后危机时代美欧货币政策的成效分析与诱因比较

美国金融海啸与欧元区主权债务危机的爆发推动了非传统货币政策工具的运用,改变了发达国家对危机前货币政策的共识。央行资产负债表变动和前瞻性指引成了危机期间美欧频繁使用的量化宽松政策,这些政策使美国从金融海啸中走出来并重拾经济复兴之路。但欧元区主权债务危机的反复爆发和传染表明,这些政策要充分发挥作用尚需要超国家的欧洲政治经济机构的整合。美国的成功取决于美国联邦政府和货币机构作为一个整体,愿意共同合作并做出对国家最有利的事情,而且共同服从国家利益的观念得到社会普遍的认可和尊重。欧元区走不出危机泥潭、经济继续衰退主要源于：一是危机解决的公共品属性诱发了成员国的集体行动和道德风险;二是货币政策引发的利益冲突与强权政治的影响;三是作为一个松散的联邦,当共同面对危机问题时,缺乏一个超国家的权威政府,能够在促进公共利益上做出正确的政策决策。     

论我国频繁使用存款准备金政策的动因--对传统金融理论的新解释

我国中央银行频繁运用存款准备金政策进行货币政策操作,这一迥异于传统金融理论做法的背后,是对我国特殊的经济金融环境的适应性实践。对这一货币政策工具运用实践,既要考虑政策效果和央行可控性,也要对货币政策实施成本作出理性选择,还需结合我国经济金融环境进行适应性考量。因此,我们应基于货币政策工具实施效果与当时当地货币政策实施条件来决定货币政策工具的使用方式。     

发达国家中央银行职能的理论与实践探讨

金融危机以来,主要发达国家的中央银行持续实施量化宽松政策,这在一定程度上模糊了货币政策与财政政策的界限,引起经济学界关于中央银行独立性问题的讨论。文章分析了中央银行独立性的概念和理论,回顾了主要发达国家量化宽松政策的实施过程,指出随着世界经济的逐步恢复与量化宽松政策的逐步退出,理顺政府与中央银行关系、强化中央银行的独立性对于保持经济长期稳定增长具有重要意义。     

The Impact of Owner’s Identity on Banks’ Capital Adequacy and Liquidity Risk

In this article, we test the potential impact of the owner’s identity on banks’ capital adequacy and liquidity risk as defined by the Basel III regulatory framework. Using a unique dataset on a sample of banks domiciled in the Middle East and North Africa region, we find that the ownership structure is an important driver of banks’ regulatory capital and liquidity risk. Private and foreign investors exhibit a stronger preference for higher levels of capital, whereas the impact of government ownership on banks’ risk remains inconclusive. Moreover, privately-owned banks evidenced lower levels of liquidity risk compared to the other groups during the last financial crisis because of tighter budget constraints and more compelling liquidity needs.     

差别存款准备金率制度的经济效应及历史定位

本文通过对国内外差别存款准备金率制度的介绍,分析了在我国实施该项制度的效应和历史地位,得出以下结论:(1)存款准备金率是中央银行调节货币供应总量的工具,也是促进金融机构稳健运行、防范支付风险的有效手段;(2)该项制度是货币政策与银行监管协调配合的尝试,在具体实施过程中,货币政策和银行监管的配合机制将会受到考验;(3)该项制度的近期效应影响有限,重在对存款类金融机构的中长期效应,特别是对商业银行无理性放贷行为进行有效约束;(4)差别存款准备金率政策是基于中国经济金融环境的一项制度创新,属于一种过渡性的措施.     

What drives the liquidity of sovereign bonds when markets are under stress? An assessment of the new Basel 3 rules on bank liquid assets

The new rules on bank liquidity set by the Basel Committee require banks to hold high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs) against future cash outflows in periods of market stress. Domestic government bonds are considered to be HQLAs. To assess the appropriateness of this rule, we investigate the liquidity of European government bonds in ordinary times and in periods of market turmoil. We find that the effect of adverse market conditions on liquidity strongly depends on individual bond’s characteristics. Our evidence argues for rules on HQLAs that should constrain the eligibility of government bonds depending on their characteristics (primarily, duration and rating).     

Did the Reserve Requirement Increases of 1936–37 Reduce Bank Lending? Evidence from a Quasi‐Experiment

We analyze the impact of contractionary monetary policy through increases in reserve requirements on bank lending. We compare the lending behavior of banks that were subject to the requirement increases in 1936–37, Federal Reserve member banks, to a group of banks that were not subject to the reserve increase, Federal Reserve nonmember banks. After implementing the difference‐in‐difference estimators, we find that the increases in reserve requirements did not create financing constraints for member banks and lead them to reduce lending. Therefore, the actions of the Federal Reserve concerning the required reserve ratios cannot be blamed for instigating the economic downturn of 1937–38.     

A Model of Monetary Policy Shocks for Financial Crises and Normal Conditions

Deteriorating economic conditions in late 2008 led the Federal Reserve to lower the target federal funds rate to near zero, inject liquidity through novel facilities, and engage in large‐scale asset purchases. The combination of conventional and unconventional policy measures prevents using the effective federal funds rate to assess the effects of monetary policy beyond 2008. We employ a broad monetary aggregate to elicit the effects of monetary policy shocks both before and after 2008. Our estimates align well with major changes in the Fed's asset purchase programs and yield responses that are free from price, output, and liquidity puzzles that plague other approaches.