The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly

Bhagwati demonstrated the nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas in the presence of monopoly. This paper also assumes domestic production to be monopolized and shows that giving import licenses or tariff revenues to the domestic producer may raise or lower the welfare cost of protection and the price paid by consumers from the price under other tariff and quota arrangements which maintain the same market share for the domestic producer. However, if the monopolist realizes that commercial policy is an instrument used to maximize the policymaker's welfare function, instead of being a goal in itself, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas re-emerges.     

Do safeguard tariffs and antidumping duties open or close technology gaps?

This paper examines how the country-breadth of tariff protection can affect the technology adoption decisions of both domestic import-competing and foreign exporting firms. The contribution of the analysis is to show how firm-level technology adoption changes under tariffs of different country-breadth. I show that a country-specific tariff like an antidumping duty induces both domestic import-competing firms and foreign exporting firms to adopt a new technology earlier than they would under free trade. In contrast, a broadly-applied tariff like a safeguard can accelerate technology adoption by a domestic import-competing firm, but will slow-down technology adoption by foreign exporting firms. Because safeguard tariffs can delay the foreign firm's adoption of new technology, the worldwide welfare costs associated with using them may be larger than is generally believed.     

Preferences,rent destruction and multilateral liberalization: The building block effect of CUSFTA

If a free trade agreement (FTA) is characterized by the exchange of market access with a large and competitive trading partner, the agreement can cause a leakage of protectionist benefits to domestic industry from lobbying against external tariff cuts. This rent destruction effect of an FTA can free policy makers to be more aggressive in multilateral tariff cuts. We argue that the Canadian–US free trade agreement (CUSFTA) provides an ideal policy experiment to link this mechanism to the data. Exploring the determinants of Canada's tariff cuts at the 8-digit HS product level, we find that CUSFTA acted as an additional driver of Canadian multilateral tariff reductions during the Uruguay Round.     

A theory of the currency denomination of international trade

The currency denomination of international trade has significant macroeconomic and policy implications. In this paper we solve for the optimal invoicing choice by integrating this microeconomic decision at the level of the firm into a general equilibrium open economy model. Strategic interactions between firms play a critical role. We find that the less competition firms face in foreign markets, as reflected in market share and product differentiation, the more likely they will price in their own currency. We also show that when a set of countries forms a monetary union, the new currency is likely to be used more extensively in trade than the sum of the currencies it replaces.     

Unilateral and bilateral trade policies for a minimum-wage economy

This paper considers optimal commercial policy for a trading economy which departs from neo-classical characteristics only in that a minimum-wage constraint gives rise to unemployment. Although for a flexible-wage fully employed economy the Baldwin envelope yields dominant domestic production-cum-trade possibilities, unilateral imposition of an optimum tariff is shown not necessarily to be optimal commercial policy for the minimum-wage economy. Rather, there exists an envelope, derived from foreigners' trade indifference and attained via bilateral trade policy, which dominates the Baldwin envelope when the optimum tariff is zero (as Brecher has shown it can be for a minimum-wage economy), and can still yield superior production-cum-trade possibilities when the optimum tariff is non-zero.     

Trade Intermediaries and the Tariff Pass-through

This paper aims at improving our understanding of the price effects of trade policies following two perspectives. First, we wish to study how the role of intermediaries in international trade affects the transmission of tariff changes to domestic prices. Second, we explore how our results are influenced by the degree of competition in the distribution-service market. In a Cournot oligopoly-oligopsony model, we show how the pass-through of tariff cuts to domestic prices is limited by the market power of intermediaries producing distribution services. Our long-run equilibrium is characterized by a larger number of firms selling at a higher mark-up. Market access barriers in distribution services determine to what extent tariff cuts are transferred to domestic consumers and foreign producers, affecting the size of their welfare effects. The benefits of trade liberalization policies can be better achieved if they are complemented by competition enhancing measures in the intermediation sector.     

Tariffs and quotas in the presence of foreign monopoly

The paper contrasts the effects of tariffs and quantitative restrictions in the presence of a foreign monopolistic exporter. It is shown that a tariff may induce a Lerner-type effect in the tariff-imposing country whereas a quota will necesarily have such an effect. More generally, a quota will worsen the terms of trade more than the equivalent tariff, although the foreign monopolist may not capture the entire scarcity rent produced by the quota. These results have significant implications when the relative costs of various trade barriers are evaluated.     

