Money with partially directed search

Partially directed search replaces the total randomness of monetary search models. Agents choose whether to stay in their production location or visit other locations. Each visiting agent randomly chooses one shop among many in each location. As in random matching models, a commodity or fiat object can endogenously become money, but the details are richer and conform better with evidence: any commodity can be money; the “best” commodity is the most likely money; fiat money can totally crowd out commodity money in an asymmetric environment; going shopping is more likely than door-to-door sales. The model nests Walrasian equilibria.     

Synthetic commodity money

The conventional dichotomy of “commodity” and “fiat” base monies overlooks a third possibility that shares some features of each. This third type, which I call “synthetic commodity money,” resembles fiat money in having no nonmonetary value; but it resembles commodity money in being not just contingently but absolutely scarce. I discuss some actual examples of synthetic commodity monies, and then argue that special characteristics of synthetic commodity money are such as might allow such a money, if properly designed, to supply the foundation for a monetary regime that does not require oversight by any monetary authority, yet is able to provide for a high degree of macroeconomic stability.     

Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model of Money and Credit

We investigate the extent to which monetary policy can enhance the functioning of the private credit system. Specifically, we characterize the optimal return on money in the presence of credit arrangements. There is a dual role for credit: it allows buyers to trade without fiat money and also permits them to borrow against future income. However, not all traders have access to credit. As a result, there is a social role for fiat money because it allows agents to self‐insure against the risk of not being able to use credit in some transactions. We consider a (nonlinear) monetary mechanism that is designed to enhance the credit system. An active monetary policy is sufficient for relaxing credit constraints. Finally, we characterize the optimal monetary policy and show that it necessarily entails a positive inflation rate.     

法定货币与电子货币的双币流通

在金融发展的历史上．多次出现两种法定货币在一国或地区同时流通,这种双币流通往往危及国家的货币主权．破坏经济社会的稳定发展。互联网金融体系中的法定货币与电子货币的双币流通。与历史上的双币流通会出现双币互相驱逐以及导致诸多负面影响不同,法定货币与电子货币的双币流通并行不悖且相得益彰．由此带来支付体系的效率为中央银行实施货币政策的流程增速,使之更快地产生政策效力。     

Banks, private money, and government regulation

We study competition between inside and outside money in economies with trading frictions and financial intermediation. Claims on banks circulate if the redemption rate is low. When the quantity of fiat money is scarce, coexistence of inside and outside money dominates equilibria with a unique medium of exchange. If outside money is ample, banks choose to redeem claims in outside money, which increases welfare. Under binding reserve requirements, tightening monetary policy leads to credit rationing. Our results support recent trends toward lower reserve requirements. However, we also identify situations where restrictions on note issue are beneficial.     

Monetary rules and commodity money schemes under uncertainty

The paper sets out a simple monetary model and uses it to compare alternative monetary systems. Money may be either fiat or gold. Both gold supply and velocity are uncertain. Asset demands are derived from expected utility maximization. I demonstrate the basic argument against a commodity money — that it wastes resources, show why the optimal growth rate of money may be zero, and compare the behavior of the economy under constant money stock, constant price level, and constant gold price rules. Expected utility is typically highest under the constant price level rule.     

Debt deflation effects of monetary policy

We assess the role that monetary policy plays in the decision to default using a General Equilibrium model with collateralized loans, trade in fiat money and production. The monetary authority extends long-term credit against risky collateral along with its traditional monetary operations. The value of collateral depends on traditional monetary policy and agents can optimally choose to default depending on the relative value of the collateral to the face value of the loan. Default results in foreclosure, higher borrowing costs, inefficient investment and a decrease in total output. We show that pre-crisis contractionary monetary policy interacts with Fisherian debt-deflation dynamics and can increase the probability that a crisis occurs.     

Reserve requirements and optimal seigniorage

This note presents a model of optimizing agents who chose to hold deposits at financial intermediaries, which are required to hold fractional reserves of fiat money. When the stock of fiat money is expanded, the reserve requirement functions as a tax on deposits. The combination of reserve requirements and inflation results in a lower steady-state utility than a direct tax on deposits. The optimal monetary policy when reserves are required is to minimize reserve requirements and inflate without limit the stock of fiat money.     

The demonetization of gold: transactions and the change in control

Three models of a monetary economy are considered, in order to show the effects of a gold demonetization: the first with a gold money, the second with demonetized gold but no central bank, and the third with demonetized gold, but with a central bank. The distinctions between ownership and control are discussed. Our results show a gain in efficiency (in the case of “enough money”) when a switch is made from a durable commodity money to a fiat money. This is due to players being able to enjoy both the full service value of gold and transactions value of money—something that cannot be done in the original model with gold money. When we further add in the central bank, there is a somewhat further efficiency gain in the case of “not enough money”. We close the paper with a discussion of the usefulness of central banks.     

电子货币对货币政策的影响

电子货币有效地降低了信息成本和交易费用,拓展了交易的时间和空间。同时电子货币的产生和发展也给社会经济带来了新的问题和挑战。电子货币的发行会减少流通中的现金,降低基础货币的规模,导致货币乘数趋于波动,从而影响央行货币政策。本文将通过分析电子货币对货币政策影响机制,探讨央行货币政策的应对措施。     

Should a monetary policymaker look at money?

