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Summary This paper examines the conditions which guarantee that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria in the normal form games withoutspillovers. We find thatpopulation monotonicity properties of the payoff functions, when the payoff of a player changes monotonically when the size of the group of players choosing the same strategy increases, are crucial to obtain the equivalence of these two solution concepts. We identify the classes of games, satisfying population monotonicity properties, which yield the equivalence of the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the set of strong Nash equilibria. We also provide sufficient conditions for the equivalence result even when the population monotonicity assumptions are relaxed.We wish to thank Mamoru Kaneko, Akihiko Matsui, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Benyamin Shitoviz, Tayfun Sonmez, William Thomson, the participants of the Southeastern Economic Theory Meeting in Charlottesville and the seminars at CORE and University of Tsukuba for useful discussions and comments. Our special thanks due anonymous referee for the suggestion to add a section addressing the issue of existence of a strong Nash equilibrium. 相似文献
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Vincenzo Scalzo 《Economics Letters》2012,115(3):387-389
In the recent paper by the author [Scalzo, V., 2010. Pareto efficient Nash equilibria in discontinuous games. Economics Letters 107, 364-365], a class of discontinuous games where efficient Nash equilibria exist has been defined. In the present paper, we complete the previous investigation and recognize a class of discontinuous games where the efficient Nash equilibria are stable with respect to perturbations of the characteristics of players. 相似文献
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This paper describes algorithms for finding all Nash equilibria of a two-player game in strategic form. We present two algorithms
that extend earlier work. Our presentation is self-contained, and explains the two methods in a unified framework using faces
of best-response polyhedra. The first method lrsnash is based on the known vertex enumeration program lrs, for “lexicographic reverse search”. It enumerates the vertices of only one best-response polytope, and the vertices of the
complementary faces that correspond to these vertices (if they are not empty) in the other polytope. The second method is
a modification of the known EEE algorithm, for “enumeration of extreme equilibria”. We also describe a second, as yet not implemented, variant that is space
efficient. We discuss details of implementations of lrsnash and EEE, and report on computational experiments that compare the two algorithms, which show that both have their strengths and weaknesses. 相似文献
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Gerhard Sorger 《Economic Theory》1998,11(1):79-100
Summary. A general model of non-cooperating agents exploiting a renewable resource is considered. Assuming that the resource is sufficiently productive we prove that there exists a continuum of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE). Although these equilibria lead to over-exploitation one can approximate the efficient solution by MPNE both in the state space and the payoff space. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for maximal exploitation of the resource to qualify as a MPNE. This condition is satisfied if there are sufficiently many players, or if the players are sufficiently impatient, or if the capacity of each player is sufficiently high.Received: November 1, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
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A Nash equilibrium \(x\) of a normal-form game \(G\) is essential if any perturbation of \(G\) has an equilibrium close to \(x\). Using payoff perturbations, we identify a new collection of games containing a dense, residual subset of games whose Nash equilibria are all essential. This collection covers economic examples that cannot be handled by extant results and subsumes the sets of games considered in the literature. 相似文献
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We study Kantian equilibria of an -player bargaining game, which is a modified version of the well-known divide-the-dollar game. We first show that the Kantian equilibrium exists under fairly minimal assumptions. Second, if the bankruptcy rule used satisfies equal treatment of equals, and is almost nowhere proportional, then only equal division can prevail in any Kantian equilibrium. On the other hand, we show that an “anything goes” type result emerges only under the proportional rule. Finally, using hybrid bankruptcy rules that we construct in a novel fashion, we can characterize the whole equilibrium set. Our results highlight the interactions between institutions (axiomatic properties of division rules) and agents' equilibrium behavior. 相似文献
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Guilherme Carmona 《Economic Theory》2011,48(1):1-4
This paper introduces the symposium on existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games. 相似文献
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Summary. Given a map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of a game, each component of the equilibrium set has an associated index,
defined as the local degree of the map. This note shows that for a two-player game, every map with the same roots induces
the same index. Moreover, this index agrees with the Shapley index constructed from the Lemke-Howson algorithm.
