基于自愿准备金制度的利率走廊调控模式研究

近年来,很多西方国家的中央银行采用了利率走廊调控框架,以此来调控和实现政策目标利率.但在基于零准备金制度下的利率走廊调控框架中,中央银行很难保证商业银行等市场主体的流动性供求决策面临对称的机会成本,因此会影响利率走廊的实际调控效果;而相比之下,在基于自愿准备金制度的利率走廊调控框架下,有效对称的机会成本设计使得市场主体的储备需求曲线更富有弹性,从而保证中央银行能够顺利实现其调控目的.     

Interest on bank reserves and optimal sweeping

A key rationale offered by the Federal Reserve for the payment of interest on reserves was to remove the incentive for banks to operate sweep accounts. Sweeping shifts funds from transactions deposits subject to reserve requirements to non-reservable deposits. This paper extends a conventional banking model to analyze sweeping behavior. Sweeping responds positively to increases in bank loan rates and reserve ratios and negatively to increases in the interest rate on reserves or exogenous increases in bank equity. Sweeping generates greater responsiveness in lending to changes in loan rates or the interest rate on reserves and lower responsiveness to changes in reserve ratios or equity than in its absence. Empirical analysis of an explicit condition that we derive suggests that, with an unchanged reserve requirement, the Fed could eliminate sweeping by setting the interest rate on reserves to no less than approximately 4% points below the market loan rate.     

Voluntary Reserve Targets

We study monetary policy implementation through an operating regime involving voluntary reserve targets (VRTs). Operating regimes based on reserve requirements may lead to a collapse in interbank trade, as they have since the financial crisis. We show that, no matter the abundance of reserves, VRTs encourage market activity and support the central bank's control over interest rates. We consider (i) the impact of anticipated and unanticipated liquidity injections by the central bank on market outcomes and (ii) a comparison with the implementation framework currently adopted by the Federal Reserve. Overall, a VRT framework may provide several advantages over other frameworks.     

The determination of commercial bank reserve requirements

Excess reserve ratios have been studied extensively and are believed to be endogenously determined. In contrast, required reserve ratios are conventionally treated as exogenous. However, there are public policy reasons for a positive response of reserve requirements to interest rates. These are opposed by private incentives to secure lower requirements when their cost rises with interest rates. Several kinds of evidence support the hypothesis that reserve requirements are inverse functions of interest rates, sometimes with long lags that reflect the political process. The results also suggest that banks are not passive creatures of regulation but mold their environment.     

The integration of the offshore and domestic banking system

The thesis of this article is that offshore banks are branches of the major U.S., British, Swiss, German, Japanese, etc., banks situated in ‘monetary havens’ jurisdictions in which they are subject to minimal regulation, especially to requirements that they must hold non-interest bearing reserves against their deposits. Each bank determines the maximum interest rate to pay on offshore deposits as a function of the maximum interest rate on domestic deposits and the implicit tax on reserve requirements. The more rapid growth of offshore deposits than of domestic deposits during the last several decades reflects two factors — the implicit tax on domestic deposits has increased with the upward movement in interest rates and investor assessment of the risk associated with external deposits has decreased. The effective reserve requirement applicable to each bank is the weighted average of requirements applied to its domestic deposits and to its offshore deposits. Because offshore deposits have grown more rapidly than domestic deposits, the effective reserve requirement has decreased: the fractional reserve multiplier has increased. Because the growth of offshore deposits to domestic deposits appears highly variable, the effectiveness of monetary control has declined.     

Corridor System and Interest Rates: Volatility and Asymmetry

The corridor system in its current form is believed to reduce the volatility of overnight interest rates and to eliminate any chance of persistent upward or downward bias. The model presented here serves to highlight two main findings: one is that a central bank can further reduce the volatility of overnight interest rates by allowing banks some flexibility to meet their reserve targets within a small range, as observed in the UK data. The second is that a seemingly symmetric corridor may be asymmetric in practice due to several distortions, as the UK and euro area data suggest.     

Banks, private money, and government regulation

We study competition between inside and outside money in economies with trading frictions and financial intermediation. Claims on banks circulate if the redemption rate is low. When the quantity of fiat money is scarce, coexistence of inside and outside money dominates equilibria with a unique medium of exchange. If outside money is ample, banks choose to redeem claims in outside money, which increases welfare. Under binding reserve requirements, tightening monetary policy leads to credit rationing. Our results support recent trends toward lower reserve requirements. However, we also identify situations where restrictions on note issue are beneficial.     

