Debt financing,first-mover advantage,and vertical product differentiation

This paper examines the impact of the strategic use of debt financing as a commitment device, in a vertically differentiated duopoly with demand uncertainty. We consider various possible game sequences for two firms with asymmetric financial structures to enter the market. The results show that (i) having access to external debt does not necessarily promote the firm to provide a higher quality product; (ii) strategic debt improves the degree of product differentiation and benefits both firms; and (iii) a firm's optimal debt level is positively related to the first-mover advantage of introducing its product to the market.     

Revisiting Oligopolistic Reaction: Are Decisions on Foreign Direct Investment Strategic Complements?

Knickerbocker (1973) introduced the notion of oligopolistic reaction to explain why firms follow rivals into foreign markets. We develop a model that incorporates central features of Knickerbocker's story—oligopoly, uncertainty, and risk aversion—to establish the conditions required to generate follow-the-leader behavior. We find that rival foreign investment will make risk-neutral firms less inclined to move abroad once its rivals have done so. We show that Knickerbocker's prediction relies on risk aversion and derive an expression for the minimum amount of risk aversion needed to generate oligopolistic reaction.     

Co-development ventures: Optimal time of entry and profit-sharing

We find the optimal time for entering a joint venture by two firms, and the optimal linear contract for sharing the profits. We consider risk-sharing, timing-incentive and asymmetric decisions contract designs. If the firms are risk-neutral and the cash payments are allowed, all three designs are equivalent. With risk aversion, the optimal contract parameters may vary significantly across the three designs and across varying levels of risk aversion. We also analyze a dataset of joint biomedical ventures, in which, in agreement with our theoretical predictions, both royalty and cash payments are mostly increasing in the smaller firm's experience, and the time of entry happens sooner for more experienced small firms.     

Attitude towards risk,uncertainty, and fixed investment

We explore the relevance of the risk attitude of managers to the investment-uncertainty relation. Higher moments of the distribution of net profits are used to measure the risk premium of the firm, from which we derive a proxy for the risk aversion of managers. Using an unbalanced panel of Dutch listed firms, we find that in general a low degree of risk aversion coincides with a positive impact of demand uncertainty on investment. More specifically, we find that risk-averse firms respond to demand uncertainty by cutting investment, while the investment undertaken by risk-taking firms responds to demand uncertainty positively.     

Strategic Product Choiceand Niche Markets

This paper presents a model of strategic product choice when consumer preferences combine features of both horizontal and vertical product differentiation. Consumers disagree on what amount of a "special" characteristic makes for a better product, but those who prefer more of this attribute are willing to pay more for it. Within this demand structure, I examine the advantages of first-mover firms. I find that such firms typically do best in markets where the maximum degree of product differentiation is limited by preferences rather than technology. These are "niche markets". Follower firms do better in markets in which the range of preferences is broad relative to the span of feasible goods.     

Cournot outcomes under Bertrand–Edgeworth competition with demand uncertainty

We provide new results for two-stage games in which firms make capacity investments when demand is uncertain, then, when demand is realized, compete in prices. We consider games with demand rationing schemes ranging from efficient to proportional rationing. In all cases, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome coinciding with the outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty if and only if (i) the fluctuation in absolute market size is small relative to the cost of capacity, or (ii) uncertainty is such that with high probability the market demand is very large and with the remaining probability the market demand is extremely small. Otherwise, equilibria involve mixed strategies. Further, we show under efficient rationing that condition (i) is sufficient for the unique equilibrium outcome to be an equilibrium outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty.     

There is no smoke without a fire: The effect of government interventions in less advanced economies

The lack of liquidity in the interbank market during the crisis of 2007–2011 led governments to impose different policies to rescue their countries’ banking sectors. While in advanced countries interventions in the banking sector were mostly related to a lack of liquidity and significant asymmetric information regarding counterparty risk, in many less advanced countries they had a precautionary motive. In our article, we investigate the effectiveness of policy interventions on healthy banking markets, with possible negative spill-over effects from other countries. To this extent, we use an event study methodology to test the effect of liquidity and financial sector policy announcements on interbank spread changes in six Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries over the period between 2007 and 2011. We find that standard liquidity interventions did not provide effective stabilization. In fact, our evidence suggests that the spread widened after their announcement, probably as a result of the negative signal and consequently increased risk aversion of banks. In such situations, regulators should consider policy instruments that aim to decrease uncertainty in the market.     

