乡镇集体企业制度解析—“科龙现象”剖析

企业的兴衰是由其本质特征和市场经济内在规律决定的,本无可厚非。但大量乡镇集体企业在闯过创业初期的艰难险阻并踌躇满志地进入二次创业之后,为什么会走向衰败?为什么乡镇企业经济作为一个整体在我国国民经济中所占比重不断上升,已成三分天下有其一之势,而大型乡镇集体企业却凤毛麟角?显然,破译乡镇集体企业二次创业失利之谜的重要性是不言而喻的。科龙是一家靠借债9万元起家的乡镇小厂,经过16年的奋斗成为我国冰箱和空调行业的龙头企业,1999年度的营业收入和净利润分别为583亿元和64亿元,但2000年度净亏损68亿元。     

Optimal collective dichotomous choice under quota constraints

Summary. This paper presents optimal collective dichotomous choices under quota constraints. We focus on committees that have to decide whether to accept or reject a set of projects under quota constraints. We provide a method for optimal ranking of projects which is suitable for solving this problem. The main result generalizes a number of earlier results in the subject. To outline the applicability of our method, we demonstrate its usage in the area of information filtering. Received: February 14, 2000; revised version: January 19, 2001     

A characterization of consistent collective choice rules

We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference, which excludes the possibility of a “money pump.” The properties of collective choice rules used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more individuals than alternatives, however, further rules become available.     

On optimality in intergenerational risk sharing

Summary. This paper defines and studies optimality in a dynamic stochastic economy with finitely lived agents, and investigates the optimality properties of an equilibrium with or without sequentially complete markets. Various Pareto optimality concepts are considered, including interim and ex ante optimality. We show that, at an equilibrium with a productive asset (land) and sequentially complete markets, the intervention of a government may be justified, but only to improve risk sharing between generations. If markets are incomplete, constrained interim optimality is investigated in two-period lived OLG economies. We extend the optimality properties of an equilibrium with land and give conditions under which introducing a pay-as-you-go system at an equilibrium would not lead to any Pareto improvement. Received: October 5, 1998; revised version: April 3, 2001     

An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems

We consider the problem of selecting alternatives from a set of feasible alternatives over which each agent is endowed with a strict preference. We show that there is one and only one rule that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, efficiency, tops-only, and reinforcement. The rule is known as plurality rule, which selects the alternative(s) most preferred by the largest number of agents. I would like to thank William Thomson for helpful suggestions and discussions. I am grateful to Biung-Ghi Ju, Hyungjun Kim, and Yan-An Hwang for detailed comments. I am also indebted to the Editor and an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions. As usual, I am responsible for any remaining deficiency.     

On the optimality of not allocating

We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.     

On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting

This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the agent's valuations are positively correlated, and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are separable, then it is optimal for the upstream principal to offer the agent full privacy. On the contrary, when any of these conditions is violated, there exist preferences for which disclosure is strictly optimal, even if the downstream principal does not pay for the information. We also examine the effects of disclosure on welfare and show that it does not necessarily reduce the agent's surplus in the two relationships and in some cases may even yield a Pareto improvement.     

An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods

This paper compares three collective choice procedures for the provision of excludable public goods under incomplete information. One, serial cost sharing (SCS), is budget balanced, individually rational, anonymous and strategy proof. The other two are “hybrid” procedures: voluntary cost sharing with proportional rebates (PCS) and with no rebates (NR). PCS satisfies all these properties except strategy proofness, and NR satisfies all the properties except for strategy proofness and budget balance. However, PCS and NR do not exclude any potential users, and they do not require equal cost shares, thereby overcoming the two main sources of inefficiency with SCS. We characterize the Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of the hybrid mechanisms and conduct laboratory experiments to compare the performance of the three mechanisms. We find that PCS produces significantly more efficient allocations than either SCS or NR.     

On the optimality of optimal income taxation

The Mirrleesian model of income taxation restricts attention to simple allocation mechanism with no strategic interdependence, i.e., the optimal labor supply of any one individual does not depend on the labor supply of others. It has been argued by Piketty (2009) [12] that this restriction is substantial because more sophisticated mechanisms can reach first-best allocations that are out of reach with simple mechanisms. In this paper, we assess the validity of Piketty?s critique in an independent private values model. As a main result, we show that the optimal sophisticated mechanism is a simple mechanism, or, equivalently, a Mirrleesian income tax system.     

On the optimality of the full-cost pricing

This article is aimed at defining the full-cost pricing as a leader-follower game in two-tier organizations: (i) the upstream unit fixes the production capacity and uses it as a cost driver to compute the average cost; (ii) the downstream unit operates on the market and chooses the output level on the basis of the average cost. In the Cournot oligopoly case, the full-cost pricing is compared with other pricing rules. There exists a wide range of values of the fixed cost, for which the full-cost pricing dominates any other pricing rules, in terms of gross profit.     

