial loan rates over the period 1953 to 1980. The evidence appears consistent with the hypothesis that commercial banks operate in a market characterized by imperfect competition and that they explicitly set loan rates.     

Entry Decisions and Adverse Selection: An Empirical Analysis of Local Credit Markets

During the last decades there has been a widespread relaxation of legal entry barriers into the banking industry, with potential benefits for financial integration and competition. Obstacles to banks geographical and business expansion have been removed and branching has been substantially liberalized. This paper analyses the determinants of entry decisions into local credit markets using a unique data set before and after deregulation of the Italian banking industry. We estimate an entry model à la Poisson and find evidence that spreads between loan and deposit rates drive entry only for newly chartered banks, but does not affect the decision to open branches of banks operating in other markets. Branching by outside banks is instead positively correlated with business opportunities in the provision of financial services which do not require the acquisition of substantial proprietary information. Both these results are consistent with the hypothesis that in credit markets incumbents have an informational advantage over new entrants.     

Bank Mergers, Competition, and Liquidity

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings, and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank.     

Imperfect Competition in Bank Retail Markets,Deposit and Loan Rate Dynamics,and Incomplete Pass Through

This paper examines determinants of pass through from the market interest rate to bank retail deposit and loan rates. A dynamic adjustment cost model with imperfect competition implies that these rates depend on own lagged values and on lagged, current, and expected future values of the security rate. Greater competition in retail markets reduces the impact of lagged and expected rates on current retail rates while raising the effect of the current security rate, yielding greater pass through. These results have important implications for both the specifications used in empirical work and biases introduced into estimates of pass‐through effects.     

Liquidity regulation and bank lending

Bank liquidity shortages during the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 led to the introduction of liquidity regulations, the impact of which has attracted the attention of academics and policymakers. In this paper, we investigate the impact of liquidity regulation on bank lending. As a setting, we use the Netherlands, where a Liquidity Balance Rule (LBR) was introduced in 2003. The LBR was imposed on Dutch banks only and did not apply to other banks operating elsewhere within the Eurozone. Using this differential regulatory treatment to overcome identification concerns and a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the LBR increased the volume of lending by Dutch banks relative to other banks located in the Eurozone. Increased equity, an inflow of retail deposits and subsequent increase in balance sheet size allowed Dutch banks to increase lending despite having to meet the LBR requirements. The LBR also affected the loan composition of Dutch banks (with corporate and retail lending increasing more than mortgage lending) and the maturity profile of loan portfolios. Our results have relevance for policymakers tasked with monitoring the impact of liquidity regulations on banks and the real economy.     

How Does Cross‐Border Activity Affect EU Banking Markets?

Cross‐border activity in the EU is widely viewed as a necessary condition for the implementation of a single banking market and therefore as a positive factor for the enhancement of competition and cost performance in the region. In this paper, we analyse the relevance of this view by investigating whether cross‐border activity really promotes competition and cost efficiency in EU banking markets. We also consider the potential role of a bank's mode of entry by comparing existing domestic banks that foreign banks take over (mergers and acquisitions) with new branches created by foreign banks, often through subsidiaries (greenfield operations). We consider the impact of cross‐border banks on cost efficiency (measured by the stochastic frontier approach), profitability (assessed through return on assets) and competition (measured by the Lerner index). We find that greenfield banks enhance cost efficiency and competition, while mergers and acquisitions hamper competition and cost efficiency. Therefore, our results suggest that EU authorities should promote only greenfield banks rather than all cross‐border entries.     

The Effects of Banking Mergers on Loan Contracts

This paper studies the effects of banking mergers on individual business borrowers. Using information on individual loan contracts between banks and companies, I analyze the effect of banking consolidation on banks' credit policies. I find that in-market mergers benefit borrowers if these mergers involve the acquisition of banks with small market shares. Interest rates charged by the consolidated banks decrease, but as the local market share of the acquired bank increases, the efficiency effect is offset by market power. Mergers have different distributional effects across borrowers. When banks become larger, they reduce the supply of loans to small borrowers.     

Market power in local banking monopolies

By means of two NEIO techniques, this paper analyzes the conduct of a group of Italian single-branch banks operating as monopolists in small local areas (municipalities) in the years 1988–2005, in order to assess pricing behavior in highly concentrated banking markets. Both tests strongly reject the hypothesis of pure monopoly pricing: regardless the advantageous condition, these banks are able to exploit only partially their market power, principally by reason of the nearby competition, the latest banking consolidation trend and the local presence of big banks. Employing another sample, we also show that in duopolistic markets the conduct of single-branch banks is virtually competitive.