Received: May 30, 1996; revised version June 25, 1996 相似文献
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Summary. The literature on the computation of Nash equilibria in n-person games is dominated by simplicial methods. This paper is the first to introduce a globally convergent algorithm that
fully exploits the differentiability present in the problem. It presents an everywhere differentiable homotopy to do the computations.
The homotopy path can therefore be followed by several numerical techniques. Moreover, instead of computing some Nash equilibrium,
the algorithm is constructed in such a way that it computes the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure of Harsanyi
and Selten. As a by-product of our proofs it follows that for a generic game the tracing procedure defines a unique feasible
path. The numerical performance of the algorithm is illustrated by means of several examples.
Received: December 21, 1999; revised version: December 27, 2000 相似文献
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In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Cournot–Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int. J.Game Theory 24 (1995) 79–94; On the existence of Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games, J. Math. Econ. 32 (1999) 207–223; A unifying pair of Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence results, J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 437–470] to games with possibly non-ordered preferences, providing a continuum analogue of the seminal existence results by Mas-Colell [An equilibrium existence theorem without complete or transitive preferences, J. Math. Econ. 1 (1974) 237–246], Gale and Mas-Colell [An equilibrium existence theorem for a general model without ordered preferences, J. Math. Econ. 2 (1975) 9–15], Shafer and Sonnenschein [Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences, J. Math. Econ. 2 (1975) 345–348], Borglin and Keiding [Existence of equilibrium actions and of equilibrium: a note on the “new” existence theorems, J. Math. Econ. 3 (1976) 313–316] and Yannelis and Prabhakar [Existence of maximal elements and equilibria in linear topological spaces, J. Math. Econ. 12 (1983) 233–245]. 相似文献
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Erik J. Balder 《Economic Theory》1997,9(1):161-167
Summary If the payoffs of a game are affine, then they are additively coupled. In this situation both the Weierstrass theorem and the Bauer maximum principle can be used to produce existence results for a Nash equilibrium, since each player is faced with an individual, independent optimization problem. We consider two instances in the literature where these simple observations immediately lead to substantial generalizations.I wish to thank Nicholas Yannelis for posing a question which led me to writing this note in its present form. 相似文献
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The formula given by McLennan [The mean number of real roots of a multihomogeneous system of polynomial equations, Amer. J. Math. 124 (2002) 49–73] is applied to the mean number of Nash equilibria of random two-player normal form games in which the two players have M and N pure strategies respectively. Holding M fixed while N→∞, the expected number of Nash equilibria is approximately . Letting M=N→∞, the expected number of Nash equilibria is , where is a constant, and almost all equilibria have each player assigning positive probability to approximately 31.5915 percent of her pure strategies. 相似文献
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Indrajit Mallick 《Economics Letters》2011,111(2):144-146
We construct a generalized two-person discrete strategy static game of complete information where continuity, convexity and compactness cannot be invoked to show the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We show that, when best responses are unique from both sides, a condition of Minimal Acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria. 相似文献
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Yaw Nyarko 《Economic Theory》1998,11(3):643-655
Summary. Consider an infinitely repeated game where each player is characterized by a “type” which may be unknown to the other players
in the game. Suppose further that each player's belief about others is independent of that player's type. Impose an absolute
continuity condition on the ex ante beliefs of players (weaker than mutual absolute continuity). Then any limit point of beliefs of players about the future
of the game conditional on the past lies in the set of Nash or Subjective equilibria.
Our assumption does not require common priors so is weaker than Jordan (1991); however our conclusion is weaker, we obtain
convergence to subjective and not necessarily Nash equilibria. Our model is a generalization of the Kalai and Lehrer (1993)
model. Our assumption is weaker than theirs. However, our conclusion is also weaker, and shows that limit points of beliefs,
and not actual play, are subjective equilibria.
Received: March 3, 1995; revised version: February 17, 1997 相似文献