The evolution of conventions in minimum effort games

The literature on minimum effort game has been concerned with a symmetric game with linear payoff functions. The main aim of the present paper is to study the coordination problem arising in a not necessarily symmetric minimum effort game with two players. The sources of asymmetry can be twofold: the productivity of effort and the distribution of the join output. To select among the Pareto ranked equilibria we use the stochastic stability criterion. We show that, for any configuration parameters, the set of stochastically stable equilibria coincides with the set of potential maximizers. We also show that when the disutility of effort is linear, the Pareto dominant equilibrium is stochastically stable provided that the distributive parameter belongs to a well defined range. When the disutility of effort is nonlinear no distributive arguments can be used to successfully affect the selection process. Lastly we prove that the connection between stochastic stability and maximum potential can fail when more than two agents are considered.     

Repetition and signalling: experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria

We report experiments where subjects generally fail to attain the efficient equilibrium of a one-shot game, but attain the efficient equilibrium of the repeated version. The results suggest that in the repeated game actions are used to signal future intentions.     

Valuing improvements in urban water security: evidence of heterogeneity derived from a latent class model for eastern Australia

In many Australian cities the response to drought has included the imposition of mandatory constraints over how water is used by households, often termed ‘water restrictions’. A similar rationing approach has been witnessed in California’s recent drought. The aim of water restrictions is to slow the depletion of water storage but restrictions have also been criticized for the costs they impose on specific water users. In order to gain insight into the potential magnitude of the cost of water restrictions, this study uses a choice experiment to investigate the non-market values for specific attributes associated with the outcomes of drought restrictions. This information was sought to understand the community’s willingness to pay for attributes related to the extent, frequency and duration of water restrictions. The article reports a latent class choice model for a major city in eastern Australia and investigates heterogeneity in preferences towards increasing water availability during drought. This study departs from the existing literature by conducting the choice experiment in a context where water supply is relatively abundant. This unique framing of the choice experiment allows for a useful comparison with existing studies and also raises challenges about the interpretation of the data for planning purposes.     

A strategic analysis of global warming: Theory and some numbers

We model the global warming process as a dynamic commons game in which the players are countries, their actions at each date produce emissions of greenhouse gases, and the state variable is the current stock of greenhouse gases. The theoretical analysis is complemented by a calibration exercise. The first set of results establishes theoretically, and then with illustrative numbers, the over-emissions due to a “tragedy of the commons.” The power of simple sanctions to lower emissions and increase welfare is then examined as is the effect of cost asymmetry. Finally, a complete theoretical charactrization is provided for the best equilibrium, and it is shown that it has a very simple structure; it involves a constant emission rate through time.     

The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study

This paper investigates the role of endogenous timing of decisions on coordination under asymmetric information. In the equilibrium of a global coordination game, where players choose the timing of their decision, a player who has sufficiently high beliefs about the state of the economy undertakes an investment without delay. This decision (potentially) triggers an investment by the other player whose beliefs would have led to inaction otherwise. Endogenous timing has two distinct effects on coordination: a learning effect (early decisions reveal information) and a complementarity effect (early decisions eliminate strategic uncertainty for late movers). The experiments that we conduct to test these theoretical results show that the learning effect of timing has more impact on the subjects' behavior than the complementarity effect. We also observe that subjects' welfare improves significantly under endogenous timing.     

Measuring the relative productivity of multitasking to sole-tasking in household production: experimental evidence

The standard household production model does not incorporate multitasking, although time-diary data reveal that individuals regularly multitask. We incorporate multitasking into a household production model in which time spent in childcare can be sole-tasked or multitasked with another household production activity and we present the results of an experiment designed to measure the productivity parameters of this model. Because utility and productivity are intertwined and difficult to disentangle in any household production model, we vary the utility pay-offs our experimental participants receive in order to determine how our estimated productivity parameters are affected by a change in the utility parameters. Our estimates of the relative multitasking productivities indicate that, while a minute of sole-tasked time produces more of a single commodity than a minute of multitasked time, total household output increases when two outputs are produced simultaneously, hence confirming the economic motivation for multitasking.     

