延迟退休会提高社会福利水平吗?

文章基于延迟退休可能带来就业挤出和闲暇损失的现实背景,在动态一般均衡世代交叠模型框架下通过引入异质性消费者并根据中国经济校准主要参数,在控制延迟退休对中国劳动力市场冲击影响的基础上,模拟分析了延迟退休政策对企业职工福利水平的长期影响。研究分析表明：(1)无论是采用保持现有的缴费率不变的政策方式还是保持养老金待遇不变的政策方式,延迟退休均能提高城镇企业职工的社会福利水平———第一种政策会增加社会福利3.66%,第二种政策会增加社会福利1.1%;在保持养老保险缴费率不变的情况下,从长期看,延迟退休5年会使社会福利最大化。(2)最优的退休年龄与劳动力市场状态息息相关,如果当前就业形势严峻,最优退休年龄需要相应降低。     

Temporary Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance: Is Experience Rating Desirable?

Abstract. This paper explores how the introduction of an experience-rated system of unemployment insurance affects employment and welfare in a model where implicit contracts between firms and workers give rise to wage rigidities and unemployment. In the literature, it has been argued that experience-rated systems of unemployment insurance may reduce long-term employment as firms anticipate the higher costs of layoffs implied by experience rating. Our analysis shows that the introduction of experience rating may increase or decrease long-term employment but it unambiguously raises welfare.     

Legal competition, political process and irreversible investment decisions

We compare the effects of competition for the design of labor laws in an environment characterized by irreversible investments in human and physical capital. We compare autarky with two-country cases, assuming that capital is mobile and labor immobile. We distinguish two cases. In the first, the political system is free from capture, while in the second, we examine the case where labor captures the institutional design problem. We find that in the former case legal competition reduces welfare while in the latter it improves the overall outcome.     

MEDICAID AND THE LABOR SUPPLY OF SINGLE MOTHERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM

The Medicaid expansions and health insurance subsidies of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) change work incentives for single mothers. To evaluate the employment effects of these policies ex ante, I estimate a model of labor supply and health insurance choice exploiting variation in pre‐ACA Medicaid policies. Simulations show that single mothers increase their labor supply at the extensive and intensive margin by 12% and 7%, respectively, uninsurance rates decline by up to 40%, and an average family's welfare improves by 1,600 dollars per year. Health insurance subsidies and not Medicaid expansions mostly drive these effects.     

Welfare and Macroeconomic Effects of the German Pension Acts of 1992 and 1999: A Dynamic CGE Study

The German Pension Act of 1992 raises the mandatory retirement age while the Act of 1999 adjusts pension benefits to demographic changes. To examine welfare and macroeconomic effects of these reform schemes, we have carried out a dynamic CGE study. The model used is an enlarged version of the Auerbach–Kotlikoff model with endogenous retirement decisions, unemployment, age-dependent rates of unemployment, health, and long-term care insurance. The simulation is performed in two stages: first, the effects of the population decline in Germany are computed ignoring the reforms and, second, the effects of the reform schemes are examined and compared with the benchmark case. The results suggest that the Act of 1992 implies welfare gains while suspending the Act of 1999 induces welfare losses.     

Taxation,insurance, and precautionary labor

We examine optimal taxation and social insurance with adverse selection in competitive insurance markets. In a previous literature, it has been shown that, with perfect insurance markets, social insurance improves welfare since it is able to redistribute without creating distortions. This result has been taken as robust to the introduction of adverse selection as this would only provide additional justifications for social insurance. We show, however, that adverse selection can weaken the case for social insurance compared to a situation with perfect markets. Whenever social insurance mitigates private underinsurance, it also causes welfare-reducing effects by decreasing precautionary labor supply and hence tax revenue. In addition, adverse selection may reduce the redistributive potential of social insurance. We illustrate our general results using different equilibrium concepts for the insurance market. Notably, we derive conditions under which a complete renunciation of social insurance is optimal and the government only relies on income taxation to achieve its redistributive objectives.     