This paper examines whether monetary indicators are useful in implementing optimal discretionary monetary policy when the policymaker has incomplete information about the environment. We find that money does not contain useful information for the policymaker, if we calibrate the model to the U.S. economy. If money demand were to be appreciably less variable, observations on money could be useful in response to productivity shocks but would be harmful in response to money-demand shocks. We provide an incomplete information example where equilibrium welfare declines when the money-demand volatility decreases.     

Social norms and money

In an economy where there is no double coincidence of wants and without public record-keeping of past transactions, money is usually seen as the only mechanism that can support exchange. In this paper we show that, as long as the population is finite and agents are sufficiently patient, a social norm establishing gift-exchange can substitute for money. However, for a given discount factor, population growth eventually leads to the breakdown of the social norm. Additionally, increases in the degree of specialization in the economy can also undermine the social norm. By contrast, monetary equilibrium exists independent of the population size. We conclude that money is essential as a medium of exchange when the population is large.     

Has government any role in money?

Recent interest in monetary reform has been sparked by the emergence of a world irredeemable paper money system. In light of this interest, we review the current validity of four ‘good reasons’ Friedman advanced in 1960 to rationalize government intervention. We conclude that the forces that produced government involvement in the past will persist. Deregulation of financial intermediaries is desirable on grounds of market efficiency, though it is an open question whether government should continue as lender of last resort. We expect that the present world fiat money standard will neither degenerate into hyperinflation nor revert to a commodity standard.     

Equilibrium traits of durable commodity money

A dynamic model of utility-maximizing agents explains why scarce, durable commodities are typically monetary. The model provides quantitative criteria for distinguishing between monetary and non-monetary durables, and is also used to analyze symmetallic equilibria.The model is then extended to analyze commodity-backed paper money. It is demonstrated that the backing generates trust in the paper money in the dynamic-consistency sense. The model predicts regular devaluations as an equilibrium phenomenon, but finds such behavior to be efficient. Finally, the results are integrated to make a technical point about dynamic models of pure fiat money.     

Currency Competition: A Hayekian Perspective on International Monetary Integration

Currency internationalization is examined from the vantage point of Friedrich Hayek's contributions in the 1970s. Compared with received commentaries in which only an idealized case for private money is attributed to Hayek, this paper underscores other dimensions of Hayek's work on money and currency. Hayek's case for "choice in currency" draws on his theory of competition, anticipates competition between government suppliers of fiat money, accommodates many aspects of international monetary integration, and embodies a distinctive approach to monetary independence, choice of exchange rate regime, and the transnationalization of currency. Hayekian predictions are outlined for future developments in currency competition.     

A model of the Federal Reserve Act under the international gold standard system

Freeman (Am. Econom. Rev. 86 (1996a) 1126) shows that an elastic money supply enhances the efficiency of monetary equilibrium by clearing default-free debts at par value in the domestic credit market. This research adds a foreign exchange market to Freeman's model and extends his analysis into a two-country model, in which the arrival rates of agents are not equal between the two countries. In this model, an elastic money supply in the foreign exchange market to clear the exchange of fiat monies at gold standard parity, accompanied by an elastic money supply in the domestic credit market, could improve the efficiency of monetary equilibrium.     

Why Inside Money Matters

This note observes that in a simple infinite horizon economy with heterogeneous endowments and a cash-in-advance constraint fiat money can be used to implement a Pareto optimum only with type-specific taxation. By contrast, if credit contracts are enforceable, the same allocation can be reached in equilibrium without type specific policy. We argue that the advantages of inside money and the fact that they depend on the capacity of the economy to enforce the repayment of debt direct us toward the study of the institutional infrastructure underlying self-enforcing inside money equilibria.     

Price dispersion, information and learning

We consider an economy where trade is decentralized and agents have incomplete information with respect to the value of money. Agents’ learning evolves from private experiences and we explore how the formation of prices interacts with learning. We show that multiple equilibria arise, and equilibria with price dispersion entail more learning than equilibria with one price. Price dispersion increases communication about private histories, which in turn increases the overall amount of information in the economy. We also compare ex ante welfare under price dispersion and one price. Our results show that, despite the existence of some meetings where no trade takes place, ex ante welfare under price dispersion may be higher than under one price.     

Money,Bonds, and the Liquidity Trap

This paper examines a search model of money and public bonds in which coordination frictions lead to multiple, Pareto ranked equilibria. Whether money and bonds are substitutes or complements, is not a primitive of the economy, but an equilibrium outcome. There exists an equilibrium resembling a liquidity trap, in which money and bonds are perfect substitutes, interest rates are zero, and monetary policy is ineffective; and a superior equilibrium in which money and bonds are complements, interest rates are positive and monetary policy has a liquidity effect. On this view, the liquidity trap is a belief-driven phenomenon.     

Inflation Targeting,Recursive Inattentiveness,and Heterogeneous Beliefs

We consider a monetary authority that provides an explicit inflation target in order to align expectations with the policy objective. However, biased perceptions of the target may arise due to imperfect information flows. We allow agents to revise expectations over time and we model their recursive choice among prediction strategies as an optimization problem under rational inattention. We then investigate whether a simple policy rule can steer the economy toward the targeted equilibrium. Our findings suggest that determinacy under rational expectations may not be sufficient to reach the target. Instead, monetary policy should be fine‐tuned to correct agents' biased beliefs.