Audit committees’ oversight of bank risk-taking

This study examines whether audit committee effectiveness affects bank risk-taking and risk management effectiveness. We find that banks with long board tenure audit committees have lower total risk and idiosyncratic risk, and banks with busy directors on their audit committees have higher total risk and idiosyncratic risk. These suggest that high audit committee effectiveness may constrain bank risk-taking activities. We also find that firm performance is more positively associated with bank risk for banks with long board tenure, more female audit committee members, or large size audit committees than for other banks, consistent with the notion that audit committee effectiveness may increase risk management effectiveness. However, this finding should be interpreted cautiously as it is contrary to the results on audit committee busyness.     

Overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee and bank risk-taking: Evidence from China

Although overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee is prevalent in banks' boards, the existing literature focuses on the impact of a single board committee on bank risk-taking. Using a sample of Chinese listed banks from 2007 to 2020, we examine whether and how overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee influences bank risk-taking. The results show that overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee reduces bank risk-taking. Furthermore, the risk-averse role of overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee is stronger in banks with weaker monitoring intensity and higher information acquisition costs. When exploring the potential channels of monitoring and information, we find that overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee helps reduce executive earnings management and make conservative interbank liability decisions. Finally, compared with other overlapping member characteristics, the role of overlapping risk management committee chair and financial experts in reducing bank risk-taking is more evident.     

Governance,efficiency and risk taking in Chinese banking

We employ a hand-collected unique dataset on banks operating in China between 2003 and 2011 to investigate the impact of board governance features (size, composition and functioning) on bank efficiency and risk taking. Our evidence suggests that board characteristics tend to have a greater influence on banks' profit and cost efficiency than on loan quality. We find that the proportion of female directors on the board appears not only to be linked to higher profit and cost efficiency but also to lower traditional banking risk. Similarly, board independence is associated with higher profit efficiency of banks; while the opposite is found for executive directors and in the presence of dual leadership of the CEO/chairperson. Among the control variables, we found that liquidity negatively affects profit and cost efficiency, while positively affecting risk. Interestingly, we find some evidence of an incremental effect of specific board characteristics on efficiency for banks with more concentrated ownership structures and state-owned institutions; while for banks with CEO performance-related pay schemes the effect on efficiency when significant is usually negative. Our results offer useful insights to policy makers in China charged with the task of improving the governance mechanisms in banking institutions.     

银行监管和股东属性对银行风险的影响——基于新兴经济体的监管数据分析

银行监管按世界银行的标准划分为总体监管和12类分项监管;银行大股东属性包括政府类、金融企业类、外资类等.总体监管可以有效地降低银行风险;大股东为工业类、金融类企业的银行能够更好地控制风险,而家族类银行的风险程度较高;通过对分项监管进行研究可以发现,加强对所有权、资本要求、经营活动限制、外部审计要求、流动性、存款保险制度、退出及监管效率八个方面的监管可降低银行总体风险,而加强准入、内部管理、资产分类配置、信息披露这四类监管反而会增加银行总体风险.     

CORPORATE BOARDS AND BANK LOAN CONTRACTING

We investigate the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance‐pricing provisions) are more favorable, and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, audit committee structure, and other board characteristics influence bank loan prices. However, they do not consistently affect all nonprice loan terms except for audit committee independence. Our study provides strong evidence that banks recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating information risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post, and they reward higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.     

Female directors in bank boardrooms and their influence on performance and risk-taking

We assess the role of women in bank boardrooms in a sample of 461 large banks from OECD countries. After controlling for bank and country specific effects, we find that the presence and percentage of female directors in boardrooms have a positive influence on performance. We also find a negative relation between the presence of women in boardrooms and risk-taking. These relations hold for the supervisory board, and with some exceptions for the audit committee. For a sub-sample of 134 listed banks we find that markets positively value the presence of women on the board, supervisory board and audit committee.     

