Performance feedback and middle managers’ divergent strategic behavior: The roles of social comparisons and organizational identification

Research Summary: What drives middle managers to search for new strategic initiatives and champion them to top management? This behavior—labeled divergent strategic behavior—spawns emergent strategies and thereby provides one of the essential ingredients of strategic renewal. We conceptualize divergent strategic behavior as a response to performance feedback. Data from 123 senior middle managers overseeing 21 multi‐country organizations (MCOs) of a Fortune 500 firm point to social performance comparisons rather than historical comparisons in driving divergent strategic behavior. Moreover, managers’ organizational identification affects whether they attend to organizational‐ or individual‐level feedback. These results contribute to research on performance aspirations and strategy process by providing a multilevel, multidimensional framework of performance aspirations in middle management driven strategic renewal. Managerial Summary: Middle managers are essential actors in strategic renewal. Their unique positions offer insights into operations alongside knowledge of strategy. In contrast to typical assessments of managerial performance with reference to a prior year, this research shows that performance comparisons relative to peers and other organizational units better motivate managers’ divergent strategic behavior. Our results also show that managers who identify with the firm are more attentive to organizational rather than individual performance discrepancies. Thus, our study unveils an important approach for organizations aiming to spark strategic renewal.     

The moderating influence of strategic orientation on the strategy formation capability–performance relationship

An effective strategy formation capability is a complex organizational resource—a dynamic capability that should lead to superior performance. Strategy scholars have examined the strategy formation capability from many perspectives. However, no study has examined a comprehensive model of strategy formation in the context of the firm's strategic orientation. We develop and examine such a model. The results show that strategic orientation moderates the relationship between different elements of the strategy formation capability and performance. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Elevating Repositioning Costs: Strategy Dynamics and Competitive Interactions

Research summary: This article proposes an approach for modeling competitive interactions that incorporates the costs to firms of changing strategy. The costs associated with strategy modifications, which we term “repositioning costs,” are particularly relevant to competitive interactions involving major changes to business strategies. Repositioning costs can critically affect competitive dynamics and, consequently, the implications of strategic interaction for strategic choice. While the literature broadly recognizes the importance of such costs, game‐theoretic treatments of major strategic change, with very limited exceptions, have not addressed them meaningfully. We advocate greater recognition of repositioning costs and illustrate with two simple models how repositioning costs may facilitate differentiation and affect the value of a firm's capability to reduce repositioning costs through investments in flexibility. Managerial summary: This article illustrates how the decision to make a strategic change is affected by both the cost to the firm of making the various strategy modifications, as well as the cost to its rivals of changing their strategies in response. These “repositioning costs” are important because they shape the responses each competitor would likely make to a move by the other competitor, and should be anticipated when considering an initial change to one's own strategy. The paper shows how repositioning costs can be used strategically to facilitate differentiation, and to assess the value of potential investments in flexibility. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Let chaos reign,then rein in chaos—repeatedly: managing strategic dynamics for corporate longevity

Combining longitudinal field research and executive experience, we propose that corporate longevity depends on matching cycles of autonomous and induced strategy processes to different forms of strategic dynamics, and that the role of alert strategic leadership is to appropriately balance the induced and autonomous processes throughout these cycles. We also propose that such strategic leadership is the means through which leadership style exerts its influence on corporate longevity. Our findings can be related to organizational research on structural inertia, learning and adaptation, as well as to formal theories of complex adaptive systems. They also contribute to resolving the seeming contradiction between a study of corporations that attributes exceptional long‐term success to leadership style, and the more common proposition that strategy is the determinant of long‐term performance. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What determines the performance of strategic alliance managers? Two lens model studies

Given the increasingly frequent call—often from macro, strategy researchers—for more micro-level probes into the drivers of strategic alliance performance, this article has responded to such a call by leveraging the organizational behavior (OB) and human resource (HR) literature on competencies. Based on two studies drawing on the lens model (Brunswik, 1954), we take on an important but little explored question: “What determines the performance of strategic alliance managers?” In Study 1 (a laboratory study), double system policy capturing results show a positive relationship between alliance competencies and performance judgments. In Study 2 (a field study), we investigate the evaluative behavior of alliance supervisors. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) results suggest that some structural, functional, and social competencies are evaluated as more important than other competencies in determining alliance managers’ performance.     

