ARE PROJECT FINANCE LOANS DIFFERENT FROM OTHER SYNDICATED CREDITS?

This paper provides the first full-length empirical analysis of project finance, which is defined as "limited or non-recourse financing of a newly to be developed project through the establishment of a vehicle company." The article compares the characteristics of a sample of 4,956 project finance loans (worth $634 billion) to comparable samples of non-project finance loans, all of which are drawn from a comprehensive sample of 90,784 syndicated loans (worth $13.2 trillion) booked on international capital markets since 1980.
The authors find that project finance (PF) loans differ significantly from non-project finance loans in that PF loans have a longer average maturity, are more likely to have third-party guarantees, and are far more likely to be extended to non-U.S. borrowers and to borrowers in riskier countries. Project finance credits also involve more participating banks, have fewer loan covenants, are more likely to use fixed-rate rather than floating-rate loan pricing, and are more likely to be extended to borrowers in tangible-asset-rich industries, such as real estate and electric utilities. Despite being nonrecourse finance, floating-rate project finance loans have lower credit spreads (over LIBOR) than do most comparable non-PF loans. The authors also report that projects funded with PF loans are heavily leveraged, with an average loan to value ratio of 67%.     

Credit Unions: A Theoretical and Empirical Overview

In 2009 there were over 49,330 credit unions across 98 countries with more than 184 million members and approximately $1,354 billion in assets. There is a great diversity within the credit union movement across these countries. This reflects the various economic, historic and cultural contexts within which credit unions operate. This paper traces the evolution of the credit union movement. It examines credit union objectives, and considers issues relating to efficiency, technology adoption, product diversification, merger, failure and demutualization. The regulatory environment within which credit unions operate is also explored under the themes of interest rate regulation, common bond requirements, taxation, deposit insurance and capital regulation. The overview also considers demutualization and the costs and benefits to credit unions of altering their organizational form.     

Deleveraging Corporate America: Job and Business Recovery Through Debt Restructuring

When the Great Recession roiled capital and labor markets in early 2009, up to a third of U.S. public corporations, and nearly 60% of privately owned companies, reported high levels of financial distress resulting from frozen credit markets. And the problems of “debt overhang” and corporate underinvestment were clearly in evidence as the combination of default risk and a relatively new provision of the tax code restricted the ability of distressed companies to deleverage their capital structures. But as described in this article, at least 110 U.S. companies used a little known provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to defer taxes on the cancellation of debt income (CODI) resulting from exchanges or repurchases of significant amounts of debt. This suspension of tax policy gave many distressed U.S. companies the flexibility to cut costs, shore up balance sheets, and boost liquidity, thereby keeping themselves in business and their workers employed throughout the economic crisis. The 110 companies examined either repurchased or exchanged a total of $32.5 billion of corporate debt. The deleveraging of these companies, which represented more than $2.2 trillion in total assets and $520 billion in market capitalization, helped them to remain solvent throughout the downturn and retain their collective 2.2 million employees. The resulting tax savings are estimated to have saved (or in some cases created) almost 90,000 jobs, while contributing $3.2 billion to total corporate earnings and $10.7 billion of output to the national gross domestic product. Although this approach could be criticized as adding to the federal budget deficit, the deferral of taxes on CODI is viewed as a targeted financial policy tool aimed directly at boosting the productive capacity and employment of corporate enterprises.     

The liquidity effect for open market operations

The liquidity effect is the negative relationship between the supply of federal funds and the overnight federal funds rate. Deviations of the federal funds rate from its target can be interpreted as demand innovations for federal funds. Permanent adjustments to demand are modeled as an unobserved component and estimated using the Kalman filter to identify liquidity effects. The demand-based approach for identifying the liquidity effect contrasts previous work which concentrates on errors forecasting the supply of federal funds. This paper finds a liquidity effect several times larger than that from previous studies, indicating the market for federal funds is less liquid than previously thought. The effect of a $1 billion increase in open market operations over a 1-week period is a decrease of the federal funds rate by about 12 basis points.     

Fair value accounting for liabilities: The role of disclosures in unraveling the counterintuitive income statement effect from credit risk changes

When liabilities are accounted for at fair value, a deterioration of a company’s credit risk results in the reporting of an income statement gain; an improvement in a company’s credit risk results in a loss. Many argue that these income statement effects are counterintuitive and that financial statement-users are likely to misinterpret fair value gains as positive signals and fair value losses as negative signals. Utilizing an experiment with CPAs as participants, we find that these arguments are indeed valid. Specifically, we find that over 70% of the participants incorrectly assess a company’s credit risk as improving (deteriorating) when a fair value gain (loss) is recognized. We also find that disclosures that explicitly specify the relation between the direction of the credit risk change and the income statement effect significantly reduce participants’ misinterpretations, and are more beneficial when fair value gains versus losses are recognized. These findings provide empirical evidence in the debate over the recognition of company-specific credit risk changes and offer direction for improving disclosures in the area of fair value accounting.     