Interest rate co-movements, global factors and the long end of the term spread

The decoupling of US short and long interest rates has been a distinctive feature of the 2000s. We employ recent advances in panel econometrics to document this disconnect for industrial countries and link it to a global latent factor in long term rates. We investigate whether international forces, such as global inflation, global output, or the global savings glut may be behind this global latent factor. The savings glut is the most likely contender, suggesting that reserve accumulation and a search for yield from emerging markets has lowered long rates internationally, driving a wedge between domestic short and long rates.     

Are There Optimal Multiple-Reserve Requirements?

A number of developing countries have adopted deficit finance regimes involving multiple- (currency and bond) reserve requirements. A key characteristic of these regimes is that the real interest rates on reservable bonds are higher than the real return rates on currency, so that the nominal interest rates on the bonds are positive. We seek an efficiency-based explanation for the existence of multiple-reserve regimes and for this key characteristic. We find that there are economies in which some of the efficient allocations can be supported only by multiple-reserve requirements, and that positive nominal bond rates may be needed to support some of these allocations. We also find that there are economies in which allocations supported by multiple-reserve regimes with negative nominal bond rates Pareto dominate single-reserve allocations, even when the latter are efficient relative to other single-reserve allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E42, E58, H62.     

Did the Reserve Requirement Increases of 1936–37 Reduce Bank Lending? Evidence from a Quasi‐Experiment

We analyze the impact of contractionary monetary policy through increases in reserve requirements on bank lending. We compare the lending behavior of banks that were subject to the requirement increases in 1936–37, Federal Reserve member banks, to a group of banks that were not subject to the reserve increase, Federal Reserve nonmember banks. After implementing the difference‐in‐difference estimators, we find that the increases in reserve requirements did not create financing constraints for member banks and lead them to reduce lending. Therefore, the actions of the Federal Reserve concerning the required reserve ratios cannot be blamed for instigating the economic downturn of 1937–38.     

Hedge commitments and agency costs of debt: evidence from interest rate protection covenants and accounting conservatism

We provide large sample evidence that credible hedge commitments reduce the agency costs of debt and that accounting conservatism enhances hedge commitments. We examine 2,338 bank loans entered into by 263 mandatory derivative users that are contractually obligated by interest rate protection covenants, 709 voluntary derivative users, and 1,366 non-users. We show that loan contracts are more likely to include interest rate protection covenants when borrowers are less likely to maintain the hedge position once the financing is completed. We find that borrowers who credibly commit to hedge using these covenants significantly reduce their interest rates. While we do not find an average interest savings for voluntary derivative users, we do find a reduction in their loan rates when they practice conservative financial reporting. Our results suggest that accounting conservatism helps borrowers resolve shareholder-creditor conflicts by committing to maintain their hedge positions after completing debt financing.     

Financial contagion and the role of the central bank

We investigate the role of a central bank (CB) in preventing and avoiding financial contagion. The CB, by imposing reserve requirements on the banking system, trades off the cost of reducing the resources available for long-term investment with the benefit of raising liquidity to face an adverse shock that could cause contagious crises. We argue that contagion is not due to the structure of the interbank deposit market, but to the impossibility to sign contracts contingent on unforeseen contingencies. As long as incomplete contracts are present, the CB may have a useful role in curbing contagion. Moreover, the CB allows the banking system to reach first-best allocation in all the states of the world when the notion of incentive-efficiency is considered. If the analysis is restricted to constrained-efficiency, the CB still avoids contagion without, however, reaching first-best consumption allocation. The model provides a rationale for reserve requirements without the presence of fiat money or asymmetric information.     

我国存款准备金制度演变的货币政策视角分析

作为货币政策操作工具的存款准备金制度是包含中央银行对存款准备金率、需要缴存准备金的金融机构、不同类型存款(资产)的存款准备金率、可以作为存款准备金的资产类型、存款准备金的计提方式、存款准备金付息及其(付息时)利率以及相关罚则等内容的确定和调整的一个整体。本文从这七个方面简要回顾了我国存款准备金制度演变的历史,认为我国对存款准备金制度在货币政策体系中作用的认识经历了三个阶段,并从货币政策角度对存款准备金制度工具的作用分别进行论述。最后是结论与启示。     

Distortionary Taxation, Debt, and the Price Level

This paper compares the determinacy of equilibria under exogenous interest rates in an economy with a cash constraint, in which taxation is lump-sum or distortionary. Under passive fiscal policies lump-sum taxes generate nominal indeterminacy, while with distortionary taxes indeterminacy can be real, but not purely nominal. In general, under distortionary taxation uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation depends on monetary and fiscal policy interactions through taxes, debt, and interest rates. To illustrate this principle, we consider balanced-budget policies under distortionary income taxation and show that a unique equilibrium allocation prevails if interest rates are set consistent with long-run deflation. A separate section extends the analysis to endogenous interest rates.     

