An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy

We propose a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi-commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal commitment plans, to be tempted to renege on them, and to succumb to this temptation with a constant exogenous probability known to the private sector. By interpreting this probability as a continuous measure of the (lack of) credibility of the monetary policy authority, we investigate the welfare effect of a marginal increase in credibility. Our main finding is that, in a simple model of the monetary transmission mechanism, most of the gains from commitment accrue at relatively low levels of credibility.     

Reconsidering the role of money for output, prices and interest rates

New Keynesian models of monetary policy downplay the role of monetary aggregates, in the sense that the level of output, prices, and interest rates can be determined without knowledge of the quantity of money. This paper evaluates the empirical validity of this prediction by studying the effects of shocks to monetary aggregates using a vector autoregression (VAR). Shocks to monetary aggregates are identified by the restrictions suggested by New Keynesian monetary models. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, shocks to broad monetary aggregates have substantial and persistent effects on output, prices and interest rates.     

Optimal sustainable monetary policy

In recent monetary policy literature, optimal commitment policy and its variant from a timeless perspective have been studied with emphasis on welfare gains from policy commitment. These policies, however, involve a time-consistency problem called a stabilization bias in forward-looking models. We analyze Chari and Kehoe's [1990. Sustainable plans. Journal of Political Economy 98, 783-802] sustainable equilibrium and examine optimal sustainable policy, i.e. a policymaker's strategy in the best sustainable equilibrium. This paper shows that such a policy becomes consistent with the optimal commitment policy in sufficiently later periods. It also shows that whether the optimal sustainable policy can attain the Ramsey equilibrium outcome depends on the magnitude of shocks hitting the model economy. Moreover, the paper finds a sustainable policy that attains higher social welfare than discretionary policy does.     

The Central Banker as a Risk Manager: Estimating the Federal Reserve's Preferences under Greenspan

We derive a natural generalization of the Taylor rule that links changes in the interest rate to the balance of the risks implied by the dual objective of sustainable economic growth and price stability. This monetary policy rule reconciles economic models of expected utility maximization with the risk management approach to central banking. Within this framework, we formally test and reject the standard assumption of quadratic and symmetric preferences in inflation and output that underlies the derivation of the Taylor rule. Our results suggest that Fed policy decisions under Greenspan were better described in terms of the Fed weighing upside and downside risks to their objectives rather than simply responding to the conditional mean of inflation and of the output gap.     

Monetary policy transmission in vector autoregressions: A new approach using central bank communication

In this paper, we study the role played by central bank communication in monetary policy transmission. We employ the Swiss Economic Institute’s Monetary Policy Communicator to measure the future stance of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy. Our results indicate, first, that communication has an influence on inflation (expectations) similar to that of actual target rate changes. Communication also plays a noticeable role in the transmission of monetary policy to output. Consequently, future work on monetary policy transmission should incorporate both a short-term interest rate and a communication indicator. A second finding is that the monetary policy transmission mechanism changed during the financial crisis as the overall effect of monetary policy on (expected) inflation and output is weaker and of shorter duration during this period compared to the overall sample period.     

Testing Commitment Models of Monetary Policy: Evidence from OECD Economies

Inflation in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries was low in the 1960s, rose for a time before peaking in the 1970s or early 1980s, and then fell back to initial levels. This paper shows that a simple time inconsistency model of monetary policy does not explain OECD inflation outcomes, except in the United States. The hypothesis that time inconsistency mattered only in earlier decades fits the data no better than the baseline model. We find some, albeit limited support for a model in which inflation spills over from the United States into other countries as a result of exchange rate targeting.     

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve: From Sticky Inflation to Sticky Prices

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) model of inflation dynamics based on forward-looking expectations is of great theoretical significance in monetary policy analysis. Empirical studies, however, often find that backward-looking inflation inertia dominates the dynamics of the short-run aggregate supply curve. This inconsistency is examined by investigating multiple structural changes in the NKPC for the U.S. between 1960 and 2005, employing both inflation expectations survey data and a rational expectations approximation. We find that forward-looking behavior plays a smaller role during the high and volatile inflation regime to 1981 than in the subsequent period of moderate inflation, providing empirical support for sticky price models over the last two decades. A break in the intercept of the NKPC is also identified around 2001 and this may be associated with U.S. monetary policy in that period.     