Maryland's all-payer system: a delicate balancing act

A state-regulated, all-payer system has saved Maryland an estimated $43 billion since 1976 while improving access to health care for state residents. It remains to be seen how healthcare reform will impact the system. Buy-in by hospitals, payers, and even the federal government is a must to keep the all-payer system working. In other states, similar efforts have failed. Uniform rate-setting takes some of the guesswork out of financial planning, but it has also resulted in lower margins and greater debt for Maryland hospitals.     

The effect of credit guarantees on credit availability and delinquency rates

We use new data to examine whether credit guarantees affect economic incentives and whether they affect the credit available to small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). We find that firms that have both guaranteed and non-guaranteed loans are 1.67% more likely to miss payments on their guaranteed loans, but are not more likely to default on these loans. These findings suggest that guarantees affect firms’ incentives to repay loans but not their long-term performance. We also find that firms selected into the guarantee programs are 1.17% more likely to default on their loans compared with similar firms that borrow without guarantees. Since we find evidence that long-term performance is not affected by guarantees, the higher default rates among firms selected into the guarantee programs must be the consequence of adverse selection. We also find that credit guarantees increase the aggregated amount of credit; in particular, one additional dollar of guarantees increases the total credit for SMEs by US$ 0.65.     

Squaring venture capital valuations with reality

We develop a valuation model for venture capital–backed companies and apply it to 135 US unicorns, that is, private companies with reported valuations above $1 billion. We value unicorns using financial terms from legal filings and find that reported unicorn post-money valuations average 48% above fair value, with 14 being more than 100% above. Reported valuations assume that all shares are as valuable as the most recently issued preferred shares. We calculate values for each share class, which yields lower valuations because most unicorns gave recent investors major protections such as initial public offering (IPO) return guarantees (15%), vetoes over down-IPOs (24%), or seniority to all other investors (30%). Common shares lack all such protections and are 56% overvalued. After adjusting for these valuation-inflating terms, almost one-half (65 out of 135) of unicorns lose their unicorn status.     

The sustainable growth rate: the elephant in the room of deficit reduction

The sustainable growth rate (SGR) is a formulaic approach intended to restrain the growth of Medicare spending on physician services. Permanently replacing the SGR will cost $300 billion to $400 billion. Ten years of congressional overrides have contributed to higher Medicare spending on physician services. The absence of a replacement for the SGR leaves the federal government with a significant budget deficit exposure.     

How much do plant guarantees reduce perceived risk?

Abstract

Consumers do perceive risk in purchase decisions and seek to reduce both uncertainty and probability of loss. Risk also varies across persons and purchasing situations. Retailers promote product guarantees as risk reducers, but the quantitative evidence is lacking. They offer guarantees to help resolve outcomes from post-purchase problems mainly, product performance. We used an online survey to investigate the role of risk mitigation by money-back guarantees (MBGs) on a live product: plants. We obtained online responses from 504?US residents?≥?age 18 years who had made at least one live plant purchase in the six months prior to the study. As MBG length increased, perceived risk (PR) decreased. PR was higher for men than for women and declined as income increased. Subjects with a higher level of product involvement, expertise, delight, repurchase intentions, and regret had a higher level of PR. We conducted separate Chow tests for annual and perennial plants by price and MBG length and found several break points. As price increased from $5 to $10, a 30-d MBG reduced PR for annual plants while the reduction in PR was incrementally decreased for all guarantee lengths when annuals were priced over $20. With perennial plants, the MBG had an increasingly larger effect on reducing PR for each $10 increase in price. Overall, for each day increase in MBG length, we observed a 0.0337 decrease in PR, which meant that a 90-d MBG on a plant would reduce PR by 3%. This quantitative evidence of reduction in PR should encourage the use and communication of MBGs which have the potential to improve purchases, customer retention, and profitability.     

