电子货币与虚拟货币比较研究

本文首先对电子货币与虚拟货币的概念进行了界定,然后从发行主体与信用保证、支付方向与支付范围、是否具有借币收费过程等方面的性质进行了比较研究。本文认为,银行等金融机构发行的电子货币具有交易媒介功能,是具有无限支付能力的全局货币;网络企业发行的法币预付充值型网络虚拟货币不是交易媒介,在性质上不是真正的货币,只是局部性单向支付工具;类似人大经济论坛币这样的纯粹虚拟货币在其虚拟经济系统中是双向支付工具,具有交易媒介性质,是一种有限支付能力的局部货币,但是其离开了虚拟社区就不再作为交易媒介,而最多可能成为倒卖对象。     

Why Inside Money Matters

This note observes that in a simple infinite horizon economy with heterogeneous endowments and a cash-in-advance constraint fiat money can be used to implement a Pareto optimum only with type-specific taxation. By contrast, if credit contracts are enforceable, the same allocation can be reached in equilibrium without type specific policy. We argue that the advantages of inside money and the fact that they depend on the capacity of the economy to enforce the repayment of debt direct us toward the study of the institutional infrastructure underlying self-enforcing inside money equilibria.     

A Comparative‐Advantage Approach to Government Debt Maturity

We study optimal government debt maturity in a model where investors derive monetary services from holding riskless short‐term securities. In a setting where the government is the only issuer of such riskless paper, it trades off the monetary premium associated with short‐term debt against the refinancing risk implied by the need to roll over its debt more often. We extend the model to allow private financial intermediaries to compete with the government in the provision of short‐term money‐like claims. We argue that, if there are negative externalities associated with private money creation, the government should tilt its issuance more toward short maturities, thereby partially crowding out the private sector's use of short‐term debt.     

Price setting, price dispersion, and the value of money: or, the law of two prices

We study models combining search, money, price posting, and preference shocks. We show how these features interact to influence the price level and price dispersion. First, price-posting equilibria exist with valued fiat currency. Second, although both are possible, price dispersion is more common than a single price. Third, we prove that generically there cannot be more than two prices. We provide intuition for this law of two prices, show it also holds in some nonmonetary search models, and discuss variations of the assumptions under which it may not hold.     

Banks, private money, and government regulation

We study competition between inside and outside money in economies with trading frictions and financial intermediation. Claims on banks circulate if the redemption rate is low. When the quantity of fiat money is scarce, coexistence of inside and outside money dominates equilibria with a unique medium of exchange. If outside money is ample, banks choose to redeem claims in outside money, which increases welfare. Under binding reserve requirements, tightening monetary policy leads to credit rationing. Our results support recent trends toward lower reserve requirements. However, we also identify situations where restrictions on note issue are beneficial.     

Inflation and productive activity in a multiple-matching model of money

This paper investigates the relationship between money growth, inflation, and productive activity in a dynamic general-equilibrium, multiple-matching framework where trade frictions are manifested by limited consumption variety. Productive activity and matching in the goods market are endogenized by a time allocation decision of work and search effort. We find that a high degree of complementarity between participation in the labor and goods markets creates a channel by which inflation can positively influence production and output. This feature arises when household preferences for consumption variety is sufficiently large and it can also lead to the multiplicity of monetary equilibria.     

ADR holdings of US-based emerging market funds

What motivates investors to hold American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) rather than the underlying stock of US listed foreign firms? We analyze the investment allocation decision of actively-managed emerging market mutual fund managers. Although legal provisions are typically assumed to affect ADR and its underlying domestic shares equally, investors holding ADRs may have a higher level of legal protection as these securities are issued and traded in the US. We find that ADRs are the preferred mode of holdings if the local market of the issuer has weak investor protection, low liquidity and high transaction costs.     

Money with partially directed search

Partially directed search replaces the total randomness of monetary search models. Agents choose whether to stay in their production location or visit other locations. Each visiting agent randomly chooses one shop among many in each location. As in random matching models, a commodity or fiat object can endogenously become money, but the details are richer and conform better with evidence: any commodity can be money; the “best” commodity is the most likely money; fiat money can totally crowd out commodity money in an asymmetric environment; going shopping is more likely than door-to-door sales. The model nests Walrasian equilibria.     

Distortionary Taxation, Debt, and the Price Level

This paper compares the determinacy of equilibria under exogenous interest rates in an economy with a cash constraint, in which taxation is lump-sum or distortionary. Under passive fiscal policies lump-sum taxes generate nominal indeterminacy, while with distortionary taxes indeterminacy can be real, but not purely nominal. In general, under distortionary taxation uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation depends on monetary and fiscal policy interactions through taxes, debt, and interest rates. To illustrate this principle, we consider balanced-budget policies under distortionary income taxation and show that a unique equilibrium allocation prevails if interest rates are set consistent with long-run deflation. A separate section extends the analysis to endogenous interest rates.     

Efficient monetary allocations and the illiquidity of bonds

We construct a monetary economy with heterogeneity in discounting and consumption risk. Agents can insure against this risk with money and nominal government bonds, but all trades must be monetary. We demonstrate that a deflationary policy à la Friedman cannot sustain the constrained-efficient allocation as no-arbitrage imposes too stringent a bound on the return money can pay. The constrained-efficient allocation can be sustained when bonds have positive yields and, under certain conditions, only if they are illiquid. Illiquidity, meaning that bonds cannot be transformed into consumption as easily as cash, is necessary to eliminate arbitrage opportunities due to disparities in shadow interest rates.     