International reserves and global interest rates

In this paper we study the relationship between foreign currency international reserve holdings and global interest rates. To guide empirical work we solve a simple, small open-economy model with money, where the central bank manages international reserves to smooth inflation over time. This model shows that changes in interest rates are positively related to the target level of reserves. As a consequence interest rate hikes increase reserve transfers, defined as the change in international reserves net of the interest earned on reserves. Using quarterly data for 75 countries between 2000 and 2013, we document a positive relationship between interest-rate changes and reserve transfers as a share of GDP, that is consistent with the model.     

The high-frequency impact of news on long-term yields and forward rates: Is it real?

Macroeconomic news announcements move yields and forward rates on nominal and index-linked bonds and inflation compensation. This paper estimates the reactions using high-frequency data on nominal and index-linked bond yields, allowing the effects of news announcements on real rates and inflation compensation to be parsed far more precisely than is possible using daily data. Long-term nominal yields and forward rates are very sensitive to macroeconomic news announcements. Inflation compensation is sensitive to announcements about price indices and monetary policy. However, for news announcements about real economic activity, such as nonfarm payrolls, the vast majority of the sensitivity is concentrated in real rates. Accordingly, most of the sizeable impact of news about real economic activity on the nominal term structure of interest rates represents changes in expected future real short-term interest rates and/or real risk premia rather than changes in expected future inflation and/or inflation risk premia. Such sensitivity of real rates to macroeconomics news is hard to rationalize within the framework of existing macroeconomic models.     

Interest rates and bank risk-taking

A recent line of research views the low interest-rate environment of the early to mid 2000s as an element that triggered increased risk-taking appetite of banks in search for yield. This paper uses approximately 18000 annual observations on euro area banks over the period 2001-2008 and presents strong empirical evidence that low-interest rates indeed increase bank risk-taking substantially. This result is robust across a number of different specifications that account, inter alia, for the potential endogeneity of interest rates and/or the dynamics of bank risk. Notably, among the banks of the large euro area countries this effect is less pronounced for French institutions, which held on average a relatively low level of risk assets. Finally, the distributional effects of interest rates on bank risk-taking due to individual bank characteristics reveal that the impact of interest rates on risk assets is diminished for banks with higher equity capital and is amplified for banks with higher off-balance sheet items.     

An Investigation of the Effect of the 1990 Reserve Requirement Change on Financial Asset Prices

In 1990, the Federal Reserve reduced reserve requirements on large, nonpersonal time deposits and net Eurocurrency liabilities. In this article we provide evidence on who gained from the reduction in this tax. No evidence is found to suggest that large depositors gained by way of higher yields. Rather, evidence indicates a decline in Eurodollar interest rates relative to other money market rates. Evidence further shows that bank shareholders were recipients of abnormal share price appreciation following the announcement. There is little evidence to indicate that shareholders outside of the banking industry experienced similar abnormal gains.     

Fiscal and Monetary Policy Coordination,Macroeconomic Stability,and Sovereign Risk Premia

In standard macroeconomic models, equilibrium stability and uniqueness require monetary policy to actively target inflation and fiscal policy to ensure long‐run debt sustainability. We show analytically that these requirements change, and depend on the cyclicality of fiscal policy, when government debt is risky. In that case, budget deficits raise interest rates and crowd out consumption. Consequently, countercyclical fiscal policies reduce the parameter space supporting stable and unique equilibria and are feasible only if complemented with more aggressive debt consolidation and/or active monetary policy. Stability is more easily achieved, however, under procyclical fiscal policies.     

Why Commercial Banks Held Excess Reserves: The Japanese Experience of the Late 1990s

We investigated, empirically, why Japanese banks held excess reserves in the late 1990s. Specifically, we pin down two factors explaining the demand for excess reserves: a low short-term interest rate, or call rate, and the fragile financial health of banks. The virtually zero call rate increased the demand for excess reserves substantially, and a high bad loans ratio largely contributed to the increase in excess reserve holdings. We found that the holdings of excess reserves would fall by two-thirds if the call rate were to be raised to its level prior to the adoption of the zero-interest-rate policy, and the bad loans ratio were to fall by 50%.