Optimal Income Taxation and the Ability Distribution: Implications for Migration Equilibria

As recently argued by Diamond (1998), one of the key factors explaining the progressivity of an optimal non-linear income tax is the distribution of productivity among workers. Migration is one source of changes in the productivity distribution. How changes in the populations ability distribution affect optimal income tax schedules has received little attention. Changing the distribution generally affects both the objective function and the government budget constraint. We first consider the comparative statics of the fraction of highly-skilled workers with maximin and maximax welfare functions (so that only the second effect is present) and a quasi-linear utility function. We also present some results for a utilitarian social welfare function.We then study the interaction between mobility and redistributive taxation. We consider mobility by either the skilled or unskilled population under majority voting where governments take the population as fixed. If individuals choose to relocate independently, having identical ability distributions is always a stable equilibrium when the unskilled are the mobile group. However, this is not always the case when the skilled are mobile. If groups of individuals can choose where to locate, having identical ability distributions across regions is only an equilibrium when the mobile type has an overall majority.     

Asset Bubbles and the Cost of Economic Fluctuations

Lucas (1987, 2003) estimates that the cost of economic fluctuations is low; a social planner would pay no more than 0.1% of (permanent) consumption to eliminate all future business cycle fluctuations. The current paper extends Lucas’ calculations by studying the costs of fluctuations arising from asset bubbles. We estimate two classes of costs: consumption volatility due to asset bubbles in a representative agent economy and consumption volatility that arises because households have heterogeneous exposure to the bubble assets. We show that the magnitude of welfare costs is primarily driven by the existence of heterogeneity. Our benchmark calibration implies that the asset bubbles of the last decade generated a social welfare cost equal to a permanent 3% reduction in the level of national consumption. If assets are held proportionately across the population, these welfare costs fall by an order of magnitude. Our calculations are sensitive to the details of the calibration, including the degree of balance sheet and trading heterogeneity, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and the magnitude of the asset bubble. Our preferred specifications generate welfare costs ranging from 1% to 10% of (permanent) national consumption.     

Immigration,remittances and business cycles

Using data on border enforcement and macroeconomic indicators from the U.S. and Mexico, we estimate a two-country business cycle model of labor migration and remittances. The model matches the cyclical dynamics of unskilled migration, and documents the insurance role of remittances in consumption smoothing. Over the cycle, immigration increases with the expected stream of future wage gains, but it is dampened by a sunk emigration cost. Migration barriers slow the adjustment of the stock of immigrant labor, enhancing the volatility of unskilled wages and remittances. Changes in border enforcement have asymmetric welfare implications for the skilled and unskilled households.     

Education, redistribution and the threat of brain drain

We analyze how the threat of brain drain affects redistributive government policies and net incomes of skilled and unskilled workers. Our analysis is based on a model that captures human capital formation, credit market constraints and tax avoidance activities. We characterize how decreasing migration costs for skilled workers shape the time-consistent policies of a government that wants to shift resources from skilled to unskilled workers. Starting from a closed economy, declining migration costs first increase net incomes of both skilled and unskilled workers, and then decrease net incomes of all households. There is a conflict of interest only for very low migration costs. In this case, skilled workers start to benefit from a further rise in their mobility, but now at the expense of the unskilled labor force.      

Markups and the Welfare Cost of Business Cycles: A Reappraisal

Gali, Gertler, and Lopez‐Salido (2007) recently show quantitatively that fluctuations in the efficiency of resource allocation do not generate sizable welfare costs. In their economy, which is distorted by monopolistic competition in the steady state, we show that they underestimate the welfare cost of these fluctuations by ignoring the negative effect of aggregate volatility on average consumption and leisure. As monopolistic suppliers, both firms and workers aim to preserve their expected markups; the interaction between aggregate fluctuations and price‐setting behavior results in average consumption and employment levels that are lower than their counterparts in the flexible‐price economy. This level effect increases the efficiency cost of business cycles. It is all the more sizable with the degree of inefficiency in the steady state, lower labor–supply elasticities, and when prices instead of wages are rigid.     

On the optimal provision of social insurance: Progressive taxation versus education subsidies in general equilibrium

In this paper we compute the optimal tax and education policy transition in an economy where progressive taxes provide social insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk, but distort the education decision of households. Optimally chosen tertiary education subsidies mitigate these distortions. We highlight the quantitative importance of general equilibrium feedback effects from policies to relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers: subsidizing higher education increases the share of workers with a college degree thereby reducing the college wage premium which has important redistributive benefits. We also argue that a full characterization of the transition path is crucial for policy evaluation. We find that optimal education policies are always characterized by generous tuition subsidies, but the optimal degree of income tax progressivity depends crucially on whether transitional costs of policies are explicitly taken into account and how strongly the college premium responds to policy changes in general equilibrium.     

