IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device

A theoretical model is developed in which both buybacks and the adoption of an IMF programme can be used as screening devices which enable a creditor to discriminate between debtor countries which are willing to use debt relief in order to invest and repay and countries which are not. Asymmetric information is assumed. This problem can be solved if the country has sufficient resources to engage in a debt buyback and so gain the debt relief. When the country is credit constrained, an alternative screening mechanism is to undertake an IMF programme in return for debt reduction and possibly an IMF loan.     

Evidence for the ineffectiveness of debt rescheduling as a policy instrument

Where an economy cannot meet its external debt service obligations, it is forced to appeal to creditors for rescheduling of the debt. As such, rescheduling is evidence of a country's incapacity to carry a debt burden. This article explores factors that explain the probability of a country requiring debt rescheduling in a panel framework. The current literature is extended by modelling a dynamic random effects panel probit, in order to identify a presence of state dependence after controlling for country heterogeneity. We find clear evidence of state dependence when a 2-year lag of the dependent variable is allowed for, suggesting that overall, the fact that a country has experienced a rescheduling arrangement in the past does indeed make them more likely to experience further rescheduling. The article stresses that in order to draw the appropriate policy conclusions from this finding, one must understand that the debt rescheduling variable is itself a policy response variable. The fact that further rescheduling is often required within 2 years of a previous action suggests that rescheduling as it took place in the 1980s and 1990s was an inadequate response that often did little to help countries move beyond their current debt crisis.     

Sovereign Liquidity Crises: The Strategic Case For a Payments Standstill

Is sovereign borrowing so different from corporate debt that there is no need for bankruptcy-style procedures to protect debtors? With the waiver of immunity, sovereign debtors who already face severe disruption from short-term creditors grabbing their currency reserves are also exposed to litigious creditors trying to seize what assets they can in a 'race of the vultures'.
The lack of an orderly procedure for resolving sovereign liquidity crises means that the IMF is de facto forced to bail out countries in trouble. The strategic case for legalising standstills is to rescue the international financial system from this 'time consistency' trap.     

LDC DEBT: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

For a combination of reasons that differ among countries, many developing countries' foreign debt service obligations have become difficult to meet. The size of the problem in 1982 raised concern over the stability of the banking system. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided the forum through which the international community's strategy for meeting this concern has evolved. The IMF also played, and continues to play, an active role in helping to finance the structural and balance-of-payments adjustments needed in countries with debt service problems. The IMF's involvement is an integral part of the broader strategy, which builds on the cooperation of debtors and creditors, on a case-by-case basis. The objective is to share the burden in a balanced way. Obtaining adequate adjustment in deficit countries is central to the strategy, but the Baker Plan increased the emphasis on restoring longer-term growth through more far-reaching structural adjustments supported by longer-term financing. The IMF has modified and enhanced some of its lending facilities in light of this emphasis. However, though the short-term nature of its lending was critical in averting a possible banking crisis during 1982 and 1983, it diminishes somewhat the IMF's role in financing the more protracted adjustments now required.     

Lender's risk incentive and debt concession

This paper demonstrates that a lender's risk incentive may render it difficult to conduct efficient debt renegotiation. When a lending bank has a risk incentive, the bank is not likely to make a debt concession, even though such a concession could resolve inefficiencies caused by a borrower's risk incentive. If the lender refrains from renegotiation the debt, then the borrowing firm chooses a value-decreasing risky project. As a result, the cash flow that the lending bank collects becomes risky, and the wealth of the bank's shareholders increases. The lender's risk incentive thus accelerates the borrower's risk incentive.     

Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia

This paper develops a model in which costly barter is used by firms to protect working capital against outside creditors. Although creditors could agree to postpone debt payments and to avoid destroying the firm's working capital, if the firm cannot commit not to divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante incentives to use barter. We show that the greater is the debt overhang, the more likely is the use of barter, with and without the possibility of debt restructuring. Empirical evidence from Russian firm-level data is shown to be consistent with the model's predictions. J. Comp. Econ., December 2002, 30(4), pp. 635–656. New Economic School, CEFIR, CEPR, and WDI, Nakhimovsky pr. 47, Moscow 117418, Russia; Sloan School of Management, M.I.T., 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142; and ROSES–CNRS and CEPR, Maison des Sciences économiques, 106–112 Bd de l'Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E41, G34, P31.     

外债风险预警模型及中国金融安全状况评估

本文提出了一个用于预警一国外债风险的动态模型 ,即多元累计和模型。模型的用户 (债权人和债务国 )能很早地预测到可能导致债务国重订债务期限的金融危机。实证分析结果表明 ,模型具有提前 3年探测到债务国潜在的还债困难的能力。对中国经济金融安全状况的评估结果表明 ,模型可提前 1年发出预警信号。     

Credit quality, the intensity of regulation and the segmentation of debt markets

Some debt markets have a “competitive advantage” over others due to easier regulatory requirements. Our model explains changes in the market shares of different debt markets. In particular, borrowers may choose between highly regulated and relatively unregulated placement of debt so as to minimize borrowing costs. Borrowers in the highly regulated market incur higher regulatory cost, but are also able to signal accurately their true risk class. In unregulated markets there is an asymmetric information problem. This results in an equilibrium where the debt market is segmented between less regulated and other, more strictly regulated, placements. Raising regulatory costs will lead to an expansion of the market share of unregulated debt. It will also lead to an increase in the overall default rate on corporate debt.     

