How venture capital firms differ

Four potential sources of differences between venture capital (VC) firms were examined—venture stage of interest, amount of assistance provided by the VC, VC firm size, and geographic region where located. Through a questionnaire, 149 venture capitalists provided data about their firms, about what they look for in evaluating an investment, and about how they work with a portfolio company following an investment.Firms were divided into four groups based on venture stage of interest. The earlier the investment stage, the greater the interest in potential investments built upon proprietary products, product uniqueness, and high growth markets. Late-stage investors were more interested in demonstrated market acceptance.There were no differences by stage regarding the desired qualities of management. However, after the investment was made, earlier stage investors attached more importance to spending their time evaluating and recruiting managers. Earlier stage investors sought ventures with higher potential returns—a 42% hurdle rate of return for the earliest stage investor versus 33% for the late-stage investor.Late-stage investors spent more time evaluating a potential investment. However, after the investment was made, there was little difference in the amount of time spent assisting the portfolio company. There were, however, differences in the significance that VCs attached to particular post-investment activities. Firms were split into three groups based upon the amount of time the VC spent with a portfolio company after an investment was made as lead investor. The most active group averaged over 35 hours per month per investment, and the least active group averaged less than seven hours.The difference in assistance provided was not strongly tied to differences in investment stage of interest. There were major differences in the importance the VCs attached to their post-investment activities. Not surprisingly, high involvement VCs viewed their activities as more important.Based upon the amount of capital they managed, firms were also split into three groups. Average fund size varied from 278 to 12 million dollars. The larger firms had more professionals and managed more money per professional. The large firms provided the least, and the medium-sized firms the most, assistance to portfolio companies. Large firms also made larger individual investments. Even though they invested over half their funds in late-stage investments whereas smaller firms focused on the earlier stages, the large firms were still a major source of early stage financing.There were no differences between geographic regions in the proportion of investments where the venture capital firm served as lead investor. There were, however, major regional differences in investment stages of interest. Also differences were observed between regions that were not a result of differing size and investment stage.     

Strategic alliances by venture capital backed firms: an empirical examination

A growing body of literature examines the formation of strategic alliances as an important value-added role provided by venture capital firms. This paper contributes to this literature by examining two related questions: whether venture capital firms use strategic alliances as a substitute or compliment to capital infusion, and how venture capital firms use alliances to mitigate different types of risk. Results from 2505 venture-backed startups reveal that venture capital firms treat alliance formation as a substitute for capital infusion and that the breadth of the network of syndication partners investing in the startup increases the number of its strategic alliances. We also find intentionality in alliance formation. Specifically, firms operating in industry environments characterized by technical risk are more likely to form alliances with partners capable of mitigating technical risks, and firms operating in environments characterized by market risk are more likely to form alliances with partners capable of mitigating market risk. Our findings lend additional support to the perspective that alliances represent an important mechanism through which venture capital firms add value to their portfolio companies.     

Determinants of venture capital investments in emerging markets

Jeng and Wells (2000) initialized the examination of venture capital (VC) determinants across countries. Meanwhile, we enlarge their scope using aggregated VC funding in 118 countries, 78 being considered emerging markets, using panel data from 2000 to 2013. We show that M&A activity, legal rights and investor protection, innovation, IP protection, corruption and also corporate taxes and unemployment have impact. We reveal the economic magnitude and direction of impact of the determinants to be different for the two country categories for several parameters, enhancing previous research by emphasizing that VC investment drivers can be different for developed and developing countries.     

Efficiency of venture capital firms: evidence from Spain

In recent years the venture capital (VC) sector has played an increasingly important role in financial systems. In general, this type of specialised financial activity is conducted by two types of operators, VC firms and VC management companies, each with its specific characteristics. The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the operating efficiency of these financial intermediaries in Spain, using data envelopment analysis, and to carry out an exploratory study of the variables that affect their level of efficiency, using a truncated regression model, and taking into consideration the nature of the operator (an approach not previously undertaken). Our analysis reveals, first, differences in the levels of efficiency achieved by VC firms and VC management companies and, second, that the most efficient organisations are those with more diversified ownership structures and which have a portfolio of companies active in the most innovative sectors.     

Cross-border venture capital investments in Asia: Selection and exit performance

We investigate the investment behavior and exit performance of VCs that have pursued expansion outside their home locations, specifically, in Asia. Our findings indicate that, in the Asian VC markets, foreign VCs have relative advantages over local VCs in terms of size and experience while they are at a disadvantage in information collection and monitoring due to both geographic and cultural distances. When investing alone, foreign VCs are more likely to invest in more information-transparent ventures. Partnership with local VCs helps alleviate information asymmetry and monitoring problem and has positive implication for the exit performance of local entrepreneurial firms. Specifically, we find that after controlling for the endogeneity of selection, firms with both foreign and local VC partnership are about 5% more likely to successfully exit.     

