Debt enforcement,investment, and risk taking across countries

We argue that the prospect of an imperfect enforcement of debt contracts in default reduces shareholder–debtholder conflicts and induces leveraged firms to invest more and take on less risk as they approach financial distress. To test these predictions, we use a large panel of firms in 41 countries with heterogeneous debt enforcement characteristics. Consistent with our model, we find that the relation between debt enforcement and firms’ investment and risk depends on the firm-specific probability of default. A differences-in-differences analysis of firms’ investment and risk taking in response to bankruptcy reforms that make debt more renegotiable confirms the cross-country evidence.     

Sources of Financing,Profitability and Productivity: First Evidence from Matched Firms

This paper contributes to the literature on capital structure and firm performance. Using firm‐level data covering over 11,000 firms from 47 countries over a recent period of 1997‐2007, we address the effect of different sources of financing on corporate performance, employing a matching process, which allows an adequate `like‐for‐like’ comparison between high and low level of financing by firms. Robust to different matching estimators, the main findings are consistent with the theories of capital structure, in that firms with high debt‐to‐equity ratio tend to have lower returns to shareholders (profitability) and lower internal efficiency (productivity). The results become more robust when we separate the firms into advanced and emerging country‐groups or countries with high/low levels of financial development. Given the lower level of leverage below 50% on average in emerging markets (or in countries with lower level of financial reforms), firms in these economies face lower risk of financial distress and thereby less adverse effect on firm profitability and productivity, relative to their counterparts in advanced economies. We also find that retained earnings and equity financing improve performance, while debt financing by firms particularly in the form of bank loans leads to lower performance, although not so in the case of debt raised through issuing bonds.     

Leverage change,debt overhang,and stock prices

We document a significant and negative effect of the change in a firm's leverage ratio on its stock prices. We find that the negative effect is stronger for firms that have higher leverage ratios, higher likelihood of default, and face more severe financial constraints. Moreover, firms with an increase in leverage ratio tend to have less future investment. These findings are consistent with Myers' (1977) debt overhang theory that an increase in leverage may lead to future underinvestment, thus reducing a firm's value.     

Investment,leverage and political risk: Evidence from project-level FDI

Does capital structure influence firms' FDI capital expenditure decisions into countries with varying degrees of political risk? We explore this question using a novel dataset that matches 10,000 unique outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) projects with 1135 distinct U.S. firms over the period 2003–2014. We find that capital expenditures allocated to FDI projects are significantly lower for highly leveraged firms, in particular for firms with low growth opportunities. Firms also commit lower capital amounts to investments located in countries characterized by higher political risk. Furthermore, leverage and political risk interact with one another in determining the financial commitment of the FDI, with leverage exerting a significantly stronger negative effect on capital expenditures in countries where political risk is elevated. Our findings are consistent with the monitoring role of debt in curbing exposure to political risk in multinational firms' foreign operations, and corroborate the disciplinary role of leverage on firms' investment decisions.     

Are Firms Underleveraged? An Examination of the Effect of Leverage on Default Probabilities

A commonly held view in corporate finance is that firms are less leveraged than they should be, given the potentially large tax benefits of debt. In this paper, I study the effect of firms' leverage on default probabilities as represented by the firms' ratings. Using an instrumental variable approach, I find that the leverage's effect on ratings is three times stronger than it is if the endogeneity of leverage is ignored. This stronger effect results in a higher impact of leverage on the ex ante costs of financial distress, which can offset the current estimates of the tax benefits of debt.     

National cultural effects on leverage decisions: Evidence from emerging-market ADRs

We examine leverage decisions in the context of national culture over the 1996–2010 period. Cultural characteristics can explain capital structure decisions from emerging-markets cross-listings. The results show that firms from countries with high Individualism and Indulgence employ more debt. Firms located in countries with high Power Distance, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Long-term Orientation are less leveraged. Additionally, Exchange-traded and capital-raising ADRs are more likely to be from countries with weaker corporate governance. Univariate tests show that capital-raising ADRs employ less debt relative to non-capital-raising ADRs, and notably, in the post-cross-listing period. Interestingly, the home country's cultural characteristics of capital-raising and exchange-traded ADRs exert less influence on their capital structure decisions. Our findings suggest that there is a value discount associated with increased firm leverage. Our insights have practical implications for portfolio managers attempting to enter emerging markets through the use of ADRs. Moreover, investors can evaluate the often neglected effect of cultural values into firm performance.     

Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms

This study provides evidence that transactions costs discourage debt reductions by financially distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court. As a result, these firms remain highly leveraged and one-in-three subsequently experience financial distress. Transactions costs are significantly smaller, hence leverage falls by more and there is less recurrence of financial distress, when firms recontract in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 therefore gives financially distressed firms more flexibility to choose optimal capital structures.     