The pricing of risk in emerging credit markets: Bonds versus loans

Much of the volatility in emerging markets in the 1990s stems from the fact that the major form of foreign investment is the bond rather than the bank loans which predominated until the debt crisis of the 1980s. Bondholders are too dispersed to negotiate with during a liquidity shortfall. Thus, a shortage of reserves becomes a full-blown crisis. This was not the case in the 1980s when banks, as the major creditors, often lent to countries in arrears. The risk to a loan is therefore rescheduling, while the risk to a bond is default. Empirically pricing loans and bonds as assets reveals that bonds incorporate the greater risk of default into their spreads. Debentures are thus riskier credit than loans. As developing countries now obtain most finance through these risky instruments, the volatility of the 1990s is better understood.     

Optimal Debt Relief Under Threat of Trade Punishments

The theory of optimal debt relief hinges critically on the assumption that the output of a defaulting debtor country can be partially confiscated by the creditors. This assumption is at odds with the crucial feature of international credit relationships. The present paper focuses on an alternative enforcement method, namely the impediment of international trade. It is shown that a similar result can be derived. Additionally, it can be rational to grant further credit to countries with very little initial endowment, even though it is clear to the creditors that they will grant debt relief afterwards.     

Perpetual youth and endogenous labor supply: A problem and a possible solution

In the “perpetual youth” overlapping-generations model of Blanchard and Yaari, if leisure is a “normal” good then some agents will have negative labor supply. We suggest a solution to this problem by using a modified version of Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman’s utility function. The modification incorporates real money balances, so that the model may be used to analyze monetary as well as fiscal policy. In a Walrasian version of the economy, we show that increased government debt and increased government spending raise the interest rate and lower output, while an open-market operation to increase the money supply lowers the interest rate and raises output.     

Beyond the Sovereign Debt Crisis: Alternative Forms of Market-Based Debt Restructuring Schemes

The resolution of the international debt crises has stimulated extensive research onhow to design solutions for countries facing external debt overhang problems. Thispaper analyses the benefits for creditors and debtors of the following `market-based'debt restructuring schemes: (i) issue of collateralised new assets inexchange for the old debt; (ii) automatic roll-over of the debt repayment with astate-contingent penalty rate. The first proposal combines the basic debt conversionscheme proposed by Krugman (1989) with Cline's proposal (1995) of self-enhancementson the new claims as a form of risk-compensation for creditors (seealso Williamson, 1988). Under this scheme the debtor country modifies the streamof the debt service payments by voluntarily exchanging the outstanding debt fornew assets with different debt service characteristics where the principal and/or theinterest rate payment can be fully or partially collateralised. The roll-over schemeentitles illiquid countries to extend the outstanding debt for a specified period at apenalty rate which is contingent on a measure of the country's creditworthiness.This solution has the desirable effect of reducing the future contractual obligationsby lowering the penalty rate on the excess of debt rolled over, thus helping thedebtor country to use additional resources to invest in the economy.     

Venture capital: Structure and incentives

Venture capital is a major source of financing for firms in their early stages of development. Such businesses, especially in the high technology industries, are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and asymmetry of information. In this paper we analyze the relationship between a venture capital organization (“capitalist”) and the initial owner of an entrepreneurial entity in which it invests (“entrepreneur”). We focus on the agency problems and derive a compensation system. In our model the capitalist provides a combination of equity and debt financing while the owner provides equity financing which serves as a signal affecting the beliefs (“optimism”) of the capitalist. The interesting result is that since the capitalist is assumed to be more risk averse than the entrepreneur, he is made to be more optimistic than the entrepreneur at the optimum.     

ESG 评级分歧一定带来负面影响吗? —— 基于债务融资成本的视角

ESG评级分歧的存在给债权人带来了一定的决策困扰,但是也会促使企业进行“自救”,这种自救行为可能会缓解企业与债权人之间信息不对称的问题,提升企业发展潜力,从而降低企业债务融资成本。本文以2009-2022年A股上市公司面板数据为样本,探究ESG评级分歧对债务融资成本的影响及其作用机理。研究发现,ESG评级分歧显著降低了企业债务融资成本,经双重聚类、子样本回归、PSM倾向得分匹配、准自然实验等一系列稳健性检验和内生性处理后依然成立。机制分析表明,ESG评级分歧通过倒逼企业提高ESG信息披露质量、绿色创新水平以及引起分析师关注度降低债务融资成本。异质性分析发现,ESG评级分歧对高污染行业企业和地区金融生态环境较差企业债务融资成本的降低作用更为明显。经济后果检验表明,ESG评级分歧提升了企业市场价值,导致企业拥有更高的市场发展能力。本文从债务融资成本的角度揭示了ESG评级分歧的经济后果,丰富了ESG评级分歧的内涵,对是否需要迫切统一ESG评级标准及如何统一具有重要的意义。     

