Managerial ownership and corporate diversification: a longitudinal view

Strategy and finance research suggests that managerial ownership results in increased incentive alignment and therefore is negatively related to corporate diversification. Using a longitudinal approach, we develop arguments to examine whether managerial ownership is associated with subsequent changes in diversification and/or if diversification is associated with subsequent changes in ownership. The results indicate that levels of managerial ownership in one time period are not associated with subsequent changes in corporate diversification, which raises incentive alignment questions. We also find that higher levels of corporate diversification are associated with changes in managerial ownership, which suggests support for the employment risk‐reduction perspective. This study provides important reasons to reassess the longitudinal implications of the managerial ownership‐corporate diversification link from both theoretical and managerial perspectives. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Agency theory and the influence of equity ownership structure on corporate diversification strategies

We articulate the agency theory view of managerial decision making and its implications for corporate diversification strategies. From agency theory, we generate testable predictions for the relation between equity ownership structure and diversification strategies and review the existing evidence on this relation. On balance, the evidence strongly supports the view that ownership structure influences corporate strategy. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of CEO equity ownership and firm diversification on risk taking

This research explores the effects of CEO equity ownership and corporate diversification on firms' risk‐taking and risk avoidance behaviors. Hypotheses regarding these effects are tested through econometric analysis of mergers in the U.S. cable television industry. Risk taking and avoidance are measured as horizontal expansion through acquisitions and as the divestiture of assets, respectively, in the face of increasing environmental turbulence. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top: The case of CEO pay raises

We examine how ownership configuration affects the determination of CEO pay raises. Based on a sample of 188 firms over a 5-year period, it was found that pay raises were based on distinctly different factors, depending on the ownership profile of the firm. In management-controlled firms—where no single major owner exists—results suggest an overarching pay philosophy: maximize CEO pay, subject to demonstration of face legitimacy of that pay. In externally-controlled firms—where a major (nonmanager) owner exists—results suggest a very different philosophy: minimize CEO pay, subject to the ability to attract/retain a satisfactory CEO.     

The relationship between product and international diversification: The role of experience

We establish prior diversification experience as a key determinant of the relationship between growth of product and international diversification. Prior diversification experience allows firms to overcome short‐run constraints on simultaneous diversification growth imposed by the difficulty to transfer tacit knowledge, ambiguous competencies, and limited absorptive capacity. Studying U.S. and European firms, we find a positive relationship between growth in product and international scope for firms with high and a negative one for those with little prior diversification experience. Further, we find that product diversification experience has greater impact than international diversification experience. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm heterogeneity in growth option value: The role of managerial incentives

Growth option value varies widely across firms. This research explores managerial incentives as a source of firm heterogeneity in growth option value. We argue that when the payoff structure of managerial incentives corresponds to that of growth options, managers will be motivated to pursue actions that increase firms' growth option value, particularly when greater growth opportunities are available in an industry. Results indicate that stock option holdings and managerial stock ownership have a positive effect on growth option value, while short‐term pay has a negative effect. We also find support for a positive interaction effect between equity‐based managerial incentives and industry growth opportunities on growth option value. These findings highlight the critical role of managerial incentives in affecting firms' realization of growth option value. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Agency problems as antecedents to unrelated mergers and diversification: Amihud and Lev reconsidered

Amihud and Lev (1981) are widely cited as providing evidence that managers, unless closely monitored by large block shareholders, will attempt to reduce their employment risk through unrelated mergers and diversification. These corporate strategies, however, may not be in shareholders' interests. Reconsidering the agency assumptions underlying Amihud and Lev's study and the methodology they used, we develop hypotheses regarding the association between ownership structure, board vigilance, corporate strategy, and corporate performance from management theory and test them using Amihud and Lev's data from the 1960s and new data from the 1980s. Neither study supports the conclusions of Amihud and Lev, nor the agency theory belief that monitoring efforts by principals affect the strategic behaviors of agents or the performance of firms that they manage. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relationship between product and international diversification: the effects of short‐run constraints and endogeneity