Model Uncertainty and Delegation: A Case for Friedman's k-Percent Money Growth Rule?

Model uncertainty affects the monetary policy delegation problem. If there is uncertainty with regards to the determination of the delegated objective variables, the central bank will want robustness against potential model misspecifications. We show that with plausible degree of model uncertainty, delegation of the Friedman rule of increasing the money stock by k percent to the central bank will outperform commitment to the social loss function (flexible inflation targeting). The reason is that the price paid for robustness under flexible inflation targeting outweighs the inefficiency of money growth targeting. Imperfect control of money growth does not change this conclusion.     

The high-frequency response of exchange rates to monetary policy actions and statements

This paper investigates the impact of US monetary policy on the level and volatility of exchange rates using an event study with intraday data for five currencies (the US dollar exchange rate versus the euro, the Canadian dollar, the British pound, the Swiss franc, and the Japanese yen). I construct two indicators of news about monetary policy stemming separately from policy decisions and from balance of risk statements. Estimation results show that both policy decisions and communication have economically large and highly significant effects on the exchange rates, with the surprise component of statements accounting for most of the explainable variation in exchange rate returns in response to monetary policy. This paper also shows that exchange rates tend to absorb FOMC monetary surprises within 30-40 min from the announcement release.     

Inflation targeting: An indirect approach to assess the direct impact

It is quite difficult to assess the benefits of inflation targeting (IT) since its immediate effect will be on inflation expectations, an unobserved variable. Due to lack of comprehensive data on inflation expectations, most studies so far concentrated on the impact of IT either on observable variables like output, unemployment, and inflation or compared post-IT surveys of IT countries with non-IT countries. In our study, we focus on a yet unanswered question, i.e., how the expectations change with the adoption of IT. We suggest that heterogeneous inflation expectations lead to long memory in actual inflation, and IT, if successful, should decrease this persistence by concentrating the public’s expectations toward the announced target. Empirical results confirm our hypothesis with a reduction in inflation memory after the adoption of IT in almost all eight developed countries in our sample.     

Inflation Persistence, Monetary Policy, and the Great Moderation

There is growing evidence that the empirical Phillips curve within the United States has changed significantly since the early 1980s. In particular, inflation persistence has declined sharply. This paper demonstrates that this decline is consistent with a standard dynamic New Keynesian (DNK) model in which: (i) the variability of technology shocks has declined and (ii) the central bank more aggressively responds to inflation.     

Intervention policy of the BoJ: A unified approach

Intervening in the FX market implies a complex decision process for central banks. Monetary authorities have to decide whether to intervene or not, and if so, when and how. Since the successive steps of this procedure are likely to be highly interdependent, we adopt a nested logit approach to capture their relationships and to characterize the prominent features of the various steps of the intervention decision process. Our estimations based on Japanese data from 1991 to 2004 indicate that the Bank of Japan: (i) mainly reacted to deviations of the exchange rate with respect to fundamentals and (ii) tended to favour secrecy when its credibility was low. We also provide new insights on the so-called secrecy puzzle by modeling explicitly the risk for a secret intervention to be detected. Our results have important implications in terms of exchange rate policy, such as the emergence of a trade-off between intervention size, communication policy and secrecy. Our results tend to provide some explanation for the observed persistence of ineffective intervention policy during some sub-periods.     

A quantitative analysis of inflation as a tax on the underground economy

Inflation rates are more dispersed and are persistently higher in developing countries. This paper quantifies the importance of the public-finance motive for inflation in the presence of a tax-evading sector, the underground economy. The approach is motivated by the observation that the underground economy is especially large in poor countries. The analysis builds on a general equilibrium monetary model with two production sectors, where income in one of the sectors cannot be taxed. A benevolent government finances its budget using an optimal combination of the income tax rate and the inflation rate. The model is first calibrated to the U.S. economy and is then used for a cross-country simulation. The resulting relationships between the size of an underground economy, inflation rate, income tax rate and the share of seigniorage in the government revenue rationalize the cross-country data quantitatively well.     

