盐田港12年派现路

分析盐田港12年的发展历程,可以看出,其股利政策具有一定的特点,考量股利政策的合理性、可持续性,或许能够发现股利派现对公司价值的影响。     

Dividend Policy in Switzerland

The paper examines dividend policy for a sample of Swiss companies. Several factors that determine cross-sectional variations in dividend policy – such as profitability, growth opportunities, and riskiness – are identified. Price volatility seems to stand out as the most significant factor. Looking at the relationship between dividends and earnings over time, dividend changes are more closely linked to past and current rather than future net income growth. However, they do confirm a persistent shift in the level of earnings. There is also a significant relationship between losses and dividend cuts. These findings suggest that it is the managers’ reluctance to cut dividends that gives informational content to dividend changes.     

Dividend Policy and Reputation

Abstract:  We examine the role of reputation when firms use dividends to signal their profitability. We analyze a signaling model in which reputation plays no role in equilibrium. We then show that taking reputation into account as a link between sequential dividend decisions makes it possible to endogenize signaling costs and obtain a separating equilibrium. Lastly, we use the reversibility hypothesis and assume that in each period, managers can reverse their choices in terms of dividend distribution. We find that in most cases, the signaling equilibrium becomes unstable, causing any dividend signaling policy to become difficult to implement.     

私募股权投资与现金股利政策

本文研究私募股权投资对被投资公司现金股利政策的影响。研究发现,有私募股权投资参与的公司更倾向于分配现金股利,且现金股利支付率较高,表明私募股权投资不仅影响公司现金股利的分配倾向,还影响现金股利的分配力度。进一步研究发现,私募股权投资的特征同样影响公司的现金股利政策,具体来说,外资背景、投资规模越大、投资期限越长和联合投资的私募股权投资参与的公司更倾向于分配现金股利且现金股利支付率较高。本文的结论对于完善公司现金股利政策以及保护中小投资者利益有重要的启示作用。     

Asymmetric Information and Dividend Policy

We examine how informational asymmetries affect firms' dividend policies. We find that firms that are more subject to information asymmetry are less likely to pay, initiate, or increase dividends, and disburse smaller amounts. We show that our main results are not driven by our sample and that our results persist after accounting for the changing composition of payout over the sample period, the increasing importance of institutional shareholdings, and catering incentives. We conclude that there is a negative relation between asymmetric information and dividend policy. Our results do not support the signaling theory of dividends.     

Dividend Policy and Corporate Performance

Substantial research has been conducted to determine the signal that results from dividend initiations and omissions. Our study extends from previous research by measuring the long-term valuation effects following dividend initiations and omissions. We find that firms initiating dividends experience favorable long-term share price performance. Conversely, firms omitting dividends experience unfavorable long-term share price performance. The long-term valuation effects resulting from dividend initiations are more favorable for firms that are smaller, that overinvest, and that had relatively poor performance prior to the initiations. The long-term effects resulting from dividend omissions are more unfavorable for large firms and for firms experiencing relatively large dividend omissions.     

Shareholder Preferences and Dividend Policy

This paper develops a theory of choice among alternative procedures for distributing cash from corporations to shareholders. Despite the preferential tax treatment of capital gains for individual investors, it is shown that a majority of a firm's shareholders may support a dividend payment for small distributions. For larger distributions an open market stock repurchase is likely to be preferred by a majority of shareholders, and for the largest distributions tender offer repurchases dominate.     

股利分配和股利收益率的国际比较研究

本文采用沪深300指数和S＆P500。指数成分股作为样本比较分析中美两国上市公司派发现金股利的特征。结果发现，与美国上市公司相比，我国上市公司股利分配至少存在以下问题：连续派现能力差、股利与业绩相关性较小和投资者获取得股利收益率较低。     

Determinants of Corporate Dividend Policy: A Factorial Analysis

This paper re-examines the dividend policy issue by conducting a simultaneous test of the alternative explanations of corporate payout policy using a two-step procedure that involves factor analysis and multiple regression. Several new proxies for theoretical attributes that have appeared in the literature are introduced, including the role of managerial dimensions in determining dividend policy. Strong support is found for the transaction cost/residual theory of dividends. pecking order argument, and the role of dividends in mitigating agency problems. Strong support is also found for the role of managerial consideration in affecting the firm's payout policy; specifically, firms that maintain stable dividend policies and firms that enjoy financial flexibility pay higher dividends. The results appear to support the tax clientele argument.     

