Trade costs, firms and productivity

This paper examines the response of U.S. manufacturing industries and plants to changes in trade costs using a unique new dataset on industry-level tariff and transportation rates. Our results lend support to recent heterogeneous-firm models of international trade that predict a reallocation of economic activity towards high-productivity firms as trade costs fall. We find that industries experiencing relatively large declines in trade costs exhibit relatively strong productivity growth. We also find that low-productivity plants in industries with falling trade costs are more likely to die; that relatively high-productivity non-exporters are more likely to start exporting in response to falling trade costs; and that existing exporters increase their shipments abroad as trade costs fall. Finally, we provide evidence of productivity growth within firms in response to decreases in industry-level trade costs.     

Comments on Orphanides and Williams’ “Robust monetary policy”

Comments on the paper by Orphanides and Williams from the November 2006 Carnegie-Rochester conference.     

Political costs and corporate tax avoidance: Evidence from sin firms

The products and services of firms operating in sin industries (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and firearms) run contrary to social norms and can produce significant negative externalities for society. As such, we expect that sin firms are at greater risk of incurring political costs in the form of additional regulation, higher excise taxes, or capital market intervention if they come under scrutiny for their income tax avoidance practices. Because of the nature of their products, regulators and policymakers are likely to face less pushback on new regulations or taxes on these firms. Sin firms start with a lower ability to influence the political process than firms in non-sin industries. Consequently, we hypothesize and find that sin firms exhibit less tax avoidance than non-sin firms, particularly through uncertain and more risky tax avoidance strategies. The negative relationship between the status of sin firms and tax avoidance is less pronounced in firms that accumulate political capital via intensive lobbying activities. Exploiting changes in partisan control of the Congress and White House, difference-in-differences tests show that firearm firms engage in less (more) tax avoidance when the Democrats (Republican) control both the Congress and White House. Overall, we conclude that political costs play an important role in corporate tax avoidance decisions.     

中注协关于印发《中国注册会计师协会关于推动会计师事务所做大做强的意见》的通知

各省、自治区、直辖市注册会计师协会:为适应我国社会主义市场经济发展需要,贯彻落实国家“十一五”规划对行业提出的新要求,服务于企业“走出去”战略,进一步推进注册会计师行业建设,实现行业做大做强和国际化发展的目     

Sustainability reporting: The role of “Search”, “Experience” and “Credence” information

Corporate sustainability reporting quality has been frequently criticised as being unbalanced, presenting an overly positive view or failing to address material issues. The purpose of this article is to provide a fresh explanation for poor quality sustainability reporting and to propose how quality issues may be addressed. The theoretical framework combines the legitimacy and accountability perspectives using Akerlof's (1970) Market for Lemons theory. Akerlof's approach is extended by differentiating between three types of information in sustainability reports namely search, experience and credence. The article concludes that the type of information must be considered when determining measures to improve report quality.     

The effect of agency costs on the value of single-segment and multi-segment firms

This paper investigates the effectiveness of equity-based compensation in mitigating the effects of agency costs on the valuation of single-segment and multi-segment firms. In a sample of 4182 firm-year observations during the period 1993–1998, we find that firms with high equity-based compensation have higher valuation than firms with low equity-based compensation. This is true in both single-segment and multi-segment firms. The effect of equity-based compensation for multi-segment firms, where agency costs are expected to be higher, is much greater than for single-segment firms. Also, the negative value-effect of diversification is less for firms with high equity-based compensation.