Understanding the welfare effects of unemployment insurance policy in general equilibrium

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of unemployment insurance reforms in a general equilibrium incomplete market model. In particular, it decomposes the total welfare effect for each individual into different factors. I consider a model where the consumers face an uninsurable unemployment risk, can save in an interest-bearing asset, and are subject to a borrowing constraint. The labor market is modeled using a Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides style search and matching model. The decomposition exercises reveal how each factor contributes to the heterogeneity of welfare effects among different consumers.     

Product Quality,Informality, and Child Labor

This paper studies how the interactions between the structure of product demand and relative wages affect the incidence of child labor. One sector (the agrarian) produces a homogeneous good, and the other (the modern) produces a vertically differentiated product. The modern sector is segmented according to quality: high‐quality varieties are produced by formal firms which employ only adult labor, whereas low‐quality varieties are produced by informal firms which employ child labor as well. Differences in tastes and incomes across households generate demand for both high‐quality and low‐quality varieties. Stricter enforcement of child‐labor regulations and increases in minimum wages can have beneficial effects regarding the incidence of child labor and the size of the formal sector. However, since these policies have undesirable welfare effects among segments of wage‐earning households, they may not garner the necessary political support.     

Constrained Inefficiency and Optimal Taxation with Uninsurable Risks

When individuals' labor and capital income are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, should capital and labor be taxed, and if so how? In a two‐period general equilibrium model with production, we derive a decomposition formula of the welfare effects of these taxes into insurance and distribution effects. This allows us to determine how the sign of the optimal taxes on capital and labor depend on the nature of the shocks and the degree of heterogeneity among consumers' income, as well as on the way in which the tax revenue is used to provide lump‐sum transfers to consumers. When shocks affect primarily labor income and heterogeneity is small, the optimal tax on capital is positive. However, in other cases a negative tax on capital is welfare‐improving.     

Quantitative analysis of health insurance reform: Separating regulation from redistribution

Two key components of the recent U.S. health reform are a new regulation of the individual health insurance market and an increase in income redistribution in the economy. Which component contributes more to the welfare outcome of the reform? We address this question by constructing a general equilibrium life-cycle model that incorporates both medical expenses and labor income risks. We replicate the key features of the current health insurance system in the U.S. and calibrate the model using the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey dataset. We find that the reform decreases the number of uninsured more than twice and generates substantial welfare gains. These welfare gains mostly come from the redistributive measures embedded in the reform, rather than from the regulatory changes.     

中国劳资关系的城乡户籍差异

本文利用最近的企业和农民工调查数据探讨了劳资关系城乡户籍差异问题。城乡工人在劳资关系各方面的巨大差异源于两个方面 :一是人力资本水平差异和就业企业的差异 ;二是农民工受到的户籍歧视。研究结果发现 ,前者解释了两类工人劳资关系差异的 70 %— 80 % ,说明人力资本和企业状况是决定工人待遇的主要因素 ;后者解释了两类工人劳资关系差异的 2 0 %— 3 0 % ,户籍歧视所造成的差距同样是不容忽视的。除劳动合同方面外 ,农民工在工资、养老保险、医疗保险、失业保险以及工会参与等方面均遭到户籍歧视。研究结果暗示仅仅关注工资收入的城乡歧视是不够的 ,同时也为更全面的劳动力市场校正政策提供了经验支持     

Closing the gap: The employment and unemployment effects of minimum wage policy in Puerto Rico

This paper examines the dynamic effect of minimum wage policy on employment and unemployment using multivariate time series techniques. The particular minimum wage policy being considered occurred in Puerto Rico in 1974 when it was decided to close the minimum wage gap between the island and the United States incrementally by 1980. Multivariate transfer functions are specified with the intent of distinguishing between minimum wage policy effects and structural changes brought about by the post-1974 recessions. The results suggest that minimum wage policy gave rise to more significant unemployment than disemployment effects. The pattern of labor mobility supports that suggested by the development literature in which labor flows from uncovered to covered sectors. However, given the structure of welfare programs on the island, it is likely that flows from the covered to the non-market sector also took place.     