STRUCTURING LOAN SYNDICATES: A CASE STUDY OF THE HONG KONG DISNEYLAND PROJECT LOAN

The volume of global syndicated loans has increased from $413 billion in 1990 to $2.195 trillion in 2000, making it not only the largest source of corporate funds in the world but also one of the fastest growing. Yet despite the size of this market and its importance as a source of corporate funds, there has been relatively little research on syndicated lending and little understanding of the structuring intricacies underlying these deals.
In this article, the author analyzes the process by which Hongkong International Theme Parks Limited (HKTP), an entity jointly owned by The Walt Disney Company and the Hong Kong Government, raised HK $3.3 billion (approximately US $425 million) in the syndicated loan market to finance part of the construction and operation of its Hong Kong Disneyland theme park and resort complex. Using this case study of the HKTP financing, the article moves beyond the overly simplistic (albeit theoretically tractable) models of debt choice favored by academics and begins to explore the dynamics and consequences of various real-world debt structures. Rather than focusing on the credit analysis or documentation issues, the author focuses on the structuring and distribution issues because they are both less well understood and provide interesting insights into debt management.     

PETROZUATA: A CASE STUDY OF THE EFFECTIVE USE OF PROJECT FINANCE

Companies are increasingly using project finance to fund large-scale capital expenditures. In fact, private companies invested $96 billion in project finance deals in 1998, down from $119 billion in 1997 largely due to the Asian crisis, but up more than threefold since 1994. The decision to use project finance involves an explicit choice of organizational form as well as financial structure. With project finance, sponsoring firms create legally distinct entities to develop, manage, and finance the project. These entities borrow on a limited or non-recourse basis, which means that loan repayment depends on the project's cash flows rather than on the assets or general credit of the sponsoring organizations. Despite the non-recourse nature of project borrowing, projects are highly leveraged entities, with debt to total capitalization ratios averaging 60–70%. Petrozuata, a $2.4 billion oil field development project in Venezuela, is a recent example of the effective use of project finance for several reasons. First, the analysis shows a typical setting where project finance is likely to create value, that of a large-scale investment in Greenfield assets (in this case, wells, pipelines, and upgrader) that can function as a stand-alone economic entity and support a high leverage ratio. Given the nature of this investment, one can think of project finance as venture capital for fixed assets, except that the investments are 100 to 1000 times larger and financed primarily with debt rather than equity. Besides highlighting the types of assets appropriate for project finance, this article illustrates the sizeable transactions costs associated with structuring a deal as well as the full range of benefits accruing to project sponsors. The structure allows sponsors to capture tax benefits not otherwise available, reduces information costs for creditors and other investors, and lowers the overall cost of financial distress. The combination of high leverage, concentrated equity ownership, and direct control in project finance also addresses a wide range of incentive problems that destroy value in diversified companies. Analysis of the explicit contractual terms of the deal reveals a careful allocation of project risks in an attempt to elicit optimal behavior by each of the participants. As illustrated in the Petrozuata case, limiting completion and operating risks are important undertakings. But project finance is most valuable as an instrument for managing sovereign risks. Indeed, the ability of project finance to limit sovereign risk is the one feature that cannot be replicated under conventional corporate financing schemes.     

Asset financing with credit risk

This paper develops a model for the unified valuation of all forms of real asset financing, such as bank loans, leases, securitization vehicles, and credit guarantees, secured by assets that generate a stochastic service flow to the operator, or a rental stream to the lessor, and depreciate over a finite economic life to their scrap value. Examples include mobile equipment, such as aircraft, railroad equipment, ships, trucks and trailers, as well as energy generation assets, heavy factory equipment and construction equipment. In the event of obligor default, after a repossession delay and incurring costs of repossession, maintenance, re-marketing and re-deployment, the lender repossesses the asset and sells it on the secondary market and is, thus, subject to the risk of decline in the market value of the asset. The model we develop in this paper treats all forms of asset financing in a unified fashion as contingent claims on the collateral asset and the credit of the borrower. As an application, we estimate the collateral asset model on historical secondary market data for aircraft values and calibrate the financing model to the Enhanced Equipment Trust Certificates (EETCs) issued in 2007 by Continental Airlines and secured by a fleet of new aircraft. We then apply the calibrated model to value private market financing, including bank loans, leases, and credit guarantees, consistently with the capital market financing, and assess the impact of repossession delays on credit spreads. This analysis leads to a policy insight suggesting that bankruptcy laws limiting asset repossession delays lead to lower costs of asset financing.     

A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

We model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. A distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost increases sovereign credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk in turn weakens the financial sector by eroding the value of its government guarantees and bond holdings. Using credit default swap (CDS) rates on European sovereigns and banks, we show that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk in 2008. We document that post‐bailout changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank‐level determinants of credit spreads, confirming the sovereign‐bank loop.     