Key managerial factors in new venture departments

Two clusters of factors —the “corporate strategic posture” and the New Venture Department (NVD) “political posture” — appear to determine the direction of an NVD's evolution. The “corporate strategic posture” refers to the cycles of diversification and consolidation that typically characterize corporate growth. A corporation's “strategic posture” at any given point in time can be positioned on a continuum, one end of which is a “diversifying” posture, while the other end is a “consolidating” posture.     

Towards a theory of ecosystems

Research Summary: The recent surge of interest in “ecosystems” in strategy research and practice has mainly focused on what ecosystems are and how they operate. We complement this literature by considering when and why ecosystems emerge, and what makes them distinct from other governance forms. We argue that modularity enables ecosystem emergence as it allows a set of distinct yet interdependent organizations to coordinate without full hierarchical fiat. We show how ecosystems address multilateral dependences based on various types of complementarities—supermodular or unique, unidirectional or bidirectional—which determine the ecosystem's value‐add. We argue that at the core of ecosystems lie nongeneric complementarities, and the creation of sets of roles that face similar rules. We conclude with implications for mainstream strategy and suggestions for future research. Managerial Summary: We consider what makes ecosystems different from other business constellations, including markets, alliances, or hierarchically managed supply chains. Ecosystems, we posit, are interacting organizations, enabled by modularity, not hierarchically managed, bound together by the nonredeployability of their collective investment elsewhere. Ecosystems add value as they allow managers to coordinate their multilateral dependence through sets of roles that face similar rules, thus obviating the need to enter into customized contractual agreements with each partner. We explain how different types of complementarities (unique or supermodular, generic or specific, uni‐ or bi‐directional) shape ecosystems and offer a “theory of ecosystems” that can explain what they are, when they emerge, and why alignment occurs. Finally, we outline the critical factors affecting ecosystem emergence, evolution, and success—or failure.     

Towards an organic perspective on strategy

The strategy field's core issues—the concept of strategy, causal models relating strategy to other constructs, and models of strategic management and choice—have been previously addressed by two key progressions. The mechanistic perspective based on disciplinary‐based theories, the design model, and a view of strategy as a planned posture, has provided a unified view, but a narrow and increasingly less pertinent one. The advent of organic developments that included strategy process research, evolutionary and process models, and interactive and integrative views, has provided richness and pertinence, but not a unified perspective. These two progressions marked an epistemological shift from mechanistic to organic assumptions: from discrete to incessant time, from directional to interactive flow, and from differentiated to integrated constructs and models. Building on this shift, this paper proposes an organic perspective that combines the insights and coherence of the mechanistic perspective with the more relevant organic ideas. It makes use of the organic assumptions to advance a view of strategy as an adaptive coordination, introduce the Organization–Environment–Strategy–Performance (OESP) integrative theoretical model, and present an organic model of strategic management. The organic perspective provides a basis for an upgraded, more unified, and better‐attuned view on strategy's core issues. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic concepts as micro‐level tools in strategic sensemaking