We examine the relationship between growth along the product and international dimension in the short run. We argue that while the presence of fungible intangible resources and economies of scope may create opportunities for a firm to expand along both dimensions, the effect of short‐ run constraints may lead to a trade‐off and a negative association between the two dimensions. In addition, we suggest that rather than being independent, decisions concerning the extent of growth along the two dimensions are likely to be made simultaneously and endogenously by firms after taking into consideration the availability of various resources. We test these propositions by observing a sample of 1,299 firms over the period of 1993–1997. Our results show strong evidence of endogeneity and a negative association between growth along the two dimensions. These findings provide important support for theories of firm growth that have long held that firms are limited in the number of opportunities they can exploit in the short run by various constraints. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Management and ownership effects: evidence from five countries

Despite the growing recognition in the corporate governance literature that the relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is context dependent, this issue has not yet been subjected to direct empirical investigation using a single cross-national sample. This study empirically examines the ownership concentration–performance relationship across the nations of Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Essentially, we argue that the correlation (if any) between ownership concentration and firm profitability differs across countries in a systematic way determined by the national system of corporate governance. Results indicate that important and statistically significant differences do in fact exist across the countries studied. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effect of equity ownership on the survival of international joint ventures

This note extends transaction cost analysis of international joint ventures (IJVs) to include explicitly the effect of equity. It challenges the common practice of treating all foreign investments with between 5 percent and 95 percent equity as IJVs. A fine‐grained analysis of the role of foreign equity ownership on the survival of 12,984 overseas subsidiaries confirms a declining, nonlinear, and asymmetrical relationship between equity and mortality in overseas subsidiaries. While investments involving small ownership levels (<20%) have very high mortality rates, those with high ownership levels (>80%) have mortality rates comparable to that of wholly owned subsidiaries. Implications for research, practice, and policy are discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relative influence of industry and corporation on business segment performance: an alternative estimate

Rumelt’s (1991) widely cited paper presents estimates of the relative influence of industry, corporate, business unit, and other influences on business unit profitability. He finds corporations explain almost none of the variability in business unit profitability. Using a simultaneous equation model, we provide alternative estimates of the influence of industry and corporation on business unit performance. We find that both corporations and industries influence business unit profitability but corporations have the larger influence. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Foreign and domestic ownership,business groups,and firm performance: evidence from a large emerging market

We adopt a multi‐theoretic approach to investigate a previously unexplored phenomenon in extant literature, namely the differential impact of foreign institutional and foreign corporate shareholders on the performance of emerging market firms. We show that the previously documented positive effect of foreign ownership on firm performance is substantially attributable to foreign corporations that have, on average, larger shareholding, higher commitment, and longer‐term involvement. We document the positive influence of corporations vis‐á‐vis financial institutions with respect to domestic shareholdings as well. We also find an interesting dichotomy in the impact of these shareholders depending on the business group affiliation of firms. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Governance,ownership structure,and performance of IPO firms: the impact of different types of private equity investors and institutional environments

This paper examines performance effects of ownership concentration and two types of private equity investors (venture capitalists and business angels) in firms that have recently undergone an initial public offering (IPO) in the United Kingdom and France. We expand and contextualize nascent understanding of multiple agency theory by examining heterogeneity of private equity investors and by suggesting that multiple agency relationships are affected by different institutional contexts. We employ a unique, hand‐collected dataset of 224 matched IPOs (112 in each country). Controlling for the endogeneity of private equity investors' retained share ownership, we find support for the agency theory argument that concentrated ownership improves IPOs' performance. The research also shows that the two types of private equity investors have a differential impact on performance, and the legal institutions in a given country moderate this impact. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The moderating effect of environmental dynamism on the ownership and performance relationship

Agency theory posits a positive relationship between insider ownership and organizational performance. Past empirical studies examining this issue have not firmly established this relationship. The current study postulates and tests the moderating effect of environmental dynamism on the insider ownership and performance nexus. Implications and future research directions are considered. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Determinants of alliance partner choice: Network distance,managerial incentives,and board monitoring

Research Summary: We ask if managerial opportunism is a significant problem in alliance partner choice and examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms in explaining this choice. Using a sample of 313 alliances of U.S. firms from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries from 1992 to 2010, we find that managerial incentives lead to managerial preference for relationally risky distant partners over existing and new close partners. Further, board monitoring encourages managers to pursue existing and distant partners over new close ones, choices aligned with shareholder interests. In addition, we find that board monitoring substitutes for managerial incentives in alliance partner choice. We contribute to the literature on alliance partner choice to identify an important, and hitherto, unexplored perspective. Managerial Summary: This article examines whether managers and shareholders view alliance‐related risks differently, and how the divergent interests between managers and shareholders affect alliance partner choice. We argue that managers’ concern about their loss of employment and compensation from alliance failure impedes the choice of relationally risky alliance partners that may increase shareholder value. We also argue that managerial stock ownership and board monitoring mitigate this managerial propensity. Our findings suggest that stock ownership owned by managers and strong board monitoring are effective governance mechanisms to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Our study offers a novel perspective to understand alliance partner choice by viewing the firm as an entity comprised of fragmented interests.     

