The Behavior of the Interest Rate Differential Between Tax-exempt Revenue and General Obligation Bonds: A Test of Risk Preferences and Market Segmentation

This paper presents evidence that the yield differential between revenue bonds and similar general obligation bonds varies contracyclically with the level of economic activity. The evidence also indicates that significant investor-borrower induced market segmentation exists in the municipal bond market. An increase in the relative demand by commercial banks for tax-exempt securities and/or an increase in the supply of revenue bonds relative to the supply of general obligation bonds increase the yield spread between the two classes of debt. These findings were the result of a series of empirical tests with both macroeconomic and microeconomic data.     

The long-run performance of firms that issue convertible debt: an empirical analysis of operating characteristics and analyst forecasts

Many firms issue hybrid securities, such as convertible debt, instead of standard securities like straight debt or common equity. Theoretical arguments suggest that convertible debt minimizes costs for firms facing high debt- and equity-related external financing costs. Theory also suggests that an appropriately designed convertible security provides efficient investment incentives. We show, however, that firms on average perform poorly following the issuance of convertible debt. The empirical evidence suggests that the efficient investment decisions predicted by theory are not in fact achieved by the actual design and issuance of convertible debt securities. An alternative interpretation of convertible debt offers is that investors ration the participation of some issuers in the seasoned equity market.     

Not knowing the competition: evidence and implications for auction design

In a government auction program where first-price auctions generate significantly higher revenue than English auctions, I document evidence that bidders are uncertain about the number of auction entrants. Motivated by additional data evidence, I estimate a structural model of auctions in which rivals' participation is stochastic, allowing for bidders' risk aversion and asymmetry. Counterfactual simulations reveal that bidders' uncertainty about the number of entrants, combined with risk aversion, substantially softens the revenue impact of low competition in first-price auctions. This explains the observed revenue patterns and uncovers an empirically important reason for sellers to favor first-price auctions over English auctions.     

Accounting Treatment of Inherent versus Incentive Uncertainties and the Capital Structure of the Firm

This paper studies the accounting treatment of uncertainty and how it affects a firm's capital structure. We distinguish two sources of uncertainty that raise reliability concerns: inherent uncertainty and incentive uncertainty. By inherent uncertainty, we refer to uncertainty about the quality of raw information regarding future cash flows. By incentive uncertainty, we refer to uncertainty about the quality of accounting numbers conveying the raw information. We explore features of accounting that can effectively deal with these two types of uncertainties in order to aid in the debt‐equity decision of the firm. To handle inherent uncertainty, preferable accounting involves flexible revenue/expense recognition rules that recognize more profit when the uncertainty level is low. To deal with incentive uncertainty, a stringent revenue/expense recognition rule may be desirable to fend off management's opportunistic reporting behavior. Inflexible accounting rules cause a firm's financing choices to deviate from what would hold with complete information. Given any accounting rule, an information environment with a lower (higher) uncertainty regarding future cash inflows leads to higher (lower) expected debt financing. This is because assessed default risk is increasing in the uncertainty of future cash inflows, holding the uncertainty of the outflows constant.     

Public Debt Management and Macroeconomic Stability: An Overview

Recent research suggests that management of the public sector’sdebt can have important effects on a country’s macroeconomicperformance. This article provides an overview of the factorsthat the recent literature has identified as important in determiningthe optimal composition of the public debt. Based on this analysis,it attempts to establish general guidelines for public debtmanagement in emerging economies. To retain market access andpromote domestic financial market development, governments shouldgenerally finance themselves at market rates using a wide varietyof securities. Beyond this general principle, the optimal compositionof the public debt involves a tradeoff between enhancing thegovernment’s anti–inflationary credibility and reducingthe vulnerability of its budget to macroeconomic shocks. Consequently,the optimal composition of the debt depends on a country’scircumstances. Debt should be heavily weighted toward long-termnominal securities for governments that have anti–inflationarycredibility and toward long-term indexed debt for those thatdo not.      