Domestic versus External Borrowing and Fiscal Policy in Emerging Markets

This paper presents a model of an emerging market sovereign that can selectively default on its domestic or external creditors. The two classes of creditors have different ways of punishing the government in the event of default, which in turn creates a differential in the sovereign's incentives to default on its domestic versus foreign creditors. We explore the extent to which the possibility of differential treatment of creditors affects the composition of debt. We find that a country characterized by volatile output, sovereign risk, and costly tax collection will want to borrow in domestic as well as in international markets.     

信用风险、信息与协调

金融机构的短期债券同时被大小两种债权人持有。信用风险由流动性不足风险和破产风险组成。我们建立了一个同时包含大小两种债权人的模型来研究大的债权人、短期债券比例与市场流动性如何影响信用风险。模型的结果显示:(1)提高大的债权人的信息准确度可以让小的债权人更愿意继续借贷,因此降低了流动性不足风险;(2)短期债券比例的提高会增加流动性不足风险,也就增加了总的信用风险;(3)市场流动性越强,流动性不足风险就越小。     

Multiple method forecasts for discontinuous innovations

This paper argues for the development of more explicit forecasting methodologies that use the pragmatics of combining methods and the philosophical base of multiple perspectives. The increasingly common “wicked” problem of forecasting demand for discontinuous innovations (DI) at the concept testing stage of new product development is used to ground the discussion. We look to the interpretivist group-based inquiry methodologies in the management and information systems literature, and coupled this with discussions with forecasting managers, to provide evidence to support the adoption of this approach. Relativism is briefly critiqued and the accuracy of the combining methods forecasting literature reviewed. It appears that the managers interviewed could benefit from an explicit understanding of the multiple perspective approach, as they already appeared to have appreciated the need for a broader based approach than traditional forecasting techniques. It is therefore hoped that as a result of this paper, more managers involved with the “wicked” problem of innovative product forecasting will recognise the need to adopt a more explicit multiple perspective inquiry methodology in their efforts to combine forecasting methods.     

One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade

I estimate the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereigns may fear the trade consequences of default; because creditors deter default, or because trade finance dries up. I use an empirical gravity model of trade and a panel data set covering 50 years, over 150 countries, and other factors that influence bilateral trade. Debt renegotiation is associated with an economically and statistically significant decline in bilateral trade between a debtor and its creditors. The decline in bilateral trade is approximately 8% a year and persists for around 15 years.     

The Economic Adjustment Program for Portugal: assessing welfare impact in a heterogeneous-agent framework

The sovereign debt crisis, triggered by the 2007-08 global financial crisis, has affected several European Union (EU) countries, leading to unprecedented financial assistance programs. In May 2011, the Portuguese Government set an agreement with the Troika (a supranational institution composed by the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)), through which, in exchange for external help, the Portuguese authorities committed to an Economic Adjustment Program (EAP). In order to assess the impacts of the EAP on welfare and, in particular, on inequality, this paper simulates the debt consolidation strategy proposed by the Troika using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. The model enables to explore the impacts of the fiscal adjustment on the endogenous cross-section distribution of income, wealth and welfare. Our results predict a positive net welfare gain, despite the existence of significant transition costs in terms of output losses and inequality, especially during the first years of implementation. Overall, the net positive welfare gains are biased towards the poorer, which means that the consolidation plan will be, in the end, equality-enhancing. These results reflect the instruments involved in the consolidation strategy: productive and unproductive expenditure cuts combined with a slight increase in social transfers. Furthermore, the simulation predicts a positive impact on the Portuguese net foreign asset (NFA) position. Assuming this prediction is correct, this strongly supports the motivation for the adoption of the Economic Adjustment Program which considers the large external indebtedness of Portugal as a central issue in the economic diagnosis.     

THE WORLD BANK'S RESPONSE TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT CRISIS

The World Bank has responded to what it has perceived as two debt crises. The first is the highly publicized crisis in the middle-income, heavily indebted countries–mainly those in Latin America. The second has affected a set of about 20 much poorer African countries. The World Bank's responses to the two crises have been dissimilar as well. In the case of the heavily indebted, middle-income countries, whose debt is mainly to private creditors, the World Bank first responded with its Special Program of Action, beginning in 1983. Under the October 1985 Baker Plan, the World Bank was to increase its gross disbursements to these countries by 50 percent–a goal it has nearly met. Unfortunately, other creditors have not met Baker Plan goals, and so investment and growth in debtor countries has stagnated. The World Bank cannot continue providing a disproportionate share of financing needs. The World Bank has responded to the problems of the poorest debtor countries through its Special Program of Action for debt-distressed countries in Africa, and has coordinated its own concessional International Development Agency–soft loan window–lending with aid from other official creditors and donors.