The benefits of geographic sales diversification: How exporting facilitates capital investment

Many strategic investments require firms to make upfront outlays to generate profits at a later date. When firms have limited access to external capital, they have to rely on internally generated funds for these investments. In this case, their strategic investments are constrained by cash flow. I predict that by geographically diversifying sales (i.e., exporting), firms can relax this constraint because exporting signals more stable expected cash flows and firm quality, which can increase external capital providers' willingness to fund investments. Examining a representative sample of Spanish manufacturers from 1990 to 1998, I find support that exporting mitigates investment liquidity constraints allowing firms to make strategic investments they would not otherwise be able to make. This highlights how diversification can be a strategy to create and maintain competitive advantage. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contingencies within dynamic managerial capabilities: interdependent effects of resource investment and deployment on firm performance

Dynamic managerial capabilities focus on managers' resource‐related decisions. Asset orchestration, a central component of dynamic managerial capabilities and of resource management, highlights the importance of integrating (matching) resource investment and deployment decisions. Building on these recent theoretical advances, we examine the contingent nature of resource investment and deployment decisions. The results, based on a sample of banking firms, indicate that firm performance suffers when managers' investment decisions deviate from the norms of rivals for both human and physical capital. However, when deployment decisions support investment decisions, greater investment deviation, both high and low, generally enhances performance. Specifically, firm performance is optimized by making congruent resource investment and deployment decisions as opposed to maximizing or economizing either decision independently. Therefore, resource management via asset orchestration is vital for superior performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of leveraged buyouts on corporate growth and diversification in large firms

This study investigates the effects of LBOs on corporate growth and diversification in large U.S. firms which underwent leveraged buyouts during the 1980s. Based on the analysis, this study found that revenue and employee growth are significantly lower in LBO firms than in control firms that remained public. Strategically, we find that LBO firms decreased the size of both their periphery and core businesses more than public control firms and that LBO firms divested a significantly higher volume of periphery and core businesses than control firms. These postbuyout differences between LBO and public firms are consistent with the argument that LBO firms provide managers with incentives to downsize and prune lines of business, resulting in reduction in overall firm size and diversifcation.     

The role of family management and family ownership in diversification: The case of family business groups

This study undertook a panel data analysis of the top 100 family business groups in Taiwan between the years 1988 and 2002 to investigate the role of family management and family ownership structures in diversification using an agency theory approach. The results show that, in the institutional context under study, family management and family ownership play key roles in diversification decisions in family business groups. Specifically, the likelihood of diversification declines as a controlling family assigns more family members to an affiliate firm’s key leadership positions. In contrast, the level of diversification increases as the degree of pyramidal ownership structure increases. The research findings presented in this study (1) clarify the roles that family management and the pyramidal ownership structure play in the diversification decisions of family business groups and (2) provide insights into family business groups’ growth.     

Corporate diversification and the value of individual firms: A Bayesian approach

Research summary: Prior theory suggests that the performance effects of a firm's diversification strategy depend on a firm's individual resources and capabilities and the setting within which it is operating. However, prior tests of this theory have examined the average diversification‐performance relationship across all firms, instead of estimating the diversification‐performance relationship at the individual firm level. Efforts to estimate this average relationship are inconsistent with a central assumption of much of strategic management theory—that firms maximize value by choosing strategies that exploit their heterogeneous resources and individual situation. By adopting an approach that allows an evaluation of the diversification‐performance relationship for individual firms, this article shows that firms, both focused and diversified, tend to choose that diversification strategy—focus, related diversification, or unrelated diversification—that maximizes value. Managerial summary: Instead of a universal diversification discount or premium, this article shows that the effect of diversification on performance is heterogeneously distributed across firms and that firms tend to be rational in their diversification decisions. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.