Debt, bargaining, and credibility in firm–supplier relationships

We examine optimal leverage for a downstream firm relying on implicit (self-enforcing) contracts with a supplier. Performing a leveraged recapitalization prior to bargaining increases the firm's share of total surplus. However, the resulting debt overhang limits the range of credible bonuses, resulting in low input quality. Optimal financial structure trades off bargaining benefits of debt with inefficiency resulting from overhang. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that leverage increases with supplier bargaining power (e.g., unionization rates) and decreases with utilization of non-verifiable inputs (e.g., human capital).     

债务杠杆、财务脆弱性与家庭异质性消费行为

本文通过引入财务脆弱性来描述家庭无法及时或完全履行偿债义务而发生的财务困境,实证分析了债务杠杆对家庭消费的异质性影响。理论机制分析和基于中国家庭金融调查(CHFS)数据的实证研究表明,家庭债务杠杆会提升财务脆弱性,从而弱化跨期消费平滑能力,强化消费预算约束,导致家庭落入“高边际消费倾向、低消费支出水平”的低层次消费路径上。进一步分析发现,对于通过负债投资多套房的家庭而言,高债务杠杆会明显增加不确定冲击下的财务脆弱性,进而对消费产生更大的抑制效应;亲友民间借贷的履约机制相对灵活,可以缓解财务脆弱性对家庭消费的抑制效应;债务杠杆上升引致的财务脆弱性,对耐用消费品支出的压缩效应大于非耐用消费品,对农村家庭消费支出的挤占效应大于城镇家庭。本文的研究为我国“不宜依赖消费金融扩大消费”“规范发展消费信贷”等提供了理论解释,对金融服务促进消费发展具有一定政策启示。     

Institutions,banking structure and the cost of debt: new international evidence

This paper analyses the effect of institutions and the structure of the banking system on the cost of debt for a sample of firms from 37 countries. The cost of debt decreases with the rule of law, the protection of creditors’ rights and the weight of banks in the economy. Bank financing and bank concentration have a positive differential effect on the cost of debt in those countries where the financial difficulties of banks are greater. Legal enforcement, the protection of creditors’ rights and the weight of bank financing have a greater influence in countries with a lower degree of economic development.     

Debt,investment, and product market competition: A note on the limited liability effect

This paper extends a model by Brander and Lewis [Brander, J., Lewis, T., 1986. Oligopoly and financial structure: The limited liability effect. American Economic Review 76, 956–970] on the relationship between capital structure, investment and product market competition based on the limited liability effect of debt. Empirical papers (see for example Campello [Campello, M., 2003. Capital structure and product markets interactions: Evidence from business cycles. Journal of Financial Economics 68, 353–378], and Chevalier [Chevalier, J., 1995a. Capital structure and product market competition: Empirical evidence from the supermarket industry. American Economic Review 85, 415–435; Chevalier, J., 1995b. Do LBO supermarkets charge more? An empirical analysis of the effect of LBOs on supermarket pricing. Journal of Finance 50, 1095–1112]) generally reject the limited liability theories in favor of the predatory theories because leverage leads to less investment and weaker product market competition. This paper shows that when firms also have an investment choice, leverage can lead to weaker product market competition in a limited liability model. In addition, non-zero leverage is still optimal within this model based solely on the limited liability effect. In predatory models debt is motivated by issues outside of product market concerns, for example to solve an agency problem. Finally, this model is also consistent with the investment decisions documented empirically.     

Sovereign Default,Domestic Banks,and Financial Institutions

We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults are costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutions allow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults. Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines in private credit, and these declines should be larger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds. In these same countries, government defaults should be less likely. Using a large panel of countries, we find evidence consistent with these predictions.     

Preemption,leverage, and financing constraints

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We investigate both a case in which the firms have optimal financial structures, and a case in which financing constraints require firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings are that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the leader, although the leader may exit before the follower's entry. The leverage effects of debt financing can increase the value of a firm and accelerate investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. Notably, financing constraints can delay preemptive investment and improve firm values in preemptive equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's high leverage due to financing constraints can lower the first-mover advantage and weaken preemptive competition. Especially with strong first-mover advantage, the financing constraint effects can dominate the leverage effects. These findings are almost consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows that high leverage leads to competitive disadvantage and mitigates product market competition.     

Diversification and Capital Structure: Some International Evidence

This study examines the effects of international and product diversification on capital structure with 232 firms from 30 countries. Results for the full sample show that international diversification is negatively related to financial leverage, but further analyses indicate that this is mainly attributable to US firms. For non-US firms, we fail to find a significant relationship. Results also show that product diversification is positively related to financial leverage, indicating that such diversification allows firms to reduce their risks, thereby enabling firms to carry higher debt levels.     

