Institutional Investors,Political Connections,and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud

We investigate two under-explored factors in mitigating the risk of corporate fraud and regulatory enforcement against fraud, namely institutional investors and political connections. The role of institutional investors in the effective monitoring of a firm’s management is well established in the literature. We further observe that firms that have a large proportion of their shares held by institutional investors have a lower incidence of enforcement actions against corporate fraud. The importance of political connections for enterprises, whether in a developed market such as the United States or an emerging market such as China, has been established by previous studies. However, we find evidence of another positive effect of political connections: they may reduce the incidence of enforcement action against corporate fraud. We also find that political connections play a more significant role in reducing regulatory enforcement incidents against non-state-owned enterprises and firms in weaker legal environments, whereas institutional ownership plays a more important role in reducing regulatory enforcement incidents against state-owned enterprises.     

Financial Statement Frauds and Auditor Sanctions: An Analysis of Enforcement Actions in China

The rising tide of corporate scandals and audit failures has shocked the public, and the integrity of auditors is being increasingly questioned. It is crucial for auditors and regulators to understand the main causes of audit failure and devise preventive measures accordingly. This study analyzes enforcement actions issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission against auditors in respect of fraudulent financial reporting committed by listed companies in China. We find that auditors are more likely to be sanctioned by the regulators for failing to detect and report material misstatement frauds rather than disclosure frauds. Further analysis of the material misstatements indicates that auditors are more likely to be sanctioned for failing to detect and report revenue-related frauds rather than assets-related frauds. In sum, our results suggest that regulators believe auditors have the responsibility to detect and report frauds that are egregious, transaction-based, and related to accounting earnings. The results contribute to our knowledge of auditors’ responsibilities for detecting frauds as perceived by regulators.     

法律环境、审计独立性与投资者保护

独立审计的根本功能是为投资者提供保护,但其投资者保护功能的实现需要相应的法律环境作为保障.本文通过模型分析,将法制因素与会计师的独立性变量引入到投资者保护中,考察法律环境、审计独立性与投资者保护之间的关系.我们的研究结果表明:法律对投资者的保护是第一位的;独立审计对投资者的保护是第二位的,当法治环境较薄弱时,其可以充当法律的替代机制为投资者提供保护.     

The Challenges of Detection and Enforcement of Insider Trading

Taking advantage of the China’s recent anti-corruption campaign, we attempt to examine the effect of public governance on a firm’s incentive to commit fraud. Using enforcement actions data from the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) from 2004 to 2014, we find that, due to enhanced public governance, firms are less likely to commit fraud in the post-campaign period than in the pre-campaign period. We further show that the effect of public governance is more evident in privately held listed firms, in firms with weak legal environment, and in firms in areas with poor local economies. In addition, we find that older CEOs respond less actively to the public governance caused by anti-corruption regulations. This paper offers clear policy implications for business ethics by indicating that public governance provides external monitoring of corporate decisions.     

Corporate fraud,risk avoidance,and housing investment in China

This study investigates the impact of corporate fraud on household investment choices. We conjecture that by undermining trust in the financial and insurance market, corporate fraud behaviour would decrease households' investment in risky financial assets and increase investment in non-financial assets. Combining data on households' investment behaviour with information on fraudulent activities of listed companies in China, we find that households with more lifetime experience of corporate fraud invest less in stocks and are less likely to purchase private insurance. By contrast, fraud experience increases households' intention to invest in residential real estate. In addition, the impact of corporate fraud is stronger among individuals who pay more attention to economic information, among individuals who have more social interaction, and among individuals in better regulated regions. Furthermore, we find that different types of fraud have differentiated effects on household investment decisions. Our findings indicate that corporate misconduct could generate profound negative externalities on the whole financial system.     

Does the “management approach” contribute to segment reporting transparency?

Segment reporting creates an opportunity for companies to add value to the information they disseminate about their industry and geographic operations. This article examines the “management approach” to segment reporting from a user perspective that should be of great interest to corporate financial executives. The management approach to segment reporting requires companies to report segment financial information consistent with the way they manage their businesses. We conclude that, despite more segment data being reported, the potential of the new management approach to significantly benefit users is compromised by uneven compliance among reporting companies. The complicity of external auditors in compliance shortcomings should concern all stakeholders in the financial reporting process. Noting two high-profile examples of accounting fraud, we comment on how the management approach sheds light on Enron's operations, while WorldCom concealed important segment information due to probable auditor malfeasance.     

