The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: Improvement on the GATT Article XIX?

The Agreement on Safeguards is a revision of the GATT Article XIX, which provided the general rules on safeguards before 1995. The legal relationship between the GATT Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards was subjected to controversy in the recent WTO panel cases, Korea—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products and Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear. The panels and the Appellate Body in those cases held that GATT Article XIX still applies to the extent that there is no express conflict with the Agreement on Safeguards. The appropriateness of this decision is questioned since the Agreement on Safeguards contains all the substantive and procedural requirements for the application of safeguard measure.     

区域贸易协定成员间实施保障措施的争论及对中国的启示

世贸组织体制下的保障措施是一种进口救济措施。本文拟对区域贸易中实施的保障措施及其争论予以分析,探讨世贸组织争端解决机构对相关争端案的裁决,在此基础上,提出解决问题的设想,并为中国订立区域贸易协定的保障措施条款提供参考性建议。     

WTO体制下的保障措施和特殊保障措施

保障措施作为一种贸易救济措施,在国际贸易中对进口国而言有着举足轻重的地位.WTO体制下尽管有保障措施的一般规定,但在不同领域针对不同国家,演变出很多特殊的保障措施.其中,中国<入世议定书>中的"过渡性保障机制"就对中国纺织业产生了重大的影响.     

Trade skirmishes safeguards: A theory of the WTO dispute settlement process

I propose a framework within which to interpret and evaluate the major reforms introduced to the GATT system in its transition to the WTO. In particular, I examine the WTO Agreement on Safeguards that has amended the GATT escape clause (Article XIX), and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that resembles a court of law under the WTO. Using this framework, I interpret the weakening of the reciprocity principle under the Agreement on Safeguards as an attempt to reduce efficiency-reducing trade skirmishes. The DSB is interpreted as an impartial arbitrator that announces its opinion about the state of the world when a dispute arises among member countries. I demonstrate that the reforms in the GATT escape clause should be bundled with the introduction of the DSB, in order to maintain the incentive compatibility of trade agreements. The model implies that trade agreements under the WTO lead to fewer trade skirmishes but this effect does not necessarily result in higher payoffs to the governments. The model also implies that the introduction of the WTO court, which has no enforcement power, can improve the self-enforceability of trade agreements.     

How do countries respond to anti‐dumping filings? Dispute settlement and retaliatory anti‐dumping

Empirical studies have found that countries may respond strategically to the anti‐dumping petition filed against their exporters through their own retaliatory actions. Although most previous studies have focused on retaliatory anti‐dumping filings, in this paper we explore another potential avenue for strategic response—filing a complaint under the World Trade Organization's (WTO ) dispute settlement understanding. Using a panel of global anti‐dumping filings between 1995 and 2011, we analyse under what conditions countries will choose to retaliate through either an anti‐dumping petition or a WTO dispute, and to what degree these two strategies are complementary or act as substitutes. We find statistical evidence that countries are more likely to file a WTO dispute when they have also filed a retaliatory anti‐dumping petition, suggesting that these two strategies may be complementary.     

The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO: A Brief History and an Evaluation from Economic,Contractarian and Legal Perspectives

Any rule‐based system has to include a mechanism for the enforcement of its rules and a means for settlement of disputes about alleged violation of rules. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded in 1947, and its successor the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that subsumed it in 1995, embody rules governing the global trading system as specified in various agreements that their members have entered into over time. Naturally, both had a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). It was a primarily political one in the GATT and was transformed into a largely legalistic one in the multilateral agreement that established the WTO. This paper reviews the history and evaluation of the two DSMs and examines their efficiency based on appropriate criteria. It views them from three alternative and overlapping perspectives: political‐diplomatic, legal‐economic and social. It concludes with a discussion of the unresolved problems in the operation of the WTO's DSM and the prospects of resolving them in the ongoing Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.     