非农就业、母亲照料与儿童健康——来自中国乡村的证据

中国农村女性参与非农就业的比例显著提高,对于增进家庭收入、减少贫困起到了积极的作用。但从女性在家庭中的双重身份——挣取收入者和照看孩子的主要人员出发,其劳动模式和供给行为的改变对于下一代福利的影响和人力资本的积累所起到的作用却是不确定的。本文通过将农村地区妇女的劳动供给状况进行区分,就其劳动参与行为对孩童健康状况的影响进行了探讨。在控制其他因素的情况下,母亲额外单位的劳动时间的增加对孩子的健康状况具有显著的负向影响,且同样的母亲非农劳动时间的增加对于孩童健康的负面影响大于农业劳动时间增加的影响程度,而母亲收入增加对孩子健康状况具有显著的正向影响;边际效果分析表明母亲收入增加对孩子健康的正向影响难以抵销劳动时间增加所带来的负面效果。孩子性别不同所受到的影响亦不同,女童相对而言处于健康的劣势地位。虽然母亲的劳动供给有助于缩小孩子营养状况的性别差距,但却是以所有儿童的健康状况下降为代价的。研究结果预期具有较强的政策含义。     

A simulation-based welfare loss calculation for labor taxes with piecewise-linear budgets

Graduated income tax rates and transfer programs create piecewise-linear budget constraints that consist of budget segments and kink points. With any change in these tax rules, each individual may switch between a kink point and a budget segment, between two budget segments, or between two kink points. With errors in the estimated labor supply equation, the new choice is uncertain, and so the welfare effects of a tax change are uncertain. We propose a simulation-based method to compute expected welfare effects that is easy to implement and that fully accounts for uncertainties about choices around kink points. Our method also provides information about expected changes in working hours.     

Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium*

In this paper we introduce a general equilibrium model of search unemployment that incorporates absence from work as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism is driven by random shocks to the value of leisure that are private information to the workers. Firms maximize profits while recognizing that the compensation package may affect the queue of job applicants and the absence rate. The analysis provides results concerning the effects of social insurance benefits and other determinants of workers' and firms' behavior. The normative analysis identifies externalities associated with firm‐provided sick pay and examines the welfare implications of alternative policies.     

Idiosyncratic Risk in the United States and Sweden: Is There a Role for Government Insurance?

We examine the effects of government redistribution schemes in an economy where agents are subject to uninsurable, individual specific productivity risk. In particular, we consider the trade-off between positive insurance effects and negative distortions on labor supply and saving. We parameterize the model by estimating productivity processes on Swedish and U.S. data. The estimation results show that agents in the United States are subject to more idiosyncratic risk than agents in Sweden. Although distortions are significant, the welfare benefits of government redistribution and insurance systems can be substantial. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E20, H21.     

Do international labor standards contribute to the persistence of the child-labor problem?

In recent years, a number of governments and consumer groups in rich countries have tried to discourage the use of child-labor in poor countries through measures such as product boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards. The purported objective of such measures is to reduce the incidence of child-labor in developing countries and thereby improve children’s welfare. In this paper, we examine the effects of such policies from a political-economy perspective. We show that these types of international action on child-labor tend to lower domestic political support within developing countries for banning child-labor. Hence, international labor standards and product boycotts may delay the ultimate eradication of child-labor.     

Productivity growth and welfare in a model of allocative inefficiency

We develop a model of learning-by-doing in human capital formation in the presence of allocative inefficiencies. The inefficiencies are a result of lobbying by firms to establish, or prevent, barriers to the perfectly competitive allocation of factors of production (labor). It is shown that lobbying may lead to a static welfare loss depending upon the elasticity of substitution between goods, and the relative lobbying power of firms. Further, productivity growth, via learning by doing, changes the relative lobbying power over time. This may magnify or diminish the static welfare loss in the long-run depending on the level of initial misallocation. Therefore, differences in initial lobbying power and rate of productivity growth between sectors determine the long-run effects of lobbying.     

Wage indexation,migration, and unemployment

This article sets up a two-goods model with wage indexation and migrants. A dual labor market is introduced where the domestic workers receive an indexed wage while migrants receive a market-determined wage. The traded sector may be assumed to be unionized while the non-traded goods sector is non-unionized giving rise to flexible wages. This provides an example of segmentation and wage indexation. The wage indexation creates unemployment in the traded sector and the segmentation allows this unemployment to persist. The main results obtained are: sector-specific migration of labor may raise domestic welfare, while with capital accumulation such migration necessarily raises the relative price of the non-traded goods, leading to structural adjustment.