Domestic and international strategic interactions in environment policy formation

Summary. In this paper, we establish the most possilbe general formulation of the technology governing carbon-gas emission, giving rise to global external diseconomies, and ty to explore into the strategic interactions,both domestic and international, when an individual country decides on the environmental policies. Through the comparison among emission taxes, quotas, and standard in the perfectly competitive private economies, we find that the first two policies are equivalent but they are different in effects by virtue of what we may call the tax-exemption effect of emission standards. Such a difference in the policy effect further affects the other country's welfare through the global externalities, amplified through whether the government can precommit to either the emission tax or the emission standard. Received: January 16, 2001; revised version: April 16, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The authors thank the valuable comments by an anonymous referee. Ministry of Education and Science for its financial support is also greatly acknowledged. Correspondence to:K. Kiyono     

Sunspot-like equilibria in an overlapping generations economy with strategic interactions

In this paper I analyze the effect of market uncertainty in an overlapping generations economy with strategic interactions among agents. I demonstrate the existence of sunspot-like equilibria, in which arbitrarily small amounts of intrinsic uncertainty in agents’ offers generate large fluctuations in equilibrium bids and prices. I would like to express my gratitude to Stephen Spear for his guidance during the realization of this project. I thank an anonymous referee for providing insightful comments and suggestions. I have benefited from comments by Alexander Elbittar, Cesar Guerrero, and Vivek Ramachandran.     

Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation

This paper presents a game theoretic morphological analysis of the strategic interactions between environmental enforcement authorities and polluting firms. The models explore the role of discretion that such authorities enjoy, either in deciding how to pursue environmental violations (investigative and prosecutorial discretion) or in judging them (judicial discretion). The purpose is to identify both the optimal firms’ behaviour in terms of compliance, and the enforcement authorities’ optimal strategies in terms of enforcement actions to undertake. Consistent with the setting of the game theoretic models, the role of the enforcement agencies in deterring firms from polluting is, then, empirically tested by means of laboratory experiments. Laboratory evidence on compliance behaviour of firms when faced with enforcement conditions predicted by the theoretical models set up is discussed for the different experimental treatments performed. Overall, we suggest that making environmental enforcement less predictable for the firms, and thus creating a degree of uncertainty for the violators, can actually encourage deterrence and, thus, improve compliance. Thus, a partly unpredictable enforcement strategy may generate more compliance than an environmental policy that is known with certainty in advance.     

A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure

For the assignment game, we analyze the following mechanism. Sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first. Then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy. Also, each buyer may report his or her indifferences (along with the previous buyers' indifferences) to the following buyer. The first phase determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. Reporting truthfully the indifferences is always a dominant strategy for the buyers. Moreover, when buyers state their true indifferences, the subgame perfect equilibria outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the maximum equilibrium price vector together with optimal matchings. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D78.     

价格促销为何只能带来人气而没有买气

价格促销是商家提高销售量的最常用手段之一,但是它虽能有效地吸引顾客(人气)却不能有效地提高销售量(买气),即能带来人气而不能创造买气。本文从决定购买行为的一个重要方面——购买坚定性入手,探索价格折扣幅度对消费者购买坚定性的影响机制。研究发现,价格折扣幅度是双刃剑:它一方面降低了消费者对未来降价的预期,提高了购买坚定性,而另一方面则提高消费者对商品质量的质疑,从而降低了购买坚定性。本研究对商业企业的促销管理具有启示作用。     

股份回购的法律探析

股份回购的禁止及其缓和不是法律理论推演的结果 ,法律政策上的考量才是主要的原因。如果在政策上有容许公司回购自己股份的必要———公司所要达到的目的以股份回购方法最为适当 ,则法律应作例外允许。同时法律必须对回购行为从决定到实施作出完善的规制 ,以使其可能产生的诸多弊端减致最小。这不仅需要公司法从公司内部权力制衡的角度对董事实施股份回购的方式、程序等作出规定 ,而且需要证券法从证券市场的宏观秩序的角度对于信息披露、防止内幕交易和操纵市场等方面作出规定     

Information and strategic voting

We theoretically and experimentally study voter behavior in a setting characterized by plurality rule and mandatory voting. Voters choose from three options. We are interested in the occurrence of strategic voting in an environment where Condorcet cycles may occur and focus on how information about the preference distribution affects strategic behavior. We also vary the relative importance of the second preferred option. Quantal response equilibrium analysis is used to analyze the game and derive predictions. Our results indeed show that strategic voting arises. Its extent depends on (i) information availability; (ii) the relative importance of the intermediate candidate; (iii) the electorate’s relative support for one’s preferred candidate; (iv) the relative position of the plurality-supported candidate in one’s preference ordering. Our results show that information serves as a coordination device where strategic voting does not harm the plurality-preferred candidate’s chances of winning.     