Research Summary: The purpose of this article is to illuminate the role of concepts in strategic sensemaking. Based on a longitudinal real‐time study of a city organization, we demonstrate how the concept of “self‐responsibility” played a crucial role in strategic sensemaking. We develop a theoretical model that elucidates how strategic concepts are used in meaning‐making, and how such concepts may be mobilized for the legitimation of strategic change. Our main contribution is to offer strategic concepts as a missing micro‐level component of the language‐based view of strategic processes and practices. By so doing, our analysis also adds to studies on strategic ambiguity and advances research on vocabularies. Managerial Summary: Our analysis helps to understand the role of strategic concepts, that is, specific words or phrases with established and at least partly shared meanings, in an organization's strategy process. We show how adopting the concept “self‐responsibility” helped managers in a city organization to make sense of environmental challenges and to promote change. Our analysis highlights how such concepts involve ambiguity that can help managers to establish common ground, but can also hinder implementation of specific decisions and actions if it grows over time. We suggest that under environmental changes, development of new strategic concepts may be crucial in helping managers to collectively deal with environmental changes and to articulate a new strategic direction for the organization.     

The disruptor's dilemma: TiVo and the U.S. television ecosystem

Research summary: Firms introducing disruptive innovations into multisided ecosystems confront the disruptor's dilemma: gaining the support of the very incumbents they disrupt. Through a longitudinal study of TiVo, a company that pioneered the Digital Video Recorder, we examine how these firms may address this dilemma. Our analysis reveals how TiVo navigated coopetitive tensions by continually adjusting its strategy, its technology platform, and its relational positioning within the evolving U.S. television industry ecosystem. We theorize how (1) disruption may affect not just specific incumbents, but also the entire ecosystem; (2) coopetition is not just dyadic, but also multilateral and intertemporal, and (3) strategy is both a deliberative and emergent process involving continual adjustments, as the disruptor attempts to balance coopetitive tensions over time. Managerial summary: New entrants confront a dilemma when they introduce a disruptive innovation into an existing business ecosystem, viz., how can they gain the support of the incumbents that their innovation disrupts? Confronting this “disruptor's dilemma”, the disruptor must consider several issues: How might it pitch its innovation to attract end customers and yet reduce the threat of disruption perceived by ecosystem incumbents? How can the innovation be modified to fit into legacy systems while transforming them? Based on an in‐depth analysis of TiVo and its entrepreneurial journey, we explore the strategies disruptors can deploy to address these issues. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Clinging to Slim Chances: The Dynamics of Anticipating Regret When Developing New Products

This paper focuses on the effects of anticipated regret during large‐scale investment projects—namely new product development. Anticipated regret means worrying about the future, and decision‐makers experience it prior to both making a decision and knowing the outcome of that decision. It is forward‐looking while actual regret is backward‐looking. Decision‐makers must make project continuation/termination decisions with conflicting pressures. If they continue it, they might receive disconfirming information in the future and therefore regret their decision. If they stop it, they also might regret that decision later, too, if they subsequently conclude it was an error to do so. We term these conflicting pressures anticipated “keep” and “drop” regret, respectively. In the main study, nearly 300 individuals completed a decision‐making exercise in which a failing new product development project was evaluated, and various factors were measured, including both types of anticipated regret at multiple points in the project. The results show that decision‐makers anticipate regret when making project continuation decisions, and anticipated keep and drop regret exert pressures that differ in direction and magnitude. Most interestingly, anticipated drop regret does not diminish as the failing project progresses whereas anticipated keep regret increases as more negative information is received over the course of the project. A second, smaller study was conducted using a different population, and the results of the main study were replicated in this supplemental study, thereby adding confidence in these findings.     

Strategy dynamics: Agency,path dependency,and self‐organized emergence

Analysis of a 42‐year strategic journey at a large multinational firm exposes the dynamics behind its strategic evolution. Grounded on a complexity science paradigm, this article challenges our understanding of the role of agency in strategic timing while adding conceptual and methodological innovations. Based on micro and macro approaches, qualitative interpretations, and econometric studies, the results tend to show that while agency partly produces strategy dynamics and timing of actions, strategic evolution (when not random) is largely emergent and driven by its past. These findings move the understanding of strategic evolution and timing away from a strategic choice perspective and toward a complex combination of agency, causal determinism, and self‐organization. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“We do what we must,and call it by the best names”: Can deliberate names offset the consequences of organizational atypicality?