On the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions

This article examines the impact of input prices on an entrant’s make-or-buy decision and on the subsequent social welfare level for three alternative models of downstream competition. For each particular model, it derives the range of input prices that induce the entrant to undertake: (a) the productively efficient make-or-buy decision; and (b) the socially optimal make-or-buy decision. The main conclusion of this article is that the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision is always socially optimal in the case of the Hotelling model, is socially optimal for the set of input prices that induce the entrant to undertake the efficient decision in the case of Cournot competition and is not necessarily socially optimal in the Bertrand vertical differentiation model. Last, this article examines the conditions under which the efficient and/or socially optimal make-or-buy decision undertaken by an entrant fulfills the regulatory two-fold goal of promoting service-based competition and encouraging facilities-based competition. Therefore, this article also provides the optimal access pricing policy that results in the best feasible outcome in terms of social welfare, productive efficiency, competition level and investment level for a given downstream competition model.     

On the optimality of unequal class sizes

The Glass and Smith (Education and Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 1979, 1, 2–16) meta-analysis of class size studies is shown to have employed an inappropriate functional form, negating Lippman's (Economics Letters, 1990, 33, 193–196) result concerning the optimality of equal class sizes. Policy implications for department chairs are noted.     

On the optimality of social status seeking

We present an endogenous growth model in which households display their social status by holding not only capital but also bonds. According to conventional wisdom, the quest for social status provides an incentive for individuals to accumulate wealth, which stimulates economic growth and elevates it to a socially optimal level. Instead, we show that portfolio allocation is crucial to the growth-enhancing effect of the quest for social status. If households exhibit their social status by accumulating physical capital and holding government bonds, the quest for social status may not increase economic growth. As a result, social status seeking cannot achieve the social optimum. Calibrating our model to data, we find that if government bonds constitute part of the wealth for households’ quest for social status, the quest for social status decreases economic growth.     

Voluntary collectivization: A model of producers' institutional choice

The concept of democratic transition to rural collective socialism is analyzed by modeling a village with both a collective farm and individual household plots. Labor is freely allocated by each household, and both the division of land between sectors and the system of distributing the net collective product are determined by majority vote, each household being equally represented. The effects of varying parameters of productivity, rent, and aggregate responsiveness to individual labor allocations are examined. A discussion of the model's relevance to Tanzania, China, and to the concept of voluntary rural collectivization concludes the paper.     

On the second optimality theorem of welfare economics

To what extent does the second optimality theorem of welfare economics (every Pareto optimal allocation can be repesented as a Walras equilibrium allocation) remain valid when preferences are allowed to be locally satiated? It is always valid for an exchange economy, and is valid for a production economy if there is a consumer who is not locally satiated, but not in general for a production economy where all consumers are locally satiated. A generalized equilibrium is defined, which includes the Walras equilibrium as a special case. Every Pareto optimum can be represented as a generalized equilibrium allocation. Furthermore, every Pareto optimal utility distribution can be realized by a Walras equilibrium allocation.     

On the optimality of limit cycles in dynamic economic systems

The purpose of this paper is to derive conditions for the optimality of a limit cycle in a dynamic economic system and to interpret them economically. A fairly general two-state continuous-time nonlinear optimal control problem is considered. It turns out that for this class of models three different economic mechanisms can be identified as the possible source of limit cycles. One relates to an intertemporal substitution effect expressed in terms of complementarity over time, the second one is a dominating cross effect between the state variables of the system (i.e., the capital stocks in our model), and the third one is positive growth at the equilibrium.We acknowledge the helpful comments by William A. Brock, Gerhard Sorger, Franz Wirl, and two anonymous referees. The research was partly supported by the Austrian Science Foundation under contract No. P6601.     

On optimality and time consistency when expectations are rational

This paper explores the implications of time inconsistency for optimal economic policy-making. It is found that if policy-makers determine policy on the assumption that expectations are adaptive when in fact they are rational economic policy can be destabilising. This adds support to reservations which Kydland and Prescott (1977) have raised about the appropriateness of standard optimal control methods. A method is proposed which is a modification of standard optimal control techniques and which allows for the endogeneity of expectations. When this method is used to determine policy there is no indication that policy is destabilising.     

On the optimality of interest-bearing reserves in economies of overlapping generations

Summary Paying interest on required reserves is considered in an overlapping generations model in which the return to capital dominates the return to fiat money. As Smith (1991) showed, financing interest on reserves benefits the initial old at the expense of future generations. We show that the transfer of wealth associated with interest on reserves can be offset by an accommodating open market purchase, so that the payment of interest on reserves is a Pareto improvement. We also show that paying interest on reserves improves welfare even when financed by distorting taxes on capital.The authors thank Mike Cox, Greg Huffman, Evan Koenig, and Bruce Smith for helpful discussion. Any remaining errors are solely ours. This work originated while Freeman was a Research Associate at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.