Fostering an ethical organization from the bottom up and the outside in

Despite the best efforts of corporate compliance officers, boards of governance, auditors, and regulators, corporate misconduct continues to plague our markets. In this thought-provoking installation of Accounting Matters, we argue that efforts to fight fraud and other forms of corporate misconduct have failed, in part, due to the systematic approach employed toward a problem that is irregular, complex, and extends well beyond the boundary of the firm. By drawing upon research from the field of behavioral ethics to suggest a new approach that does more than just stress formal control systems, we illustrate how executives may strengthen organizational ethics through informal practices that work from the ‘bottom up’ and the ‘outside in.’ Our review includes practical recommendations regarding how to create shared responsibility for ethical leadership, how to empower employees to achieve both economic and ethical ends, how to enlist the aid of key stakeholders in identifying problems before they grow and spread, and how to redesign compliance practices to address the complex nature of corporate misconduct.     

Does the External Monitoring Effect of Financial Analysts Deter Corporate Fraud in China?

We examine whether analyst coverage influences corporate fraud in China. The fraud triangle specifies three main factors, i.e. opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. On the one hand, analysts may reduce the fraud opportunity factor through external monitoring aimed at discouraging managerial misconduct, which can moderate agency problems. On the other hand, analysts may increase the fraud incentive factor by pressurizing managers to achieve short-term performance targets, which can exacerbate agency problem. In either case, the potential influence of analysts on the fraud rationalization factor may be more pronounced among firms that are more dependent on the capital market for corporate finance. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we show a negative association between corporate fraud propensity and analyst coverage, and that this effect is more pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises, which are more reliant on the stock market for external funding. These findings suggest that analyst coverage contributes to corporate fraud deterrence in emerging economies characterized by weak investor protection. The main policy implication is that further development of the analyst profession in emerging economies may benefit investors and strengthen business ethics.     

Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China

This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms penalize CEOs for fraud by lowering their pay. We also find that CEO compensation is lower in firms that commit more severe frauds. Panel data fixed effects and propensity score methods are used to demonstrate these effects. Our results also indicate that corporate governance mechanisms influence the magnitude of punishment. We find that CEOs of privately controlled firms, firms that split the posts of CEO and chairman, and CEOs of firms located in developed regions suffer larger compensation penalties for committing financial fraud. Finally, we show that CEOs at firms that commit fraud are more likely to be replaced compared to those at non-fraud firms.     

Understanding Auditors’ Sense of Responsibility for Detecting Fraud Within Organizations

The objective of this study is to evaluate auditors’ perceived responsibility for fraud detection. Auditors play a critical role in managing fraud risk within organizations. Although professional standards and guidance prescribe responsibility in the area, little is known about auditors’ sense of responsibility for fraud detection, the factors affecting perceived responsibility, and how responsibility affects auditor performance. We use the triangle model of responsibility as a theoretical basis for examining responsibility and the effects of accountability, fraud type, and auditor type on auditors’ perceived fraud detection responsibility. We also test how perceived responsibility affects auditor brainstorming performance given the importance of brainstorming in audits. A sample of 878 auditors (241 external auditors and 637 internal auditors) participated in an experiment with accountability pressure and fraud type manipulated randomly between subjects. As predicted, accountable auditors report higher detection responsibility than anonymous auditors. We also find a significant fraud type × auditor type interaction with external auditors perceiving the most detection responsibility for financial statement fraud, while internal auditors report similar detection responsibility for all fraud types. Analysis of the triangle model’s formative links reveals that professional obligation and personal control are significantly related to responsibility, while task clarity is not. Finally, the results indicate that perceived responsibility positively affects the number of detection procedures brainstormed and partially mediates the significant accountability–brainstorming relation.     

