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本文以制造商主导和零售商跟随的两级低碳供应链为模型,在政府补贴绿色产品的策略下,分别研究零售商和制造商的公平偏好对产品绿色度、最优定价及供应链利润的影响。研究发现:(1)不论供应链成员偏好与否,政府的补贴对供应链都是有利的,但补贴比例需控制在合理的范围内,以期供应链系统利润最大化。(2)研究制造商的批发价变化趋势时,需同时考虑政府补贴比例和偏好行为对其的影响。(3)供应链成员的偏好行为都会损害系统的利润,只有零售商的偏好行为会增加其自身的利润,特别是制造商的公平偏好行为是一种损人不利己的行为。 相似文献
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在不确定的市场需求情况下,研究由单一供应商和多零售商组成的供应链系统中,双方在不合作情况下的订货批量模型,然后供需双方通过采用价格折扣策略的stackelberg博弈模型方案,使双方的利润和整条供应链的利润增加,最后分析合作博弈模型下利润分配问题。 相似文献
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本文以一个制造商、一个大型零售商和一个小型零售商构成的供应链为研究对象,在以利润最大化作为决策依据的前提下,分别研究数量折扣契约与收益共享契约下的供应链协调问题。 相似文献
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为探寻低碳供应链中订购资金约束的零售商面对多渠道融资时最优决策,构建了一个碳减排投资的制造商和一个资金约束的零售商组成的两阶段供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,分别在单一债权渠道和债权股权合作渠道下,探讨消费者低碳偏好、银行信贷利率、股权合作比例对低碳供应链融资及订购决策的影响。研究表明,消费者低碳偏好和股权合作比例的提高均有利于扩大低碳产品市场需求、促使制造商提高碳减排投资,同时有利于制造商、零售商实现利润最大化,而银行信贷利率的影响与之相反。且制造商始终偏好债权股权合作渠道,而零售商只在特定条件下偏好债权股权合作渠道;否则将选择单一债权渠道。 相似文献
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为弥补供应链理性经济人假设或只考虑单一偏好的缺失,基于批发价格契约建立完全自利和社会偏好下(仅零售商具有社会偏好、仅制造商具有社会偏好,以及双方同时具有社会偏好)的供应链博弈模型,分析决策主体的社会偏好对定价策略、碳减排策略、最优订购量、决策主体的利润和供应链的利润及其协调性的影响。研究发现:双方利他偏好程度的增大可激励制造商投资减排;领导者制造商的利他行为有利于减缓供应链"双重边际效用",而跟随者零售商的利他行为对供应链利润的影响与制造商的社会偏好有关;当双方的互惠偏好起主导作用且认为对方存在不友善行为时,互惠偏好会降低制造商减排积极性并会加剧供应链"双重边际效用"。上述结论延拓了供应链管理理论,为低碳供应链节点企业选择合作伙伴类型以及低碳供应链运作提供了参考。 相似文献
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本文在易损耗的区域特色商品交易中,构造一个相对简单合理的市场环境,研究单周期两阶段供应链的订购策略模型,且假设该模型是运输路程为变量,考虑基于路程的运送损耗,基于运输路程的市场需求。引入期权的策略,求得有无期权工具时,零售商订购量与最大期望利润、供应商最大期望利润。通过比较得出结论,无期权时零售商的最大订购量大于有期权时总订购量且大于产品订购量;引入期权使得零售商、供应商和整个供应链上最大期望利润都增大;在假设条件下,零售商和供应商最大期望利润是订购量的减函数。最后通过三组实例验证上述结论。 相似文献
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Multiple categories of retail products suffer limited shelf life, demand uncertainty, and, in some cases, long lead times. To provide retailers with an incentive to increase the stocking quantity of such products, manufacturers may offer an option to return unsold items at wholesale or less than wholesale prices. This article extends the additive price-dependent demand model in three ways. First, partial returns are optimal for the manufacturer but do not induce higher stocking quantities compared with when the manufacturer offers no returns. Second, in terms of the effect of investment in demand-enhancing activities, when retailers invest, they set higher resale prices, but an optimal partial returns policy still does not induce higher stocking quantity, whereas when manufacturers invest, the optimal returns policy induces higher stocking quantity. Third, when the manufacturer and retailer have different expectations of demand uncertainty, the retailer's estimate influences the expected profits for both, whereas the manufacturer's estimate has a major impact on its profits only. 相似文献
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供应链模型由一个制造商和零售商组成,其中制造商向零售商供应商品,零售商面临客户的商品需求与储量相关。在该模型中,制造商欲通过批发价和储量成本补偿方式来协调分散式供应链并赢利,使供应链分散式时的系统总储量等于集中控制时的储量水平。假定商品需求是依赖储量的函数和一个储量成本补偿。在单个零售商情形下,制造商需要增大批发价及支付给零售商的储量成本补贴来协调整个渠道并盈利。当两个及多个零售商竞争时,假定市场需求依赖于总储量水平,零售商按照储量比例分割市场。 相似文献
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Ricardo Ernst Jose Ignacio López-Sánchez David Urbano 《Group Decision and Negotiation》2009,18(5):499-517
This paper analyzes, in the context of negotiation, the problem of coordination and conflict resolution between the manufacturer
(Seller) and the retailers (Buyers) for a two-tier inventory system. The retailers capture demand (from customers) and therefore
are responsible for the level of service offered by the system. The larger the inventory that a retailer has of a particular
product, the lower the probability of running out of stock and therefore, avoid the possibility of a lost sale for the manufacturer.
A conflict arises (and therefore the negotiation process starts) when the manufacturer wants the retailer to increase the
level of service while retailers are satisfied with the status quo. Using the Nash bargaining solution, we develop a theoretical