Duration analysis of venture capital staging: A real options perspective

This study takes a real options perspective towards venture capital staging and views the staging decision as a choice between holding the current option to invest and investing now to obtain the option to invest subsequently. It proposes that this staging decision depends on the factors that influence the value of these two options, such as competition and various sources of uncertainty. The empirical results suggest that market uncertainty encourages venture capital firms to delay investing at each round of financing, whereas competition, project-specific uncertainty and agency concerns prompt venture capital firms to invest sooner. This study has useful implications for theory and practice.     

Towards understanding who makes corporate venture capital investments and why

This study examines when established firms participate in corporate venture capital (CVC). We build on the resource-based view of interfirm collaboration and emphasize the strategic flexibility of CVC relationships. We use longitudinal data on 477 firms from 1990 to 2000 to test our hypotheses. We find that firms in industries with rapid technological change, high competitive intensity and weak appropriability engage in greater CVC activity. We also show that firms that possess strong technological and marketing resources and resources developed from diverse venturing experience engage in greater CVC activity. Finally, we find that these firm resources moderate the influence of the observed industry effects in paradoxical ways.     

Exploring the innovation strategies of young firms: Corporate venture capital and venture capital impact on alliance innovation strategy

We investigate how governance structure and power influence alliance exploration strategy. Adopting a real options perspective and the agency view, we suggest that innovation strategies differ based on the firm's governance authority. We find that the motivations of corporate venture capitalist firms, venture capitalists, and firm founders may have an impact on the formation of exploratory alliances among adolescent firms. Using a sample of 122 adolescent firms, we examine the influence that governance structure has on the firm's alliance portfolio and innovation potential. While the influence of corporate venture capitalist firms alone do affect alliance formation strategy, corporate venture-backed firms with founders having high influence (knowledge or ownership in the firm) are more likely to form innovation-focused alliances. In contrast, venture capitalist-backed firms tend to avoid innovation-focused alliances, preferring more exploitive ones, even when founders have high influence within the firm.     

Determinants of required return in venture capital investments: a five-country study

Using two complementary theoretical perspectives, we develop hypotheses regarding the determinants of the return required by venture capitalists and test them on a sample of over 200 venture capital companies (VCCs) located in five countries. Consistent with resource-based theory, we find that early-stage specialists require a significantly higher return than other VCCs when investing in later-stage ventures. Consistent with financial theory, we find that acquisition/buyout specialists require a significantly lower return than other VCCs when investing in expansion companies. Furthermore, in comparison to specialists, highly stage-diversified VCCs require a significantly higher return for early-stage investments. Independent VCCs require a higher rate of return than captive or public VCCs. In general, higher required returns are associated with VCCs who provide more intensity of involvement, have shorter expected holding period of the investment, and being located in the US or UK (in comparison to those in France, Belgium, and The Netherlands).     

Upper echelons and portfolio strategies of venture capital firms

In this study we analyze how the composition of the top management team (TMT) influences the portfolio strategy choice in venture capital (VC) organizations. We develop a model of risk perception to investigate how education and experience of TMT members impact whether VC organizations invest with a focus on early stage ventures or not, specialize or diversify across industries, and invest with a broad or narrow geographic scope.Evaluation of data on TMTs and portfolio strategies of 136 European VC firms revealed that VC firms with higher proportions of TMT members with science/engineering education and entrepreneurial experience more likely invest with an early stage focus. Furthermore, TMTs with more management education diversify their portfolios more across industries. Finally, the more international experience TMT members of VC organizations have, the broader the geographic scope of investees. We discuss the implications of our findings for the VC literature.     

Risk management in Indian venture capital and private equity firms: A comparative study

Venture capitalists and private equity funds are often considered experts at investing in high‐risk projects and firms. To be successful investors, venture capitalists and private equity funds must therefore manage the many aspects of risk associated with investing in unlisted small and medium‐sized enterprises. This study examines how Indian venture capital and private equity firms manage several dimensions of risk. We analyze risk management preferences in Indian venture capital and private equity firms. A comparison between Indian and U.K. funds is presented. The results are discussed in detail. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The structure of the investment networks of venture capital firms