IPO share allocation and conflicts of interest

The underwriter of an IPO has two sources of compensation for its services on behalf of the issuer. One is through a commission (spread), the other is by buying issued shares for itself (or its affiliates) and reselling them in the post-issue market. Profits from the former decrease along with the magnitude of underpricing while profits from the latter increase with it. Faced with these countervailing interests, the present paper analyzes how the underwriter decides upon the pricing and allocation of IPOs.      

Competitive IPOs

Competition between investment banks for lead underwriter mandates in IPOs is fierce, but having committed to a particular bank, the power of the issuer is greatly reduced. Although information revelation theories justify giving the underwriters influence over pricing and allocation, this creates the potential for conflicts of interest. In this clinical paper we analyse an interesting innovation that has been used in recent European IPOs whereby issuers separate the preparation and distribution roles of investment banks, and keep competitive pressure on the banks throughout the issue process. These 'competitive IPOs' allow the issuer greater control and facilitate more contingent fee structures that help to mitigate against 'bait and switch.' But unlike more radical departures from traditional bookbuilding – such as auctions – the competitive IPO is an incremental market-based response to potential conflicts of interest that retains many of the advantages of investment banks' active involvement in issues.     

Aggregate uncertainty, money and banking

This paper addresses the problem of monitoring the monitor in a model of money and banking with private information and aggregate uncertainty. There is no need to monitor a bank if it requires loans to be repaid partly with money. A market arises at the repayment stage and generates information-revealing prices that perfectly discipline the bank. This mechanism also applies when there exist multiple banks. With multiple banks, competition of private monies improves welfare. A prohibition on private money issue not only eliminates money competition but also triggers free-rider problems among banks, which is detrimental to welfare.     

Anonymous markets and monetary trading

We study infinite-horizon monetary economies characterized by trading frictions that originate from random pairwise meetings, and commitment and enforcement limitations. We prove that introducing occasional trade in ‘centralized markets’ opens the door to an informal enforcement scheme that sustains a non-monetary efficient allocation. All is required is that trading partners be patient and their actions be observable. We then present a matching environment in which trade may occur in large markets and yet agents’ trading paths cross at most once. This allows the construction of models in which infinitely lived agents trade in competitive markets where money plays an essential role.     

Applying a factor copula to value basket credit linked notes with issuer default risk

This paper explores a reasonable coupon rate for basket credit linked notes (BCLN) with issuer default risk. Based on the one factor Gaussian copula model, this paper proposes three methods of incorporating issuer default into BCLN pricing. Numerical results indicate that issuer default risk impacts BCLN coupon rate. Furthermore, coupon rate differs with changes in correlation structure among the three methods. One of the three methods is ultimately identified as the most suitable.     

Float on a note

From 1863-1914, banks in the U.S. could issue notes subject to full collateral, a tax on outstanding notes, redemption of notes on demand, and a clearing fee per issued note cleared through the Treasury. The system failed to satisfy a purported arbitrage condition: the yield on collateral exceeded the tax rate plus the product of the clearing fee and the average clearing rate of notes. The failure is explained by a model in which note issuers choose to issue notes only in trades that produce a low clearing rate (high float), but in which there are diminishing returns to additional note issue.     

Counterfeiting as Private Money in Mechanism Design

We describe counterfeiting activity as the issuance of private money, one that is difficult to monitor. Our approach, which amends the basic random‐matching model of money in mechanism design, allows a tractable welfare analysis of currency competition. We show that it is not efficient to eliminate counterfeiting activity completely. We do not appeal to lottery devices, and we argue that this is consistent with imperfect monitoring.     

Earnings Management Surrounding New Debt Issues

We examine whether firms manage earnings before issuing bonds to achieve a lower cost of borrowing. We find significant income‐increasing earnings management prior to bond offerings. We also find that firms that manage earnings upward issue debt at a lower cost, after controlling for various bond issuer and issue characteristics. Our results are consistent with studies that report earnings management around equity issuance. The results indicate that, like equity holders, bondholders fail to see through the inflated earnings numbers in pricing new debt.     

Optimal monetary policy in an economy with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic risk

This study investigates an incomplete markets economy in which the saving behavior of a continuum of infinitely lived agents is influenced by precautionary saving motives and borrowing constraints. Agents can use two types of assets (interest bearing IOUS and money) to smooth consumption. Money is valued because of a timing friction in the bond market. In particular, the bond market closes before agents observe their idiosyncratic productivity shock. I find that the Friedman rule is not optimal for this economy. The results indicate that the optimal allocation has a rate of inflation of 10%, and a positive amount of private credit held by the government. A positive inflation rate transfers resources from agents with big endowments to those holding bonds which improves risk sharing, and therefore, welfare. However, for higher rates of inflation, agents economize on money holdings, offsetting the insurance effects, and causing a reduction in welfare. Furthermore, higher rates of inflation discourage agents from borrowing, and the endogenous lower bound on bond holdings is higher than the exogenous borrowing limit. High rates of inflation, therefore, exacerbate frictions in the bond market.     

Determinacy and expectational stability of equilibrium in a monetary sticky-price model with Taylor rule

Recent studies show that the Taylor rule possesses desirable properties in terms of generating determinacy and E-stability of rational expectations equilibria under sticky prices. This paper examines whether this policy rule retains these properties within a discrete-time money-in-utility-function model, employing three timings of money balances of the utility function that the existing literature contains: end-of-period timing and two types of cash-in-advance timing. This paper shows: (i) even a small degree of non-separability of the utility function between consumption and real balances causes the Taylor rule to be much more likely to induce indeterminacy or E-instability if this rule responds not only to inflation but also to output or the output gap; (ii) differences among the three timings strongly alter conditions for the Taylor rule to ensure both determinacy and E-stability.