Tariff and tax reform: Dynamic implications

In an endogenously growing small open economy with a capital good and a consumption good, we characterize the optimal combination of an import tariff and consumption taxes under the revenue neutrality constraint. Focusing on the case in which the economy imports the capital good, we obtain two main results. First, consumption of the capital good is distorted more than the consumption good at the optimum. Second, the optimal tariff rate is positive, implying that free trade is not optimal even for a small open economy with no market failure.     

Industry concentration and optimal discriminatory commercial policies

We derive the characteristics of firm-specific strategic trade policies when industries consist of heterogenous firms, and show how the informational requirements for policy design are thereby expanded. A knowledge of the Herfindahl index of concentration of the foreign industry is required for the design of optimal protection for domestic firms. It is shown that optimal firm-specific tariffs reduce the degree of foreign concentration, thus shifting rents to domestic firms.     

Potential FDI causing large distortions in domestic production

When a foreign firm enters a domestic market, either via exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI), one factor determining the most favourable entrance mode is the profitability of the market, which may not be directly observed by the foreign firm. If the domestic trade protection policy is within a certain range that causes the foreign entrant's decision to swing between the two entry modes, the final choice will depend on the foreign firm's belief about the profitability. In such a situation, a domestic incumbent firm wishing to prevent FDI will heavily distort its production downward to convince the foreign competitor that the market is not profitable. When making trade policy, such strategic behaviour on the part of the domestic firm should be taken into account.     

Domestic monopoly and redundant tariff protection

This paper examines the redundancy of tariff protection when there is a single domestic monopolist producer. The cases where the monopolist exports in free trade and where he confronts import competition are distinguished and a general rule characterizing water-in-the-tariff in protected equilibrium is derived.     

Foreign entry and domestic welfare: lessons for developing countries

This paper examines the effects of foreign entry, in the form of either imports or direct foreign investment, into an oligopolistic market. Incorporating a possible divergence between private and social costs, it first derives simple conditions under which foreign entry reduces welfare relative to autarky. Then, in a multi-firm Cournot model with linear demand and international cost asymmetries, it shows that foreign entry reduces welfare unless it captures a very large share of the home market. However, it also shows that an optimal tariff can prevent this welfare decline. Some suggestive empirical evidence and extensions to differentiated products and to merger analysis are offered. The paper concludes with implications for trade and investment liberalization, as well as for domestic and international competition policy.     

Trade, wages, and the political economy of trade protection: evidence from the Colombian trade reforms

Worker industry affiliation plays a crucial role in how trade policy affects wages in many trade models. Yet, most research has focused on how trade policy affects wages by altering the economy-wide returns to a specific worker characteristic (i.e., skill or education) rather than through worker industry affiliation. This paper exploits drastic trade liberalizations in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s to investigate the relationship between protection and industry wage premiums. We relate wage premiums to trade policy in an empirical framework that accounts for the political economy of trade protection. Accounting for time-invariant political economy factors is critical. When we do not control for unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics, we find that workers in protected sectors earn less than workers with similar observable characteristics in unprotected sectors. Allowing for industry fixed effects reverses the result: trade protection increases relative wages. This positive relationship persists when we instrument for tariff changes. Our results are in line with short- and medium-run models of trade where labor is immobile across sectors or, alternatively, with the existence of industry rents that are reduced by trade liberalization. In the context of the current debate on the rising income inequality in developing countries, our findings point to a source of disparity beyond the well-documented rise in the economy-wide skill premium: because tariff reductions were proportionately larger in sectors employing a high fraction of less-skilled workers, the decrease in the wage premiums in these sectors affected such workers disproportionately.     

Strategic Trade Policies Under Monopsony and Uncertainty: The Exporter’s Non-Linear Responses Based on the Organization of Its Industry

Players’ access to information, their market power, and the timing and rationale of their decisions are important but often neglected in the making of strategic trade policies. I examine optimal decisions in a monopsonistic market with asymmetric information to determine an exporting country’s policy strategies. The large importing country first sets a producer subsidy and later imposes an import tariff after learning about the welfare-maximizing exporter’s reactions to the subsidy. I assume that at the time of their decisions, the n exporting firms have incomplete information and rely only on noisy signals from their own domestic market to account for the uncertainty in the international market. I find that import tariff and producer subsidy can be substitute rather than exclusively independent policies. Results also show that the exporting country’s optimal reaction is non-linear and is based on the structure of its export industry; the exporting country’s government facing a large importer subsidizes (or taxes) its export when the number of exporting firms is low (or high) relative to a threshold number of firms. More important, before giving out subsidies, the exporting country’s government requires more collusion of its firms especially when the large importer targets a fixed domestic price.     