Research summary: This article focuses on organizational naming as a strategic choice organizations make to overcome liabilities of atypicality. We argue that, in markets presenting an “illegitimacy discount,” atypical organizations may use deliberate names—names that communicate the market categories to which organizations claim membership—to offset the consequences of atypicality. Using data from the global hedge fund industry, we show that atypical hedge funds are more likely than typical funds to have deliberate names. Importantly, the selection of a deliberate name is economically significant. First, funds with deliberate names grow faster than funds without deliberate names, especially among atypical funds. Second, while atypicality heightened the likelihood of failure during the recent financial crisis—even after controlling for fund performance—having a deliberate name mitigated this effect. Managerial summary: Differentiation is a core element of many organizations' competitive advantage. Nevertheless, as differentiation implies being atypical among one's competitors, differentiation strategies can also lead to an “illegitimacy discount” whereby differentiators are at risk of being misunderstood, miscategorized, and ignored by consumers. Here we investigate how atypical hedge funds—funds that differentiate themselves from their competitors by investing in notably unique ways—use names to offset the potential consequences associated with the “illegitimacy discount.” Our analysis of more than 12,000 hedge funds over 12 years highlighted a trend whereby atypical hedge funds were more likely to choose names that unambiguously associated them with a known investment strategy—for instance, choosing the name “Apex Global Macro Capital” over simply “Apex Capital.” Importantly, name selection proved to be economically significant. For example, among atypical hedge funds, those with unambiguous names grew faster than those without. Furthermore, while being atypical increased the level of disinvestment during the recent financial crisis, having an unambiguous name reversed this effect. Organizational names play an important communication role with consumers, which, while highly symbolic, may also help resolve the dual organizational need to both conform to consumer expectations and differentiate from market competitors. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why strategic factor markets matter: “New” multinationals' geographic diversification and firm profitability

This study examines firm profitability differences among “new” multinational enterprises (NMNEs) pursuing geographic diversification into two distinct types of geographic locations based on the development of strategic factor markets. Building on strategic factor markets theory, we propose that firm‐specific advantages of NMNEs contribute differentially to firm profitability because they evolve differently given strategic factor market differences in host compared to home countries. Using a sample of Korean manufacturing MNEs during the 1993–2003 period, we find that geographic diversification into resource‐poorer host countries has a positive relationship with firm profitability, whereas geographic diversification into resource‐richer host countries has a U‐shaped relationship with firm profitability. Our study demonstrates why strategic factor markets—an important and often overlooked contextual factor—matter in exploring rationales for geographic diversification. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic purity: A multi‐industry evaluation of pure vs. hybrid business strategies

Twenty‐five years of empirical research has failed to resolve a basic strategy question. Does strategic purity pay? Most theorists believe strategic purity—the extent to which a business pursues one type of generic strategy over another—contributes to better performance. By defining the strategy space consistent with the theory, and employing improved design and methods, our study of 2,351 businesses finds a significant relationship between strategic purity and performance. Purity does appear to pay. Some variations in strategic purity and performance relationship were observed across four major industry sectors: manufacturing, construction, retail, and business services. But in all instances pure strategies never did less well, and often did better than hybrid strategies. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dragon multinationals: New players in 21st century globalization