framework that incorporates behavioral dimensions and predicts the outcome of “sharing” the profit. The results indicate the
advantage of developing long term relationships among the members of the distribution channel to minimize the uncertainty
and therefore the source of conflict. 相似文献
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针对一个制造商开通直销渠道销售产品与零售商的价格竞争问题,文章基于制造商与零售商共享品牌权益的视角,研究在制造商双渠道供应链结构中,价格和品牌权益同时作用下的双渠道供应链定价决策,分别分析在集中决策下和分散决策下,品牌权益对两种渠道价格和利润的影响。研究发现:在集中决策下,两种渠道的价格、利润与品牌权益成正相关;在分散决策下,当品牌权益超过一定临界值时,其对制造商直销渠道的价格和制造商总利润的影响大于零售商。鉴于品牌权益对供应链定价决策的重要影响,文章建立制造商和零售商之间的品牌权益成本共担机制,并通过数值仿真分析发现,当实施品牌权益成本共担机制时,制造商和零售商的销售价格和利润均是最优的。因此,零售商应加强与制造商的互动,共同创造高品牌权益的同时,也应共同分享高品牌权益。 相似文献
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This paper shows that a manufacturer may benefit from parallel trade. In addition to an intuitive condition about the effect of demand shocks, this occurs when competitive retailers must order inventories before they know the realization of demand and for products whose sale value drops at the end of the demand period. For these types of products, letting retailers trade unsold inventories generally results in larger orders placed with the manufacturer and higher manufacturer profit. The model provides a simple explanation as to why the volume of parallel trade is now very large and accepted by manufacturers for some products such as automobiles, clothes, toys, consumer electronics, musical recordings, cosmetics and perfumes. 相似文献
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Hamed Jafari Seyed Reza Hejazi Morteza Rasti-Barzoki 《Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade》2016,16(3):323-343
Emergence of the Internet as a new distribution channel has led to increasing attention by researchers to dual-channel supply chain in recent years. In this paper, pricing and ordering decisions are investigated on a dual-channel supply chain which consists of monopolistic manufacturer and duopolistic retailers. The market is assumed to be controlled by the manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer becomes leader and the two retailers act as followers. Due to establishing this new structure, different game-theoretic models including Bertrand, Collusion, and Stackelberg are developed to analyze pricing strategies under the various interactions between the two retailers. Then, the equilibrium decisions are compared under the considered scenarios and valuable managerial insights are presented. We found that the various games do not have any effects on the manufacturer’s responses. The retail prices given by the Collusion game are higher than by the other games. In the Collusion model, demands in the retail channel are lower than in the other games. Moreover, the manufacturer and retailers receive respectively the lowest and the highest profits under the Collusion game. 相似文献
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This paper studies the cooperative promotion problem in the presence of the promotion reference effect. We consider retailer price-reduction promotion activities that enhance their sales but may impair brand image for the manufacturer. Moreover, because frequently used promotion induces a promotion reference effect on customers, we investigate how the promotion reference effect influences cooperative control strategies. We do so by examining the context in a supply chain with one leading manufacturer and two competing retailers, where the manufacturer implements a cooperative promotion program for the retailers. We use differential game models vis-a-vis dynamic promotion control strategies and cooperative promotion strategies under the scenario of existence and non-existence of the reference effect. Findings show that the presence of a promotion reference effect increases profit for the manufacturer but generates reduced profit for the retailers. We also find that the manufacturer augments the level of national brand advertising when incorporating the reference effect, and retailers raise (lower) their degree of promotion when the negative effect is low (high). 相似文献