Auditor choice and bank risk taking

We investigate the importance of auditor choice on bank risk-taking in a cross-country setting for 5498 banks from 116 emerging and developed countries. Using the Z-score as our main proxy for bank risk, we report evidence that hiring a Big Four auditing firm reduces bank-risk even after controlling for bank and country variables. The reported evidence is valid for banks outside the United States and is robust to concerns relating to endogeneity and alternative banking risk measures. The results are economically meaningful. All else constant, the Z-score of a bank audited by a Big Four firm is 10.4% higher than a similar bank with a non-BIG Four auditor. Moreover, consistent with the view that Big Four auditors serve a corporate governance mechanism in emerging markets, we find that Big Four auditors maintain the ability to curb bank risk in countries characterized by weak institutions. Finally, our results suggest that while audit quality is associated with bank safety, its impact is reduced in countries that require audit-oversight.     

Bank globalization and efficiency: Host- and home-country effects

Analyzing 126 countries for 1995–2013, we investigate the link between bank globalization and efficiency from the perspective of both host and home countries. We find strong and consistent evidence that foreign bank entry is associated with lower efficiency in host countries (host-country effect), while foreign expansion in the banking sector improves the efficiency of banks at home (home-country effect). We further observe that the effect of bank globalization is dependent on the regulatory and institutional regimes of the respective host (home) countries. Specifically, stringent activity restrictions, tight supervision, fewer limitations on foreign banks, lower market entry barriers, and less government interference all help mitigate the efficiency loss from foreign bank entry. Less supervision power, multiple supervisors, more restrictions on foreign banks, and a competitive banking market are all conducive to the higher efficiency gain of incumbent domestic banks from the respective country’s outward investments in the banking sector. Moreover, we find that the adverse impact on efficiency from foreign bank presence is less pronounced for less risky, more profitable, and larger banks, while banks that are more efficient, more profitable, taking on more risk, and/or smaller gain more efficiency from their country’s foreign expansion.     

Internal audit reporting lines,fraud risk decomposition,and assessments of fraud risk

The main purpose of this research is to examine the effects of internal audit reporting lines on fraud risk assessments made by internal auditors when the level of fraud risk varies. Significant emphasis has been placed on the importance of reporting lines in maintaining the autonomy of internal auditors, but the perceived benefits of requiring internal audit to report directly to the audit committee have not been validated or systematically investigated. Results of an experiment involving 172 experienced internal auditors and additional survey findings indicate that internal auditors perceive more personal threats when they report high levels of risk directly to the audit committee, relative to management. Perceived threats lead internal auditors to reduce assessed levels of fraud risk when reporting to the audit committee relative to when reporting to management. This finding runs counter to the anticipated benefits of requirements that the internal audit function report directly to the audit committee, and it reveals potential conflicts of interest and independence threats created by the audit committee itself. We also investigate the effects of fraud risk decomposition on risk assessments made by internal auditors. We find that fraud risk assessment decomposition does not have the same effects on internal auditors as it has on external auditors, and the effects of decomposition do not align with the expected benefits of decomposition.     

Credit information sharing in the nexus between charter value and systemic risk in Asian banking

In this paper, we assess whether the link between charter value and systemic risk in banking is affected by credit information sharing at the country level. Using a sample of Asian listed banks, we document that banks with higher charter value exhibit lower systemic risk because these banks hold more capital. Nevertheless, we find that the self-disciplining role of charter value in banking is more pronounced for countries with lower depth of credit information sharing. Specifically, our findings also reveal that higher charter value alleviates systemic risk and increases capitalization, particularly in countries with lower quality of private credit bureaus. These findings suggest that higher charter value can be detrimental for financial stability due to an increase in bank systemic risk, particularly when private credit bureaus are of better quality. In order to overcome bank systemic risk, this paper advocates the importance of strengthening bank competition to limit charter value, in addition to promoting the development of private credit bureaus.     