This review article starts from the question: how does the global business system appear to a challenger firm, and how have challenger Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) from formerly peripheral areas such as the Asia Pacific established themselves successfully, against the sometimes fierce resistance of incumbents? To answer this question, the review develops an argument concerning the pluralistic character of the process of globalization, as contrasted with the conventional account that sees global processes creating uniformity and convergence. This alternative account is based on a review of the experiences of latecomer and newcomer MNEs, particularly those from the Asia Pacific—such as Acer, Ispat International, Li &; Fung and the Hong Leong Group—that are dubbed “Dragon Multinationals.” I argue that the innovative features that these MNEs share, such as their accelerated internationalization, strategic innovation and organizational innovation, fit particularly well with the characteristics of the emergent global economy as one of complex inter-firm linkages. The core proposition of the review is that this complementarity between the characteristics of the emergent global economy and latecomer and newcomer strategic and organizational innovations is what drives the remarkable success of these Asia Pacific firms in establishing themselves as serious international players. Such a proposition carries implications for the process of globalization as well as for the dominant frameworks utilized in International Business. The review argues that Dragon Multinationals adopt a different perspective to the resources accessed through internationalization, and that this requires a rethink of the criteria normally utilized in resource-based accounts of strategy. The challenger firm internationalizing in order to access resources also poses a challenge to the dominant OLI (ownership, locational, internalization) account of multinational advantage. Thus it is argued that the question posed at the outset goes to the core of the IB frameworks, and thereby counts as one of the ‘big questions’ that should guide research in IB in the 21^st century.     

Value creation through stakeholder synergy

Our “stakeholder synergy” perspective identifies new value creation opportunities that are especially effective strategically because a single strategic action (1) increases different types of value for two or more essential stakeholder groups simultaneously, and (2) does not reduce the value already received by any other essential stakeholder group. This result is obtainable because multiple potential sources of value creation exist for each essential stakeholder group. Actions that meet these criteria increase the size of the value “pie” available for essential stakeholder groups, and thereby serve to attract exceptional stakeholders and obtain their increasing effort and commitment. The stakeholder synergy perspective extends stakeholder theory further into the strategy realm, and offers insights for realizing broader value creation that is more likely to produce sustainable competitive advantage. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

红色战略还是灰色战略——针对我国制度转型中企业战略迷失的实证研究

我国制造业公司目前陷入了战略迷失:在重视市场的红色战略和利用正式制度漏洞来寻租的灰色战略两者之间应该选择哪一个?基于我国的制度转型情境,我们采用战略均衡三角理论,通过我国制造业所有上市公司2000—2010年15620个公司年的数据,研究了近十年制度转型过程中企业战略迷失问题的形成以及作用机制。研究表明,政府不正确的、过度的干预,不仅会影响企业行为的获利回报,而且会导致企业战略行为选择的错位。同时指出,在战略均衡的三角中,制度观视角比产业观、资源观视角更能够解释我国企业的战略行为,且与后两者属于不同维度。本研究加深了人们对我国企业关系型战略、战略与商务模式匹配、政府角色等问题的理解。     

Equity stakes and exit: An experimental approach to decomposing exit delay

Research summary : Exit delay is an important problem for entrepreneurs and managers alike, yet relatively little is known about its causes. We conduct a laboratory experiment in which optimal exit is well defined, and in which a treatment group with equity stakes—the actual cash flows of a firm and decision rights over its continuation—is compared to a control group whose compensation is based solely on its assessment of the firm's profitability. While treatment group participants make exit decisions that are nearly optimal given their beliefs, their beliefs are significantly distorted relative to the control group. The pattern of distortion is consistent with confirmatory bias and motivated reasoning. A fundamental finding of our study is that incentives may not only affect behavior, but belief formation as well. Managerial summary : Managers and entrepreneurs frequently destroy significant value by failing to shut down underperforming businesses in a timely manner. To address this problem, we must understand the mechanisms causing exit delay. We examine behavioral mechanisms causing delay through a laboratory experiment in which subjects make decisions about when to exit a failing venture. We find that “equity stakes”—receiving the firm's cash flows and having decision rights over exit—cause participants to discount negative performance information, retain overly optimistic beliefs, and delay exit. By contrast, participants without these high‐powered incentives exit nearly optimally. Our findings suggest ways to reduce exit delay in managerial settings, including implementing automated decision rules, removing equity‐based compensation, and recruiting managers less susceptible to knowledge overconfidence, a trait associated with exit delay. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.