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This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain network consisting of multiple competing manufacturers, multiple competing retailers and multiple demand markets. Each manufacturer produces and distributes his products via direct e-commerce channel along with traditional physical channel. The manufacturers also provide services for the consumers in both channels, while the retailers only offer offline services to the consumers. On this basis, a dual-channel supply chain network equilibrium model with pricing and service decisions are established based on variational inequality theory. Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained by modified projection and contraction method. Combined with numerical examples, we analyze the impact of three critical factors on the equilibrium states and profits. Some interesting managerial insights are derived. We find that the profits of the manufacturers decrease (increase) in the raw material conversion ratio under single channel case (dual-channel case), while the increase of the raw material conversion ratio always benefits the retailers and the whole dual-channel supply chain network; the service level in each channel is positively correlated with its transaction volume. There are significant inconsistencies among the best combinations of cross-channel price coefficients between two channels for the manufacturers, the retailers and the whole dual-channel supply chain network. The same equilibrium decision (service level, price) or profit may exhibit the opposite changing trend with respect to cross-channel price coefficients under two cases of active e-commerce transaction and inactive e-commerce transaction. When the introduction of e-commerce channel can bring more profits for the whole dual-channel supply chain network, the manufacturers should provide reasonable allocation schemes of profit increment for the retailers to satisfy their participation constraints. 相似文献
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In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses. 相似文献
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《International Journal of Research in Marketing》2023,40(1):226-247
The diverging interests of manufacturers and retailers famously give rise to the double marginalization problem but have consequences far beyond pricing. Advertising is another marketing instrument that is under the control of the manufacturer but its ultimate effect on consumer demand also depends on retailers’ pricing decisions. We decompose the effect of advertising in the channel and highlight an additional route through which advertising affects sales, namely via the changes in the retail price that a strategic retailer makes in response to changes in demand following manufacturer advertising. The total demand effect of advertising thus comprises the direct effects of advertising on market shares, and the indirect effects coming through adjustments that the retailer makes to the in-store prices of all the brands in a given product category in response to the shifted demand due to advertising. We match advertising data for four different categories (both food and non-food) to store-level scanner panel data, which also include information on wholesale prices. Controlling for wholesale prices, we establish in a reduced-form model that the retailer reacts to manufacturer advertising by changing retail prices instead of simply imposing a constant markup on the wholesale price. To further explore the role of the strategic response of the retailer in a systematic fashion and quantify the effects derived in the decomposition, we estimate a discrete-choice model of demand and determine the magnitude of the direct and indirect effects. We find that the indirect effect of advertising through retailer prices is about half the size of the direct effect, and thus substantively affects advertising effectiveness. 相似文献