Pay to Switch or Pay to Stay: Preference-Based Price Discrimination in Markets with Switching Costs

In many markets, firms can price discriminate between their own customers and their rivals' customers, charging one price to consumers who prefer their own product and another price to consumers who prefer a rival's product. We find that when demand is symmetric, charging a lower price to a rival's customers is always optimal. When demand is asymmetric, however, it may be more profitable to charge a lower price to one's own customers. Surprisingly, price discrimination can lead to lower prices to all consumers, not only to the group that is more elastic, but also to the less elastic group.     

Corporate risk management and asymmetric information

We discuss the effect of information on corporate risk management decisions when the information is asymmetric between the insider and the market. We suggest an explanation for previous contradiction between existing theories and empirical findings, which state that fewer small firms choose to hedge. We consider two different scenarios of information revelation to the market, and find hedging cost is not the main reason preventing firms from hedging. Rather asymmetric information plays the decisive role in a firm's risk management policy. One of the empirical implications we find is that cash flows with high variances may discourage firms from hedging even when they face high financial distress costs.     

Entrepreneurial optimism and creative destruction

Using textual analysis of annual reports of US-listed firms, we provide empirical evidence that uncertainty (rather than risk) and optimism are distinctive characteristics of high-impact entrepreneurial firms (recently listed firms) relative to old incumbent firms. We construct an entrepreneurial entry predation model with uncertainty based on this evidence. We show that optimistic entrepreneurs may enter markets that otherwise would be blocked from entry by incumbents’ predatory threats. Thus entrepreneurial optimism may be to the benefit of consumers. Entrepreneurial optimism can also create a strategic advantage for entrepreneurs since incumbents may react by being less aggressive in product market interactions, which will benefit the profitability of the entrepreneur’s venture and consumers via lower prices.     

Information provision and consumer search behavior for products with asymmetric uncertainty

When selling multiple products with asymmetric uncertainty, should the seller disclose product information so that customers do not have to incur any cost to resolve their uncertainties; if so, which product should the seller choose? To address these questions, we consider a monopolist selling two substitutable products to a group of consumers. Each consumer has asymmetric uncertainty regarding the two products. A total of four different information provision structures are considered based on whether the seller discloses information about each product with the aim of determining which strategy provides the seller with the greatest revenue. We derive several interesting results. First, the optimal information provision strategy depends on the magnitude of uncertainty in relation to the product with lower uncertainty. Specifically, if the uncertainty regarding the product with lower uncertainty is sufficiently small, it is optimal for the seller to provide information about the product with higher uncertainty, otherwise, the seller should provide information about both products. Second, when only one product's information should be revealed, it is optimal for the seller to choose the product with higher uncertainty and charge a higher price. Third, withholding information on both products is never optimal for the seller. Finally, our main model is extended by examining the Mean-Preserving Spread setting, and the robustness of our main results is confirmed. Furthermore, we examine the situation in which a monopolist sells a single product with two main attributes. We find that each of the four information provision strategies can be optimal under various scenarios.     

Heterogeneous players in a Cournot model with differentiated products

In this article, we analyse a duopolistic Cournotian game with firms producing differentiated goods, marginal costs are constant and demand functions are microfounded. We consider firms adopting different decisional mechanisms which are based on a reduced degree of rationality. In particular, we assume that a firm adopts the local monopolistic approximation approach, while the rival adjusts its output level according to the gradient rule. We provide conditions for the stability of the Nash equilibrium and investigate some bifurcation scenarios as parameters vary. The main finding of the article is that both a high level and a low level in goods differentiation may have a destabilising role in the system.     

Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods

This paper contains a theoretical exploration of the potential effects of an information-supplying activist on a market for credence goods. Using a non-cooperative game-theoretic model with incomplete information, we find that such an activist can alter the decisions of firms and consumers and enhance the social welfare of market exchange. We also find that an activist can support equilibria in which firms differentiate their products on some credence characteristic even though this characteristic remains unknown to the consumer both prior and subsequent to consumption. In general, our analysis has several implications for the study of private collective action in markets.     

Evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms

In this paper we study an oligopoly market where profit-maximizing firms and socially concerned firms compete in quantities. Confronting remarks by Milton Friedman and Gary Becker, we are using an evolutionary setting to investigate the endogenous choice of the proper objective of business firms and the influence of product differentiation on the long run survival of firms which pursue non-profit motives. We find that firms which consider a combination of profit and consumer welfare can indeed have larger market shares and profits than their profit-maximizing rivals. One insight is that it might pay off for shareholders to consider stakeholder welfare, but that the level of social concern should not be too high. Based on a strategy׳s profitability, we consider asynchronous evolutionary updating with firms selecting Nash quantities or choosing best replies to the expected market quantity. Here we observe that the consumers׳ willingness to pay a price premium for products is crucial for the long run survival of socially concerned firms. Depending on the degrees of product differentiation and social concern, long run outcomes consist either of both types of firms or only one type of firm. If the firms׳ propensity to switch between a social or a profit-maximizing strategy is sufficiently large, steady states are unstable and even complicated dynamics can occur.     