“美国—影响中国家禽产品进口的 某些措施”争端研究

"美国—影响中国家禽产品进口的某些措施"案是中美贸易争端中首起直接涉及WTO《卫生与植物检疫措施协定》(《SPS协定》)的争端。此争端源于美国国会依据《2009年综合拨款法案》第727条禁止美国农业部制定从中国进口家禽产品的规则。本争端涉及3个核心问题:一是SPS措施的认定问题;二是专家组的管辖权(职能范围)问题;三是SPS措施的对等承认问题。但归根结底第727条违反了WTO非歧视性原则。该争端说明,推进我国与其他国家(包括美国)检验检疫机制的对等互认是我国稳定和扩大外贸出口的重要手段。     

WTO框架下的全球贸易争端研究

作为WTO"皇冠上的明珠"的争端解决机制一直是保障多边贸易体制的正常运行的中流砥柱,在缓解、消除全球贸易摩擦与冲突中起到重要作用。然而随着特朗普政府引领的美国"强权主义"回归,挑战了WTO争端解决机制的权威性,对上诉机构的干扰致使上诉机构几近瘫痪。在此背景下本文在对1995-2019年WTO争端案件发展趋势详细分析的基础上,着重研究了特朗普执政以来全球以及中美之间的贸易争端案件。通过对案件和当前WTO争端解决机制发展的最新事态的分析,本文进一步剖析了当前全球贸易争端机制存在的问题以及我国的应对之策,以期能对我国贸易利益的保护有所助益。     

Dispute Settlement at the WTO: Impacts of a No Deal in the US‐Brazil Cotton Dispute

On the day before Brazil was to start imposing retaliatory sanctions against the United States in the WTO dispute settlement case regarding unfair domestic and export upland cotton subsidies, the parties have reached a preliminary concession aimed at settling this eight‐year‐long trade dispute. In this paper, we explore the economywide impacts of a no deal with specific emphasis on intellectual property retaliation in a computable general equilibrium framework. As awarded by a WTO dispute settlement panel, Brazil would have been entitled to $591 million in retaliatory sanctions in goods sectors and $238 million in intellectual property sanctions. We find that retaliation by Brazil would have led to welfare gains for all countries except the United States. Most importantly, however, had Brazil not been allowed to retaliate in the form of suspension of intellectual property rights, the impact of trade retaliation alone would have been negative for both Brazil and the United States, a case of shooting oneself in the foot to shoot at the other person's foot.     

中国涉案WTO争端解决的条约解释及其比较

2011年是中国入世后涉案WTO争端解决的结案数量最多的一年。这些结案报告含有大量关于WTO协定的条约解释,且多半直接影响案件的裁定,全面地、深入地研究这些条约解释,对于总结中国涉诉案件的经验教训以及继续更好地应对WTO争端解决,维护中国的国家利益及企业合法权益,具有十分重要的理论与实践意义。     

非关税措施量化公式评价

与直接可以用税率高低来度量其保护程度的关税不一样,非关税措施是一种隐蔽的难以直接度量其保护作用的贸易保护主义手段。本文评价了近年来国外普遍采用的非关税措施保护作用的量化方法,包括频度——类型测算法、价格对比测算法、支持率测算法的设计思路和运用状况,以便为不时发生的贸易争端和贸易谈判提供可以用来判断进口国非关税措施保护程度的分析工具。     

争端解决机制选择的经验研究

现有的争端解决机制选择的经验研究,主要关注单边行动和WTO争端解决机制。文章在此基础上,进一步检验双边磋商和WTO争端解决机制的选择问题,检验结果表明:政治、经济因素对于双边和多边机制的选择都有不同程度的影响,并且政治因素的影响更为显著,进而在结论中提出了对中国的启示。     

WTO贸易救济措施争端解决的绩效分析——基于动态非平衡面板数据模型系统GMM检验

文章在回顾相关研究的基础上考虑四阶段WTO争端解决程序,根据WTO争端案例结案时长不等的特点和多阶段策略选择难以量化的性质,建立WTO贸易救济措施争端解决绩效动态非平衡面板数据模型,运用系统GMM检验,对WTO贸易救济措施争端解决绩效进行了实证分析。结果表明：积极援引WTO争端解决机制是能够在一定程度上挽回贸易损失的,尤其是双方在争端解决过程中达成的磋商解决、请求专家组中止工作、相互满意解决或者败诉方执行WTO决定等均对申诉方出口贸易具有促进作用;尽快结案将有利于申诉方,而WTO争端解决案件的持续时间越长,越不利于申诉方。     

知识产权国际组织内部争端解决机制述评──基于WIPO和WTO的理论和实践

知识产权国际争端是知识产权国际保护制度和市场交易制度演化的结果。但在20世纪90年代之前,知识产权国际组织争端解决制度实际上是对传统国际公法争端解决机制的交叉援引,争端解决方式缺失国际仲裁和知识产权国际组织内部的争端解决程序。90年代后,国际商事仲裁范围的扩大、WIPO的机构改革和WTO的成立促成WIPO和WTO确立了内部争端解决机制,这是知识产权国际保护制度的重大发展。在国际争端解决实践中,WIPO和WTO的内部争端解决机制得到了成功的运用。     