Financial distress and corporate risk management: Theory and evidence

This paper extends the current theoretical models of corporate risk-management in the presence of financial distress costs and tests the model's predictions using a comprehensive data set. I show that the shareholders optimally engage in ex-post (i.e., after the debt issuance) risk-management activities even without a pre-commitment to do so. The model predicts a positive (negative) relation between leverage and hedging for moderately (highly) leveraged firms. Consistent with the theory, empirically I find a non-monotonic relation between leverage and hedging. Further, the effect of leverage on hedging is higher for firms in highly concentrated industries.     

Capital structure,executive compensation,and investment efficiency

This paper examines how the similarity between the executive compensation leverage ratio and the firm leverage ratio affects the quality of the firm’s investment decisions. A larger leverage gap (i.e., a bigger difference between these two ratios) leads to more investment distortions. Managers with more debt-like compensation components tend to under-invest, whereas managers with larger equity-based compensation engage more in over-investment. Furthermore, investment distortion is likely to increase the equity (debt) value when compensation leverage is lower (higher) than firm leverage. These findings suggest that managers can deviate from an optimal investment policy to increase the value of their portfolio, and that a lower leverage gap can reduce agency costs.     

EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON FIRMS' DECISIONS TO RETIRE DEBT EARLY

We examine the effect of marginal tax rates on the decision to retire debt early. Other factors that have been linked to the debt retirement decision are also investigated, including leverage adjustment and the value associated with the immediate recognition of a loss for tax purposes on early retirement. Results indicate that firms that retire debt early have lower marginal tax rates than firms that do not retire debt early. This finding is consistent with the proposition that firms are motivated to retire debt early by an incentive to reduce tax shields that cannot be used efficiently. Further, firms that retire debt early are more highly leveraged than firms that do not retire debt early. Evidence also suggests that some firms retire debt early at a loss to reduce currently taxable income.     

The zero-leverage phenomenon: A bivariate probit with partial observability approach

The empirical literature on zero leverage investigates why some firms are debt-free using standard logit and probit specifications. However, such models are not suitable to provide a direct answer to the main research question that arises in this context: is zero leverage a financial decision of the firm or an imposition raised by creditors? This paper examines the factors that affect the demand for debt and the supply of debt using bivariate probit models with partial observability in the sense of Poirier (1980), providing empirical evidence on the zero-leverage phenomenon for European listed firms during the period 2001-2016. We find that some variables influence in opposite directions debt demand and supply, or affect significantly only of them. In particular, firms’ profitability affects negatively debt demand but positively debt supply; asset tangibility increases the willingness of creditors to grant debt but does not influence debt demand; and the recent European crises reduced the propensity of firms to resort to debt but did not affect debt supply. We also find that firms in countries with common law systems, market-based financial systems and stronger protection to investors’ and creditors’ rights are more prone to have zero leverage due to both demand and supply effects.     

Heterogeneous effects of macroprudential policies on firm leverage and value

We empirically investigate the effect of financial institution-targeted macroprudential policies on firms using a comprehensive macroprudential policy dataset and corporate panel data across 35 countries. We find that tightening of macroprudential measures persistently curbs the leverage of firms, while loosening is related to the increase in leverage. We also find that this effect on leverage is heterogeneous across firms, as net macroprudential policy actions reduce the procyclicality of leverage more significantly for small firms and firms with high leverage. Also, we estimate the effect of macroprudential policies on firm value to evaluate potential policy trade-offs as the policies restrict the firms' access to credit during economic booms while protecting them from future financial crises. The effect of macroprudential policies on firm value is generally positive despite the policies' restrictive nature. Further, the effect on firm value is heterogeneous depending on firm characteristics: the positive effect becomes stronger as firms are less leveraged, but this positive effect is weaker for firms that grow faster, suggesting potential costs of macroprudential policies for these firms.     

我国居民杠杆率现状及影响因素研究

近年来,我国居民部门杠杆率的快速上升引起社会各界关注。本文使用货币信贷和城镇储户调查数据,对我国居民部门杠杆率和偿债能力现状进行了分析,并运用各省住户贷款数据计算各省的居民杠杆率,使用面板数据模型对居民杠杆率上升的原因进行了实证分析。结果表明,房价的快速上涨和住房销售的增长都对居民部门杠杆率的上升有显著正向影响,其中房价上涨的影响程度更大。此外,金融发展水平和老年人抚养比对居民杠杆率有正向影响,少年人抚养比对居民杠杆率有负向影响。