Global Engagement and Returns Volatility

This paper finds that a greater reliance on foreign market sales increases the volatility of firms’ stock returns, using high‐frequency data for publicly listed Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 2000–10. The two margins of global engagement we consider, namely, exports and sales via foreign affiliates (horizontal foreign direct investment), have both a positive and economically significant effect on firm‐level volatility. We find, however, that increasing the intensity of sales through foreign affiliates has a stronger effect on volatility than a similar change in export intensity. We also uncover evidence consistent with the notion that firms’ need to use external finance to cover the substantial costs involved in reaching foreign consumers can be an important channel through which firms’ participation in international markets increases their exposure to economic uncertainty.     

Acquisitions and Real Options: The Greenfield Alternative

Although acquisitions are a popular way to enter new markets, empirical evidence tends to indicate few benefits accrue to acquiring firms. This might be the case because firms use acquisitions when they should be employing an alternative mode of expansion. Applying real options theory to this issue, we suggest that greenfield start‐up ventures provide a real option alternative to acquisitions for firms establishing new international subsidiary units. To test this notion we examine a sample of Western European firms entering the emerging economies of Eastern Europe. The evidence suggests that acquisitions are a good choice only when firms enter markets containing low demand uncertainty and when these firms possess acquisition‐based strategic flexibility. Overall, our analysis indicates that greenfield ventures appear to provide firms with a real option when making the acquisition decision.     

Regulatory risk, market uncertainties, and firm financing choices: Evidence from U.S. Electricity Market Restructuring

Based on the universe of rate-regulated electric utilities in the U.S., we examine why firms alter their financing decisions when transitioning from a regulated to a competitive market regime. We find that the significant increase in regulatory risk after the passage of the Energy Policy Act, state-level restructuring legislations, and divestiture policies have reduced leverage by 15 percent. Policies that encouraged competition, and hence increased market uncertainty, lowered leverage by another 13 percent on average. The ability to exercise market power allowed some firms to counter this competitive threat. In aggregate, regulatory risk and market uncertainty variables reduce leverage between 24.6 and 26.7 percent. We also confirm findings in the literature that firms with higher profitability and higher asset growth have lower leverage, and those with more tangible assets are more levered. Firms with greater access to internal capital markets and those with a footloose customer segment use less debt, while those actively involved in trading power in the wholesale market use more debt.     

Differentiated Duopoly with Asymmetric Costs

In this paper, we compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with linear demand and cost functions. We extend the Singh and Vives (1984) model by allowing for a wider range of cost and demand (product quality) asymmetry between firms. Focusing on the case of substitute goods, we show that both the efficient firm's profits and industry profits are higher under Bertrand competition when asymmetry is strong and/or products are weakly differentiated. Therefore, Singh and Vives's ranking of profits between the two modes of competition is reversed in a sizeable portion of the relevant parameter space. Contrary to the standard result with symmetric firms, we also show that product differentiation can reduce both the efficient firm's and industry profits, implying that a local incentive towards less differentiation may arise.     

Real options game analysis of sleeping patents

Using the real options game approach, we analyze the two-stage preemptive patent-investment race between an incumbent and a challenger (new entrant) in a product market with profit flow uncertainty. The challenger can gain entry into the monopolized product market dominated by the incumbent by patenting related technologies for a substitute product. To maintain its monopolized advantage, the incumbent has an incentive to block challenger’s entry by patenting the substitute product before the challenger. Either firm can pay an upfront fee to gain an immediate acquisition of the patent and subsequently holding the real option to develop the new substitute product. Under our simplified real options game model, there is no potential patent litgation risk. Also, the costs of holding the patent, like the payment of annual fees, are taken to be zero. We provide a full characterization of the optimal strategies adopted by the incumbent and challenger firm in this asymmetric patent-investment race. In particular, we examine the phenomena of sleeping patent, where the patented product is not launched immediately into the product market.     

Mergers with Product Market Risk

This paper studies the causes and the consequences of horizontal mergers among risk-averse firms. The amount of diversification depends on the allocation of shares among the merging firms, with a direct risk-sharing effect and an indirect strategic effect. If firms compete in quantities, consolidation makes firms more aggressive. Mergers involving few firms are then profitable with a relatively low level of risk aversion. With strong enough risk aversion, mergers reduce prices and improve social welfare. If firms instead compete in prices, consumers do not benefit from mergers in markets with demand uncertainty, but can easily benefit with cost uncertainty.