Fraud,Enforcement Action,and the Role of Corporate Governance: Evidence from China

We examine enforcement action in China’s emerging markets by focusing on (1) the agents that impose this action and (2) the role played by supervisory boards. Using newly available databases, we find that supervisory boards play an active role when Chinese listed companies face enforcement action. Listed firms with larger supervisory boards are more likely to have more severe sanctions imposed upon them by the China Security Regulatory Commission, and listed companies that face more severe enforcement actions have more supervisory board meetings. Our findings are of interest, as supervisory boards in China are generally perceived to be dysfunctional. This study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we shed light on the effects of supervisory boards whose role in a fraud setting has not yet been examined. Second, the study has important policy implications for governance reform. Finally, our analyses provide the most up-to-date picture of fraud and governance issues in China’s ever-growing markets.     

Motivators of Mobilization

Using data on shareholder-initiated class action lawsuits in the US, I investigate the corporate scandals of US-listed foreign firms. The shareholders of scandal firms suffer considerable loss in both the short term and the long term. I document that firms domiciled in countries with weak institutions are more likely to be embroiled in corporate scandals, but such a relation can be moderated by the presence of Big 4 auditors. Investors automatically adjust for undiscovered misconduct when valuing the stocks of non-scandal firms (i.e., the spillover effect). Investors rely on the audit quality to form their expectations about the severity of undiscovered misconduct, and thus impose less negative spillovers on firms with Big 4 auditors, especially when the firms are from countries with weak institutions. Taken together, my results suggest that listing on US exchanges does not fully compensate for weak local institutions; voluntarily bonding to a more stringent audit process has an incremental effect on protecting shareholder interests and enhances the confidence of investors in firms’ financial integrity.     

The Effects of Satisfaction with a Client’s Management During a Prior Audit Engagement,Trust, and Moral Reasoning on Auditors’ Perceived Risk of Management Fraud

The recent accounting scandals have raised concerns regarding the closeness of auditor–client relationships. Critics argue that as the relationship lengthens a bond develops and auditors’ professional skepticism may be replaced with trust. However, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 states that auditors “should conduct the engagement with a mindset that recognizes the possibility that a material misstatement due to fraud could be present, regardless of any past experience with the entity and regardless of the auditor’s belief about management’s honesty and integrity” (AICPA 2002, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, paragraph 13, p. 10). The purpose of this study is to investigate whether auditors develop trust in a client’s management and whether this trust affects auditors’ decisions. Specifically, this study examines whether auditors’ satisfaction with a client’s management during a prior audit engagement affects auditors’ self-reported trust in that client’s management and whether that trust affects their fraud risk assessment. The decision to trust a client’s management should be an ethical decision because excessive trust may impair auditors’ skepticism, which auditors are required to maintain by their professional responsibilities. We therefore also investigate whether auditors’ trust is affected by their moral reasoning. An experimental case was completed by 89 professional auditors, all with experience assessing the risk of fraud. The results suggest auditors’ satisfaction with the client affects their trust in the client (higher satisfaction associated with higher trust and lower satisfaction associated with lower trust). Further, after an overall unsatisfying experience, auditors’ trust affects their fraud risk assessments. However, after an overall satisfying experience, their trust does not affect their fraud risk assessments. The results indicate auditors are able to maintain their professional skepticism after satisfying past experiences with the client regardless of their beliefs about the honesty and trustworthiness of the client’s management. Lastly, auditors’ moral reasoning was not related to their trust in the client’s management.     

Determinants of Nigerian managers’ environmental attitude: Africa's Ubuntu ethics versus global capitalism

We investigate the impact of economic, institutional, and ethical pressures on African managers' corporate social and environmental attitude based on a survey involving 377 Nigerian executives in the extractive industry. We find that environmental orientation and behavior are mostly induced by instrumental economic motives, while ethical considerations exert a weak impact. This finding is significant because it contradicts mainstream corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature in Africa, which suggests the dominance of the culturally based, altruistic African Ubuntu philosophy. Based on this research finding, we suggest that economic globalization has spurned a transnational capitalist cadre of managers whose values are shaped far more by global capitalist instincts than any putative cultural philosophy. The findings also undercut the fundamental logic underpinning the numerous global initiatives to promote environmental responsibility by multinational corporations in developing countries, which assumes that managers will pursue environmental sustainability voluntarily in the absence of robust regulations and strict enforcement.     