Welfare Cost of Fluctuations When Labor Market Search Interacts with Financial Frictions

We study the welfare costs of business cycles in a search and matching model with financial frictions. The model replicates the volatility on labor and financial markets. Business cycle costs are sizable. Indeed, the interactions between labor market and financial frictions magnify the impact of shocks via (i) a credit multiplier effect and (ii) an endogenous wage rigidity inherent to financial frictions. In addition, in a nonlinear framework, large welfare costs of fluctuations are explained by the high average unemployment and the low job finding rates with respect to their deterministic steady‐state values.     

Migration and Social Replacement Incomes: How to Protect Low-Income Workers in the Industrialized Countries Against the Forces of Globalization and Market Integration

This paper discusses how an industrialized country could defend the living standard of its unskilled workers against the wage competition from immigrants. It shows that fixing social replacement incomes implies migration into unemployment. Defending wages with replacement incomes brings about first order efficiency losses that approximate the budget cost of the government. By contrast, wage subsidies involve much smaller welfare losses. While the exclusion of migrants from a national wage replacement program does not avoid the distortions in labor migration, the (temporary) exclusion of migrants from a national wage subsidy program makes it possible to reach the first best migration pattern despite the preservation of the welfare state.JEL Code: F15, F22, I38, H5, J61     

Labor market dynamics under long-term wage contracting

Recent research seeking to explain the strong cyclicality of US unemployment emphasizes the role of wage rigidity. This paper proposes a micro-founded model of wage rigidity—an equilibrium business cycle model of job search, where risk neutral firms post optimal long-term contracts to attract risk averse workers. Equilibrium contracts feature wage smoothing, limited by the inability of parties to commit to contracts. The model is consistent with aggregate wage data if neither worker nor firm can commit, producing too rigid wages otherwise. Wage rigidity does not lead to a substantial increase in the cyclical volatility of unemployment.     

On the Instability of Long‐Run Money Demand and the Welfare Cost of Inflation in the United States

We evaluate the policy implications of measuring the welfare cost of inflation accounting for instabilities in the long‐run money demand for the United States over the period 1900–2013. We extend the analysis and reassess the results reported in Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009), also considering the recent theoretical contributions of Lucas and Nicolini (2015) and Berentsen, Huber, and Marchesiani (2015). Breaks in the long‐run money demand give rise to regime‐dependent welfare cost estimates. We find that the welfare cost is about 0.1% of annual income over 1976–2013, as compared to 0.8% over 1945–75. Overall, these values are substantially lower than those reported in the literature.     

HOW MUCH DOES TRADE WITH THE SOUTH AFFECT WORKERS IN THE NORTH?

Does trade with developing countries have a small and benigneffect on workers in industrial countries, as most economistshave maintained, or a large and adverse effect, as the generalpublic and advocates of protection believe? A review of theevidence suggests that neither of these positions is tenable.The methods that economists have conventionally used to measurethe effect of North-South trade are biased downward. The truesize of this effect remains uncertain, but some recent studiessuggest that it is much larger than previously estimated. Tradewith the South has probably significantly altered the sectoralcomposition of employment in the North, shifting workers outof manufacturing and into nontraded services. More important,it has probably significantly worsened the relative economicposition of unskilled workers in industrial countries, and mayalso have aggravated the problem of reconciling low inflationwith low unemployment. Even so, the adverse side effects oftrade with the South are much smaller than is popularly supposed.And the popular remedy—protection—is clearly wrong.What is needed instead is more action by governments to offsetthe reduction in the relative demand for unskilled labor throughtraining and education, job creation, and income redistribution.      

Understanding European unemployment with matching and search-island models

To understand European and American unemployment during the last 60 years, we use a search-island model and four matching models with workers who have heterogeneous skills and entitlements to government benefits. When there is higher turbulence, in the sense of worse skill transition probabilities for workers who suffer involuntary layoffs, high government mandated unemployment insurance (UI) and employment protection (EP) in Europe increase unemployment rates and durations. But when there is lower turbulence, high European EP suppresses unemployment rates despite high European UI. Four matching models differ in how they assign unemployed workers to matching functions. That affects how strongly unemployment responds to increases in turbulence. Heterogeneity among unemployed workers highlights the central role of adverse labor market externalities in matching models and reveals that the cost of posting vacancies is the lynchpin of a matching model.     

On the optimal progressivity of the income tax code

This paper computes the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in a dynamic general equilibrium model with household heterogeneity in which uninsurable labor productivity risk gives rise to a nontrivial income and wealth distribution. A progressive tax system serves as a partial substitute for missing insurance markets and enhances an equal distribution of economic welfare. These beneficial effects of a progressive tax system have to be traded off against the efficiency loss arising from distorting endogenous labor supply and capital accumulation decisions.Using a utilitarian steady state social welfare criterion we find that the optimal US income tax is well approximated by a flat tax rate of 17.2% and a fixed deduction of about $9,400. The steady state welfare gains from a fundamental tax reform towards this tax system are equivalent to 1.7% higher consumption in each state of the world. An explicit computation of the transition path induced by a reform of the current towards the optimal tax system indicates that a majority of the population currently alive (roughly 62%) would experience welfare gains, suggesting that such fundamental income tax reform is not only desirable, but may also be politically feasible.     