Context matters to explain field experiments: Results from Colombian and Thai fishing villages

During the last decade, field experiments regarding the study of common pool resource governance have been performed that replicated earlier findings of laboratory experiments. One of the questions is how the decisions made by participants in rural communities are influenced by their experience. This paper presents the results of field experiments in Colombia and Thailand on fishery resources. Context information is derived from the communities via in-depth interviews, surveys and role playing exercises. The use of different methodological tools allowed to link decisions in field experiments with contextual variables for two fishery villages. Explanation of core variables in social dilemmas is given, the degree of cooperation levels, preferred rules, rule compliance and enforcement. Main findings include: i) fishermen made decisions in the field experiments that reflected their own experience and context, ii) agreements for rule crafting are possible only under specific conditions that guarantees livelihoods and sustainability, iii) the broader context determines cooperation levels at a local level, iv) inequalities in the sanctioning of rule breakers decrease the possibilities of reaching cooperation agreements, and v) high levels of trust among local fishermen is not a sufficient condition for resource sustainability, when trust in external rule makers and enforcers is low.     

The effects of group composition in a strategic environment: Evidence from a field experiment

Recent theoretical and empirical studies have explored the effect of group membership and identity on individual decision-making. This line of research highlights that economic models focusing on the individual as the sole entity in the decision-making environment potentially miss critical features. This study takes this literature in a new direction by overlaying a field experiment onto a setting where groups have arisen naturally. Our experimental laboratory is large open air markets, where we are able to examine the effects of group membership on seller׳s collusive behavior as measured by prices and surplus allocations. This permits us to explore strategic implications of group composition. Empirical results illustrate the importance of group composition on pricing decisions, and show that deviations from Nash equilibrium are crucially related to group membership.     

面向战略管理的国家实验室评估工作机制研究

当前,我国国家实验室建设处于重要战略机遇期,在诸多方面面临重大挑战,亟需面向战略管理需求加快完善评估工作机制。在梳理相关研究成果的基础上,首先分析国家实验室战略管理特点,论述评估在战略管理全流程中的职能作用;其次,比较中国国家重点实验室、美国能源部下属国家实验室和德国马克斯·普朗克学会(MPG)等大型科研机构评估实践,从战略管理视角讨论存在的差距和短板;最后,结合现有管理问题和国外经验,提出推动我国国家实验室评估工作的政策建议。     

协调博弈均衡随机稳定性的研究现状与展望

协调博弈均衡选择不仅依赖于博弈支付，更重要的是依赖于参与人之间复杂的行为预期过程，它是继囚徒困境博弈模型之后又一被广泛研究的博弈类型，本文基于随机稳定性思想，结合已有的研究文献，基于实验经济学的研究结果阐述了除博弈支付之外还有许多其他影响均衡稳定性的因素，在此基础上，进一步论述了相关理论模型的研究结论及其存在的缺陷，因此，要更现实地研究协调博弈均衡的稳定性，就需要加入除博弈支付之外的其他因素，最后，文章结合实验研究及理论模型提出了协调博弈均衡稳定性研究的思路与方向，为学者们进一步研究提供了新的视角。     

Behavioural responses to science-based eco-labelling: gold,silver, or bronze

This study uses unique data collected from field experiments to investigate consumer willingness to pay (WTP) for otherwise homogeneous commodities that provide different levels of environmental services. On average, individuals are willing to pay more for products that provide a higher level of ecosystem services. This effect is larger when the label contains symbols that explicitly differentiate the levels. The effect magnitude is further amplified when it contains brief information on the scientific basis for the levels. However, our results also suggest that the WTP premium for the superior product is smaller than the discount in WTP for the inferior product.     

Resolving Indeterminacy in Coordination Games: A New Approach Applied to a Pay-as-you-go Pension Scheme

This paper shows that when players ignore what outcome will emerge because of the presence of multiple equilibria, they can coordinate their expectations by forming an initial belief based on the principle of indifference followed by a process of reasoning that updates this belief. Since this procedure describes a natural way to form beliefs under indeterminacy, it is reasonable for every agent to conjecture that all the others form their beliefs according to the same logic. Exactly the fact that agents are aware that they form their beliefs following the same procedure allows them to successfully coordinate their expectations.      

Co-evolution of firms and strategic alliances: Theory and empirical evidence

This paper reviews the analogies of evolution and co-evolution within a business context. Specifically it examines some of the essential underlying assumptions of these theories including the unit of change, the unit of selection; the mechanism of selection, and the ability to change an organisational form. The usefulness of the application of theories of both evolution and co-evolution to explain firm behaviour is examined. Empirical evidence from the UK fresh produce industry is presented to illustrate that both firms and strategic alliances evolve, co-evolve and are subject to selection at individual, dyadic and group levels simultaneously.     

Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: the Brazilian constitution of 1988

Constitutional assemblies are a common feature of many democratic transitions. However, the goal of coordinating constitutional choice would seem nearly impossible when assemblies are comprised of highly fragmented and volatile political parties. Building on Knight’s bargaining model, this article argues that the main challenge to coordination in unstable party systems is the procedural disequilibrium that results from incomplete information over breakdown payoffs. The likelihood of compromise in such circumstances is a function of the ideologies that frame constitutional choice and inform coalition-building. Thus, unstable party systems are not chaotic, although they may be deeply conflict-laden. These issues are illustrated empirically via the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, which demonstrates the possibilities for a stable constitutional order emerging from a fragmented and volatile party system.

Ambient-based pollution mechanisms: A comparison of homogeneous and heterogeneous groups of emitters

Over the last two decades, ambient-based tax mechanisms have been offered as a potential solution to the problem of nonpoint source water pollution. Previous theoretical analyses suggest that the performance of ambient-based tax mechanisms does not depend on firm characteristics, such as size, whilst policy discussions advocate that such mechanisms are best suited for regulating relatively homogeneous firms. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we provide empirical evidence that the distribution of firm sizes does have a significant impact on observed group decision making and further that heterogeneity has the potential to generate both some relatively desirable outcomes as well as some outcomes that are not attractive. These results suggest that richer theoretical models that capture important strategic interactions and social preferences are needed to better describe laboratory behavior and, by extension, behavior in potential policy settings.     

国家实验室体系构建与制度创新：理论依据与实施机制

国家实验室是国家科技创新体系的重要组成部分,在国家发展战略中发挥着重要作用。目前,鲜有研究针对国家实验室体系构建进行理论阐述及体制机制探讨。以我国布局国家实验室体系为研究背景,探讨国家实验室体系构建的现实逻辑,结合国家创新系统理论、协同创新理论和合作博弈理论,剖析国家实验室制度创新的理论依据。结果表明：(1)国家创新系统理论是国家创新驱动发展战略的行动指南,也是推动国家实验室发展的重要依据;(2)协同创新理论强调各类创新要素协调合作与相互作用,有助于国家实验室体系实现整体效应最大化;(3)合作博弈理论探讨决策主体均衡问题,对于实验室与外部单位建立良好互信决策机制大有裨益。基于理论分析,围绕政策引导、运行成长、利益共享和风险分担4个方面体制机制创新,提出国家实验室体系构建的政策建议。未来,国家实验室体系研究需要进一步围绕基础理论和实证研究(驱动因素、运行成效和科学评价)等进行深入探讨。     

Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

We test a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games. Players first simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts to pay their counterparts for cooperating, and then play the induced game knowing these amounts. In our games, all payment pairs consistent with mutual cooperation in subgame-perfect equilibrium transform these games into coordination games, with both mutual cooperation and mutual defection as Nash equilibria in the second stage. When endogenous transfer payments are not permitted, cooperation is much less likely. Mutual cooperation is most likely when the (sufficient) payments are identical, and it is also substantially more likely with payment pairs that bring the mutual-cooperation payoffs closer together. Both the Fehr–Schmidt and Charness–Rabin models predict that transfers that make final payoffs closer are preferred; however, they do not explain why equal transfers are particularly effective. Transfers are also effective in sustaining cooperation even when they are imposed and not chosen.     

Laboratory Testbeds and Non-Market Valuation: The Case of Bidding Behavior in a Second-Price Auction with an Outside Option

Researchers now use the lab to examine the behavioral underpinnings of valuation before the field application which some argue has less experimental control. But lab valuation work raises its own set of concerns when it uses private goods to explore non-market valuation behavior because private goods have substitutes often unaccounted for in the lab. Therefore, the lab as a tool to testbed field valuation work may be limited. Herein we design an induced valuation experiment to explore bidding behavior in a second-price auction with an outside option that is a perfect substitute for the auction commodity. Theory predicts that rational bidders will consider the prices of outside options when formulating bidding strategies, and will reduce their bids whenever their resale value exceeds the price of the outside option. Our results suggest that bidders account for outside options when formulating bids with behavior following comparative static predictions. In addition, we provide evidence concerning hypothetical versus actual behavior with induced values – the data suggesting a hypothetical bias in the level of bids but not in bid shaving.     

Stock price responses to the eco-points programme for electrical household appliances: evidence from Japan

This article examines the Japanese government’s ‘Project for Green Consumer Electronics to Promote Business through the Use of Eco-points’ and its economic impact on consumer electronics firms’ stock prices. There has been little research on the economic effect of this project. In order to achieve our aim, we employ event study methodology. Our results show that stock prices responded positively to programme adoption, thereby indicating that the programme had positive effects on the related firms’ performance. The results also show that the programme’s economic effects gradually decreased over each subsequent programme extension. This probably occurred because the programme targeted durable goods, which consumers do not replace frequently.