资产质量与公司违规行为

文章以2003—2015年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,探讨了公司的资产质量对公司违规行为的影响。研究表明,良好的资产质量能够减少公司的违规行为,这种影响在控制了可能的内生性问题后依然显著。此外,文章还发现,资产质量对信息披露违规的影响较大,而在非信息披露违规中不显著;公司所处的内外部环境显著影响资产质量的治理效果。文章的研究结论丰富了公司违规行为影响因素方面的文献,为我国会计准则改革的必要性提供了证据支持。     

Military executives and corporate outcomes: Evidence from China

This study investigates the impact of executives' military experience on corporate outcomes in China. We find that firms with military executives take higher financial leverage and underperform their non-military counterparts, although they perform relatively better during periods of industry distress. Our results are robust when using propensity score matching and instrumental variable approaches. Interestingly, military executives in China commit relatively more corporate violations compared to those without military experience. This finding differs to the findings of Benmelech and Frydman (2015) for U.S. military CEOs, where there are clear differences in culture, education background, and ethical behaviours as compared with China.     

Ownership Structure and Insider Trading: Evidence from China

In this paper, we examine the information content of insider transactions in China and analyze how ownership structures shape market reaction to these transactions. We find that the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to insider purchases is a convex function of the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder. Further, the CAR to insider purchases is lower when the largest shareholder is government-related, or when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash flow rights. We also find that the market reaction to insider purchases is more positive for firms audited by Big4 auditors. However, we do not find a significant relationship between an ownership structure and the market reaction to insider sales. Our results are remarkably robust to alternative model specifications, corporate insider identities, and recent corporate news releases on price-sensitive events. Finally, we show that market reaction to insider purchases is larger for firms with less severe expropriations, as captured by the use of other receivables.     

Contribution of the Management System and the Institutional Framework to the Efficiency of Values-Based Management

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares that could not be traded. This restriction mitigated state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders to replace fraudulent management. Our findings support the view that economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud.     

Integrity as a Business Asset

In this post-Enron era, we have heard much talk about the need for integrity. Today’s employees perceive it as being in short supply. A recent survey by the Walker Consulting Firm found that less than half of workers polled thought their senior leaders were people of high integrity. To combat the perceived lack of corporate integrity, companies are stressing their probity. This stress is problematic because executives tend to instrumentalize the value of integrity. This paper argues that integrity needs to be better defined because the current mode of talking about the subject is misleading. The paper considers three traditions’ understanding of the idea of integrity, argues that integrity is intrinsically valuable, and concludes with some reflections on the way in which integrity, properly understood, functions as a business asset.     

The Anatomy of Corporate Fraud: A Comparative Analysis of High Profile American and European Corporate Scandals

This paper presents a comparative analysis of three American (Enron, WorldCom and HealthSouth) and three European (Parmalat, Royal Ahold and Vivendi Universal) corporate failures. The first part of the analysis is based on a theoretical framework including six areas of ethical climate; tone at the top; bubble economy and market pressure; fraudulent financial reporting; accountability, control, auditing, and governance; and management compensation. The second and third parts consider the analysis of these cases from fraud perspective and in terms of firm-specific characteristics (ownership structure) and environmental context (coverage in media and academic literature, regulatory and corporate governance frameworks). The research analyses shed light on the fact that, despite major differences between Europe and U.S. in terms of political institutions, laws and regulations as well as managerial practices, there are significant similarities between six groups. The analysis also demonstrates that, the ethical dilemma has been coupled with ineffective boards, inefficient corporate governance and control mechanisms, distorted incentive schemes, accounting irregularities, failure of auditors, dominant CEOs, dysfunctional management behavior and the lack of a sound ethical tone at the top. Significant similarities were also observed in the analysis from the fraud triangle perspective. However, there are several major differences between the six corporate failure cases particularly with regard to ownership structure, coverage in media, and legal, regulatory and governance frameworks. This research study may have several academic and practical contributions, particularly because of multidisciplinary, international features, and comparative analyses used in the paper.