Venture capital firms are linked together in a network by their joint investments in portfolio companies. Through connections in that network, they exchange resources with one another. The most important of those resources are the opportunity to invest in a portfolio company (good investment prospects are always scarce), the spreading of financial risk, and the sharing of knowledge. All venture capitalists operate in very uncertain environments, none more so than the one confronting high innovative venture capitalists, HIVCs,¹ that specialize in investing in high innovative technology companies. The most uncertain of all their investments is a high-technology start-up with nothing more than a product in the head of the founder. There is uncertainty about the talent of the entrepreneur, the market need for the product, the development of a saleable product, the raising of second-round financing for working capital and expansion; the manufacturing of the product, competitors' responses, and government policies such as capital gains tax and ERISA rules, to name some of the major components. It is a formidable list. Indeed, it is hard to name a segment of any other industry that bears more uncertainty than HIVCs.A venture capital firm copes with uncertainty by gathering information. This research shows that the amount of coinvesting by a firm depends on the degree of uncertainty it faces. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the degree of coinvesting.By examining how venture capital firms were connected by their joint investments, it was found that the top 21 HIVCs comprise a tightly coupled network. And of that group, none is more tightly bound than the nine HIVCs located in California. In contrast, the group of top 21 firms that invest mainly in low innovative technology companies, LIVCs, is more loosely bound. HIVCs are more tightly bound together because they shoulder more uncertainty and therefore have a greater need to share information with one another.The practical implications of this study are as follows: Venture Capitalists. It is vital to be well-connected to other venture capital firms. They are important sources of information and investment opportunities. For HIVCs, the California group is central in the network, so links to them are valuable. Communications in a tightly coupled system are swift, so it is likely that information is disseminated very quickly among members of the group. It probably facilitates the setting of a market rate for venture capital. A disadvantage of a tightly bound system is that information flowing among the members has a redundancy and sameness about it, so to ensure a supply of fresh information, members should have as many links as possible to other organizations and individuals besides venture capitalists. Entrepreneurs. When entrepreneurs submit a proposal for funding to venture capital firms, they can assume that news will spread fast to other firms. Thus, they should not use a bird-shot approach; rather, they should select their targets with rifle precision. The proposal should be submitted to a few firms that are known to specialize in the type of product or service that the entrepreneur is planning to make. Entrepreneurs should be concerned about more than the price of the deal. When the top 61 firms invest in a portfolio company, they bring information, contacts, and “deep pockets” to the companies in which they invest. Those factors are significant in nurturing a growing company. Policy Makers. The networks of HIVCs and UVCs are quite different. The HIVCs cluster around oases of high-technology entrepreneurship in the northeast and California, whereas the LIVCs are more evenly spread throughout the U.S.A. HIVCs are located almost exclusively in the so-called “bi-coastal regions of prosperity.”This study found cliques among the venture capital firms. But it found no evidence that the top 61 firms exclude other venture capital firms from their coinvestments of first-rounds of capital. More research is needed before conclusions can be drawn about the power and influence of the top firms. Researchers. In a recent article, Granovetter (1985) suggests that if we are to explain economic behavior, we must understand the networks in which transactions are embedded. This research shows that the networks formed by the syndicated coinvestments of venture capital firms may help us to explain their behavior. A general model for coinvestment networks that is developed in this article is applicable to analysis of syndicated coinvestments not only of venture capital firms, but of investors and lenders in general.     

Institutional investors and international investments in emerging economy firms: A behavioral risk perspective

While the extant literature has examined the influence of controlling and non-controlling principals on the internationalization decisions of emerging market firms, heterogeneity among non-controlling principals is largely ignored. The risk characteristics of different groups of owners, shaped by their institutional environments, could contribute to the differences in their preferences for firm internationalization. In this paper, we draw insights from institutional theory and behavioral risk perspective to examine the risk propensities and risk perceptions of various non-controlling principals, such as pressure-resistant (FIIs and mutual funds) and pressure-sensitive (banks, insurance companies and lending institutions) institutional investors. Empirical results from a sample of 2364 unique Indian firms during the 2005–2014 time-period show that, after controlling for firm-level resources and capabilities identified in prior literature, the ownership share of different types of institutional investors is associated with firms’ international investments differently. While pressure-sensitive institutional investors, such as banks and insurance companies, are not supportive of foreign investments by firms, pressure-resistant institutional investors, such as FIIs and mutual funds, are supportive of this strategic decision. Furthermore, our results show that the family ownership in a firm (measured in terms of family shareholding) further lowers the preference of pressure sensitive institutional investors for internationalization, whereas family ownership positively moderates the pressure resistant investors towards internationalization.     

The political and legal determinants of venture capital investments around the world

This paper investigates the political and legal determinants of cross-country differences in venture capital (VC) investments. Our results show strong and positive effects of a favorable sociopolitical and entrepreneurial environment on the inception and development of VC investment activity. Controlling for effects due to the legal system prevailing in each country, we find strong evidence that this factor plays an important role in explaining cross-sectional variance. This result conveys important normative implications: entrepreneurship and innovation benefit significantly from an active VC industry, which also allows the ignition of virtuous cycles. Activating this cycle, though, relies on some socioeconomic prerequisites that government and institutions should primarily address.     