Ownership, Governance, and Bank Performance: Korean Experience

The paper examines the effect of ownership and governance on firm performance. Tracing the post financial crisis experience, 1998–2002, of the Korean commercial bank industry, the paper investigates whether the involvement of foreign investors in the ownership structure had any significant effect on the banks' performance i.e., return and risk measures. Further, it examines the effects of the presence of outside directors, especially directors from foreign countries, in the corporate board structure impacts banks performance. Evidence indicates that the extent of the foreign ownership level, not the mere existence of foreign ownership, has a significant positive association with the bank return and a significant negative association with the bank risk. The number of outside board of directors does not have any significant affect on performance however the presence of a foreign director on that board is significantly associated with bank return and risk. These findings are relatively robust under the different specifications of performance measures.     

Financial markets development,business cycles,and bank risk in South America

In this paper, we examine whether banking crises or business cycles affect the influence of financial markets development on bank risk in a sample of 37 publicly listed commercial banks in seven South American countries over a 22-year period between 1991 and 2012. Banking crises in this region offer a natural setting in which the impact of financial markets development on bank risk is examined. We find that financial markets development improves banks’ capitalization ratio and reduces their exposure to non-traditional banking activities, suggesting that financial markets development on average reduces bank risk. In addition, banking crises and business cycles appear to moderate the impact of financial markets development on bank risk. In the aftermath of banking crises, banks appear to concentrate more on their core traditional banking activities.     

Bank power,block ownership,boards and financial distress likelihood: An investigation of Spanish listed firms

We investigate the effects of bank power, block ownership and board independence on the likelihood of financial distress. Using a matched sample design, we find that firms in which banks have power are more likely than their counterparts to enter financial distress. However, the bank power effects are moderated by block ownership and board independence. Specifically, on the one hand, financial distress due to bank power is lower for firms with greater ownership by pressure resistant blockholders and such blockholders appear to be the largest blockholder in the firm. The bank power effects are also lower in firms with greater outside directors and this appears to be primarily driven by proprietary directors than independent directors. On the other, we document evidence suggesting that the bank power effects are magnified for firms in which the board chair is a proprietary director aligned to non-financial blockholders or CEO/Chair, suggesting that banks might partly influence decisions via board chairs. Overall, the findings are consistent with bank power actions being detrimental to the firm, but the extent to which such actions harm the firm depends on the monitoring intentions of blockholders and/or board of directors. These findings have important implications for policymakers.     

Independent audit committee members’ board tenure and audit fees

An independent audit committee is an audit committee on which all members are independent directors. This study examines whether independent audit committee members’ board tenure affects audit fees. On the basis of the prior literature, we formulate an unsigned hypothesis. This is because on the one hand, long board tenure audit committee members (defined as members with board tenure of 10 or more years) have greater incentives to protect their reputational capitals by purchasing increased audit effort, which positively affects audit fees. On the other hand, audit pricing reflects audit committee quality. Long board tenure audit committee members may have less need for increased audit effort because they can effectively oversee the financial reporting process themselves, which negatively affects audit fees. We find that audit fees are negatively associated with the proportion of long board tenure directors on the independent audit committee, consistent with the notion that audit committee members’ long board tenure results in lower audit effort.     

Audit committee equity holdings,the risk of reporting problems,and the achievement of earnings thresholds

There is conflicting evidence on whether audit committee equity holdings enhance or undermine committee effectiveness. Some researchers contend that equity holdings motivate audit committees to minimize the risk of reporting problems, while others believe equity holdings align the committees’ incentives with management. To reconcile these seemingly contradictory positions, I hypothesize that the influence of audit committee equity holdings depends upon the risk of reporting problems. I contend that when the risk of reporting problems is low (high) equity holdings motivate audit committees to give managers greater (less) discretion over reporting policies because the expected benefits from giving the discretion is greater (less) than the expected cost of the reporting problems that might occur from giving the discretion. I test whether the influence of audit committee equity holdings varies with the risk of reporting problems using a sample of 1370 firm-observations with earnings near the prior year’s earning level and a sample of 2389 firm-observations near analyst forecasts. I find the influence of audit committee equity holdings on the likelihood that a firm meets the prior year’s earnings level varies with the CEO’s equity incentives and the level of high-risk assets. I also find the influence of audit committee equity holdings on the likelihood that a firm meets analysts’ forecast varies with the CEO’s equity incentives and the effectiveness of internal controls. Collectively, my results suggest equity holdings enhance audit committee effectiveness by increasing a committee’s responsiveness to risk factors.     