The rising skill premium and deunionization

During the past 50 years, the US economy has seen a rapid decline in labor union membership and a substantial rise in wage inequality. Since labor unions compress wages between skilled and unskilled workers, a rising skill premium encourages skilled workers to withdraw from the union. If this withdrawal is accompanied by a fall in the productivity of unskilled workers, firms become reluctant to hire the relatively expensive union workers, reinforcing the decline in the unionization rate. Evaluating this hypothesis, we find that the rise in the skill premium explains about 40% of the decline in the unionization rate.     

Unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing

Labor unemployment insurance reduces unemployment concerns. We argue that these benefits moderate incentives to smooth earnings to reduce employees’ concerns about unemployment risk. Using exogenous variations in unemployment insurance benefits, we find evidence consistent with this argument. We also find that the link between unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing is stronger when there is higher unemployment risk and when the firm is likely to employ more low-wage workers, who find unemployment insurance benefits especially useful. Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that public policy decisions such as unemployment insurance have significant, albeit probably unintended, externalities on corporate financial reporting.     

Unemployment insurance and capital accumulation

In this paper, I examine a model economy with production, search, and unemployment insurance. The introduction of capital into the economy of Wang and Williamson (J. Monetary Econom. 49(7)(2001)1337) generates the result that optimal replacement ratios are always zero. The result arises from the decline in aggregate activity caused by unemployment insurance: both capital and labor inputs to production fall when benefits rise. Unlike most of the literature, I compute explicitly the cost of the transition path; agents are made better off by switching to a steady state with no unemployment insurance, but the welfare gain is approximately cut in half. Only the very poor and unemployed suffer welfare losses along the transition path. I then briefly investigate the implications of negative replacement ratios.     

Business cycles in emerging economies: the role of interest rates

We find that in a sample of emerging economies business cycles are more volatile than in developed ones, real interest rates are countercyclical and lead the cycle, consumption is more volatile than output and net exports are strongly countercyclical. We present a model of a small open economy, where the real interest rate is decomposed in an international rate and a country risk component. Country risk is affected by fundamental shocks but, through the presence of working capital, also amplifies the effects of those shocks. The model generates business cycles consistent with Argentine data. Eliminating country risk lowers Argentine output volatility by 27% while stabilizing international rates lowers it by less than 3%.     

Household Level Economic Incentives, Unemployment Trap and Job Finding Probability

This paper considers the sensitivity of the household's disposable income with respect to the labour market states and the labour market transitions of unemployed workers. The paper analyses the following questions: (i) which are the determinants of starting wages? (ii) how many unemployed are in the unemployment trap? (iii) how do household level economic incentives affect the conditional probability of finding a job? The empirical analysis is based on individual panel data covering the years 1987–1993 in Finland, when the unemployment rate rose from about 4% to 18%. We have estimated the starting wage equation to calculate the effects of hypothetical re-employment on the household's disposable income and to evaluate the frequency of the unemployment trap. To analyse factors affecting the transition out of unemployment to employment in open labour market, we estimate unemployment duration using a semi-parametric proportional risk model. The paper shows that the impact of the economic incentives, measured by the hypothetical change in household disposable income, on employment is more important in the recession than in the boom.     

Crude substitution: The cyclical dynamics of oil prices and the skill premium

At the business cycle frequency, energy prices and the skill premium display a strong, negative correlation. This fact is robust to different de-trending procedures. Identifying exogenous shocks to oil prices using the Hoover-Perez [1994. Post hoc ergo propter once more: an evaluation of ‘Does monetary policy matter?’ in the spirit of James Tobin. Journal of Monetary Econonmics 34, 47-73] dates, shows that the skill premium falls in response to such a shock. The estimation of the parameters of an aggregate technology that uses, among other inputs, energy and heterogeneous skills, demonstrates that capital-skill and capital-energy complementarity are responsible for this correlation. As energy prices rise, the use of capital decreases and the demand for unskilled labor—relative to skilled labor—increases, lowering the skill premium.     

How important is intra-household risk sharing for savings and labor supply?

While it is recognized that the family is a risk-sharing institution, little is known about the quantitative effects of this source of insurance on savings and labor supply. In this paper, we present a model where workers (females and males) are subject to idiosyncratic employment risk and where capital markets are incomplete. A household is formed by a female and a male, who decide on consumption, savings and labor supplies. In a calibrated version of our model we find that intra-household risk sharing has its largest impact among wealth-poor households. While the wealth-rich use mainly savings to smooth consumption across unemployment spells, wealth-poor households rely on spousal labor supply. For instance, for low-wealth households, average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are 8% higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands. This response in wives’ hours makes up 9% of lost family income. We also study consumption losses upon an unemployment spell, precautionary savings and the crowding out effects of the public unemployment insurance program on the extent of risk sharing within the household.