Measurement of organizational investments in social capital: The service employee perspective

This paper describes the development and validation of a measure of organizational investments in social capital (OISC). The scale development process is carried out over three stages (item generation, scale purification, scale validation), with two separate data collection phases involving a total of 735 working adults from multiple and diverse service-related workplace settings. As such, the data provide evidence for the face, content, discriminant, convergent and nomological validity, dimensionality and reliability of the OISC measure. The OISC measure is a concise, unidimensional scale that has the potential for significant usage in the development and testing of theory, as well as practical application in retail and other service provision contexts.     

Human capital theory and venture capital firms: exploring “home runs” and “strike outs”

Using a human capital perspective, we investigated the relationship between the education and experience of the top management teams of venture capital firms (VCFs) and the firms' performance. We found that although general human capital had a positive association with the proportion of portfolio companies that went public [initial public offering (IPO)], specific human capital did not. However, we did find that specific human capital was negatively associated with the proportion of portfolio companies that went bankrupt. Interestingly, some findings were contrary to expectations from a human capital perspective, specifically the relationship between general human capital and the proportion of portfolio companies that went bankrupt. Future research is suggested.     

R&D investments in family and founder firms: An agency perspective

Investments in R&D can influence a firm's ability to develop new products and to create and adopt innovative technologies that may enhance productivity. However, due to uncertainty regarding the outcome, investments in R&D may lead to an agency problem between the owners and the managers of a firm. Family and founder firms are often considered to be different in their agency situation than other firms, which may have an influence on R&D investments. This paper analyzes R&D spending in family and founder firms versus other firms. The results show that while family ownership decreases the level of R&D intensity, ownership by lone founders has a positive effect not only on R&D intensity but also on the level of R&D productivity. The paper contributes to the understanding of the role of entrepreneurship in making high risk/high return R&D decisions.     

After the cash arrives: A comparative study of venture capital and private investor involvement in entrepreneurial firms

Equity investments in entrepreneurial firms continue to grow in number and dollar amount from both venture capital and private investment sources. Increasingly, these two sources of capital play an important role in the development of new and existing entrepreneurial ventures. Due to the sometimes hurried attempt to turn their dream into reality, entrepreneurs may fail to consider similarities and differences in the value-added benefits supplied by venture capital firms (VCs) and private investors (PIs).Accordingly, the purpose of this study was to determine how initial relationships are established and maintained between entrepreneurs and their primary investors. Specifically, we asked entrepreneurs to assess characteristics of the relationship with their primary investor. We then contrasted the results between entrepreneurial firms that had received venture capital funding versus private investor funding. Differences were examined along the following lines:

• 1.• Levels of investor involvement in entrepreneurial firms
• 2.• Reporting and operational controls placed on the firm
• 3.• Types of expertise sought by the entrepreneur

     

Fast growing small entrepreneurial firms and their venture capital backers: An applied principal-agent analysis

First the empirical background of the U.K. venture capital industry is developed using a panel of major U.K. venture capital funds over the period 1988–92. Then a framework for applied principal agent analysis is developed, focusing on risk management and information. Under risk management it explores attitude to risk, risk sharing and bearing, and the effects of risk bearing on effort. Under information handling, it explores information systems, information asymmetries between investor (venture capitalist) and investee (entrepreneur), and ways of attenuating them, and information variance and costs. Finally, the contract between investor and investee is seen as a device for trading risk and information. The implications of this trading for risk bearing, effort and efficiency are explored. The whole analysis is supported by a detailed case study which reflects current practice in the U.K. venture capital industry. The evidence provides striking confirmation of the applicability of the principal-agent model to the venture capital financing of hightech ventures.     

The relationship between governance structure and risk management approaches in Japanese venture capital firms

This paper attempts to understand what drives Japanese venture capital (JVC) fund managers to select either active managerial monitoring or portfolio diversification to manage their firms' investment risks [J. Bus. Venturing 4 (1989) 231]. Unlike U.S. venture capitalists that use active managerial monitoring to gain private information in order to maximize returns [J. Finance 50 (1995) 301], JVCs have traditionally used portfolio diversification to attenuate investment risks [Hamada, Y., 2001. Nihon no Bencha Kyapitaru no Genkyo (Current State of Japanese Venture Capital), Nihon Bencha Gakkai VC Seminar, May 7]. We found that performance pay is positively related to active monitoring and that management ownership is positively related to active monitoring and negatively related to portfolio diversification. The managerial implication of our study is that venture capitalists should be as concerned about the structure of their incentive systems for their fund managers as they are for their investee-firm entrepreneurs. Agency theory says that contingent compensation is a self-governing mechanism for individual effort that is difficult to measure and verify. When properly applied, equity ownership and performance-based pay can have powerful influencing effects on the strategic choices of managers.