Transatlantic systemic risk

In this paper we study systemic risk for the US and Europe. We show that banks’ exposures to common risk factors are crucial for systemic risk. We come to this conclusion by first showing that relations between US and European banks are smaller than within each region. We then show that European banks react more strongly to the onset of the financial crisis than US banks. Regarding the consequences of systemic risk, we show that dependence between the banking sector and a wide range of real sectors is limited. Our results imply that regulators and supervisors should address international bank dependencies arising from common risk factors, while recessions in real sectors due to bank defaults should be a secondary concern.     

Measuring systemic risk: A risk management approach

This paper proposes a new method to measure and monitor the risk in a banking system. Standard tools that regulators require banks to use for their internal risk management are applied at the level of the banking system to measure the risk of a regulator’s portfolio. Using a sample of international banks from 1988 until 2002, I estimate the dynamics and correlations between bank asset portfolios. To obtain measures for the risk of a regulator’s portfolio, I model the individual liabilities that the regulator has to each bank as contingent claims on the bank’s assets. The portfolio aspect of the regulator’s liability is explicitly considered and the methodology allows a comparison of sub-samples from different countries. Correlations, bank asset volatility, and bank capitalization increase for North American and somewhat for European banks, while Japanese banks face deteriorating capital levels. In the sample period, the North American banking system gains stability while the Japanese banking sector becomes more fragile. The expected future liability of the regulator varies substantially over time and is especially high during the Asian crisis starting in 1997. Further analysis shows that the Japanese banks contribute most to the volatility of the regulator’s liability at that time. Larger and more profitable banks have lower systemic risk and additional equity capital reduces systemic risk only for banks that are constrained by regulatory capital requirements.     

Are foreign banks more profitable than domestic banks? Home- and host-country effects of banking market structure, governance, and supervision

Using both bank- and country-level data on banking sectors from 70 countries over the period 1992-2006, this paper empirically investigates the joint home- and host-country effects of banking market structure, macroeconomic condition, governance, and changes in bank supervision on foreign bank margins. We find that foreign banks are more profitable than domestic banks when they operate in a host country whose banking sector is less competitive and when the parent bank in the home country is highly profitable. Moreover, when foreign banks operate in a host country with lower growth rates of GDP, higher interest and inflation rates, and more stringent regulatory compliance with Basel risk weights, their margins increase. Specifically, changes in bank supervision of a parent bank’s ownership restrictiveness in the home country significantly increases foreign bank margins, while supervisory changes in regulatory compliance with Basel risk weights in the host country enhances foreign bank margins.     

Ownership structure and risk in publicly held and privately owned banks

Using detailed ownership data for a sample of European commercial banks, we analyze the link between ownership structure and risk in both privately owned and publicly held banks. We consider five categories of shareholders that are specific to our dataset. We find that ownership structure is significant in explaining risk differences but mainly for privately owned banks. A higher equity stake of either individuals/families or banking institutions is associated with a decrease in asset risk and default risk. In addition, institutional investors and non-financial companies impose the riskiest strategies when they hold higher stakes. For publicly held banks, changes in ownership structure do not affect risk taking. Market forces seem to align the risk-taking behavior of publicly held banks, such that ownership structure is no longer a determinant in explaining risk differences. However, higher stakes of banking institutions in publicly held banks are associated with lower credit and default risk.     

How does competition affect bank systemic risk?

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.