Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies

This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. Further, we find that greater tournament incentives lead to higher R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage, but lower capital expenditures intensity. Our results support the hypothesis that option-like features of intra-organizational CEO promotion tournaments provide incentives to senior executives to increase firm risk by following riskier policies. Finally, the compensation levels and structures of executives of financial institutions have received a great deal of scrutiny after the financial crisis. In a separate examination of financial firms, we again find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives.     

Managerial shareholding policies and retention of vested equity incentives

Previous literature documents that executives tend to cash out equity incentives when equity-linked compensation vests. Such a behavior destroys long-term incentives and hence is costly to outside shareholders. It is recommended that the unloading of incentives can be limited when the firm adopts a minimum executive shareholding policy. We provide the first evidence of the effectiveness of such policies in that respect. Using data for UK FTSE 350 companies we show that executives whose ownership is below the minimum set by the policy retain more newly vesting equity and the incentives to retain shares weaken when the holdings are above the minimum. We also document economic implications of compliance with the policy and we find higher firm valuations when actual ownership increases relative to the minimum holdings required. Our results have implications for the debate on executive remuneration regulations and practices.     

Health incentives: the science and art of motivating healthy behaviors

Employers seeking to motivate and encourage healthy behaviors among their employees are increasingly turning to incentive rewards. In fact, a recent Buck Consultants survey of 555 employers, titled Working Well: A Global Survey of Health Promotion and Workplace Wellness Strategies, predicts the use of such rewards to more than double over the next two to three years. This article provides an overview of the key considerations for employers seeking to maximize the value of incentive rewards. Discussion includes incentive strategies, types of rewards, reward amounts and regulatory considerations under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).     

Is Prescott right? Welfare state policies and the incentives to work, learn, and retire

This paper bolsters Prescott’s (Fed. Reserve Bank Minneap. Q. Rev. 28(1):2–13, 2004) claim that high taxes are responsible for lackluster labor market performance in Continental European countries. We develop a life-cycle model with endogenous skill formation, endogenous labor supply, and endogenous retirement. Labor taxation distorts not only labor supply, but also education and retirement decisions. Actuarially unfair pensions further exacerbate labor tax distortions on retirement. Education subsidies can nevertheless cushion the adverse impact of taxation on skill formation. Feedbacks between education, labor supply, and retirement are important. The model is simulated with realistic behavioral elasticities that are consistent with microeconometric evidence. If, besides labor supply, also learning and retirement are endogenous, the uncompensated (compensated) elasticity of the tax base equals 0.46 (0.85), which is more than twice as large as the standard uncompensated (compensated) labor supply elasticity of 0.18 (0.40). Furthermore, life-cycle interactions between education, working, and retirement are quantitatively important and the interactions raise all behavioral elasticities substantially. For example, the uncompensated labor supply elasticity increases with one-half due to life-cycle interactions (to 0.26). We demonstrate that low European labor supply can be fully explained by taxation without relying on unrealistically high labor supply elasticities. Reducing labor market distortions, cutting benefit levels, lowering tax rates, and making (early) retirement actuarially more fair, therefore, boosts labor supply, delays retirement, and stimulates skill formation. In addition, high education subsidies are needed in large welfare states to offset explicit and implicit tax burdens on human capital investment.      

Nonprofit boards: Size,performance and managerial incentives

We examine relations between board size, managerial incentives and enterprise performance in nonprofit organizations. We posit that a nonprofit's demand for directors increases in the number of programs it pursues, resulting in a positive association between program diversity and board size. Consequently, we predict that board size is inversely related to managerial pay-performance incentives and positively with overall organization performance. We find empirical evidence consistent with our hypotheses. The number of programs is positively related to board size. Board size is associated negatively with managerial incentives, positively with program spending and fundraising performance, and negatively with commercial revenue, in levels and changes.     

Uncertainty,investment, and managerial incentives

This study provides evidence that managerial incentives, shaped by compensation contracts, help to explain the empirical relationship between uncertainty and investment. We develop a model in which the manager, compensated with an equity-based contract, makes investment decisions for a firm that faces time-varying volatility. The contract creates incentives that affect both the sign and magnitude of a manager׳s optimal response to volatility shocks. The model is calibrated using compensation data to quantify this predicted investment response for a large panel of firms. Our estimates help explain the variation in firm-level investment responses to volatility shocks observed in the data.     