Dealer behavior in the specials market for US Treasury securities

We assess dealer behavior in the specials market for US Treasury securities by comparing dealer participation in the Federal Reserve's securities loan auctions with prices in the private market. Dealer behavior is generally consistent with the law of one price and apparent violations can largely be explained by institutional differences between the private market and the Fed's program. However, for auctions that are effectively noncompetitive, dealers regularly pass up true arbitrage opportunities and frequently overpay to borrow securities. Dealers apparently do not realize that certain auctions are noncompetitive, even though the information needed to discern this fact is publicly available in advance.     

关于当前我国证券公司实行股权激励的监管思考

我国证券公司目前实行股权激励的部分背景条件正逐步形成,但是仍存在制约因素,而且可供复制的相关成功实践较少。因此,全面开展证券公司股权激励还为时过早,证券监管部门应引导先试点再推行,使得股权激励为证券业发展发挥积极作用。     

Debt Schedules of Tax-Exempt Bonds Using NIC

Municipal bonds are a large proportion of the total number of securities offered every year. The volume outstanding is more than that of all federal agency debt. It is important that the issuance procedure be as cost efficient as possible. This research develops a model to minimize the net interest cost of a municipal bond issue. Net interest cost remains a highly popular award criteria. The model incorporates the level and shape of the yield curve, the schedule of revenue to be received, and the segmented nature of the municipal market.     

Revenue and optimality in unequal-sized share auctions

This paper analyzes unequal-sized share auctions with symmetric private-value buyers. The property that each buyer can win at most one unit, but variable-sized, makes share auctions situated between single-unit auctions and multiunit auctions. We calculate revenue and optimality of efficient share auctions and discuss how the optimal reserve valuation varies according to risk attitude towards share size.     

The bidder exclusion effect

We introduce a new, simple‐to‐compute test of independence of valuations and the number of bidders for ascending button auctions with symmetric, conditionally independent private values. The test involves estimating the expected revenue drop from excluding a bidder at random, which can be computed as a scaled sample average of a difference of order statistics. This object also provides a bound on counterfactual revenue changes from optimal reserve pricing or bidder mergers. We illustrate the approach using data from timber auctions, where we find some evidence that bidder valuations and the number of participants are not independent.     

Determinants of corporate debt securities in the Euro area

Abstract

This study examines the macroeconomic determinants of corporate debt securities in the euro area. The financing costs, as approximated by the cost of debt securities vis-à-vis other sources of corporate finance, and financing needs, as captured by mergers and acquisitions and gross domestic product, are found to be significant determinants in the short and long run. The empirical results are also supportive of substitution between debt security and internal financing unrelated to cost of differentials in the short run and of differences in the determination of long- and short-term debt securities. These findings are robust across different samples and specifications.     

An empirical study of auction revenue rankings: the case of municipal bonds

Using a novel dataset of 386 first‐price municipal bond auctions held in California, I perform counterfactual revenue comparisons, based on the theoretical result of Milgrom and Weber (1982). I show that the revenue in the second‐price auction is nonparametrically identified, and the counterfactual revenue in the English auction can be bounded in an informative way. These results form a basis for nonparametric estimation of counterfactual revenue differences. I find that the revenue gain from using the English auction would be in the range of 11%—19% of the gross underwriting spread, and that most of it would already be captured by using the second‐price auction. The recent explosive growth of Internet English auctions, administered by Grant Street Group, provides external support to the claim that auction design matters in this market.     

The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions

This is an exploration of how bidding behavior of firms in variousauctions is affected by their capital structure. The theoreticalmodel considers a first-price sealed bid and an English auction.We find that as debt levels increase, firms tend to reduce theirbids. The lower bids give the competition incentives to reducetheir bids as well. These results are investigated empiricallyusing data from the 1994–1995 FCC spectrum auctions. Consistentwith the theoretical model, higher debt levels of the biddingfirm and of the competition tend to lead to lower bids. Additionaldeterminants of bidding behavior in these auctions are alsoanalyzed.     

EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON FIRMS' DECISIONS TO RETIRE DEBT EARLY

We examine the effect of marginal tax rates on the decision to retire debt early. Other factors that have been linked to the debt retirement decision are also investigated, including leverage adjustment and the value associated with the immediate recognition of a loss for tax purposes on early retirement. Results indicate that firms that retire debt early have lower marginal tax rates than firms that do not retire debt early. This finding is consistent with the proposition that firms are motivated to retire debt early by an incentive to reduce tax shields that cannot be used efficiently. Further, firms that retire debt early are more highly leveraged than firms that do not retire debt early. Evidence also suggests that some firms retire debt early at a loss to reduce currently taxable income.     

Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes

This article develops a theory of multiunit auctions where shortsqueezes can occur in the secondary market. Both uniform anddiscriminatory auctions are studied and bidders can submit multiplebids. We show that bidders with short and long preauction positionshave different valuations in an otherwise common value setting.Discriminatory auctions lead to more short squeezing and higherrevenue than uniform auctions, ceteris paribus. Asymptotically,as the auction size approaches infinity, the two formats leadto equivalent outcomes. Shorts employ more aggressive equilibriumbidding strategies. Most longs strategically choose to be passive.Free riding on a squeeze by small, long players has no impacton these results, but affects revenue in discriminatory auctions.     

AN EXAMINATION OF FEDERAL AGENCY DEBT PRICING PRACTICES

Debt issuance procedures for federally sponsored agency securities differ considerably from the methods used by the U.S. Treasury and most corporate and municipal debt issuers. This paper examines the debt issuing procedures of the three major federally sponsored agencies and the efficiency with which the fiscal agents for those agencies price new debt issues. The conclusions from the analysis are: (1) fiscal agents for the major federally sponsored agencies are extremely adept at estimating the equilibrium competitive yields for new debt issues; (2) pricing errors on new issues are generally due to factors beyond a fiscal agent's control, such as the volatility of debt market conditions; and (3) the debt pricing practices for federally sponsored agency securities are efficient and effective.     

Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt

We investigate the impact of founding family ownership structure on the agency cost of debt. We find that founding family ownership is common in large, publicly traded firms and is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower cost of debt financing. Our results are consistent with the idea that founding family firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and debt claimants. This suggests that bond holders view founding family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests.     

High-temperature exposure risk,corporate performance and pricing efficiency of the stock market

Using the daily temperature data of the national meteorological stations, we measure the high-temperature exposure risk of Chinese A-share listed enterprises, investigate the impact of high-temperature exposure risk on corporate prime operating revenue and performance, and further discuss securities analysts' forecasts for this risk. We find that increased exposure to high temperature reduces corporate prime operating revenue, and the response of enterprises to high-temperature risk will lead to a rise in management expenses and the deterioration of business performance. Further evidence suggests that securities analysts generally underestimate or ignore the impact of high-temperature exposure risk, and our results are robust to different measures and samples.     

Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands

Online auction sites often enable sellers to add a buy‐out price. In one‐shot auctions, this has been motivated by appeal to impatience or risk aversion. We offer additional justification in a dynamic model, by showing that an early seller has an incentive to use a buy‐out price, if a similar product is offered later by another seller, and bidders desire multiple objects. Revenue in the first auction increases, but revenue in the second auction decreases, as does the sum of revenues. The buy‐out price causes the auction sequence to become inefficient, because the first item may be awarded to a bidder who should have received none.     

Risk premia and the pricing of primary issue bonds

Researchers investigating the impact of various economic or regulatory changes on debt securities have generally employed two types of bond pricing models: the absolute yield or the relative yield model. This paper explores the behavioral implications of these two models and provides a theoretical and empirical examination of the contrasting specifications. Evidence is presented that suggests the relative yield model to be the more appropriate specification.