Product Heterogeneity and Cost Allocations in Contingent Trade Protection

The WTO allows members to impose contingent protection, including anti‐dumping duties, within agreed constraints. Anti‐dumping proceedings typically name a single captioned product but include large numbers of individual products within that caption. The inclusion of multiple products creates a variety of issues for both anti‐dumping and other contingent protection measures, issues that have been prominent in national actions and WTO dispute settlements, but have been largely ignored in research. This work focuses on the most important such area, the allocation of costs among products in anti‐dumping proceedings. We develop a comprehensive economic analysis for cost allocation issues, and couple it with the accounting tools that must be used for its implementation, to derive the first‐best allocation methods for anti‐dumping purposes. These results have direct relevance in other contingent trade contexts, such as injury determinations and subsidy pass‐through analysis.     

非关税措施的国际比较及其对我国的启示

在关税壁垒不断削弱的背景下,非关税措施逐渐成为各国实行贸易战略最有效的工具之一。从世界主要贸易市场的非关税措施及其引发的政治经济效应看,我国在发展对外贸易中应着力实现海关规则的国际化,履行取消配额、补贴的承诺,充分利用世贸组织为我们提供的保障措施,并建立更有效的非关税措施体系。     

Empirical evidence on surrogate country method for non‐market economy: US anti‐dumping policy towards China

Whether the non‐market economy (NME) treatment on China can be maintained even after the expiry date under Section 15 of China's World Trade Organization (WTO) Accession Protocol is one of the most controversial issues in the WTO. In fact, the key issue of the NME status in the anti‐dumping (AD) proceedings turns out to be how surrogate countries are selected in relation to dumping margin calculation. This paper reviews the US practices concerning the application of the surrogate country method. Despite the general perception of capricious and random selection of surrogate countries, the Department of Commerce has maintained a consistent pattern for applying the criteria. This seemingly consistent practice, however, raised systematic problems—but not at a significant scale—in dumping margin calculation concerning Chinese products. This result sheds an interesting light on the current WTO disputes concerning the China's NME status. At least in terms of the US AD practices, the result of the WTO dispute settlement process may not have a significant impact on the China's exportation.     

Non‐Tariff Measures,Specific Trade Concerns and Tariff Reduction

This paper studies the determinants of the recent proliferation of Specific Trade Concerns raised at the WTO on non‐tariff trade measures (NTMs), with a focus on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBTs). Even though NTMs are imposed de jure to protect consumers from unhealthy products, they increase trade costs de facto. So, when tariff protection lowers, NTMs become effective barriers to trade and the exporting countries can complain at the dedicated committee at the WTO (STCs). Therefore, we study whether STCs are raised by exporting countries as a consequence of tariff reductions in importing countries, that is when non‐tariff measures become barriers to trade. Using a recent database on STCs over the period 1996–2010, we find empirical evidence that SPS and TBT concerns are raised by exporting country as a consequence of importer's tariff cut.     

世贸组织争端解决实践中的条约目的解释

世贸组织争端解决实践中贸易规则的目的解释呈现出以下特点:一是争端解决机构否认在目的解释与其他条约解释方法之间存在位阶关系,主张各种条约解释方法之间应保持统一和整体性;二是通过目的解释明确了世贸组织法律规则与一般国际法之间的部分与整体关系,强调世贸组织规则与其他国际法部门规则间的相互协调;三是通过目的解释方法的运用,完善和发展了世贸组织争端解决的程序性规则,强化了争端解决机制的功能。目的解释的正当性决定于它能否被争端当事方及世贸组织成员普遍认同与接受。     

The costs of freer trade

Free trade cannot exist as a pure benefit in a democracy because there will always exist political pressures that seek to protect some group from foreign competition or uncertainty. These groups must be taken care of politically and administrative costs are incurred in so doing. Similarly, there must be a dispute settlement apparatus at the supernational as well as the national level. Administrative costs are incurred in maintaining as well as in achieving the existing degree of liberalization. There may exist a state in which the gains from additional liberalization are outweighed by the marginal administrative costs incurred.