Words that shake traders : The stock market's reaction to central bank communication in real time

This paper investigates the effects of Federal Reserve's decisions and statements on U.S. stock and volatility indices (Dow Jones Industrial Average, NASDAQ 100, S&P 500, and VIX) using a high-frequency event-study analysis. I find that both the surprise component of policy actions and official communication have statistically significant and economically relevant effects on equity indices, with statements having a much greater explanatory power of the reaction of stock prices to monetary policy. For instance, around 90% of the explainable variation in S&P 500 is due to the surprise component of Fed's statements. This paper also shows that equity indices tend to incorporate FOMC monetary surprises within 40 min from the announcement release. Finally, I find that these results are robust along several dimensions. In particular, I consider different estimators, such as the Generalized Empirical Likelihood, and I extend the sample to include the recent period of heightened financial stress. This sensitivity analysis corroborates that central bank communication about its future policy intentions is a key driver of stock returns.     

Flexible inflation targets,forex interventions and exchange rate volatility in emerging countries

Emerging economies with inflation targets (IT) face a dilemma between fulfilling the theoretical conditions of “strict IT”, which imply a fully flexible exchange rate, or applying a “flexible IT”, which entails a de facto managed-floating exchange rate with foreign exchange (forex) interventions to moderate exchange rate volatility. Using a panel data model for 37 countries we find that, although IT lead to higher exchange rate instability than alternative regimes, forex interventions in some IT countries have been more effective to lower volatility than in non-IT countries, which may justify the use of “flexible IT” by policymakers.     

An exploration into Pigou's theory of cycles

This paper explores a theory of business cycles in which recessions and booms arise due to difficulties encountered by agents in properly forecasting the economy's future needs in terms of capital. The idea has a long history in the macroeconomic literature, as reflected by the work of Pigou (Industrial Fluctuation, MacMillan, London, 1926). The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we illustrate the type of general equilibrium structure that can give rise to such phenomena. Second, we examine the extent to which such a model can explain the observed pattern of U.S. recessions (frequency, depth) without relying on technological regress. We argue that such a model offer a framework for understanding elements of both the recent U.S. recession and of the Asia downturns of the late 1990s.     

The impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate: evidence from three small open economies

This paper studies the impact effect of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand during the 1990s. Shocks are identified by the reaction of three month market interest rates to policy announcements that were not themselves endogenous to economic news on the same day. The main result is that a 100 basis point contractionary shock will appreciate the exchange rate by 2-3 percent on impact. The association of interest rate hikes with depreciations that is sometimes observed during periods of exchange market pressure is mainly attributable to reverse causality.     

A further contribution towards explaining why disinflation through currency pegging may cause a boom

We revisit the question of why exchange-rate-based (ERB) disinflation is often expansionary. We use an analytical DGE model in discrete time with staggered wages. If the policy is unanticipated, and if the currency is pegged at the level it would have reached under unchanged policies, then a boom occurs. For preannounced ERB disinflation, our model also predicts a boom. The explanation for both is that when wages are staggered, wage-setters have to be forward-looking. Anticipating lower future inflation, they reduce wages before the change in the exchange rate, causing a favourable supply-side effect on output.     

Does Inflation Targeting Affect the Dispersion of Inflation Expectations?

In this paper, we examine the effect of having an inflation targeting framework on the dispersion of inflation forecasts from professional forecasters. We use a panel data set of 25 countries—including 14 inflation targeters—with 16 years of monthly information. We find that the dispersion of long-run inflation expectations is smaller in targeting regimes after controlling for country-specific effects, time-specific effects, the level and the variance of inflation, disinflation periods, and global inflation. On average, the full effect is not observed until the third year after implementation of inflation targeting. When we differentiate between developed and developing countries, the dispersion of inflation expectations after inflation targeting is smaller and statistically significant only in developing countries.     

Escaping Volatile Inflation

Why has inflation been so stable in developed economies since the early 1990s? In this paper, we answer that the United States and other countries may have escaped from a volatile inflation equilibrium. Our argument builds on the story proposed by Tom Sargent in The Conquest of American Inflation, where the fall in inflation in the 1980s was attributed to changing government beliefs. To explain the escape in inflation volatility, we unwind one of Sargent's simplifications and allow the government to react to some of the shocks in the economy. In this case, when government beliefs turned against the Phillips curve in the 1980s they not only led to an escape from high inflation, but also stopped government using changes in inflation to offset shocks. Inflation and inflation volatility therefore escaped in tandem. Our analysis also sheds some light on why the escape in inflation occurred at the time it did.