Investment incentives,debt, and warrants

This paper models and characterizes investment incentive problems associated with debt financing. The decision problem of residual claimants is explicity formulated and their investment policies are characterized. The paper also analyzes the use of conversion features and warrants to control distortionary incentives. These claims reverse the convex shape of levered equity over the upper range of the firm's earnings, and this mitigates the incentive to take risk. It is shown that, under certain conditions, such claims can be constructed to restore net present value maximizing incentives and simultaneously meet the financing requirements of the firm.     

Empire-builders and shirkers: Investment,firm performance,and managerial incentives

We consider the equilibrium relationships between incentives from compensation, investment, and firm performance. In an optimal contracting model, we show that the relationship between firm performance and managerial incentives, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether managers have private benefits of investment, as in theories of managerial entrenchment. We estimate the joint relationships between incentives and firm performance and between incentives and investment. We provide new results showing that investment is increasing in incentives. Further, in contrast to previous studies, we find that firm performance is increasing in incentives at all levels of incentives. Taken together, these results are inconsistent with theories of overinvestment based on managers having private benefits of investment. These results are consistent with managers having private costs of investment and, more generally, models of underinvestment.     

Managerial incentives, derivatives and stability

In this paper we model the derivative strategies optimally undertaken by a manager (or head of a profit center in a hedge fund) when the detailed derivative positions taken are not contractible. We show that with commonly-used incentive features in the compensation structure, managers have incentives to implement complex derivative strategies that lead to a slight reduction in default probabilities (or a slight increase in performance measures) with a high probability at the cost of allowing for the possibility of disaster states involving large losses, although with a very small probability. Such disaster states cause systemic instability (similar to the experience of Long-Term Capital Management in September 1998). We discuss possible audit strategies, governance mechanisms and incentive structures that will ameliorate the probability of systemic instability arising from such incentives in a market with a rich enough menu of derivatives. We characterize the optimal intensity of audit effort with and without the presence of such derivative strategies. The dependence of the optimal audit intensity on the legal liability regime and different rules for apportioning the auditor's liability is derived. Our results also relate the optimal audit intensity to the cost and efficiency parameters of the audit firm.     

Rules of proof,courts, and incentives

We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of incentives for potential tort‐feasors to exert care when evidence is imperfect and may be distorted by the parties. Efficiency is consistent with courts adjudicating on the basis of the preponderance of evidence standard together with common law exclusionary rules. Inefficient equilibria may nevertheless also arise under these rules. Burden of proof guidelines are then useful as a coordination device. Alternatively, guidelines are unnecessary if courts are allowed a more active or inquisitorial role in contrast to that of passive adjudicator.     

Liability protection,director compensation,and incentives

We examine the effect of liability protection on the compensation of directors and on takeover outcomes. Consistent with the hypothesis that directors require additional compensation if they bear liability, we find that director compensation is higher for firms that provide less liability protection. Examining takeovers, we find evidence that takeovers of firms with protected directors are less likely to succeed. Moreover, firms with protected directors are more likely to accept a lower bid premium, and this finding is consistent with protected directors having reduced incentives to negotiate for the highest possible price during the acquisition. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that director liability provisions have a significant impact both on director compensation and director duty.     

Patent privateering,litigation, and R&D incentives

We model “patent privateering”—whereby producing firms sell patents to Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), which then license them under the threat of litigation—in a bargaining game. PAEs can negotiate higher licensing fees than producing firms because they cannot be countersued for infringement. Privateering produces two countervailing effects: it increases the offensive value of patents, whereas it decreases their defensive value and lowers the aggregate surplus of producing firms. Embedding the bargaining game into a Research and Development (R&D) contest for multiple complementary technologies, we find that privateering may increase R&D investments, even as it induces more litigation threats and reduces industry profits.     