Self-confidence and strategic behavior

We suggest that overconfidence (conscious or unconscious) is motivated in part by strategic considerations, and test this experimentally. We find compelling supporting evidence in the behavior of participants who send and respond to others’ statements of confidence about how well they have scored on an IQ test. In two-player tournaments where the higher score wins, a player is very likely to choose to compete when he knows that his own stated confidence is higher than the other player’s, but rarely when the reverse is true. Consistent with this behavior, stated confidence is inflated by males when deterrence is strategically optimal and is instead deflated (by males and females) when luring (encouraging entry) is strategically optimal. This behavior is consistent with the equilibrium of the corresponding signaling game. Overconfident statements are used in environments that seem familiar, and we present evidence that suggests that this can occur on an unconscious level.     

消费者跨渠道购买行为研究评述与展望

消费者跨渠道购买行为是指多渠道零售环境下,消费者在购买决策过程的不同阶段运用不同渠道的行为。文章基于文献研究法,从定义、影响因素和企业管理策略三个方面对消费者跨渠道购买行为的国内外相关研究进行了梳理和评述,阐述了消费者跨渠道购买行为的定义,总结了消费者跨渠道购买行为的影响因素,归纳了企业对消费者跨渠道购买行为的管理策略并进行了评述,分析了未来研究方向,得出消费者跨渠道购买行为可以细分为消费者跨渠道搭便车行为和消费者跨渠道保留行为,研究结果为多渠道零售企业进行渠道设计和多渠道顾客管理提供了决策参考。     

我国网络团购发展现状及存在的问题

团购作为一种新兴的电子商务模式,因低价、自由,具有个性化等优势已成为最流行的一种购物形式。随着网络团购火爆的同时,因缺乏行业规范,欺诈、维权难等问题频遭团友投诉,给网络团购的健康发展造成很大的威胁。文章分析了我国网络团购发展现状,阐述了我国网络团购中存在的主要问题,并提出了相应的发展对策。     

发电设备产业应对发展新机遇

作为我国装备工业的一个重要门类,发电设备产业是我国国民经济的支柱产业,是我国综合国力和制造业国际竞争能力的集中体现。在过去50年中,尤其是80年代以来,依靠国家的支持,在改革开放的大环境以及国内外市场竞争的推动下,我国发电设备产业取得了长足发展,初步具备了一定的国际     

Cross-border mergers and strategic alliances

This paper develops a model with distribution costs to study firm cooperation in forming strategic alliances and mergers, under different types of foreign market entry modes, that is, export or foreign direct investment (FDI). Under both export and FDI, we find that cross-border alliances (mergers) dominate domestic alliances (mergers); and cross-border alliances and mergers are preferred to independence if and only if distribution cost is high. Under export, cross-border alliances are chosen in equilibrium if distribution cost is high. Under FDI and with high distribution cost, cross-border alliances (mergers) are chosen in equilibrium if plant setup cost is low (high).     

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games.     

Environmental taxes and strategic delegation

This paper analyzes a managerial delegation model in which the government chooses an environmental tax to control environmental damage. By giving the managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we show that firm owners have to pay a higher environmental tax and both environmental damage and social welfare increase compared to the profit-maximization case. Financial support from UPV (Subvención a grupos, 2001), UPV (HB-8238/2000) and MEC (BEC 2000-0301) is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank A. Saracho and two referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider price-setting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004) [4]).     

On-the-job search and strategic bargaining

This paper studies wage bargaining in a simple economy in which both employed and unemployed workers search for better jobs. The axiomatic Nash bargaining solution and standard strategic bargaining solutions are inapplicable because the set of feasible payoffs is nonconvex. I instead develop a strategic model of wage bargaining between a single worker and firm that is applicable to such an environment. I show that if workers and firms are homogeneous, there are market equilibria with a continuous wage distribution in which identical firms bargain to different wages, each of which is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game. If firms are heterogeneous, I characterize market equilibria in which more productive firms pay higher wages. I compare the quantitative predictions of this model with Burdett and Mortensen's [1998. Wage differentials, employer size and unemployment. International Economic Review 39, 257-273.] wage posting model and argue that the bargaining model is theoretically more appealing along important dimensions.     

浅析我国企业并购存在的问题及其对策

企业并购是实现企业超常规发展的一种重要方式 ,也是我国企业加入WTO后必然面临的机遇和挑战。但是 ,由于我国企业并购活动的不规范性 ,还存在许多问题。本文针对我国企业过程中存在的问题进行论述 ,希望能够为我国企业并购活动的进一步完善提供借鉴。