行为股利政策研究:一个文献综述

建立在行为金融学基础上的行为股利政策理论,充分考虑了市场参与者的心理因素的作用,为人们研究金融市场股利分配异象提供了新的视角。我国的行为股利政策研究目前主要集中并停留于对国外研究成果的归纳、总结及介绍上,因而,借鉴西方行为股利政策的研究成果,并结合我国实际,来深入研究我国证券市场上的股利政策现象与问题将具有十分重要的理论意义与实践意义。     

Corporate Dividend Policy: The Views of British Financial Managers

Abstract:   Using a survey approach, this paper examines the importance and relevance of the various theories of dividend policy for UK companies. Further, it evaluates the extent to which corporate characteristics such as size and industry influence managerial responses to the survey. In general, the results support dividend hypotheses relating to signalling and ownership structure, in preference to those about capital structure and investment decisions and agency issues. At a more detailed level, the cross sectional analysis reveals important differences between managers' responses, based on company size, industry sector, growth opportunities, ownership structure and information asymmetry.     

Earnings Response Coefficients and Dividend Policy Parameters

In a seminal paper. Ball and Brown (1968) documented a positive statistical association between earnings surprises and stock returns around an earnings announcement. They concluded that accounting earnings conveyed ‘useful’ information to the market. However, the question of how accounting earnings convey useful information is still being understood. Recent work on this topic has found that current accounting earnings aid investors and analysts in predicting future accounting earnings. Few studies, however, have examined the usefulness of current earnings for predicting other value-relevant attributes. A model by Ohlson (1989a) suggests that investors are also interested in the relationship between current earnings and future dividends. Ohlson's model is supported by empirical tests in this paper which show that the relationship between current earnings and future dividends is significant in explaining cross-sectional variation in earnings response coefficients (ERCs). A second result of interest is that information in dividends substitutes for that in accounting earnings. We find that dividend policy parameters reflect information contained in current earnings. These results add new insights on the information revealed through the analysis of ERCs. Consistent with logic presented here, a symmetrically opposite result is found with respect to dividend response coefficients. The informativeness of earnings (dividends) is found to be negatively (positively) related to the information content of dividends.     

上市公司股利政策:非稳定性及选择动因

股利政策的研究一直是西方理论研究者和上市公司管理层关注的焦点。本文沿袭并拓展Linter(1956)的研究框架,运用动态面板数据一阶差分GMM估计方法,对2000-2009年我国200多家上市公司的股利政策进行实证检验。最终结果表明,我国上市公司未对股利政策进行平滑。同时,我们对上市公司股利政策的选择动因进行了比较分析,希望能对股利政策的理论与实践有所贡献。     

CEO Involvement in Director Selection: Implications for REIT Dividend Policy

This paper examines the relationship between CEO entrenchment and dividend policy of real estate investment trusts (REITs). We develop an index for CEO entrenchment using CEO tenure and duality and find that this index has significant impact on dividend policy. We further separate our sample into two sub-groups: REITs with and without nomination committees. Our analyses show a strong positive relationship between CEO entrenchment level and dividend payout for REITs without a nomination committee. In REITs with nomination committees, CEO entrenchment has less influence on dividend policy. We conclude that dividend policy serves as a substitution for other governance mechanisms. Further, our results are consistent with the evidence for other US firms—CEO that are more entrenched pay higher dividends to avoid shareholder sanctions and the threat of takeover.

公司治理、管理者过度自信与企业股利政策

文章基于公司行为财务学视角,以2008—2010年间在上海、深圳证券交易所上市的公司为样本,对我国上市公司的高管人员过度自信、公司治理与股利政策进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,管理者过度自信与股利政策正相关,有效的公司治理能抑制管理者过度自信对股利政策的影响。