Teams,repeated tasks,and implicit incentives

In a team setting, wherein only group performance is tracked, we show that muted incentive contracts may be sufficient to motivate team members. By having the team repeat a task, explicit (contractual) incentives can be substituted by implicit incentives team members provide to each other. We also study an example in which, despite uncorrelated individual performance measures being available, it is optimal to condition each manager's pay on both managers' performance. This can be viewed as creating a group performance measure. Using a group performance measure provides each manager with incentives to monitor and a means of punishing other managers.     

Managerial incentives,options, and cost-structure choices

This study explores the relationship between changes in managerial risk-taking incentives and adjustments of firms’ cost structures, particularly the operating leverage (fixed-to-variable cost ratio). We find managers reduce operating leverage by substituting fixed costs with variable costs, mainly in the selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) and research and development (R&D) cost components, in response to reductions in option-based compensation following the issuance of FAS 123R. Managers facing a decrease in risk-taking incentives adjust operating leverage downward because high operating leverage intensifies the downside potential of earnings. Overall, we present compelling evidence that managers adjust the cost structure of their firms in response to a reduction in risk-taking incentives.     

Nonprofit classification decisions in response to threshold-based charity care incentives

We examine how the threat of losing income tax-exemption affects U.S. nonprofit hospitals' misclassification of the components of uncompensated care when the hospitals (i) are required to provide charity care subject to a minimum threshold in exchange for keeping the tax-exemption, (ii) are reimbursed for their bad debts, and (iii) can misrepresent their privately observed information regarding bad debts and charity care provided. Using an analytical model, we illustrate the optimal misclassification strategies of bad debt and charity care.     

The Medicare hospice benefit: the effectiveness of price incentives in health care policy

This article examines the implications of fixed-price reimbursement of providers for access to hospice care by Medicare beneficiaries. Hospices that are offered higher reimbursement rates by Medicare are found to be more likely to become certified to provide care under the Medicare Hospice Benefit program. Each $1.00 increase in the daily routine home care rate raises the probability of certification by 1.7%. In turn, the Hospice Benefit increases access to hospice care by enabling Medicare-certified facilities to serve more patients than they would if they were noncertified. However, care must be taken to set reimbursement rates appropriately. Failure to correctly adjust reimbursement rates for the real costs of certification across different parts of the country leads to disparities in hospice certification and differential access to hospice care for Medicare beneficiaries.     

The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives

Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm?s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and enforcement actions, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk.     

Leverage,executive incentives and corporate governance

This paper analyses the effect of executive incentives and internal governance on capital structure. Using a large sample of non‐financial US‐listed firms over the period 1999–2005, it is found that managers have different attitudes towards leverage when offered different incentive schemes; leverage initially decreases in bonuses and stock incentives and then increases in these incentives after a certain incentive level, suggesting the existence of the entrenchment–alignment effects under these incentive schemes. In contrast, leverage initially increases in option incentives and then decreases after a certain option incentive level. When all of these incentive schemes are combined together into a single incentive package, the entrenchment–alignment effects prevail. It is also found that leverage increases in internal governance and managers behave differently under different governance regimes such that the entrenchment–alignment effects prevail under weak governance firms, whereas the alignment–entrenchment effects prevail under strong governance firms. The results also suggest that managers’ target leverage ratio is less than the one predicted by theory or preferred by firm shareholders.     

Social insurance,incentives and risk taking

From the perspective of parents, redistributive taxation can be seen as social insurance for their children, for which no private alternative exists. Because private insurance comes too late during a person's life, it cannot cover the same risks as social insurance. Empirically, 85% of social insurance covers risks for which no private insurance would have been available. Redistributive taxation can be efficiency enhancing, because it creates safety and because it stimulates income generating risk taking. However, it also brings about detrimental moral hazard effects. Both the enhancement of risk taking and the moral hazard effects tend to increase the inequality in the economy, and, under constant returns to risk taking, this increase is likely to be strong enough even to make the net-of-tax income distribution more unequal. Optimal redistributive taxation will either imply that the pie becomes bigger when there is less inquality in pre-tax incomes or that more redistribution creates more post-tax inequality.The author gratefully acknowledges reserach assistance by Claudio Thum and useful comments by two anonymous referees. The paper is a broadened and non-technical discussion that draws on previous writings by the author on the subject. See in particular Sinn (1995).