湖南省再担保体系构建模式与运行机制研究

湖南省担保行业迫切需要开展再担保以切实缓解中小企业融资难问题。本文在多方调研的基础上,总结国内外再担保机制的经验与教训,结合湖南省担保业的现状,提出应明确地将省担保公司定位为再担保机构,由其发起建立再担保基金,以自身信用和再担保基金规模向银行申请担保信用,再转授给符合条件的但保机构,并承担最终风险。同时设计了具体的实施方案,为湖南省建立再担保机构支持信用担保发展和中小企业融资提供理论依据和操作层面的参考。     

How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important?

This paper estimates the value of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) subsidy. Using data from the merger boom of 1991–2004, we find that banking organizations were willing to pay an added premium for mergers that would put them over the asset sizes that are commonly viewed as the thresholds for being TBTF. We estimate at least $15 billion in added premiums for the eight merger deals that brought the organizations to over $100 billion in assets. In addition, we find that both the stock and bond markets reacted positively to these TBTF merger deals. Our estimated TBTF subsidy is large enough to create serious concern, particularly since the recently assisted mergers have effectively allowed for TBTF banking organizations to become even bigger and for nonbanks to become part of TBTF banking organizations, thus extending the TBTF subsidy beyond banking.     

KMV模型在我国商业银行信用风险管理中的适用性分析及实证检验

在介绍 KMV 模型、Credit Metrics 模型、Credit Risk+模型和 Credit Portfolio View 模型这四种国际流行的信用风险管理方法的基础上,基于定性和定量分析相结合,对这四种信用风险管理方法进行比较分析,认为 KMV 模型最适合我国目前的国情。以2013年45家 ST 公司和与之配对的45家非 ST 公司以及2014年20家 ST 公司和与之配对的20家非 ST 公司为样本,对样本的违约距离进行实证检验。实证结果表明 KMV 模型基本上能够识别上市公司的信用状况,但是也有一些企业的违约距离不符合实际情况,这也说明该模型在我国商业银行信用风险度量中的识别能力有限,究其原因可能与该模型所要求的一些假设条件在我国尚不能得到有效满足等因素有关。因此,我国商业银行在对债务企业进行信用评价时,综合利用KMV 模型与债务公司的财务数据会使信用风险的度量结果更加可靠。     

Institutional demand pressure and the cost of corporate loans

Between 2001 and 2007, annual institutional funding in highly leveraged loans went up from $32 billion to $426 billion, accounting for nearly 70% of the jump in total syndicated loan issuance over the same period. Did the inflow of institutional funding in the syndicated loan market lead to mispricing of credit? To understand this relation, we look at the institutional demand pressure defined as the number of days a loan remains in syndication. Using market-level and cross-sectional variation in time-on-the-market, we find that a shorter syndication period is associated with a lower final interest rate. The relation is robust to the use of institutional fund flow as an instrument. Furthermore, we find significant price differences between institutional investors’ tranches and banks’ tranches of the same loans, even though they share the same underlying fundamentals. Increasing demand pressure causes the interest rate on institutional tranches to fall below the interest rate on bank tranches. Overall, a one-standard-deviation reduction in average time-on-the-market decreases the interest rate for institutional loans by over 30 basis points per annum. While this effect is significantly larger for loan tranches bought by collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), it is not fully explained by their role.     

Does adding up of economic capital for market- and credit risk amount to conservative risk assessment?

There is a tradition in the banking industry of dividing risk into market risk and credit risk. Both categories are treated independently in the calculation of risk capital. But many financial positions depend simultaneously on both market risk and credit risk factors. In this case, an approximation of the portfolio value function separating value changes into a pure market risk plus pure credit risk component can result not only in an overestimation, but also in an underestimation of risk. We discuss this compounding effect in the context of foreign currency loans and argue that a separate calculation of economic capital for market risk and for credit risk may significantly underestimate true risk.     

Evaluating the Technical Provisions for Traditional Brazilian Annuity Plans: Continuous-Time Stochastic Approach Based on Solvency Principles

This article presents an approach for evaluating the liabilities of traditional Brazilian annuity plans, using a continuous-time stochastic approach based on modern solvency principles. The technical provisions are obtained by means of conditional expectation, under a real-world measure and considering the peculiar characteristics of each plan and the financial guarantees and profit participations (bonus and dividend plans) embedded in the annuity plans. We assume that policyholder behavior is not optimal, but we also illustrate a calculation of provision assuming optimal policyholder behavior to show the differences between both assumptions. In this article all explicit provisions formulas are derived, and several relevant conclusions about the values of these provisions are discussed.