Optimal revenue-raising trade restrictions under uncertainty

A country seeks to achieve a fixed expected revenue by restricting trade when it faces uncertainty about domestic demand for a good and about foreign supply. If the uncertainty in the demand and supply functions is multiplicative then the policy which maximises domestic expected surplus is a fixed schedule of tariffs depending only on world price. Under additive uncertainty the ranking of ad valorem tariffs and quotas depends systematically on the targeted expected revenue and the degree of uncertainty in demand and in world price but a specific tariff is superior to both these policies.     

Strategic Trade Policy through the Tax System

If conventional instruments of strategic trade policy are unavailable, the system of foreign profit taxation and transfer price guidelines may serve as surrogate policy instruments. In this paper, I consider a model where firms from two countries compete with each other on a market in a third country. Both firms have affiliates in the third country where (part of) the production takes place. I analyse optimal policy choices of the firms' residence countries aiming at strategically manipulating the competitiveness of their firms. I show that, first, countries prefer the tax exemption system over the tax credit system if there is no intra‐firm trade. Second, if the headquarters provide inputs for production in the affiliate, countries prefer the tax exemption system if the transfer price for these inputs is close to the headquarters' variable cost and if the residence country's tax rate is high. However, if transfer prices are high and the residence country's tax rate is low, I show that the tax credit system is an optimal tax policy choice for both countries. From a policy perspective, the view that the tax exemption system is generally the best policy response if domestic firms' competitiveness is a policy goal has to be qualified.     

Strategic trade policies with first-mover and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure

With strategic trade policies, we consider first- and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure given the two-part tariff contract (composed of the input price and the fixed fee) of an upstream firm, where a home and a foreign final-good firms export to a third-country market. We find that the upstream firms’ and governments’ preference orderings over sequential versus simultaneous play and over free trade versus a regime of subsidies contrast with early results in the strategic trade policy. Thus, the endogenous market structure is that (i) the potential leader chooses the Leader role with quantity strategies, and the equilibrium trade regime is unilateral subsidy regardless of the nature of goods; (ii) with price strategies, the potential leader chooses the simultaneous timing, and the equilibrium trade regime is bilateral taxes (free trade) when goods are substitutes (complements).     

Foreign acquisition and post-privatization exit of state-owned firms

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign and domestic ownership on the exit rates of privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in transitional countries. The exit of privatized SOEs can have a profound impact on employment and on the development of local economies of transitional countries. An oligopoly model that incorporates country-level trade costs and individual SOE's productivity is developed to assess the exit of SOEs under either foreign or domestic ownership. The model shows that market competition between firms can lead to liquidation of the SOE by a domestic firm when trade costs increase. When the productivity of SOE is high, neither foreign nor domestic firm will liquidate. The predictions of the model are tested using firm-level privatization data from Central and Eastern Europe. By controlling for productivity, trade costs, and other attributes of SOEs after privatization, it is found that foreign ownership significantly reduces the probability of SOE's exit as compared to domestic ownership. Furthermore, there is evidence that as trade costs increase, the exit probability of domestically owned SOEs increases and the exit probability of foreign-owned SOEs declines.     

Taxation of Foreign Profits with Heterogeneous Multinational Firms

This paper analyses optimal taxation of foreign profits using a model with heterogeneous multinational firms that serve a foreign market through exports or foreign direct investment (FDI). If a firm switches from exporting to FDI, domestic activity and tax payments may decrease, stay constant or even rise because of intra‐firm trade. It turns out that, in contrast to recent claims, in all three cases, the optimal tax system implies full taxation after deduction of foreign tax payments. If the country accounts for the effects of its policy on the foreign price level, the case for taxing foreign income becomes even stronger. However, the globally optimal tax system may require exemption of foreign income from tax.     

对外开放程度度量方法的研究综述

从贸易方面度量开放程度的指标有外贸依存度、关税率、有效保护率和数量限制平均覆盖率、非关税壁垒覆盖率、价格扭曲度等。从金融角度来研究开放的指标有外汇黑市溢价、本国对外投资和吸收外资的流量、存量、增长率以及它们占GDP的比重等。有些学者运用计量方法测算选定指标的理论预测值,通过比较实际值与理论预测值的差异来度量开放程度。国内学者一般选择3至6个分指标的加权平均值来度量我国经济的对外开放程度。