Central bank cooperation under the interwar gold standard

The limits of cooperation and the failures of leadership are recurrent themes in historical accounts which seek to explain the instability of the interwar gold standard. Yet these themes are wholly incompatible with received models of the gold standard. In an attempt at reconciliation, this paper has presented a simple model of central bank interaction under the interwar gold standard, and used it to interpret Anglo-French financial relations following Britain's return to gold. The model is inspired by Keynes' and Norman's comment that the interwar system can be understood as a competitive struggle for gold. It shows that if two central banks play a noncooperative game in which they both seek to augment their gold reserves, they will tend to raise their discount rates above the level consistent with price stability, depressing incomes at home and abroad. While central bank policy was but one factor at work in the world economy in the 1920s, the model is suggestive when applied to a period marked by historically high discount rates, conflicts over the distribution of gold, and steady deflation culminating in a Great Depression.     

Sectoral shift in antebellum Massachusetts: A reconsideration

But no man, who can have a piece of land of his own, sufficient by his labor to subsist his family in plenty, is poor enough to be a manufacturer, and work for a master. Hence, when there is land enough in America for our people, there can never be manufacturers to any amount of value. Benjamin Franklin, 1760¹